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7President of the Republic of Bulgaria
to the participants in the XXIV session
of the International Varna School in Philosophy
Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,
It is my pleasure to welcome you to this authoritative meeting of phi-
losophers from various countries at the XXIV session of the International 
Varna Summer School in Philosophy. 
The topic you have chosen is of paramount importance to the cur-
rent processes of integration in Europe. Since Bulgaria is due to become 
a member of the Union in the beginning of 2007, debates concerning 
processes of integration have been intensified in our society during the 
recent years. 
So far, it seems that the predominant discussions in the public space 
concern exclusively the technology of integration of our country together 
with the economical, political and administrative issues that accompany 
it. As a matter of fact, the processes of cultural exchange, interaction be-
tween languages, philosophies, identities, historical memory, and values 
are of equal importance to the cause of integration.
During the recent years it has become evident that the latter group 
of processes plays a crucial role in modeling the economical and political 
domains where the main efforts of statesmen and politicians are focused. 
Also, the association of new countries to the Union brings about growing 
diversity of cultures, ethnic groups, religions, and languages, and thereby 
causes salient problems and discrepancies within the framework of inte-
gration. For that matter, intellectuals, philosophers, and the men of spirit 
have to take the burden of searching for answers to questions like: how to 
combine unity with diversity, how to form a common European identity 
and culture, while preserving and developing our national identities and 
cultures?
Two thousand and five hundred years ago, here on the Balkans the 
bases of European civilization, value system and identity grew up. I am 
sure that your discussion will contribute to linking the past, present, and 
8future of the Continent, and will help forming the contemporary basis of 
United Europe through a constant dialog among European people for a 
better future for everyone.
I would like to wish you serious achievements in this dialog. Not 
only as a President of the Republic of Bulgaria dedicated to the cause of 
integrating our country to the European community, but also as a histo-
rian, I know that such a dialog is more valuable and long-lasting than the 
circumstantial political and economical interactions.
I am looking forward to the outcome of this year’s discussions at the 
traditional International Varna Summer School. 
Once again, good luck to the School in its twenty forth edition!
Sofia June the 1st 2006.
Georgi Purvanov
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA
9Stefan Danailov
To the participants and the guests 
of the twenty-fourth International Varna
School of Philosophy
Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,
It is a pleasure and an honour for me to address you during the open-
ing of the Twenty-fourth International Varna School of Philosophy. The 
reason thereof is not just the extremely dignified specialists participating, 
but mostly, the topic you have chosen as a subject of your research efforts 
and creative discussions – Philosophy as a bridge between cultures and 
civilizations: universal, regional and national values in united Europe.
I perceive it as extremely topical and quite important not only from 
a scientific point of view, but also from the point of view of its practical 
application and management significance. It is close to me – as a person, 
whose life- and creative path has been entirely connected with the prob-
lems of the Bulgarian national culture, also as a politician, as a Member 
of Parliament and as a Chairman of the Committee on Culture of the 39th 
National assembly, and not the least now also – as a Minister of Culture, 
directly engaged with finding the good legislative and management ap-
proaches to the problems’ solution.
It is my deep conviction that the cultural traditions’ preservation 
and development is a point of departure when building the value system 
of both the separate individual and the society as a whole. The national 
culture is a creator of values, far exceeding the market’s dimensions. It is 
an active accelerator of the country’s socio-economic development. The 
investments for the development of the culture potential are also invest-
ments for the society’s stabilization and national unification. The national-
ly shared aims in the field of culture, the instruments and actions for their 
achievement are the factors, promoting the society’s consolidation and the 
active involvement of all its members in the processes of own change and 
development, as well as of integration in the community of European peo-
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ples and states. Therefore the government and the ruling majority defined 
the sustainable development in the field of culture as their foremost task, 
and the increase in funds for development, promotion and integration of 
the Bulgarian culture – as one of the most important factors for strength-
ening our national security.
In the contemporary world of intensifying contradictions culture has 
a powerful potential to stabilize communities, to stimulate the processes of 
dialogue and extension of cooperation, and to give a touch of irreversibil-
ity to the integration processes. In the field of culture the differences mean 
first of all enrichment and mutual complementarity, whilst the search for 
European identity is connected with peoples’ return to their common civi-
lization roots and a rethinking of their shared heritage. In that connection 
Jean Monnet’s words sound quite topical today, said a quarter of a century 
after the beginning of the European integration, and namely that if this 
process had to start again from the beginning, then he would have started 
it with culture.
Europe identifies itself mostly and sooner through its culture than 
through its institutions. The separate cultures coexist tolerantly; they com-
pete sometimes in between, but often act in a condition of full accord. This 
harmony in the diversity needs preserving and developing. The interac-
tion between the cultural differences opens opportunities for a creative 
exchange and mutual enrichment. Each nation gives its own contribu-
tion to the European cultural identity formation. Therefore, the European 
cultural policy has to create such integration conditions that can support 
multiformity, and not impose unification. The preservation and the pro-
tection of culture are ethic imperatives, tightly interwoven with keeping 
the dignity of human individuals and with people’s and groups’ desire to 
live together. There are considerable risks and practices of manipulating 
through culture. Today we all have to work against such dangers, and for 
eradicating the threat of cultural exclusion or capsulation.
In Bulgaria we have a rich experience in carrying out initiatives, 
projects and programmes, establishing the role of culture as a factor for 
equal dialogue and tolerance. In the last years we have been witnesses and 
real participants in the processes of intensive development in the field of 
culture. Defining their meaning and outlining the tendencies and those 
characteristics of the phenomena and of the processes in culture that 
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should be supported, or rejected and overcome, is thus a task of primary 
significance. The role of philosophers, esthetes, culturologists and many 
other specialists, involved in the processes of creating, as well as dissemi-
nating and acquiring the values of culture, is undoubtedly enormous and 
responsible. It is in this light that we should view the work of and assess 
the results of the commencing school of philosophy. These are also the 
grounds behind the Ministry of Culture’s support for holding the school, 
as well as behind its readiness to continue its collaboration with the Insti-
tute of Philosophical Research at the Bulgarian Academy of Science, and 
not the least, with all the other institutions and specialists working on the 
culture’s problems, development and preservation.
I wish the twenty-fourth international Varna School of Philosophy 
fruitful work.
Prof. Stefan Danailov
MINISTER OF CULTURE
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I. Constructing  
the European Identity

15
Vassil Prodanov 
THE MULTICULTURAL DILEMMAS  
Of EUROPE
The notion of “multiculturalism” and the respective policy of identity 
were first developed at the turn of the 70s of the XX century in Canada and 
became popular in the context of the big shift in the North America bring-
ing about the so-called “third generation” of rights concerning the group 
rights of the communities in contrast to the first two “generations” which 
are individual. “In the new multicultural environment as opposed to the 
conventional multiethnic situation, the state glorifies differences from the 
way of life associated with the population that once represented a majority. 
It rewards those who personify the desired differences, while taking away 
cultural recognition and even political rights away from those who do not. 
The differences being honored involve not only a wide range of cultural 
exotica, but, perhaps even more importantly, the showcasing of alternative 
lifestyles".1
In some sense the idea of multiculturalism in contrast to the term 
“multiculturalism” is old and deals with the support of various ethnic 
groups and cultures within the same polity. The Soviet Union and Yugo-
slavia were multicultural but they disintegrated. Multicultural was also the 
Austria-Hungarian Empire where Hungarians and Austrians had even 
their own parliaments but it also broke up. The USSR and Yugoslavia 
wanted to create common Soviet and Yugoslav identities, retaining at the 
same time the identities and cultures of the different ethnic and national 
groups. During the last decades however the notion of multiculturalism 
has been connected primarily with the expansion of immigrant commu-
1 Gottfried, Paul Edward. Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt: Toward 
a Secular Theocracy, University of Missouri Press, 2002, P. 14.
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nities in the developed countries and not just with the traditional local 
communities on the territory of a state. Respectively two types of multicul-
turalism – territorial and non-territorial – could be discerned. These two 
types of multiculturalism however are charged with conflicts.
On the European continent with its strong tradition of cultural ho-
mogeneous nations the multiculturalism brings dilemmas that are quite 
risky. I will point out three types of risks.
The first group of risks is connected with the growth of immigrants. As 
a result of the processes of globalization Europe is becoming increasingly 
multicultural, multiethnic, multireligious phenomenon. To help support 
an ageing population and counteract plummeting birth rates, Europe 
needs more immigration. Otherwise over the next 20 years, there will be 
20 million fewer workers in Europe, even including migrants.2 Maintain-
ing the current birth-rate levels until 2050 Europe would need to receive 
an influx of 169 millions of immigrants in order to preserve the current 
ratio between the age groups of 15 and 60 years.3 That could lead to radi-
cal changes of European identity, new ethno-cultural balances, and fast 
islamization of Europe threatening to turn it into an enlarged Kosovo. The 
increase of the number of culturally and religiously different immigrants, 
especially in conditions of economic difficulties harshly magnifies the 
conflict potential of the continent.
The second group of risks is related to the strong national identities in 
Europe and their clash with any common identity. Let’s go over only several 
conflict points:
– A кey element of any common identity till now has been the com-
mon official language as an instrument of communication and shared 
views, but the EU is a region without a common language. That is why its 
institutions are becoming a “Tower of Babel”, the expenditure for transla-
tion from one language into another are on the increase, and the adminis-
trative procedures are getting more and more “language polluted”. 
– The distribution of authority between the institutions of the EU and 
the separate states is connected with persistent tensions. 
2 Вж. Rennie, David. Europe needs a lot more immigrants, says EU chief, 
Telegraph, February 10, 2005.
3 Вж. Бьюкенен, Патрик Дж. Смерть Запада, М., Изд. АСТ, 2003, с. 40.
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– The strong tradition of national state and political particularism in 
Western Europe keep the individual states as separate entities and national 
communities have strong identities. For instance, despite half a century of 
continuous integration process the number of international marriages is 
the same as at the beginning of the XX century.4 
– The war in Iraq in 2003 and the division among the states on that is-
sue demonstrated that as an united political community EU is not mature 
enough to take common political decisions. The increase in the number 
of member countries creates even more opportunities for divergence in 
views, conflicts and the ultimately leads to incapacity to act as an unified 
entity with common political will.
The third group of risks is connected with the trend of disruption of the 
states and the revival of local and ethnic identities inside the member states 
of the EU. There are conflict issues such as: 
– The trend towards regionalization within separate states brings 
about the rise of regional political structures, local cultures and identities. 
John Newhouse notes that most of the Germans today feel as if they are 
living once again as Thuringians or Bavarians or Westphalians first, and 
Germans second. It’s easier to say, “I am a Swabian” or “I am a Saxon” than 
“I am a German,” although some might add, “I am also a European.”5 
– The small – ethno-national communities aspiring to prevent the 
domination of their larger neighbors find out in the opening of the bor-
ders as a result of the processes of globalization and European integration 
opportunities for secession from their states and become separate political 
units.
– With the growth of global emigration streams representatives of dif-
ferent ethnic communities and nations take up their residence on many 
places over the world, but through the use Internet and mobile commu-
nications they retain contact with their native communities and often 
they don’t just maintain their identity in a foreign environment but even 
strengthen it further. So they start to support actively the secession battle 
4 Вж. Желев, А. Истерията на “правилните” демократи, в. Зора, 1999, 
бр. 6, 8 февруари 2000 г.
5 Вж. Newhouse, John. Europe’s Rising Regionalism, Foreign Affairs, Janu-
ary/February 1997, Vol. 76, N 1, pp. 67-84.
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of their ethnic brothers in the native country if they are a specific group 
inside a larger political unit.
With the prevalence of all kinds of ‘ethnic dilemmas’ in Europe and 
North America – the problems of immigration, minorities or ethnic and 
racial conflict – the philosophical question of reconciling cultural or value 
pluralism with political unity has grown in importance and circulation.
In the early 1990s the previous liberal-communitarian controversy 
transformed into a more particular debate about how to accommodate 
cultural and ethnic claims onto a broadly liberal philosophy. The discus-
sion was oriented toward the relationship between liberal Western values 
and non-Western traditions, minorities and immigrants. Although at first 
the two sides of the debate drew lines of opposition between individualist, 
rights-based liberals, and communitarian or identity-based liberals, the 
opposition has increasingly given way to a search for theoretical solutions, 
often versions of civic republicanism. That is, between a liberal position 
that puts the choices and autonomy of the individual as uppermost in any 
theory, and those who argued that a broader communal socialization in 
a historically rooted culture was necessary to enable the preconditions of 
such individualism identified in the pure theory. At a pure philosophical 
level, the debate was simply between two kinds of liberals, arguing about 
the source of reason and autonomy in a modern liberal democratic soci-
ety: a Kantian vs. a Hegelian stance. However, under the influence of im-
ported examples from current politics, the division began to take the form 
of tension between liberal Western values and the defence of non-Western 
traditions, minorities and immigrants.
Special attention was paid to the impact of the various kinds of de-
mands made by minority cultures on the state. These demands have been 
categorized into three broad types.6 
First, there are rights to do with government, including special repre-
sentation rights, devolution and national self-determination. 
Second, there are rights that seek to accommodate a variety of dis-
tinct cultural practices within larger states. These include both exemption 
6 Kymlicka, W. Multicultural Citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995
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rights and cultural rights, which give special assistance to a disadvantaged 
minority, such as affirmative action programs.
Third, there is a category of demands that are not rights claims, but 
pertain to the issue of collective esteem. This becomes a matter for public 
policy when the symbolism of flags, currencies, names, public holidays, 
national anthems, public funds for cultural activities and the content of 
school curricula bear on a minority’s fragile presence in the public politi-
cal culture”.
There are different views concerning the negatives and positives of 
multiculturalism. Several philosophical positions collide:
– anti-essentialist (postmodernist) liberal individualism;
– essentialist monoculturalism;
– essentialist multiculturalism;
– constructivist multiculturalism;
– constructivist monoculturalism
All these positions are based on two opposite visions of multicultural-
ism – essentialist and anti-essentialist. Which are the characteristics and 
the weak points of these visions? 
Cultural essentialism
The notion of cultural essentialism presumes that “each culture has its 
unique, fixed essence that exists independently of the context or the inter-
cultural relations and forces the ethnic group to act in the way in which 
it acts”.7 This essence reveals itself more or less in the behavior of each 
representative of the respective culture. That means that cultural affiliation 
is not right of choice but predetermined essence of all members of a com-
munity and some positive but also and negative traits could be considered 
as given ant typical for each one of them.
Multicultural essentialism means that the individual per se possesses 
some characteristics of his culture as inseparable from his identity. So the 
culture confines the individuals within some boundaries, cutting them off 
from the others, limits their opportunities for change and choice, and in 
many cases impairs their individual rights. Policy based on cultural essen-
7 Modood, Tariq. Introduction, In: Tariq Modood and Pnina Werbner (Eds), 
The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe, London: Zed Press, 1997, p. 10.
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tialism builds borders, and divisions, puts the people in their own cultural 
ghetto separated from the others. The person is “born” in a specific culture 
and is unable to come out of it. This divide is a way towards disintegration 
of states and a factor for conflict relationships between different commu-
nities.
If the cultural identities are fixed entities the matter at hand is whether 
a democratic society should respect cultures whose views on ethnic, reli-
gious and racial superiority are inimical to other cultures. Are we to toler-
ate, respect or celebrate all cultures, all ways of life? What should be done 
if some of them are authoritarian, intolerant and disrespectful regard to 
other views? This is the case with the different kinds of fundamentalism, 
nationalism, racism. And if not, then are we not simply embracing our own 
views of what should and should not be accepted and thus adopting a non-
multicultural stance? This is the key dilemma of cultural essentialism.
Cultural anti-essentialism
Anti-essentialism or constructivism is based on methodological in-
dividualism supporting the idea that the main social reality are the in-
dividuals with their rights and opportunities for choice while collective 
entities such as cultures are something secondary and explicable through 
the individuals who create, choose and change these cultures.
A principal feature of anti-essentialism is the dominance of con-
structivist accounts of ethnic and national identities, with a particular 
emphasis on the plural. Anti-essentialists argue that groups do not have 
a unitary character and that culture needs to be analyzed as an interac-
tive process rather than a fixed set of properties. Deriving from that are 
also the views that ethnic or cultural identities are not pure or static but 
change in new circumstances or by sharing social space with other herit-
ages and influences. If there are no pure identities then the groups are not 
homogeneous.
Anti-essentialism emphasizing on the absolute right of the individ-
ual to choose his cultural products and identity suffers from an extreme 
market perception of the phenomenon culture. In the long run it entitles 
the individual to choose its identity and culture as any other product on 
the market. The problem however is what are the criteria applied to this 
choice. These criteria could not be explained by methodological individu-
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alism. They are determined by the preliminary cultural attitudes and so-
cial development of the individual.
Anti-essentialist multiculturalism neglects the common traits which 
could unite the separate cultures in a national state. If there is no common 
national identity but many equal in rights and no one of them with prior-
ity over the others, then there is no ground for integration of people in a 
political community.
Multicultural anti-essentialism does not explain convincingly enough 
the coherence and lifespan of some cultures, mentality, values and the way 
they manage to maintain their continuity for a long period of time.
for a mitigated or a weak multiculturalism  
vs. radical or strong multiculturalism
I will plea for a weak form of multiculturalism going beyond the ex-
tremes of the multicultural essentialism and multicultural constructivism 
(ant-essentialism, postmodernism). The main things to point out here are 
as follows:
1. A possible outcome of the dilemma value essentialism vs. value 
anti-essentialism (constructivism) is value progressism. What does that 
mean? The values are neither equal nor unchangeable. They undergo de-
velopment, some of them are more general and universal, result of the 
human progress but nevertheless even they are historically and contex-
tually anchored. For instance the absolute value of human life and the 
abolishment of the death penalty emerge as notions at a high level of hu-
man progress but are impossible at the earlier stages of historic develop-
ment. Beyond their context in other historical circumstances they could 
be harmful and bring about devastating effect on the communities. The 
attempt to impose these values by force means a de facto value imperial-
ism. The example with Iraq where the value of democracy was imposed 
by force is a salient example. The result was devastating, bearing in mind 
that more than 100 000 people – most of them innocent – have been killed 
over the course of the last three years.
2. Each individual has the right to choose his cultural identity. The 
level of individualization of the person in the postmodern societies and 
the high dynamics of the social processes they are a part of bring up the 
issue about the right of choice of the individual including also the choice 
of cultural affiliation and identity.
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3. The outcome of the dilemma liberal multiculturalist anti-essential-
ism vs. cultural essentialism is the cultural historicism. The cultures are 
historically and contextually changing phenomenon and not unchange-
able substances. Accordingly, the identity is not some incoherent melt-
ing pot of unchanging cultural traits that can simply be examined and 
enumerated in order to determine differences between groups. Rather, 
ethnic, religious, cultural groups are situationally defined in relation to 
their social interactions with other groups, and the boundaries established 
and maintained between them as a result of these interactions. The origin, 
content, and form of cultural identity are all open to negotiation, reflect-
ing the creative choices of individuals and groups in the process of self-
determination. Mobilizing particular identities will also depend, to a large 
extent, on the audience being addressed. The various individual identities 
may overlap with, or cross-cut other social identities. For example, one 
may be a man, an Orthodox Christian, a Bulgarian, a philosopher, teach-
er, a representative of middle class, all at the same time. We also need to 
keep in mind that ethnic, linguistic, class, religious and gender groups are 
themselves not solidary groups but have their own broad-based internal 
divisions.
4. The maintenance of stability and integrity of a state, the prevention 
of situations of disintegration and “clash of civilizations” becomes much 
more probable if there are no coincidences of different points of division 
or inequalities – religious, racial, cultural, economic, political, etc.
5. The steady existence of political communities and above all the 
state is impossible without a common identity and culture, a set of values, 
norms, rituals accepted by its citizens as their own. Just because there are 
no static and constant identities and cultures but a wide variety of different 
levels of cultural affiliation, it should be taken into consideration that the 
integrated political communities are possible if they have common value 
fundamentals, connected with common identity despite their cultural di-
versity.
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Magdalini Rumanea
THE CONTRIBUTION Of „THE CITIZEN  
Of EUROPE” AS A CENTRAL ASSISTING 
fACTOR IN THE PROCESS Of UNIfICATION
It is an extremely interesting, and altogether curious fact, that the at-
tempts for building theoretical standards and bringing closer the view-
points for interpretation of the phenomenon of regional integration have 
completely ignored the main “hypotheses” – for the dynamics of forma-
tion of “the political individuality”, of the political unity, or of the political 
system. More specifically, in the case of the European Community and the 
European Union, the manner of ignoring these issues has been particularly 
striking, since the Union aims to undertake – by means of a new political 
system – new possibilities for government and for exercise of autonomous 
powers and strength. The process of building of a new political system 
– such as the European Union – from political systems, which existed be-
fore, and which shall be turned into sub-systems or elements of the new 
political system, poses a direct reference to “the political hypotheses” for 
the formation of “the City”, as formulated by Aristotle in his “Politics”.1
Aristotle undertook analysis and interpretation of the phenomenon 
of the “City” by means of a comparative empirical approach based on the 
study of 158 different methods of government of his own time; this fact, 
mentioned by R. Macridis, turns Aristotle into “the first researcher of com-
parative politics, and also of the system approach”. In order to understand 
the Aristotelian approach, it is extremely important to determine the ex-
act content of “the City”. The notion “City” with Aristotle should not be 
1 Sir Ernest Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 
1968, and Aristotle, Politics, translated with an introduction by T. A. Sinclair, 
London, Penguin Books, 1969.
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mixed with the modern use of the term “city” as a place of residence; in the 
Aristotelian times this meaning was conveyed with the term “αστυ”. The 
term “City”, as used by Aristotle, relates to a “politically formed society” 
in general, or to a political unity, and is very close to the modern terms of 
“political system”, “political organization” or “political unity”.
The starting point in Aristotle’s approach, which presents a basic ele-
ment of the integration theory, is Aristotle’s view of the City as an inte-
grated political unity, as a result (product) of a process of evolution. Such 
process begins with the simplest forms of unity (organizations) and con-
nections, and later develops into more complex forms, to end up with the 
creation of the City. Such unities are created to satisfy the natural desires 
and needs of the people; this is because the separate individuals cannot 
satisfy such desires alone. In this sense, the choice of the City presents a 
natural state – the political phenomenon emerges in order to satisfy higher 
and more complex needs and desires.
The appreciation of the City as the product of a process of evolu-
tion justifies the thesis for the possibility to interpret the Aristotelian ap-
proach as a general integration theory. Furthermore, some common el-
ements between the Aristotelian evolutional approach and the modern 
neo-functional approach cannot be else but evident. The modern attitude 
for the European Community – as a new form of political unity – is that 
it presents exactly the product of a process of evolution – it is formed of 
separate communities, its member-states.
In its essentials, the European Community may be seen as the Aristo-
telian City. Both the European Community and the City present the final 
products of an evolutionary development. It is not possible for anyone to 
miss the fact that, in the same way as the City for Aristotle is the final and 
perfect form of political unity, the European Community in the process of 
European integration is also described as the final form of political unity2.
The European Community is a product of the phenomenon of “inte-
gration”; integration is defined as “to combine parts into a whole”3. Thus 
2 European Union, Report by Mr. Leo Tindemans to the European Council, 
Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 476.
3 A.S.Hornby, Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English, 
London, Oxford University Press, 1974, p.451.
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the European Community presents a “compound reality”. The City also 
presents a compound reality – both with respect to its origin, and to its 
creation – since it consists of many parts. According to an important for-
mulation contained in “Politics”, the City is “a compound”; it belongs to 
the compound states, which need to be analyzed in their separate com-
pounding elements. The preservation of its compound character presents 
an absolutely necessary element for the existence and preservation of the 
City. In other words, differentiation and clash are the prerequisites for the 
existence of the City as a political unity. In case the community passes 
beyond a given border, the City ceases to be a City. In one of his outstand-
ing excerpts, where Aristotle is critical of the political theories of Plato, he 
wrote: “it is obvious that the community is to some extent necessary for 
both the family and for the City. However, not an absolute community. 
There is a point where, if the community continues to grow, the City will 
cease to be a City. There is still another point, where the City may continue 
its existence; however, it would have lost all of its essential features, conse-
quently, it will be a very bad City. It will be as if someone is trying to turn 
harmony into a monotonous sound...”
In still another formulation of his, Aristotle once more confirms that 
the City, being the final form of political community, cannot but have plu-
ralistic character. In case the ever deeper integration of the community 
eliminates the pluralistic character of the City, this will mean destroying 
of the City itself. A real community – like the one of the City – should be 
formed by elements, which are diverse in their type. According to Aristo-
tle, the chase of ever deeper integration of the community (the thesis of 
Plato) may bring to destroying the City – i.e. to the elimination of its po-
litical element. As noted by E. Barker, according to Aristotle, “a city is not 
one in the identity of exactly similar members; it is one in the co-operation 
of dissimilar units”.
The above positions, which have been presented more analytically 
in Chapter Two of the Second Book of “Politics”, present a hypotheses 
of a theory for political unity, containing a particularly important ele-
ment – the stress on the dangers, to which the deepening of the unity 
may lead, if surpassing a given border. It is obvious that in the above-
mentioned Aristotelian analysis exist both the main principle of modern 
federalism, which is concentrated in the formulation “unity in diversity”, 
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and the content of the principle of subsidiarity, which strives to divert 
the hyper-concentration in the institutional expression of the European 
Community4. Further, according to the interpretation of the Aristotelian 
thinking undertaken by E. barker, the City does not present a simple 
“compound” or “a whole”, where the existence of its separate different 
parts vanishes. It is just the opposite, “the City presents a unity of ele-
ments, which continue their existence as parts of the new whole they 
have formed”. Such description conveys, with a surprising precision, the 
essentials of our contemporary process of integration of the European 
Community.
We have stressed on the primary importance, which the Aristotelian 
analysis gives to the pluralistic character of the City (of the political com-
munity). As noted by B. Krieck, according to Aristotle, the essentials of 
politics presuppose differentiation, a dialectical counter-standing. The 
unity of the City should not surpass a given border, since the very mean-
ing of the City will be rejected beyond such border.
The pluralistic formation of the political community and the achieve-
ment of equilibrium between “communion” and “differentiating”, present 
one of the main problems in the building of the European Community. 
As we have already seen, the achievement of such equilibrium (through 
securing unity and differentiation at the same time) is of interest for Aris-
totle, who approaches this topic from different points of view – such as, for 
example, the manner of formation of the constitutional order (of a form 
of government), the formation of an ideal political system, or even of the 
factors and dynamics leading to the destroying, change, or revolution in 
the different forms of government.
Conclusively, we have to accept that the Aristotelian analysis has sig-
nificantly contributed to the theory of integration – with the central im-
portance he yields, and the research he makes on “the integrative capabili-
ties and role” of the Citizen.
According to Aristotle, the City belongs to the category of “com-
pounds”, since it consists of different parts. More specifically, the City is 
formed by the Citizens, and the concept of the City also requires under-
4 K. Neanheither, “Euphoria about Subsidiarity?”, Newsletter of the IPSA Re-
search Committee on European Unification.
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standing of the quality and role of the Citizen.5 Aristotle inevitably sought 
the definition of the Citizen -on the basis of what could have been judged 
from his own time – and reached to a functional definition of particular 
importance, namely that “the Citizen is the one to take part in the process 
of rendering justice and government”. Such definition, which can only be 
considered justified for a democratic system, however, relates closely to 
the meaning of “the political phenomenon”. The City cannot be grasped 
without its citizens being identified with the City. The City, Aristotle un-
derlines, is formed by a sufficient number of citizens, so that they could 
achieve “securing their lives”.
Of course, in modern representative democracy the meaning of the 
Citizen has significantly changed.
However, the stress on the functions with participating content – as 
conditions, which predetermine the quality of the “Citizen” – has great 
importance for the understanding of the dynamics of formation of mod-
ern political systems on regulation bases – such as the European Com-
munity. As we have already designated, the central stress on the role of the 
Citizen for the existence of a political system has consequences on the size 
of the system (the City). Only in case the size allows the participation of 
the Citizens and their identification with the political process, shall it be 
possible for the City (for the political system/for the community/for the 
organization) to exist. Of course, it is self-understood that normally “the 
size” shall be viewed as a function from the resources and the capabilities 
of the communication systems of each epoch”.
Aristotle found the unification role of the Citizen in the fact that the 
character of the Citizen presents a factor pre-determining the type and 
form of government, or of the Constitution (according to the analysis of 
Sir D. Ross6, with Aristotle “each form of social order is formed and pre-
served through the specific character of the Citizens, and presents the mis-
sion of the City as pushing forward the character of the Citizen – by means 
of education”. In other words, all forms of government correspond to the 
different character of the Citizens. 
5 Aristotle, The Political, 1274b, 1275a, p.234, 236-239.
6 D. Ross, Aristotle, London, Methuen and Co., 1964.
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The Extraordinary European Council, which took place in Birming-
ham on October 16, 1992, tried to outline the meaning of „the Citizen of 
Europe” in the process of unification, and the more efficient „binding” 
of the Community with the role of the Citizen; this attempt followed the 
French Referendum, which ratified the Maastricht Treaty with an ultimate 
majority. The above-mentioned Council approved a special Declaration 
named “A Community Close To Its Citizens”. Said declaration presents 
the most accomplished attempt made by the member-states with the pur-
pose of forming a package of principles for determination of the dialec-
tical relationship between the European Community and the European 
Citizen, and for enhancement of the role of the European citizen in the 
process of unification. This attempt has been correctly interpreted as a step 
towards the „de-bureaucratization” and „de-elitezation” of the process of 
unification. After stating in its Forward that, „as a community of demo-
cratic states, we can only progress with the subsidiarity of our citizens...”, 
the Birmingham Declaration notes that the Community must “consider” 
the concerns of the citizens of Europe – as expressed during the respec-
tive discussions on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, as well as that 
„decisions should be taken as closely as possible to the Citizen of Europe”. 
As principle means for achieving of the above goals, the Birmingham 
Declaration designates the following: the use and development of the sub-
sidiarity principle – for democratization of the process of unification in 
decision-taking and for the formation of a policy of increased transpar-
ency. Consequently, „the search” for the European citizen – as an assisting 
factor, as the final beneficiary, and the legalizing factor of unification – has 
started with procedural regulations, and basically through the use of the 
subsidiarity principle.
The meaning of subsidiarity, which, as we have already noted, is con-
tained in Aristotle’s theory of the City, appeared – in its contemporary 
formulation – in the decade of the thirties of the previous century, that is, 
in a period of strong social and political instability, with the main purpose 
of enhancing the role of the individual, as „a capable and responsible as-
sisting factor” in the organization of society7. In other words, the meaning 
7 Subsidiarity: The Challenge of Change, Maastricht, European Institute of 
Public Administration, 1991.
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of subsidiarity came to underline the meaning of the individual and its 
functions as a main unit within the frame of the social organization – a 
unit, which the state (the Government) has to respect.
More particularly, the content of subsidiarity was formulated by Pope 
Pius ХІ. He described the main leading principles in the organization of 
society, while almost exclusively stressing on the role, the meaning, and 
the mission of the individual. The central idea of his formulation was that 
„it is unfair, a big evil, and an anomaly in the harmonious order of things, 
if larger and more significant unities assume functions, which could oth-
erwise be efficiently performed by smaller unities”.
The underlying dimension of subsidiarity as a principle of the Ro-
man-Catholic philosophy for social organization was the fixing of a bor-
der in the relation between the individual and the state, while stressing on 
the limitations of the activity of the state, and on the meaningful moral 
purity of the individual – for the performance of a number of functions. 
As M. Wilke and H. Wallace have marked: „the subsidiarity principle ex-
presses the bi-lateral relationship between the society and the individual. 
Society is absolutely necessary for the development of the individual and 
his/her values and talents. Society needs the individual but the individual 
also needs society...”8
It is obvious from this point of view, that the analysis of Aristotle on 
the formation of the state and on the role of the Citizen contains – as a 
main philosophic notion – the subsidiarity principle (with the content 
added therein by the Roman-Catholic Church. This same content corre-
sponds with the meaning of subsidiarity in the works of Th. Acquinas, 
Roudhon and Al. Tocqueville, as the main citizens’ virtue with respect to 
the social and state organization, which aims to secure the role of the in-
dividual (and, to a lesser extent, the constitutional order); it has, as its sup-
plement, the solidarity principle.
The meaning of subsidiarity at the citizen-institutional level has been 
largely related to the Federal Government System, and the role of the fed-
eral states and regions. The main law (the Constitution)9 of the Federal 
Republic of Germany contains the subsidiarity principle – though the 
8 M.Wilke – H.Wallace, Subsidiarity…… p.12.
9 S.E.Finer. Fire Constitutions. London Penguin Books, 1979, p. 197-266. 
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exact term is not expressly used. Furthermore, Neo-liberalism, as well as 
the Roman-Catholic social dogmas, which contribute to the formation of 
the social structures and morals in Germany, have been influenced by the 
meaning of subsidiarity. It is important that the essence of these dogmas 
contains the principles of solidarity, social justice, and mercy.
The Federal Constitution of the USA also contains a hint about the 
subsidiarity principle, especially in its Tenth Amendment, which provides 
that „... the authorities, which have not been assigned by the Constitu-
tion of the United States, neither have been expressly taken away from the 
States, shall belong to the States or to the People”.
In addition, the meaning of the subsidiarity principle has been un-
derlined by a significant number of studies of the forms of federal and 
de-centralized government.
Within the European Community, the notion of „subsidiarity” first 
appeared in 1975, in a text, which the Commission processed as recom-
mendation for the elaboration of the “Tindemans’ Report”10 for the Eu-
ropean Community. This is a bit different from what President Delhors 
claims, namely that article 3 and article 4 of the Treaty for the EC, as well 
as „the Directive” as a legal act, which only binds its aimed result, also 
contain the notion of “subsidiarity”.
The demand of the Citizens for support and overall diffusion of the 
subsidiarity principle was manifested particularly clearly in 1990, when 
the process started for enhancement of civil community. According to 
M.Wilke and H. Wallace, the interest for the subsidiarity principle is due 
to a number of reasons, amongst which:
А) the fears of the German länder concerning the possible reduction 
of their powers and constitutional role, because of the transfer of most 
prevailing authorities to the European Community.
B) the largely shared opinion that the Community is too much over-
loaded with powers, and, consequently, that a border and a barrier would 
have to be put to the expansion of the authorities of the Community, and 
to „the intervention” of the legislation of the European Community in 
daily social functions. Such opinion is equal with the more general civil 
philosophy for restricting the general role of the state, as already expressed 
– before all, by the British Prime-minister M. Thatcher (1979-1990).
10 European Union, Report by Mr. Leo Tindemans to the European Council.
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C) the wish to secure the rights and the role of the national state relat-
ed to the collective exercise of rights on part of the European institutions.
The demand for the subsidiarity principle to be included in the new 
Treaty for the European Community – the negotiations for which started 
in 1990 by summoning of a special inter-governmental conference – was 
basically supported by Germany, France, Great Britain, the European Par-
liament, and the European Commission. The President of the Commis-
sion Jacque Delhors „sees” subsidiarity also as a principle in the federal 
formation of the Community, with the purpose of securing the role of the 
authorities and rights of both the national states and the European citi-
zens, i.e. in the logics of the Roman-Catholic philosophy11. The European 
Parliament supports the decreed declaration of the principle, as part of the 
Federal organization of the European Union, „which helps the restriction 
of the procedure of exercising authorities in the central bodies, the bod-
ies of the European community, on the one hand, and on the other hand 
– in the Central government or regional units”. The meaning of the sub-
sidiarity principle (with the purpose of securing the regulation role of the 
länder) has been most acutely stressed by Germany. The institutions and 
the above-mentioned countries support “decreed subsidiarity” as a regula-
tion of the federal organization of the European Union, as well as means 
for the protection of the role, rights, and authorities of smaller citizens’ 
units, and of the rights of European citizen.
Vice versa, Great Britain and (to a lesser extent) Portugal support the 
decreed establishment of the subsidiarity principle, however, within their 
estimate that this principle could possibly act also as „means for deviation” 
from the federal development of the Community. 
After overcoming significant problems during the negotiations 
(problems arisen because of these two different points of view), the mem-
ber-states of the Community agreed on the inclusion of the subsidiarity 
principle in the Treaty for the European Union (Article 3B). This text was 
finally approved by the European Council in Edinburgh, and after under-
going some changes, in the Month of October, 1993, turned into a basis for 
reaching of understanding between the institutions (the Parliament, the 
Commission, and the Council) for applying the subsidiarity principle.
11 J. Delhors, “Le Principe de Subsidiarite”. 
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In its Forward, the above-mentioned text underlines that the subsidi-
arity principle provides for „the taking of decisions as close to the European 
citizens, as possible”. It is yet immediately acknowledged, that the formula-
tion of article 3B of the Maastricht Treaty contains „rules” and „principles”, 
which „go beyond the frame” of the meaning and content of subsidiarity.
As can be felt from the above analysis, „the answer” of the Euro-
pean community and of the member-states concerning the estimate of 
the legalization of the process of unification was actually focused in 
work of procedural nature, and in the content of regulations – appli-
cation of the subsidiarity principle and enhanced transparency in the 
functioning of the institutions and in the procedures for formation of 
the policies.
It is obvious that such an approach can neither bring to legalization 
of the process of unification nor to the purpose of the European Com-
munity. From the view point of one of Aristotle’s opinions, an approach 
is found answering the dispute and the „challenge to legalization”, which 
approach shall lead to the establishment of the notion for the European 
citizenship – by means of acknowledgement and strives of teleological 
nature.
The European Community has failed to form the notion of European 
citizenship as main legalizing factor in the process of unification. As noted 
by Soledad Garcia „ ...the notion of citizenship in the modern world is 
formed by legal, economic, political, and social practices, which determine 
social participation, and which cover social contrasts. In this sense the 
quality of a „citizen” also presents a method for social integration, which 
gives equal rights to individuals of different genders, age, convictions, or 
colour. From this point of view, the notion of „citizen” contributes for the 
legalization of the modern state. It has also turned into an element of the 
legalization of the New Europe...”.
The notion of European citizenship, as a legalizing base for the build-
ing of the European Community, and as an element of the legalization of 
the unification process (in a broader sense), makes a reference to two basic 
integrities in the formation of the Community:
А) the notion of „European identity”
B) the content of the „political outputs” in the system of the Com-
munity.
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А. The European Identity
The notion of European cultural identity as a formation assisting fac-
tor of the notion of European citizenship (with its psychological, symbolic, 
and political dimensions) has not – as a system – been dealt with by the 
theory and practice of European unification. It was only recently, and fol-
lowing many disputes, tensions, and difficulties manifested within the rat-
ification of the Treaty for the European Community, as well as following 
the nationalistic clashes in Eastern Europe, that attempts have started for 
reaching an analytical approach to the notion of European identity, as a 
formation assisting factor of the notion of European Citizenship. Certain-
ly, the theoretical approach of K. Deutsch with respect to communication 
has its contribution for the understanding of this phenomenon (however, 
only within a limited scope).
Cultural identity, together with the historical collective memory, ex-
perience, and symbols, determine collective consciousness and common 
destiny – the common ends. From this point of view, cultural identity de-
termines the psychological basis for fixing the notion of „citizenship”. The 
notion of „citizenship” occurs in the political and social aspect (and not 
simply in the legal or constitutional aspect), only if it is rooted in the cul-
tural identity.
The Maastricht Treaty for the European Community was the first to 
decree, as a legal provision, the notion of European Citizenship, National-
ity). Article 8 of the Treaty provides that „Nationality of the Community 
is decreed. Citizen of the Community shall be each person, who is a Na-
tional of a member-state”. Alongside with this, and as a consequence of the 
legalization of the Nationality of the Community, the Treaty provides for 
a number of legal rights. Thus, the Treaty acknowledges the opportunity 
for each European citizen to avail of double citizenship. This is a situation, 
which is in harmony with the concept for participation of each individual 
in multiple cultural systems, and with the acceptance by each individual of 
multiple cultural identities.
The question, however, is whether the notion for the European Citi-
zenship (European Nationality) is rooted, and legalized in the European 
collective cultural identity?
Any confirmative answer to this question naturally presupposes the 
existence of European cultural identity – as a sum of values, common 
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myths, memory, historical traditions, and symbols. As it is generally ac-
knowledged, the legal effect and validity in time of the national state and 
of the notion of “nationality” are the elements, which (to a very significant 
extent) predetermine the cultural identity and morphology, but also the 
rivalries in the European space. National identity comes to offer concrete 
advantages related to „the idea of common European identity”. From this 
point of view „Europe appears insufficient both as an idea and process”. 
Consequently, the determination of the European identity shall have 
to be made within a framework limited by the trends of globalization, on 
the one hand, and on the other hand – by the trends of national revival 
and exaltation. Between the above two (clearly contradicting) trends, shall 
have to be determined the elements, which form, or which could form and 
outline the European cultural identity, as a collective memory12.
B. “Policy Outputs”
In case according to the analysis of Aristotle the justification base for 
the existence of a given political unit (political system) is based on „the 
ends” it seeks, and in case such „ends” essentially present „good life”, i.e. 
„welfare” in the broader scope of the term, which also contains the idea of 
security, then it becomes easier to understand why the process of unifica-
tion is legally challenged. As we have already designated, the process of 
unification failed to identify its content for the purposes of „welfare”, and 
to depict such purposes as finally achieved (also on the basis of acceptance 
of such legalization by the European Citizens). Just the opposite, in some 
particular cases, and for specific periods of time, the process of unification 
and the institutions of the European Community have been considered 
as a hindrance for the progress of „the welfare politics” or even as factors, 
which have become the reason for unemployment and social tensions. 
Thus, for example, according to the Commissioner competent for Social 
Policy, P. Flynn, „there are too many people, to whom the Community is a 
factor assisting for the problem with unemployment, rather than a factor 
assisting for its solution...”
12 A.D. Smith, “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity”, Interna-
tional Affaires, Art.68, 1992.
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Borislav Gradinarov
NATIONAL POPULISM BETWEEN  
THE GLOBALISATION AND ISOLATION
Subject of this report is the nature and role of the national populism 
as a social and political phenomenon in the CEE countries. 
In many states that changed their social, economic and political mod-
el of development in the end of the 1990s, movements that represent a 
peculiar symbiosis between nationalistic ideas and populist speaking are 
gradually gathering might and powers – which, apparently, is the only al-
ternative to the political status quo. 
Is this symbiosis harmless or is it an explosive agent that may entail 
unpredictable and fatal consequences both in the countries and regions 
where it is advancing?
The populism is a philosophical theory and political behavior, whose 
general idea is that the interests of the “ordinary people” and, in general, 
the “common folk” have been neglected, oppressed and unrealized by the 
existing political elite who is looking only after their own interests. Ac-
cording to those people “new faces” should take the ruling, to serve the 
nation, the downtrodden, common people’s interests or the interests of the 
state as a whole, and not their own.
During the last few years populist natured social movements and 
leaders tend to be in the ascendant. 
In many European countries as well as in the rest of the world, popu-
list political parties win votes and more and more populist leaders gather 
popularity, enter parliaments and some of them even get into the govern-
ments. In this respect, typical movements and parties are those of Jean-
Mari Le Pen in France, Carl Hagen in Norway, Jerry Brown, George Wal-
las, Pat Bukanon, Howard Dean, Jesse Jackson, Ross Perot, Ralph Nader 
in USA, Silvio Berluskoni, Umberto Bossi and Alexandra Mussolini in 
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Italy, Jörg Heider in Austria, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Pim Fortuyn in 
the Netherlands, Preston Manning, Mike Harris and Ralf Kline in Canada, 
Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, Leh Kachin-
ski and Andrzej Lepper in Poland. 
Obviously the outlined trend manifests all over Europe and in many 
other countries in the world, but it is especially peculiar to Central and 
Eastern Europe.
To take Poland for example – the conservative and populist party “ 
Right and Justice ” that won the elections in the autumn of 2005, signed a 
coalition agreement with another populist party – the Euroskeptic “Self-de-
fense” in the end of April. The two of them as well as their allied parties from 
other countries, draw ideas and lexis from the confrontation and the hatred 
of the elites, the ideas of economic and cultural egalitarism, anticapitalism 
and xenophobia. And the highlights are the moralistic confrontation to the 
“corrupted elite”, the noisy anticorruption rhetoric against the “old, exhaust-
ed” politicians and also the attempts for promotion of “new, pure” people.
And this leads to a total disintegration of the existing political systems 
and appearance of charismatic semi-authoritarian leaders at a number of 
places. 
Such a process developed in Bulgaria in 2001 when Simeon Saxe – 
Coburg-Gotha created a party just for 3 months and provoked a political 
tsunami, which helped him win the elections and attract electorate from 
all social, educational, income and age groups. The trend revived also on 
the following 2005 elections when a similar formation, called “Attack”, ap-
peared and its supporters are still constantly increasing.
In a similar way the charismatic former policeman and security 
guard – Mr Boyko Borisov, won the elections in Sofia without having rela-
tions with any political party. This is a global phenomenon therefore we 
cannot expect that Bulgaria’s EU accession will make it disappear.
The second element of this phenomenon is the nationalism in its two 
shapes. 
The first of them is the excluding nationalism. It is understood as an 
ideology that emphasizes the idea that all those people, who ethnically 
belong to a given community, have common history, traditions, culture 
and language, should be united in one state on a united territory. When 
such a state is missing, it promotes the expansion as an instrument for 
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unity achievement. And when the given ethnical community exists in the 
frames of a bigger state, shared with other communities then this pro-
motes separatist trends. 
There is one softer version of the nationalism and we can call it civic 
nationalism. It presupposes loyalty and readiness to do the undertaken 
duties to a given geopolitical community, in front of which all people are 
equally treated as citizens despite the ethnical and cultural differences. 
However, this presupposes also the creation of a mutual spiritual space, 
language, culture and rules that are applicable to all members of the nation 
as well as their equal treatment.
Unlike the excluding nationalism, the civic one includes all citizens of 
a state, but due to that it is also quite more assimilating because, usually, 
it requires acceptance of the relevant language, culture, history as one’s 
own. In countries like USA, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Germany and 
France the obtaining of citizenship requires not only handling the relevant 
language but also knowledge of the culture, history, customs etc. 
In the environment of globalization the world is divided into two – 
between the civic and ethnical nationalism. On the one side, the ethni-
cal self-determination and ethnical nationalism make headway in a lot 
of countries in the world. This leads to the disintegration of united civil 
nations and differentiation of ethnical territories in separate nations. The 
same happened to the former Soviet Union, when it was trying to build up 
a united civil Soviet nation composed of ethnically heterogeneous popula-
tion. The same happened to Yugoslavia.
Most probably this tendency will also extend to the solving of Kos-
ovo problem in the frame of Serbia after the separation of Montenegro. 
One and the same processes was repeating again and again during the 
time of dissolution of all the Federations of the Eastern block – the USSR, 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, as well as ethnical conflicts and wars that 
deployed over some of their territories. However, this trend affects to a 
different extend the old EU member – states where there is an upsurge 
of ethnical autonomy movements coming, for example, from the Basque 
and Catalonian provinces of Spain as well as northern Italy and northern 
Ireland. 
Which are the reasons for this symbiosis between nationalism and 
populism and what will lead this to? 
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Of course, as in all similar phenomena the reasons are quite complex. 
As Ralf Darendorf (Darendorf, 1993) notes, the first group of 
reasons is in the fact that declassed elements have existed and still ex-
ist in all of the societies and under stress of circumstances or by their 
own choice appear to be outside of the political, economic and social 
life. Very often they struggle for existence, live without any significant 
goals and sense of affiliation to a group or nation. Sometimes these el-
ements create ghettoes and live in awful conditions, other times they 
are constantly moving. These are the roamers, bums, permanent un-
employed people and petty criminals who have been spurned by the 
society and have neither intellectual nor physical chances to become 
an integral part of it.
In cases of abrupt collapse of the social systems, for example in 
post war periods, economic crises, total change of the well known way 
of life etc., as it happened in the former Eastern block countries, the 
number of these declassed elements drastically increases. And try-
ing to make public their negative attitude towards the circumstances, 
which have made them touch the bottom, they easily fall a prey to 
populist movements and leaders.
The second group of reasons is related to the weak points and 
malformations of the political democracy. 
In regime of democracy it is possible also that big groups of peo-
ple do not manage to become representatives of the governing state 
bodies and institutions fall into disrepute, especially when a society 
does not dispose of a strong civic corrective. For example, at the mo-
ment the symptoms of such a situation exist in Bulgaria. This leads to 
strengthening the process of rejection of the political status quo and 
to incessant punitive votes that actuate the political pendulum. 
One more group of reasons exists, too. It is related to the proc-
ess of globalization and the state’s impossibility to perform its social 
functions as in the past. The globalization erodes the national state’s 
key institutions like those of the social state and pension insurance 
systems, the social support and public services’ policy, the trade un-
ions organized power, states expenditures etc. 
As U. Beck notes, when leaving the national states the transna-
tional companies withdraw their loyalty to the national main play-
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ers, too. And even the most developed social states are not protected 
from the danger to fall into a precarious vacuum: they have to spread 
their legally regulated acquisitions over more and more people but 
in time when they increasingly loose control over the taxes (U. Beck, 
2002,21).
Of course, there are other circumstances like political elites’ fall-
ing in disrepute, geopolitical embroilments as a result of the inter-
section of strong international interests, global financial and petrol 
crises. But the common denominator is the forming of a conjuncture, 
in which the national populism turns out to be in a favorable social 
and political environment. 
What will result this in?
According to J. Lukach (Lukach, 2005; 184) the nationalism 
“replaces the old forms of patriotism and appears to be even a more 
sound and sustainable relation of the masses than the class struggle 
conscious”. Its extreme manifestations and variations are more than 
hostility to foreigners. It means that such nationalists are full of con-
tempt and hatred of people in their own countries for having insuf-
ficient nationalistic mood and even for being traitors.
This is no longer an aristocratic or conservative phenomenon – it 
is a populist one.
That is why the national populism is a phenomenon, which 
should not be ignored, as its manifestations may play a significant 
role in the further European integration. Despite the clear and strong 
trend towards drawing closer together the social, economic, military 
and cultural areas of the countries of the Continent, a great number 
of the problems and contradictions from the past periods have not 
been overcome yet.
The fear of depersonalization of the national priorities and their 
subordination to foreign interest are the most frequently used argu-
ments for inculcation of doubts, opposition and rejection of the Eu-
ropean integration. 
At the same time we should pay attention to the fact that behind 
the national populism certain economic and authoritative interests 
stay whose political envelope could be different but they are amaz-
ingly similar at their core. And they could be found not only in the 
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so called young democracies but also in many of the states that have 
been recognized a long time ago as an example of highly developed 
economies with enough effective mechanisms of democratic political 
life. 
All this creates a real problematic situation that should be analyzed 
in details. But the most important is that the considerable and practically 
feasible conclusions should be made vacillating neither from uncritical ac-
ceptance of the globalization as a positive synonymous phenomenon, nor 
to the isolationism as a last shelter taken from the expansion of the uncon-
trollable external forces. 
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Dragolub Jivković
EUROANTHROPUS’S TEMPTATIONS
After the Greek mythology Europe was a beautiful girl Zeus fell in 
love with. Three boys were born out this love... Mythical Minos, brave 
Sarpedones righteous Radamentus. Asterious, the king of Crete, having 
been married to Europe, gave the continent Greece was on the name of 
Europe (Greek mythology, p. 26, Toubis).
If following the mythology, we could say that Europe has born its 
myth, its courage and its righteousness. Have its successors been cherish-
ing those three virtues as their own in there own lives it is hard hard to 
say. It seems they have been existing only in the myth sphere. The real 
Europe, passing through many ages of its existance has revealed its own 
dramatic nature to us, from the most primitive human life forms up to the 
great civilization creations which make Europe the world history centre. 
It would be too much to mention what is that all born in Europe, and 
became the humanity base at all. Europe did not jelously conserve its in-
ventions, ideas. Promethius and Ullysses themselves could symbolize the 
Europian path into the world history. 
The Europeans have plenty of partial thruths about Europe, numer-
ous of ‘their own’ Europes, not caring much Hegel’s thought that ‘only the 
whole is thruth’. We still have not reached that thruth whole, though many 
of those partial thruths are trying to force themselves like being absolute. 
If we, even today, are offered partial thruths as only ones, how is it possible 
to avoid a particular Europian’s trap (from some part of Europe) of intrud-
ing himself to be a typical Europian man’s model? If being so for ages, how 
could, for example, a western Europian accept an eastern Europian as a 
Europian at all? And that is not all. What is it in that partial Europian being 
that makes him not recgonize the other Europian, or to intrude his own 
Europian gorments as being Europian? A particular and solemn thruth 
from some part of Europe is being tried to force as a ruling thruth, and in 
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many ways, even including the millitary forces, is trying to subject Europe 
to its own demands and interests. Well, the Europe variousness and partial 
thruth have always been the frequent war cause in which the Europian 
people suffered a lot, more than in any other continent. So the opponent 
pictures of Europe have been mixed, and so representing that what could 
be called the human civilization reneissance and progress symbol, even in-
cluding unbeliveable victories of evil against good. No other continent has 
this kind and quantity of diametrically opponent values as the Europian 
man has. No man could imagine so many contrasts in such a relatively 
small space. 
To exceed the differences bearing tragical confrontations in Europe, 
the Europian civilization and man flows should be built on the base con-
necting the people of Europe by its positive energy, and make Europe a 
common house of the Europians. Well, except the geographical unity, is 
there anything in culture, tradition, economy, educatrion, feeling, politics, 
science, religion, etc. common with majority of Europians, and can it be 
their granted future base? How to reconcile such numerious differences in 
the future of Europe, and not to adopt violation over that particular and 
individual that is not in the position to rule, that is on the future Europe 
decision making, plans and projects edge? What is that expected to be the 
Europe progress carrier, its basic value, a thread linking, not separating 
or confronting the peoples of Europe. If known that even up to today has 
been playing a big role in the big world’s play, then the modern Europe 
constructors’ responsibillity is much more greater regarding all the future 
generations. Many dictators in Europe, trying to adopt it to their features 
and interests, have done so much evil that it could be said Europe is the 
largest camp of freedom, right to live, and the human dignity. Can gen-
erations today bear such a project of Europe that would have safe mech-
anisms to ensure yhe victory of good counter evil. Well, numerous are 
temtations that Europian man is confronted to, both today and tomorrow. 
The Europian reality philosophy has to give answers to those questions 
and temptations.
The basic Euroanthropus’s Temptations’ theme problem requires a 
great anlytic-synthetic effort, in comprehending that contents, and defin-
ing that notion. Antrophology bore a lot of notion and phenomenon defi-
nitions called ‘man’, and all the definitions beeing already absolved, there 
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is no need either to quote theme or to oppose them. What has to be said is 
that man is rather ‘a task giving’ then ‘giving’; and that we deal with a unit-
ed being for whom his nature is not an in advance given value system (as 
Leibnitz would say for the world’s monanthous nature). Man is not man in 
advance, at least not by his birth. Without education, creative work, think-
ing, spiritual and physical effort, problem solving ability, knowledge and 
self-knowledge it is impossible to become man in advance by mere fol-
lowing nature laws. Even accepting his genetic predispositions, which no 
doubt have a great importance for man to become man, even than these 
dispositions or possibilities would not be realized without his special cre-
ating. Other living beings do not have to think about what will come next, 
to plan or make visions. Their future is defined by their birth. From his 
birth on man is totally opened for future, and his life is in whole a resultant 
of that he does and imports for himself while creating. His genetic ability 
creation frame is unbelievable, from the imitation of life just as with all 
other beings and even more beneath it, and all up to the divine results of 
his creative power. So it is true that being a man is most difficult for a man. 
Complex is, very difficult, and unpredicable the path from a weak being to 
a being who holds both his own and the world’s destiny in his hands. There 
are a lot of proofs that the rule easiness of that animalistic instinctive and 
brutal in a human life multi-surpases the effort for advancing towards the 
highest level of the human dignity. That kind of dignity was once defined 
as the power of ruling other people, and nature itself. And even today such 
a space and time orientation is regarded to be the highest and most desir-
able human dignity level. It is not his only mislead.
If we do not accept (as an esential onthological attitude) that a task 
giving and not a giving is the a human life essence the most perfect life 
organization is unvaluable for checking the development value. An orani-
zation means the arranged mutual human relations, as well as human and 
nature relations. It also means certain rights and duties; it offers chances 
for the human creative effort demonstrations. Is it the Europe that is being 
born? The previous one was not such. It would be just a mere utopia to 
believe that that human, just by itself or under the institutional pressure, 
will come out and act spontaniously as all the Europians life dimensions. 
The Europian man creation is a very long and complex process. However, 
if that essentialy human in the Europian comming civilization gets lost 
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somewhere in the woods of institutions, rules, economy pressure, tehnol-
ogycal power, then there will be nothing of Europe as organization. 
I am not sure about the so-called conditions set up to peoples and 
goverments which are ‘not in Europe’ yet without regarding there geo-
graphical position. Those conditions are written by the ones regarding 
themselves the world’s masters, true Europians, selected ones who surely 
simbolize the right Europian future. Captivated by economic, technolo-
gycal, military and political power fethish they seem to see it is for more 
easier to fulfil the conditions than to become a Europian citizen in the 
real sense. And it is up to the moder Europian philosophy to call their 
attention, themselves getting included into the Europian man rising very 
actively, with all the differences, but one thought of the holy task towards 
constant improvement and completition as a being living in a creative dia-
logue with a world. 
The second crucial question the Europian philosophy is exspected to 
answer is what life experience represents the best new Europe base besides 
the common geographical position. Is it the question of modern economy 
experience and commands, political constitution, law system, culture, sci-
ence, education, sport, information system, computing culture, etc.? A 
thorough experience could be a driving power of forming a functional and 
surving Europian peoples organization. Therefore Europe should gather 
the new ‘Europe’ project strategists in various spheres whose ideas would 
have the highest political appreciation level. Voluntarism, or political sci-
entism would not possibly become the political decision closest ally, being 
deaf for the scientific and philosophical ideas which have not become poli-
tics servants but its most important correctors. Political voluntarism and 
totaliterity having ruled Europe for centuries (even today with a signifi-
cant adherent number) would not possibly be the leading Europian po-
litical idea. Europe should not be the exclusive office experts project that 
honestly serves the interests of those powerful, of profit, or partial elites. It 
is neither utopistic nor naive to worry about the recognizable demagogu-
ery of political calculators with an abyss between that spoken i public and 
that really acted out. 
In wise people’s counciousness the new Europe appeares to be a great 
chance of positive solving of big conflicts which made it the grounds of 
cold or open wars with apocaliptic consequences. It was not a mere chance 
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that in Europe only we have the greatest world wars, propaganda hates and 
revenges, proclaiming evil for good and vice versa, factories of death. The 
Europe of alienated people, civilization schism, violence, and the terror 
and the terrorism rule cannot be our future. A great job is being expected 
of Europian man, and to do it successfully the notion ‘Europe’ must be 
clear and close to him. The Europe of dynamic changes, democratic solv-
ing methods can be the home for every Europian possessing a positive 
energy. Such a Europe could become worthy philosophy subject. Well, we 
do need the modern philosophy life, economy, technics, culture, commu-
nication, politics, law, sports, education and science. That life philosophy 
can be a plentious spiritual food, and an intellectual support to the mod-
ern Europian man. 
How much of the evil rule with the Europian man experience as to see 
that he has to make a common political body that will serve the interests of 
peace, tollerancy, altruism, the social differences reduction, all leading to 
violence and destruction of people. Perhaps that is why the United Nations 
appeared. The idea the Europian people should make something similar 
was announced long ago. But not long ago didi it become every Europian’s 
real task in the name of the Europian democracy. However the each de-
mocracy gretest weakness is when the low ability people become political 
subjects. And here Plato could help us even today if we rember what the 
matter is. In the harmony with the best philosophy are cautiousness anal-
litical critisism of the philosophically educated people, and an openness 
for all the problems existing on the Europian future creation path. Such a 
critisism is not a utopism,. not an ideological mistake, or personal interest 
but the Europian historic movement knowledge consequence – of what 
it is today and can be tomorrow. Well, in order not to fall into the known 
problem of easily seen technological knowledge progress (in the techno-
logical culture era), and the from-savageness-to-civilization progress un-
seen, we have to remind of the following problems: 
A – The contemporary Europian philosophy should not stay in the 
indifference sphere against the real life, in some thinking world of its own 
understood only by a small number of people. The philosophy not differ-
ing true and false, productive and destructive, efficient and sensual cannot 
take part in the new society dinamics. The ruling thinking methodology 
for which profability is not only an economical aspect but a universal so-
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cial measure, is the the philosophy gravedigger. If the above methodology 
imposes to be a general ruling measure, a new mastering religion despising 
people from up the riches abundance and power, then the door is opened 
the philosophy indifference in all men’s life questions. 
B – Politics, as ‘the seducing and dazzling art and cultural cynicism 
of the ruling ones’ can easily change people’sconsiousness and behavior 
by the means of a powerful information system up to the unfor seen pro-
portions of the imbecils’ breeding.Such politics thinks it can thoroughly 
influence the general people’s behaviour, quickly converting them from 
murderers and liars into men of trust and honour. In the situation like 
that there is not place for the crucial life truth care. The arguings with the 
world and the one’s self, with the nature and cosmos are being cherishing 
into forgetness, or into ‘the being – antibeing archeology’. 
C – Justice is more and more becoming a justice for the powerful and 
their world control. Various assembly plays (passing so many laws, consti-
tutions, rules, etc.) are mor and more alike a skillfully thought out trap for 
the naive. In the best case, it could be ‘a democratic control of the weaker 
ones’. The power of the ruling ones is directly connected with the weakness 
of the ruled ones. Although it is a mere truth that all the beings’ nature 
settled the fact that the physicaly powerful rule the physicaly weaker ones, 
when dealing with men there is something not admitting that law. Namely, 
there is no room here for the physicaly stronger subject rule. If so, man 
would be the earth’s inferior being. That stronger in him consists of his 
mind, of his produced artificial beings, of his smartness, of his mutuel life 
forms. Even then can the stronger ones’ law be proclaimed the human life 
postulate. Namely, the human kind deprived of the weaker ones’ protec-
tion measures and rights, would need no laws at all. Those are ages long 
and past laws, always improving for the democracy development benefit. 
What a fortune to bear the Europe Constitution, and what barriers 
to start its acting. It is still the problem of hope. It is enough if some of 
the powerful ones does not agree to that common law act without which 
there is no law basis of Europian man, no responsibility and right for all 
to follow; or if the priviledged authority carriers in some contries ‘defend 
democracy’ from the others; and then rights and justice still stay at the 
beginning. Being constantly at the social developement beginning means 
defending own priviledges in the name of everybody’s benefit and hap-
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piness. We are more and more beiing convinced that great priviledges 
and small responsibilities of the ruling ones are fully constitutional, and 
really good for all. The legitimacy problem has been made absurd with 
the sanctions undertaken by those ‘most responsible’ ones, most powerful 
ones, and all that against dictarships, terrorism, elementary human rights 
violation, being performed upon the whole nation, innocent people who 
endure both their own authorities evil and the powerful ones’ justice at the 
same time. It seems justice is very selective, not adapted to everybody and 
always, that enormously proportioned unjustice can also be the powerful 
ones’ justice. So either justice or unjustice are often helped and mixed up 
to the level which a common sense cannot stand. 
D – Some institutions should exist as Europian uniting mechanisms. 
However, acording to its logic and notion an institution transfers easily its 
planned and defined position into a ruling one – for disciplinising people. 
The whole institution loses its contact with people. It really takes people 
for a statistics mass, impersonal beings with data, placed in some drawers, 
very easy to control. The institution becomes everything and a single be-
ing nothing. The larges and most beautiful buildings in Europe are those 
of governments, administrations, institutions, offices and controls, police, 
army, informatics, the human consciousness and behavior control. What 
about those of science, culture, art, creation, communication, spiritual and 
spontanious performances enviroment? 
E – The myth and fetish rule, evil and seducing people rule can naith-
er be the modern Europe basis nor Europian man’s desiring characteristic 
feature. It means that the tehnics, profit. war, natural or religious belonging 
fetish, together with that of plays and informatics, which attack the human 
spiritual health agressively, cannot be the Europian man’s values either. 
And the point is not to support any idealizing or tradition rule but of great 
danger of attacking the Europe base and that is no doubt the Europian 
man with all his natural and spiritualy developed needs. A virtual man 
and a virtual Europe is not our ideal. They are the democratic totalitarity 
prodacts, not knowing or recognizing the man’s human dignity. If the val-
ue system perversion appears to be a democratic phenomenon then we are 
much more closer to the social pathology then the people’s unity. 
Well, enormous are the temptations Europian man is confronted 
with. Cautiousness is mother of wisdom. Philosophy that does not see it, 
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cannot become the spiritual strenght of the Europe that many people are 
striving to, and see a great possibility for their creative potencials for their 
own and world benefit.
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Alexander Stoychev
EUROPEAN RATIONALITY AS  
AN OPPORTUNITY fOR A VALUE CONSENSUS
The unprecedented process of European unification suppose not only 
an emerging socio-economic and political entity but also a commonwealth 
of nations based on shared values. While the content and interpretation 
of the values comprising such a consensus is subject to debates, the core 
and spirit of those values are founded on a specific form of rationality. 
The vagueness of the notion of European nationality should not stop us 
from identifying an intellectual and spiritual tradition that is not limited 
to modernity, but can be traced down to Greco-Roman antiquity. Jaspers 
summarizes the features of the Western man as an unlimited rationality 
rooted in Greek science and Roman law, subjectivity of Being revealed 
in the personality based on rationality, as well as the perception of the 
world as factual reality in time (Jaspers 1957). Most often Greece from 
VII-VI c. B.C. is pointed out as the birth place of a new theoretical and 
rational attitude in contrast with the pragmatic, mythico-religious attitude 
of antiquity and the Orient. While the practical aspirations of the ancient 
Greeks were limited by the narrow horizon of the polis, their theoretical 
aspirations included no less than the cosmos and the logos. The notion of 
infinity, otherwise alien to the Greeks, was readily attributed to the power 
of rational inquiry. True knowledge as episteme was contrasted to doxa 
(opinion) on the ground of theoretical inference and justification. Husserl 
describes their philosophical theoria as an end in itself, impractical and 
based on “artful epoche ( suspension of judgment towards ) on all natural 
practice (Husserl, E. 1962, p.394). He stresses however the transformation 
from “the original theoria, from the completely “disinterested” (result-
ing in the epoche from all practical interest) gazing at the world (wonder, 
thaumazein as a source), to the theoria of genuine intellectual science…” 
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(Husserl 1962: 397). Here comes the understanding of truth and reason as 
telos. A philosopher’s life is devoted “to the task of theoria, to the building 
of theoretical knowledge on theoretical knowledge ad infinitum” (Husserl 
1962: 398). The link of theoria with practice was mainly in the domain of 
ethics with the assumption that true moral values exist as ideal objects of 
rational inquiry and validation (Socrates and Plato). Otherwise the theo-
retical attitude tended to show a remarkable detachment from practical 
life and negligence of empirical observation of facts. When Russell stresses 
that the scientific outlook that “statements of fact should be based on ob-
servation” is an entirely modern conception, which hardly existed before 
the seventeenth century, he points out that even Aristotle who is often 
praised for his fidelity to observation was very far from such standards. 
“Aristotle maintained that women have fewer teeth than men; although 
he was twice married, it never occurred to him to verify this statement by 
examining his wives’ mouths” (Russell 1953: 7). 
When we compare the theoretical aspirations of the Greeks with the 
culture of Rome which manifestly lacks such a theoretical spirit and in-
terests, it seems that the idea of “reason as telos “ has been abandoned. 
Actually it has taken a new form in the pragmatic social institutions of 
Rome. For a first time a vast European space had been unified by the po-
litical power and the legions of Rome, but its civilizing impact was exert-
ed through the thin threads of the viaducts, the Roman law and its public 
institutions. Roman law deserves special attention, as in its developed 
form it has exerted a remarkable influence throughout European history. 
In Thorndike’s words “through law schools, through the decisions of im-
perial jurists, and through the legal literature, which reached its height 
about A.D. 200 in the writings of Ulpian and Papinian, and which is 
marked by acuteness of reasoning, clearness in statement, and fairness 
and judgment, Roman law became both technically and practically the 
greatest legal system that the world had known” (Thorndike 1956: 20). 
Furthermore “the Roman jurist was not content with logical reasoning if 
it led to an unfair decision. In such a case he went back and reexamined 
his premises. He was not satisfied to apply an old law or judicial decision 
in its original meaning, if the social and economic conditions to which 
it would have to be applied had altered since its formulation. (Thorndike 
1956: 20). 
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Parallel with this remarkable development a contrasting picture of 
ruthless pragmatism and egoistic drive for power and material domina-
tion, political corruption and violence show ample evidence in the Roman 
society as early as I c. B.C. If we borrow a metaphore from K.G. Jung, 
the dark side of European rationality, its “shadow” driven by irrational 
impulses clearly manifests itself here and throughout the subsequent Eu-
ropean history. It is difficult to present European rationality as a continu-
ing body of reason from antiquity to present days. However the flashes of 
this spirit can be recognized in some of its strange metamorphosis in the 
Middle Ages. Among them we have to mention the universities with their 
privileges, autonomy and academic freedom, the special statute and liber-
ties of towns people (e.g. Magna Carta and Habeas Corpus in England, the 
special individual liberty and security of private property in Italy, France 
and other European sites.) and even the appeal to reason and the attempts 
for rational justification of catholic theology. For example Augustine at-
tempts to deduce standards of human behavior from theoretical princi-
ples. “His moral order is expressly routed in a natural order established by 
speculative reason. Justice in the highest sense prescribes the right order-
ing of all things according to reason” (Fortin 1987: 250). More than that, 
Fortin asserts that unlike Islam and Judaism that both “present themselves 
first and foremost as divinely revealed laws or as all-inclusive social orders, 
regulating every segment of men’s private and public lives and preclud-
ing from the outset any sphere of activity in which reason could operate 
independently of divine law – Christianity on the other hand first comes 
to sight as a faith or as a sacred doctrine, demanding adherence to a set of 
fundamental beliefs but otherwise leaving its followers at liberty to organ-
ize their social and political lives in accordance with norms and principles 
that are not specifically religious” (Fortin 1987: 251). 
Although the new spirit of the Renaissance and of the Reformation 
has been largely recognized and discussed, in many fields the humanists 
and reformers lacked originality. Except for the renewed interest in antiq-
uity and the denial of medieval church traditions, the changes seriously af-
fected mostly the fine arts. In many other fields “the course of development 
already initiated in the medieval centuries went on uninterrupted” (Thorn-
dike 1956: 679).This continuity and the division between the secular and 
the ecclesiastical mentioned above, facilitated the socio-economic and cul-
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tural development of Europe of the epoch of Enlightenment, guided by a 
marked respect for reason. The specific form that European rationality had 
taken with modernity was marked by the rise of mathematical knowledge 
connected with natural sciences and their further progress under the spell 
of empirical validation. Further manifestations of this spirit can be traced 
in the subsequent rise of new political ideas concerning human rights, 
freedom, democracy, equality and justice and in the accelerated techno-
logical changes and the rising industries . The last 3-4 centuries marked 
such an unprecedented explosive development of Europe, change has ac-
celerated with such a speed, that today we began to wonder whether we 
are still guided by the same rational principles and values that were at the 
core of this progress. Reason as telos and the Socratic readiness to follow 
the argument wherever it may lead that had shaped European rationality, 
fell under the spell of Francis Bacon’s “science is power”, the idea of “con-
quering Nature” and the utilitarian-technical approach to the surrounding 
world. The optimistic visions of progress guided by science so typical of 
the XIX century had been replaced by bitter disappointments. The begin-
ning of XX century saw the end of la Belle époque and the bitter disillu-
sionment of European intellectuals after the slaughterhouse of World War 
I. Once again the dark side of European spirit had spread the “shadow” 
of irrational impulses over the continent bringing much pain and suffer-
ing accompanying the nationalistic and social clashes dominated by ruth-
less egoism, aspirations for power and totalitarian nightmares. The philo-
sophical perceptions of the “shadow” can be traced in a variety of thinkers 
from that period. Spengler’s “Decline of the West”, Max Scheller’s concept 
of the knowledge of achievement (instrumental knowledge) whose one 
sidedness threatens the West to degenerate into a state of “sophisticated 
barbarism” (Scheller, M. 1962); Husserl’s concept of the externalization of 
reason leaving its proper domain (Husserl, E. 1962); M.Heideger’s fears of 
objectification that result in the attempt to secure human freedom in the 
natural world through technology (Gillespie 1987: 897). 
The rationalization of the “shadow” doesn’t mean that once we have 
discovered and explained our irrational impulses and motivations and 
their corresponding societal forms, we would be able to remove them by 
adhering to an enlightened rational project. This is equal to the claim that 
there exist an ideal form of societal organization and leads directly to the 
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chimeras of utopian social engineering. What we claim is that in the light 
of a specific European intellectual tradition values can be justified by ra-
tional inquiry. This makes it possible to escape from relativistic post-mod-
ern conclusions that all sets of values stand equal and if “anything goes”, 
then the best we can do is equally respect or at least tolerate all of them. 
The justified value choice is not separated from the question in what kind 
of a world we would prefer to live tomorrow. The model of liberal democ-
racy may raise questions of different sort, but certain values have passed 
the test of rational inquiry. Summarizing the liberal tradition I. Berlin 
states it as follows: …”no society is free unless it is governed by at any rate 
two interrelated principles: first, that no power, but only rights, can be 
regarded as absolute, so that all men, whatever power governs them, have 
an absolute right to refuse to behave inhumanly; and second, that there are 
frontiers, not artificially drawn, within which men should be inviolable, 
these frontiers being defined in terms of rules so long and widely accepted 
that their observance had entered into the very conception of what it is 
to be a normal human being, and, therefore, also of what it is to act inhu-
manly or insanely…” (Berlin 1969: 165). 
In the beginning of XIX century George Byron wrote prophetically: 
“This is the patent age of new inventions 
For killing bodies, and for saving souls, 
All propagated with the best intentions.”  
That age lasted too long and costs too much to European people. Now 
for the first time in its history European society has the unique opportu-
nity for peaceful and cooperative existence in a common socio-economic 
and cultural space. There might be disputes and different interpretations 
of the recognized common values that underlie this emerging unity and of 
course no ideal and final solutions. Repeating old errors, would be a lack 
of wisdom, only confirming J. Swift’s statement that we never learn from 
our mistakes, because stupidity always takes a new image. The consensus 
about the possibility of finding reasonable practical solutions by means of 
rational debate and dialog, give us hope however, that our specific form 
of European rationality is increasingly establishing more control on the 
irrational obsessions of its “shadow”.
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Maria Trofimova
PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNT Of MODERNITY: 
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL 
PARADOXES.
In his Vienna lecture dated 1934 Edmund Husserl stated: “Clearly 
the title Europe designates the unity of a spiritual life and a creative ac-
tivity – with all its aims, interests, cares and troubles, with its plans, its 
establishments, its institutions”. From this he proceeds to the statement 
that the original phenomenon of spiritual Europe, not of the geographical 
concept of Europe, consists in the emergency of philosophy in the sense 
of universal science, science of the world as a whole, of the universal unity 
of all being. This phenomenon of philosophy as the first and universal sci-
ence emerged in the Ancient Greece and since then, according to Husserl, 
remains the main pivot of European humanity. 
In this paper I am not going to contest this idea of the origin of the Eu-
ropean spirit, but rather try to elaborate on the consequences that neces-
sarily follow from it. It can be stated that it is exactly philosophy that binds 
Europe as a unity and preserves its specific features through the centuries. 
The exact way of how it has happened and (if at all) continues to hap-
pen is by no means clear. Philosophy as a universal science and other par-
ticular sciences existed in the European society in a special mode, which 
was shaped through the centuries. This mode can be called the academy 
or, more general, school. The notion of school, though, appears to be ob-
scure and problematic if it is considered in its historicity. The first group of 
problems is related to the notion of heritage and the unity of philosophi-
cal thought through centuries and can be pushed to its extreme with the 
question of whether the phenomenon called (post)modern philosophy 
has anything at all to do with, for example, Plato or Aristotle. Another 
problematic field comes from the attempts to search for the basis of the 
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classical distinction of philosophy into Ancient, Medieval and Modern. 
It can be argued that this distinction is nothing but an artificial scheme, 
which has nothing to do with the real historical thought-process, but there 
is, unfortunately, no serious alternative to it. 
If we understand the school as an institution where philosophy is 
shared as knowledge and where it can be taught and learned, then philoso-
phy understood along these lines has always existed within the framework 
of school: not only Proclus, Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas belonged to a 
school, but Plato and Aristotle as well, and the same can be said about Schell-
ing and Hegel, and even – to mention the 20th century – about Husserl and 
Heidegger. The school understood in such a narrow way does not allow for 
the questions either about the origin of the school itself (to be more precise it 
allows such questions only in the form of the positivistic historical/archival 
investigation about the origin of the particular institution), or about the role 
of the wise teacher (ancient times) or the natural metaphysician (Kant) in 
the school. Moreover, this notion of school even blocks any possible articu-
lation of the relation of the school itself to every kind of knowledge which it 
does not include and support. Philosophy so understood does not have any 
substantial opposition to itself and lacks an articulated and elaborated his-
tory other than the school’s own legends. Needless to say, this kind of school 
can easily disappear, and such occasions we can be easily pointed out in the 
commonly accepted history of philosophy. 
On the other hand, if by philosophy we understand the very idea of 
philosophical thinking (the philosophical nous), then we have to admit that 
it is not an achievement of any particular philosopher, and does not even 
have its origin in anything specifically human at all. Thus it cannot have a 
particular place among human activities, neither in a school, nor outside 
of it. This kind of thinking is so ‘independent’ in its origin that it cannot be 
opposed to school understood in any sense (neither in the aforementioned 
narrow sense, nor in the ancient or Neokantian sense, about which I will 
speak later). Neither can it be related historically (as an event) to any spe-
cific ‘philosophy’, be it the philosophy of Plato or of Descartes in opposition 
to Platonism or Cartesianism. Insofar as the so understood philosophical 
thinking does not have anything in common with the human striving na-
ture, by the same token it cannot possess its own specific historicity. Its ori-
gin is very obscure and cannot be articulated in terms of an epochal event, 
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unless the very historicity of thinking acquires a totally different meaning 
– a meaning that does not guarantee the possibility of experience of any 
particular philosophizing human being. The truth of the so understood 
ideal philosophical thinking cannot reside in temporality or in the facticity 
of the human understanding aiming for this truth, as it was prescribed in 
the modern maxim of Enlightenment. Therefore, this idea of philosophy 
does not necessarily require the traditional historical existence of any phil-
osophical school, and at the same time it is not ‘responsible’ for the disap-
pearance of philosophy from the school when the latter transforms into the 
social institution, which is subject not to philosophy anymore, but to the 
scientific and the world-view crises, and represents a number of techniques 
for their rethinking, critique and overcoming. 
The school can be also understood as the co-existence and common 
efforts of people aiming at truth accessible to human beings. This notion of 
school dates from ancient times and keeps its value even in the Modernity. 
The problem with such a definition of the school consists in the fact that 
it is difficult to position it within the horizon of what is outside of it, with 
the environing world. There is always a danger within the school perspec-
tive to label the outsiders as those, using Aristotle’s expression, who all the 
time feel as good as we extremely rarely do. In this case, what is opposed 
to school will turn out to be no less than the psychological everyday life of 
the individuals and social structures of the humankind. In order to keep 
this opposition at work the school inevitably should claim the status of the 
‘elite’ upon itself, which obviously means nothing but the participation in 
the two of the aforementioned pivots, i.e. the inscription into the existing 
acceptable human psychological behavior and social institutions. Another 
danger is that the school’s own self-sufficiency and peculiarity can be eas-
ily reduced to the content of the philosophical myth about the ‘wise Phi-
losopher’ whose works are more or less held as the point of departure for 
the members of the school own philosophical efforts. 
We see now that any understanding of school, however problematic, 
calls into question the very notion of the historical division of philosophi-
cal epochs and especially the understanding of ‘Modern philosophy’. If we 
turn now to the specific position that philosophy occupies in modernity, 
the obvious question we are faced with is about the modernity of phi-
losophy itself; in other words, about the grounds on which the discipline 
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or science rooted in the tradition can develop and change and about the 
conditions of possibility of such a change. In the 20th century philoso-
phy we have two exemplary ways of understanding and describing the 
philosophical changes in the transition from the ‘old’ (be it the Medieval 
philosophy or the renaissance of ancient thought) to the modern para-
digm of thinking. To present them in the most simple and reduced way, 
Heidegger believes metaphysics to be the ground for all the changes: the 
shift in the fundamental metaphysical thinking defines the shifts in the 
essences of other sciences and the status of knowledge in general. Alter-
natively, Foucault claims that it is the episteme that changes, i.e. change 
occurs in the order and the essence of thought in general, and philosophy, 
as just one mode of thinking, changes accordingly. It has to be taken into 
account, though, that Heidegger has almost never dealt with the history of 
sciences other than philosophy (be it understood as logics or metaphys-
ics), and Foucault also only mentions different philosophical theories in 
his descriptions of the shifts in the positivistic scientific knowledge. What 
is characteristic for both ways of argumentation is the absence of an ac-
count of the peculiar historical fact that the novelties in thought did not 
emerge and the old way of philosophizing did not disappear in one stroke 
or within, say, half a century. On the contrary, until the end of the 18th 
century traditional pre-modern philosophy co-existed with the modern 
and, moreover, were actively involved into theoretical discussions with it 
held in the framework of the academic disputes. This circumstance, i.e. the 
absence of attention to this fact in the works of both aforementioned phi-
losophers, should not be accepted as purely contingent. It seems that the 
two exemplary ways of constructing the history of philosophy fail to deal 
with this fact for important philosophical reasons, insofar as both of them 
describe the history itself in no other way but as the order of justification. 
Heidegger, motivated by his idea of the end of metaphysics, plausibly sees 
the foundation of any epoch in its metaphysics accordingly. Foucault sees 
it in the positivistic order of knowledge or discourse, and this choice of 
foundation perfectly fits the framework of his archeological method. Both 
philosophers presuppose that the very philosophical basis of the historic-
ity of any of occurring changes, which lead to the pulling down of one ep-
och and the emergence of the new one, is some event that is hidden behind 
the traditional history of philosophy or knowledge, but manifests itself in 
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the very possibility of such a history. Both modes of presenting the way of 
dealing with the problem of the emergence of modernity beg a question, 
whether there is simply too much of rationality and justification in these 
attempts to write a fundamental history of interconnected and intertwined 
field of philosophical knowledge. Are they not caught in the circle of the 
rationally understood history and the history of rational thought defined 
by Kant? Nevertheless, it can be presupposed that the history of modernity 
is not that well-grounded in itself, that the history of metaphysics and the 
history of knowledge have a connection, but are still two different histories 
which cannot serve as a basis for the justification of each other. 
The established history of knowledge and the notion of the modern 
paradigm of knowledge have a problematic relation to each other, so that 
in many cases they even share clarity and justification or ‘borrow’ it from 
each other. It can be argued that the questions of the meaning and essence 
of philosophical modernity should be considered primarily within the ac-
cepted history of knowledge and history of philosophy. On the other hand, 
it can also be argued that the history of knowledge we have now is the 
by-product of Modern thinking. This paradox can be restated in the fol-
lowing way: the history of knowledge deals with ‘modernity’ as with one 
of its own peculiar concepts, although ‘the history of knowledge’ is itself a 
concept within Modern paradigm of thinking. 
Arguably, the history of knowledge has as its aim the clarification 
of the meaning of historical reality and the answer to the question, why 
human knowledge has taken the form it did, what are the reasons for it 
to take the shape it has. On the other hand, the history of philosophy, 
for example, traditionally has very little in common with other historical 
disciplines. It is not a methodology of the historical inquiry unrelated to 
philosophy, and it is not connected with the elaboration of the concepts 
and schemes of the historical science in general. The history of knowledge 
is aimed at development of different kind of concepts, concepts defining 
the horizon of what can be known in principle given the particular un-
derstanding, occurring within the particular epoch, of what knowledge 
is. Some of these concepts can appear extremely problematic due to the 
fact that they describe the conditions of possibility for the philosophical 
knowledge in its totality. The notion of Modernity in its relation to phi-
losophy is one of them. 
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It is quite telling that in the historical science proper there is no ar-
ticulated notion of the contemporary situation. It is commonly accepted 
that the historical inquiry should promote itself into the future through the 
present, although the actual inquiries stop at the point where the last oc-
curring events can be found. ‘Afterwards’ there is simply no object for the 
analyses of facticity, which are replaced accordingly with the moral, politi-
cal or any other evaluation of the matters of fact. It is justified by the pre-
supposition that in every historical inquiry a certain gap between the object 
of the investigation and the means of its description should be preserved. 
This disposition looks very different in philosophy. If philosophy 
should be considered historically at all, then the present situation is first 
and foremost the object of radical rethinking: it is in modernity that phi-
losophy finds the meaning of historicity (and exactly in the attempts to 
find this meaning such concepts as post-modernity and the like emerge), 
and to a large extent finds itself, in the sense of its striving to be something 
more rather than history of philosophy, rather than the denial or critical 
reproduction of the already existing thoughts. 
Despite all the value of the notion of modernity for philosophy it can 
hardly be stated that philosophy nowadays has already acquired such a 
developed notion that imply only the elaboration of the details within sys-
tematic discussions and detailed research. The notion of modernity ar-
guably calls for more problems than it is aimed to solve. It is essentially 
obscure not only because there can be found many co-existing formula-
tions of it nowadays. But it is through elaboration of this notion the deter-
mination of philosophy not just as history of philosophy, but as modern 
philosophy, which exists here and now, takes shape. 
The highest level of schematization in history seems almost inevita-
ble. History in itself is the collection of facts first and foremost, so that any 
philosophical history should present us with the evaluation of the content 
of these facts, and this evaluation can hardly avoid being schematic, in 
terms of distribution of facts among the centuries, periods, countries and 
nations. History of knowledge is, nevertheless, not only the schematiza-
tion of the ready-made material. When it tells us about centuries, nations 
and other constitutive elements of historical schematization it presents 
us with the account not only of the content of some historical moment, 
but with the essence of this historical moment in itself. In this sense the 
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philosophical peculiarity of the history of knowledge consists in the avoid-
ance of what is taken for granted, what is understandable without any fur-
ther deliberations. The temporality of the philosophical description of the 
knowledge history consists not in the schematizing, and not in the replac-
ing of the physical time with the social, but in the underlining of what is 
non-temporal, ideal within the described period of time. 
Thus, we are faced with the described above problematic field of the 
philosophy’s account of its own historicity, which only becomes even more 
problematic if we recall the multi-layered notion of (modern) philosophi-
cal school. How, then, a modern philosopher should position itself within 
a contemporary society, given the fact that one understanding of the phil-
osophical school requires a solely theoretical insight, which hardly coin-
cide with human practical purposes and another way of understanding 
requires from a philosopher to be practically involved in the contempo-
rary social life, even if it is reduced to its academic matters? Husserl, with 
whose quote this paper starts, suggests an arguably plausible solution to 
this problem, namely the synthesis of the opposing interests that occurs 
in the transition from the theoretical to the practical attitude. In order 
to achieve a theoretical insight an epoche (reduction) from all practical 
considerations is needed indeed. But this insight into the sphere of the 
ideal laws and meanings can be then transformed into a practical outlook, 
which can take shape of the political critique of the contemporary social 
structure or the practical outcomes of the particular sciences. It is exactly 
in this sense that he introduced the notion of philosophy as a rigorous 
science governing and giving justification to all other sciences, be it sci-
ences proper, or humanities, or social sciences, up to the rigorous critique 
of the modern humankind itself with its explicit and implicit values. It is 
the theoretical insight which transforms into a practical norm guided by 
the scientific reason, and this reason only, according to Husserl, is able to 
elevate the humankind to the point when it will be in accord with norms 
of truth in every form, so that it will hold an absolute responsibility to 
itself. This is the possible way by means of which the practical and the 
theoretical attitudes can be joined together, and it can lead to ‘the rebirth 
of Europe from the spirit of philosophy, through a heroism of reason that 
will definitively overcome naturalism.’
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Ina Dimitrova
BRUNO LATOUR AND MERAB 
MAMARDASHVILLI – SITES Of ENCOUNTERS
The aim of this paper is a humble one – to present the common 
theoretical ‘places’ in the vocabularies and in the theoretical ‘box with 
instruments’ of two comparatively distant, at first sight, traditions: the 
eastern Marxist tradition, presented by Merab Mamardashvilli and one 
western, empirical, to great extent, research programme, namely Actor-
Network Theory. In the focus I put two central notions – the so-called 
converted form (Verwandelte Form), broadly discussed and employed by 
Mamardashvilli and the ‘black box’ of ANT. I argue that they have con-
siderably similar structure, origin and role in the conceptual scheme of 
Mamardashvilli and Actor-Network Theory, respectively. 
The first part of the paper presents schematically some of the com-
mon initial assumptions, on which these two theories are based. The sec-
ond one explores these two notions and the third one argues that some of 
the initial assumptions that are present in ANT and not in Mamardashvilli 
are crucial for the better ‘utilization’ of such concepts and respectively – 
for the investigation of such phenomena. Accordingly, this opens a wider 
horizon for research, especially in social sciences. Particularly, I focus on 
the fundamental distinction between that which is ‘real’, ‘genuine’ and that, 
which is ‘mere appearance’, epiphenomenon. This distinction is preserved 
in Mamardashvilli’s thinking, while blurred in ANT. Precisely this feature 
of Mamardashvilli’s theory makes him still speaking of ‘the deep fetishist 
presuppositions’ of the converted form, which distinguishes it from the 
‘actual scientific object’. 
The step that Latour undertakes, that is blurring this distinction, is 
necessary one – the demystification-option disappears and what remains 
is treating the black box and exploring its possibilities as an entity or mac-
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roobject, which has completely rational and sensible relations with the rest 
of the ‘representatives’ of given regional ontology. This perspective is cru-
cial for the social sciences because proposes one way to consider a wide set 
of social phenomena or artefacts.
1. Initial assumptions – a sketchy account
Both programmes aim at eliminating some classical oppositions – 
subject – object scheme of knowledge and scientific practice, the clear-cut 
demarcation line between ontology and epistemology, the ‘hard’ distinc-
tion between the (material) world out there, which waits to be represented 
and the mental reality in here, in mind.
The logical outcome is the common thesis of the historical and praxe-
ological genealogy of scientific objectivity, which could be connected with 
some Husserl’s assertions in the Crisis According to him the law-like state-
ments correspond to objective qualities of the world, due to the practi-
cal and conceptual production of the observable phenomena themselves 
(Husserl 2002: 133). This could be thought as one perfect summary of the 
essence of the conceptual efforts of ethnomethodology and social stud-
ies of science. The difference is that Husserl’s focus on the transcendental 
subject is shifted towards communicative practices and technology, which 
cannot be enclosed in the structure of individual mind. 
On this basis the consideration of ontology itself is also similar – 
Mamardashvilli speaks of the being-incompleteness principle and the 
continuum ‘being-consciousness’, and Latour of the mutual constitution 
of object, environment, scientist. As Callon says reality is a process – it 
passes through successive states as chemical compound (Callon 1986: 8). 
Latour holds that there are special states or phases of the scientific ‘mat-
ter’ that he calls – ‘warm’. Just after that phase we have ‘facts’ or statements 
with no trace of authorship.
2. Black boxes and converted forms
This proximity of the initial assumptions is the reason for the com-
parison of the mentioned above notions – black box and converted form. 
A closer look at them proves that there is enough ground for this ques-
tion – it appears that they have quite similar functions and origin. 
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Introduced quite schematically the black box is any setting that, no 
matter how complex it is or how contested its history has been, is now 
so stable and certain that it can be treated as a fact. “A black box contains 
that which no longer needs to be considered, those things whose contents 
have become a matter of indifference.” (Callon, Latour, 1981). The law, 
for example, is a collection of black boxes. In its formation stage a law is 
a contested set of competing sentences around which occasionally large 
alliances are built to influence their specific shape. During the legislative 
process they are fluid and open. Once the legislation has been passed, con-
tested sentences turn into a black box, sealing all the elements, however 
arbitrary they might be, in a fixed and stable relationship that cannot be 
questioned easily. 
If we use the Callon’s concept ‘translation’ which implies the passing 
through different, successive states in the mentioned above ‘warm’ phase 
of mutual constitution, the notion of black box should grasp the moment 
when the whole process begins to run automatically and there is no need 
to renegotiate the process case by case. 
Through this concept Callon explains the durability of given configu-
rations of actor-networks. The successful translation process leads to agree-
ment and coordination and as a result the network converges and becomes 
irreversible (Callon 1991). In this moment it becomes stable and starts to 
behave and to be treated as one entity rather than as a heterogeneous net-
work. In other words it becomes black box and wraps up all previous pas-
sage points in the process. A macro-actor (an actor-network that behaves 
like an actor) grows by adding or associating actors to herself and simpli-
fying them into one black box. In the process of becoming black box the 
key moment that makes it possible is the so called displacement. In one of 
the most famous studies of ANT, the scallops are transformed into larvae, 
the larvae into numbers, the numbers into tables and curves which repre-
sent easily transportable, reproducible, and diffusable sheets of paper. The 
scallops have been displaced by graphic representations and mathematical 
analyses. They are transported into the conference room through a series 
of transformations. The same happens to the soil samples in Latour’s study 
Circulating Reference (1999) or with the yeast in Pasteur’s laboratory. 
One of the most important features of black boxes is that they are 
the objects, which we designate as referent, as the cause rather than as the 
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outcome. In reality it is the outcome, which becomes possible and comes 
to existence only after a long series of transformations. In such a sense it is 
consequence and not a cause. (Callon 1986: 15).
It is time to explore the main features of the converted form. I will 
begin with one description, which is literally a repetition of the metaphor 
‘black box’: Mamardashvilli characterizes the converted form as ‘dead, 
lifeless space’, as a shadow on different parts of the system, which induces 
a space of principal non-understanding. 
It appears that these phenomena – black boxes and converted forms 
play similar role and are build up in similar way. The interaction in com-
plex systems creates qualitatively new phenomena, additional ‘forms of life’, 
namely the converted forms. They regulate the system through filling the 
missing links and replace them with new relations. Instead of the complex 
web of relations we have quasi-object (Mamardashvilli 2004: 228). Now this 
quasi-object replaces those relations which have become unobservable and 
‘dropped out’. In these phenomena the intermediate phases have converged 
in the same way as in the case of black boxes. And again exactly like them, 
the converted forms are conceived as initial causes and premises, as inde-
composable, independent entities (Mamardashvilli 2004: 224). It stands to 
reason the similarity with the irreversibility of the black box. 
More than that – the converted form is crucially characterized by the 
notion – displacement: it ‘saves up’, economizes the passing through all 
the states and phases, which are irrelevant to the operation of the system 
as a whole.
3. Why ANT is better?
Simplifying, I would say that ANT is better because the key concept 
‘black box’ is embedded in different set of initial methodological assump-
tions, besides those, mentioned in the beginning, which are quite similar. 
Mamardashvilli preserves in clearer way the ontological hierarchization of 
real and ‘seeming’, which is typical motive in social sciences and in criti-
cal theory in its modernist mould. Radically distancing from such posi-
tion, ANT blurrs this distinction and attempts to make ‘one-level’ analysis 
without the support of made in advance distinctions. Mamardashvilli’s 
main tenet is to look ‘behind’, to reveal the deep fetishist preconditions 
of converted forms, to debunk. According to him in the real scientific 
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analysis we cannot do with converted forms – we should explore into the 
‘real relations’ behind the converted form. Instead of this demystifying, 
liberating gesture ANT prefers doing good descriptions: If we display a 
socio-technical network – defining trajectories by actants’ association and 
substitution, defining actants by all the trajectories in which they enter, 
by following translations and, finally, by varying the observer’s point of 
view – we have no need to look for any additional causes. The explanation 
emerges once the description is saturated. There is no need to go searching 
for mysterious or global causes outside networks. If something is missing, 
it is because something is missing. (Latour 2004b). This position has its far 
reaching consequences: if we abandon the ontological hierarchization, we 
will be able to discern the importance of Things – those beautiful, search-
ing for forums matters of concern, those mobile states, which resemble 
so much the Dewey’s image of the ‘public’. The politics today is forced to 
balance on the matters of concern, which should be handled with care and 
caution and shared responsibility. The critic is not the one who debunks, 
but the one who assembles. The critic is not the one who lifts the rugs from 
under the feet of the naïve believers, but the one who offers the partici-
pants arenas in which to gather. (Latour 2004a). 
In such a sense today, in our globalizing or ‘second modernity’ society 
we should deal with highly complex, entangled social ‘textures’ and it is 
no more relevant to try to arrange our social lives and order by exercising 
the well known ‘revolutionary gesture’, directed towards all illusive idols. 
‘Reactionary’ is dangerous and unstable word, but it might be understood 
as simply the wish to bring back into the fabrication in facts and to make 
the salutary ‘Beware!’ audiable again…(Latour 1999: 291).
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Liliya Sazonova
THE ISSUE Of THE CONSTRUCTION  
Of EUROPEAN IDENTITY IN THE CONTEXT 
Of MULTICULTURALISM
The question about the European identity does not require reflection 
on a silent, past and completed phenomenon. As such, the elaboration of 
the contemporary phenomena challenges the relevance of the Hegel’s no-
tion that ‘The owl of Minerva, takes its flight only when the shades of night 
are gathering’1. It is rather an actual, unpredictable, on-going process that 
is being constructing and transforming at the time of the philosophical 
consideration.
That is why the main purpose of the essay is not to exhaust the is-
sue neither is to propose receipts or definite answers how to shape New 
Europe or to construct effective European cultural identity. The paper, in-
stead, aims at providing a framework for an open discussion or for further 
reflection on the subject. It tries to highlight certain problems connected 
with the creation of the European identity and its linkage with the concept 
of multiculturalism. Therefore, the main questions that will structure the 
paper address the discussion about the extent to what European identity 
is being multiculturally constructed as well as the consequences and spe-
cificities of constructing the European identity following a multicultural 
sample. 
Speaking about the construction of the European identity, there is a 
clear link between the liberal theories and its creation. Both the Enlight-
enment and post-Enlightenment figures and streams within liberalism be 
they ‘classical’ authors or more contemporary ones, influenced the foun-
1 Hegel, G. (1821), in: “Preface”’ to The Philosophy of Right, translated by S. 
W. Dyde, 1896
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dations of the European idea and principles. The modern culture and lib-
eral values can be undisputedly seen as a basis of the European culture. 
For instance, the New Age attitudes towards creation of a new tradition, 
the age of ideology, rationalism, individualism, the notions of freedom, 
the social contract and order, and importantly – the concepts of universal-
ism and democracy, have an impact on the construction of the European 
socio-cultural system.
Another issue that demonstrates the way liberalism inspired Euro-
pean culture and identity is the importance of the articulation and defense 
of the ‘rights’ – civil and human rights alike. As William Sweet2 points out, 
not only the founders of modern liberalism, such as Hobbes, Locke and 
Kant, for whom the concept of natural right obviously has a central posi-
tion but also authors like Rousseau, Bentham, Mill, and Green for whom 
such rights do not have such a fundamental role address the question of 
their nature, source, and limits. The European Union3 continues the lib-
eral rights’ paradigm at the level of the civil and human rights. In this 
regard, the EU officially recognizes the universal applicability of human 
rights. Although the protection of human rights is not among the initial 
goals of the Union it is part of its engagements and political identity. For 
example, in 1999 a Committee on Democracy and Human Rights to the 
European Commission started to work providing technical and financial 
assistance, supporting programs and plans for action aimed at protecting 
human rights and the European Chart on the Fundamental Human Rights 
is underlined in the draft of the European Constitution.
From the above-mentioned, it can be concluded that, on the one 
hand, the historical roots of the idea of united Europe as well as some of 
the central characteristics of the European identity are reflected in its rela-
tion to liberalism.
On the other hand, given the challenges of post-modernism, the proc-
ess of globalization and life in a world that is increasingly pluralistic, the 
criticism of the possibility of universal values and liberal notions has taken 
place. An evident example of such revision of the common European val-
2 Sweet, W. “Liberal Political Philosophy and Rights from the 18th to the 20th 
Century”, http://www.uib.no/issei2000/workshop/sec4/sweet.htm, August 7, 2000. 
3 Hereafter EU
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ues is the debate and eventually the refusal of the EU and consequently 
– European identity’s identification with Christianity in the Preamble of 
the European constitution. The multicultural construction of identity 
adds new aspects to the human rights concepts insisting on their cultural 
specificity thus undermining or at least challenging the liberal EU values 
like universality, democracy, etc. Therefore, the second influence on the 
construction of the European identity one can observe derives from the 
concept of multiculturalism.
There is an on-going debate on the pros and contras of multicultural-
ism as well as on its applicability in the European context. For example, 
Mozejko in his article “Multiculturalism – an ideal and reality”4 argues 
that unlike the Canadian multiculturalism that is implemented or in-
tended to be implemented in practice, its interpretation in the majority 
of the EU countries remains mainly a theoretical issue taking place in the 
academic discussions but without a consistent legal basis and regulation. 
Countries like France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK similarly to 
the USA associate multiculturalism only with community-based claims 
arising from immigrant population with no results at the official politi-
cal level. At the level of the separate nation-state members of the EU the 
responses to the “multicultural riddle”5 differ. A notorious example illus-
trating the rejection of one of the basic multicultural policies – the accept-
ance of traditional and religious dress in schools, the military and society 
in general was offered by the French ban on religious symbols in public 
institutions. Such a political initiative that resulted in legal restrictions is 
in the spirit of liberalism according to which cultural identities (includ-
ing religious ones) that differentiate individuals from each other remain 
for the private sphere only, while in the public one citizens communicate 
on the basis of their common universal characteristics – reason, human 
nature, shared values, etc.
Nonetheless, there are examples illustrating the opposite view: Italy 
and Spain have institutionalized multicultural practice by establishing re-
4 Mozejko, E. “Multiculturalism – an ideal and reality”,http://www.slovo.bg/
old/litforum/136/edwardm.htm
5 Baumann, G. (1999). The multicultural riddle: Rethinking National, Ethnic, 
and Religious Identities, London: Routledge, pp. 122-133.
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gions with their own powers, while Switzerland officialized linguistic di-
versity. Additionally, other authors criticize Canadian multicultural model 
claiming that although multicultural policies as a rule oppose cultural as-
similation, the policy of Canada do support structural assimilation be-
cause the immigrant groups are encouraged to participate in the larger 
society, learn the majority languages, and enter the labour force.
Thus one can assume that the EU member-states do not respond 
equally to the multicultural challenge. But when it comes to the official 
EU policy some resemblance with the multicultural notion can be found. 
The implementation of the governmental multicultural policies around 
the world can include dual citizenship, programs to encourage minor-
ity representation in politics, education and the work force, support for 
arts from cultures around the world, etc6. Similarly, the EU’s approach of 
managing cultural diversity within the Union duplicates this multicultural 
public policy. An example is the multicultural fragmentation of society 
into self-contained communities that corresponds to the EU official intent 
to promote the policy of regionalism having the ambition to decentralize 
political decisions (especially in the cultural and educational sphere) and 
place them closer to the citizens. 
But what is even more important is the question if multicultural prax-
is can adequately correspond to the EU needs and reality when construct-
ing a common identity for its people. On the one hand, multiculturalism 
presents a way to guarantee respect for cultural identities and equality of 
rights, while consolidating the foundations of democracy. In this regard, 
some Canadian political scientists argue that such a defuse of the nation-
alistic temptation can prevent the existing social problems in Germany, 
France, England and the Netherlands and can reconcile the conflicts in the 
South Eastern Europe that is to be eventually accepted in the EU. 
However, the question that puts reservations about the possibility 
multiculturalism to be the “solution” for the European conflicts and for 
the construction of a common identity in Europe is the different historical 
background Europe has compared with the other continents where multi-
cultural project takes place. For example, in Canada, the USA or Australia 
6 See Wikipedia, Multiculturalism, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multicul-
turalism 
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the multicultural practice is reality to some extent and in some of them 
(Canada) it is even officially codified.7 Symbolically, although the word 
“multiculturalism” was first used in 1957 to describe Switzerland –a Euro-
pean country, it came into common currency in Canada in the late 1960s. 
It was created as a response to the bilingual and bicultural French-English 
society. As such, it was a phenomenon designed and working in a, to some 
extent, artificial environment – demographically and culturally contem-
porary Canada was set up relatively recently and by immigrants. But on 
the old continent it is not the immigrants but the indigenous people living 
for centuries in the region who are addressed by the multicultural sug-
gestion. Unlike the other above-mentioned continents whose history and 
common existence date back only few centuries ago, in Europe mutual 
stereotypes have been deeply-seated for centuries and the reciprocal hos-
tilities motivated by the history, ethnic differences, religions and cultures 
have been part of the national myths. Therefore, a question that remains to 
be answered is whether the multicultural model can be transferred to the 
EU who is not a nation-state type construction but a structure constituted 
by centuries-long co-existing identities with deep national traditions and 
roots? 
Moreover, multiculturalism tends to let the public space be invaded 
by expressions of subgroup identities. This, together with the fragmenta-
tion of society in several linguistic factions might ultimately lead to loss of 
public debate and democratic unity making many doubt the viability of a 
democratic European Union. However, the latter is not a critique related 
to the European identity only but to the multiculturalism as a whole im-
plying that the world-wide ethnic revival of the late 1960s would lead to an 
ethnic Balkanization destructive to modern industrial societies.
From anthropological view it is significant to mention the influence 
multicultural construction of a common European identity might have on 
the individual identities of the EU citizens. Ayn Rand considered multi-
culturalism and monoculturalism to be culturally determinist collectivism 
7 The multicultural policy was added to Canada’s 1982 constitution, in sec-
tion 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Also the Canadian Mul-
ticulturalism Act received Royal Assent in July 1988 affirming that Canada is a 
multicultural nation. 
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(i.e., that individual human beings have no free choice in how they act and 
are conditioned irreversibly by society). Philosophically, Rand rejected 
this form of collectivism on the grounds that: 1) it undermines the con-
cept of free will, and 2) the human mind (according to her philosophy) is 
a tabula rasa at birth.
In the same line of reasoning, Anthony Apia warns that the collec-
tive identification (of individuals as members of specific sex, race, ethnic 
group, nationality, etc) that multiculturalism presupposes imposes certain 
images how a person belonging to a specific group should behave and per-
ceive him/herself. From the point of view of the philosophical anthropol-
ogy, these collective scenarios have tremendous impact on human’s self 
identification – they ignore and destruct the possibility of validating the 
personal existential value of moral choice and self determination as unique 
human being. On the contrary, acting in accordance with the multicul-
tural principles, people tend to perceive themselves attributively – iden-
tifying themselves as representatives of a certain group, not subjectively 
– as distinctive, morally responsible human beings. The latter substitution 
reminds of the liberal reduction of the person – from a separate and dis-
tinctive human being to a citizen with equal rights among other citizens. 
The difference is that while liberalism puts the accent on the individual’s 
belonging to the humanity or to human beings as such, multiculturalism 
recognizes even more specifically the individual on the base of his/her be-
longing to a particular group. But none of them discusses the person out 
of its belonging to the “sameness” – be it a nature, a characteristic, a group 
or a collective identity. However, these both critiques of multicultural and 
liberal vision of the human being do not undermine the great intellec-
tual, political and social value and achievements they have and are evident 
when investigated from other standpoints. 
At the same time, multicultural approach is a kind of an “under-ques-
tioning” of the traditional, prescribed, mainstream culture. Similarly to the 
postmodern ideas, multiculturalism states there are no obligatory samples 
but only dissimilar models, cultures and values with which the individual 
decides to identify him/herself. And if it was not so much orientated to-
ward collective identities, it could be like a learning to be subject of one’s 
own life, decisions and identity. Moreover, the term multiculturalism be-
came a substantive category for all those who in the postmodern society 
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are striving to express their subjectivity and equal status. The creation of 
the phenomenon itself was inspired and motivated by the people’s aspira-
tion of fully recognized and embodied identity and respect of their sta-
tus as unique and specific subjects sometimes to the extent of narcissism. 
Compared to the other possible approaches towards cultural diversity and 
the Others, like assimilation, integration or indifference, multicultural ac-
ceptance and respect offer a higher degree of expressing ones collective 
identity and peaceful co-existence with the Others. Thus unlike other po-
lices of managing peaceful co-existence with the Others, like monocul-
turalism, leading culture and melting pot, multiculturalism better suit the 
European situation of having double – national and European identities. 
Thus in terms of the philosophical anthropology, multiculturalism 
satisfies the need of the human being of self _expression and raises the 
important question about the Others in constructing self identification or 
as in the case of the EU – of a common field of identification. Importantly, 
the definition of the term “multiculturalism” in the EU situation has new 
aspects and requires redefining its traditional meaning as a governmen-
tal policy dealing with immigrant subcultures. In the European case we 
cannot speak about a governmental policy towards immigrant groups and 
their cultures only but about the EU policy that would concern both im-
migrants and European citizens ideally reconciling their possible cultural 
clashes and introducing a culture of mutual respect and recognition of 
each other’s ethnic, religious, sexual, etc. identity. 
The latter specificity of the European construction of identity shows the 
Others not only as a “prerequisite” for creating my identity but they are prac-
tically part of my identity – I construct a shared identity together with them. 
The emblematic Taylor’s statement about the dialogical identity says that: 
We define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle 
against, the things our significant others want to see in us (…) The mak-
ing and sustaining of our identity (…) remains dialogical throughout our 
lives. Thus my discovering my own identity does not mean that I work 
it out in isolation, but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, 
partly internal, with others8 
8 Taylor, Ch. (1994) “Politics of recognition”, in: Gutmann, A., Multiculturalism: 
Examining the politics of recognition, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 33-34.
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However, in the European situation the Others are not only my mir-
ror, my “significant other” as George Mead9 puts it, but they are co-au-
thors of our identity. Or in other words, if multiculturalism emphasizes the 
unique characteristics of different cultures, as they relate to one another in 
receiving nations the European paradox is that there is no receiving na-
tion in the EU when constructing the common identity. So together with 
the dialogue within the EU that following Taylor is to shape the national 
identities EU needs another significant “other” to become the Other of 
the representatives of the European identity? America? The Muslim other? 
Turkey – the inner other as a test for the EU. Or the Others this time are 
maybe the national identities that confront, complement and accept the 
new European identity thus forming it and being formed, reconstructed 
and respected by it on their turn.
It seems, however, that exactly the dialogue between the existing na-
tional and the envisioned European identities is missing. Although it is 
not socially-derived or monological, the multiculturally constructed Eu-
ropean identity is in a way social oppression over the personal sphere or 
in the Amy Gutmann’s10 words multiculturalism deconstructs the intel-
lectual subordinating it to the political discourse. This raises the debate 
to what extent political interests and considerations can interfere in the 
intellectual, cultural, personal, existential realities? Even more given that 
the normative, political approach is emblematic for the EU hierarchically 
constructed European identity and reminds of the Soviet or Yugoslavian 
cultural identities that proved to be unsuccessful. 
The result of the two French and Dutch referenda have clearly re-
vealed the distance that lies between the construction of the European 
institutional project and the existence of a common European identity 
that could eventually lead citizens to share the political and institutional 
aims. And here the main question is not anymore – how multicultural is 
the construction of the European identity. Because multiculturalism as a 
policy and as an ideology exists on the EU agenda and is systematically 
9 Mead, G. (1934). Mind, Self, and Society, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.
10 Gutmann, Amy (1994). Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recogni-
tion, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 36.
76
promoted from Brussels. It is rather the issue how to reconcile the tension 
“power – existential” in the EU and parallel to the politically imposed by 
the center to the periphery instructions, an authentic intercultural com-
munication among Europeans to take place as a natural basis for a future 
common field of our-identification. Only then Europe will be able to reach 
its declared definition ‘a state of mind’ and replace the current one “a state 
of norm”. And only then the pre-reflectively inherited national identities 
can be harmonically combined with the new identity constructed as a re-
flected choice one made on the base of the certain European values, mod-
els and standard of life.
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Milena Licheva
PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS Of THE 
DIffERENCE BETWEEN THE EAST  
AND THE WEST  
(the process of constituting United Europe)
On the basis of philosophical reflection on experience in European 
projects Socrates (in the sphere of education) I will endeavour to describe 
my encounter of ‘otherness’ in representatives of European Union member 
states, as well as to ponder on conversations on the future of Europe – un-
clear and problematic – as Marcel Gochet refers to it (in Situation poli-
tique, Paris, 2005), conversations in which we articulate our differences 
but never for their own sake, but in the context of the thought of reality 
Europe.
My argument is that I differentiate between “intellectual difference” 
as such, seen by European masterminds, their reflections on the future of 
Europe, on the division East-West, and the “existentially experienced dif-
ference” which is precipitated experience, a basis for potential philosophi-
cal reflection.
I infer that the second difference is rich in reflexive and practical run-
ways. And that it has potential for a practical unification of Europe in the 
sense of creation of bridges, links and interrelationships in everyday life. I 
will describe their potential in the context of change in the personality and 
change in society. I have in mind the contacts which serve as the beginning 
of change – spiritual, everyday life change, social and institutional change. 
My first analytical viewpoint is that European intellectuals have dwelt 
upon the problem of the difference between East-West and expressed their 
belief that potentially there lies an opportunity for United Europe.
The West can be described implicitly through the notion of hypermod-
ernism, which Jill Lipovetzki defends in “Hypermodern Times”, S., 2005. 
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The hypermodern society is a function of the developed market economy, 
which gives rise to the dynamic, consumer type of man, orientated to eve-
rything connected with the market-focused thinking – “if something is 
sold, then it is good.” The materially satisfied society, in which the diver-
sification of goods and services creates and stimulates individualism of 
tastes, gives rise to a new type of man, according to Lipovetzki, the one 
after postmodernism, a man with new identity features. The hypermodern 
type of man takes over the flexibility of thinking and behaviour, based on 
his individualism, from the post-modern type. There are cases when this 
type of man might like certain lay or religious ideas from different tradi-
tions, but he will accept them only as far as they guarantee him spiritual 
comfort and practical value. That is why Lipovetzki is right in drawing the 
conclusion that “traditions have been re-tailored to suit the individual” (p. 
105). However, this amalgam of ideas, beliefs, styles and tastes assumes 
utilitarian aspects, i.e. if something serves the purpose, assists, stimulates, 
then it is accepted, used, adapted to the situation. Taking steps towards 
“everything which …” can be interpreted as amorphousness of this type of 
man, his identity is undetermined, since the latter is a succession of even-
tual metamorphoses, led by the imperative of the moment. The individual 
becomes a sort of a centre, subordinating and engulfing everything which 
could be of use to him. Then the maxim “there re no eternal friendships, 
there are eternal interests” becomes valid. And on the background of such 
logic, the long-lasting social relationship becomes an anachronism.
On the other hand, the individualism means a need for toposes, 
which could allow him to realise his potential; those will be the sites where 
he will meet other representatives of his kind, brought to those sites by 
the same tastes and preferences/needs. Then the associative need for uni-
fication, security, togetherness, community identity is not only the other 
face of individualism, but also a sort of an individualisation of the social. 
Society becomes the particular groups of people, who meet a shared need 
and carry out a mission in the general social context, i.e. to raise a particu-
lar question or to do something for society. Identity is constituted, it is a 
problem, therefore, it is not given nor found, it is a product which people 
create as much as they can.
This process of individualism turning into socially utilitarian (it is not 
always the case) activities, can be defined as a natural process of separate 
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constituting of identities being realised and finalised in a socially accept-
able end product.
These features-explanations make sense in the argumentation of the 
thesis that the West European also has his reasons to desire United Eu-
rope, and they are not only economical.
The identity in the process of being constituted, is always looking for 
opportunities to be realised, i.e. to create product (economic, spiritual), 
that is why the West European can be defined as a person whose spiritual-
ity always needs challenges. This word from the popular political practice 
can be understood as philosophical – the European spirit is being devel-
oped in the clash of opposites, in its meeting with the new and different 
and unpredicted: the European spirit itself is looking for challenges so that 
it can overcome them, understand them, and conquer them for reasonable 
aims. This gnoceological “hunger” for the new developments may be has 
its roots in the travels of the ancient philosophers to unknown lands to test 
their thinking, and perhaps to feel curiosity as a spiritual state, when the 
mind confronts new horizons. 
The meeting of the unknown in the form of the “other Europe”, which 
years ago was in opposition to the West, is a challenge, but it is a pre-set 
task – the unknown has to be understood and its integration achieved, i.e. 
this is a condition of mutual effort and activity.
Eril Veil, very much similar to Jill Lipovetzki, in “Political philoso-
phy”, Sofia, 2005, p.105 – he actually wrote it in 1955 – claims that the 
modern society of XX century consists of essentially unsatisfied individu-
als. The individualism is understood as breaking away from a certain tra-
dition, engaging into conflict, and therefore, starting along a hazardous 
road – that of opposing something… Therefore, the membership in the 
traditional community brings about an internal unbalance, and it has to 
be realised in new conditions, those of a world with values listed as effi-
ciency, success, calculation, struggling. Living becomes problematic every 
day, and this becomes the norm. The feeling of being isolated, outcast be-
comes widespread, but it is not due to the changing society, it is due to 
the changing individual, who wishes to achieve his own aims (p.111), but 
could never anticipate being unhappy after achieving them. Veil stands 
next to Lipovetzki when he establishes that the fate of the modern man 
is very similar to the one of the ancient man – they both have to survive 
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in day-to-day combat. The modern man, however, is in combat with the 
others, who also are individuals, and therefore the living communication 
becomes more difficult. The shift back to internal happiness can be seen 
both as a desire for balance, and desire for “standing firmly on one’s legs”, 
different from the living with a lot of insecurity, instability, changeability, 
which gives a sense of fatigue.
From the above mentioned statements and argumentation about the 
essence of the modern way of life of the man from the West, one can make 
the conclusion that the man from the West is in a new situation in the 
spiritual aspect – he understands he will have to work with an unknown 
partner and will have to build something difficult, forming in the process 
of mutual efforts in building it (getting to know each other, dialogue).
I do not want to claim that the fragile and confused man from the 
developed society will see in the unification of Europe processes his spir-
itual panacea, which will give him back the long lost stability. He will have 
the opportunity to look back into himself and to re-evaluate himself in the 
ensuing comparison, and there lies the historical chance for the “European 
type” of man to be created, in the aspects which Marcel Gochet mentions.
Gochet is a politologist, sociologist, but also a philosopher of the so-
cial aspects of life. In his book “The Political Situation”, Paris, 2005, he 
makes a clear distinction between the notions “nation” and “civilisation”. 
If the nation is a territorial and cultural formation, the civilisation has to 
be thought of always in the singular, according to him. It is a product of 
the existence of nations, the best they create in the economic and spir-
itual spheres. Civilisation is the sum total of all economic and spiritual 
achievements, products of the human genius, which are channelled along 
their social applicability towards entering the everyday life of the people 
to make it easier and more comfortable. The European man holds and 
nurtures this spirit of constant search, investigation, discovery, application 
and then again search – deductive and inductive. That is the basis of the 
European science which has always aimed at practical applicability.
The United Europe has turned out to be a historical chance for na-
tions to cooperate and in this cooperation to enhance new dimensions of 
the European genius at different levels.
The modern man, however much he maybe under the control of 
his own individualism, is confronted by the tradition, in the broadest 
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sense – he will have to “defy” it, to process it and subordinate it to his 
aims.
Gochet formulates some of the traditional European values – every-
one develops their own identity by reflection upon the universal values, 
seen through his own Self, which is based on precipitated experience, i.e. 
relatively permanent attitudes in thinking. The European spirit is the spirit 
of compatibility as a product of the individual insights into the realities. 
The compatibility then develops the European dynamics – the nations, 
according to Gochet, have always compared among themselves, they have 
always scrutinised each other, followed each other, copied each other. This 
mutual getting to know each other has happened many times in European 
history and it has affected it – movements, groups and societies, thinkers, 
have never been only national heritage (p. 473-5).
The European spirit holds in itself the strife to interpret “the univer-
sality of civilisation”. If the universal is the best people aim at, today it is 
achieved in the process of mutual activity. And this is a challenge in itself. 
To strive after the best, that Platonic optimum, which is the idea itself, 
means the spirit to pursue his perfection. This leads to two aspects accord-
ing to Plato:
• search within yourself, i.e. in your thought system for the better of 
the good, so that you do not impose limitations on yourself to stay 
within the completeness of either the idea or the thing; 
• wish to constantly change the thing-as-a-product of your activity, 
and to adapt it to your needs. 
Pierre Statius in a lecture to university professors (University of Besan-
son, France, December 2005) outlines the beliefs of Toquil about democ-
racy on the background of the different French interpretations of Toquil. 
The anthropological dimension of democracy is in the understanding of 
equality – the other one is similar to me, and hitherto the so called “socie-
ties of the other” are those of co-belonging, solidarity. Closeness is the re-
sult, it is the product of the activity of equality. Man has deeply engrained 
in himself the strife to look for others of his kind, although he knows that 
even two individuals will be very different.
Modern democracy, according to Toquil, does not allow for much 
time to the modern individual for thought – he works and he has enter-
tainment and these two activities are then repeated. Democracy needs 
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agreed consent of everyone, but it is prone to potential crises, because it 
bases itself on thinking creatures, that have many means of communica-
tion and information, diversified in their activities. The individual as an 
individualist is fragile, as far as he lives between a certain successive re-
quirement for unity and his own autonomy of identity.
This orientation towards oneself as interior (the Self) and exterior 
(my things, my products) is impossible without turning to the others. The 
otherness is the experience of the others, another vision about things. The 
European spirit is also one of dialogue.
The constituting of United Europe is good in itself in the sense of 
unification is a challenge to the ways of thinking in the West and in the 
East. There is an array of questions we have to ask ourselves as Easterners. 
The European family which would like to include us, should it be achieved 
at the expense of old friendships, or should old friendships be renewed 
and interpreted in the new situation, in which the mutual interest is the 
determining factor? Is cooperation based on feelings of sympathy, or on 
closeness, for example? When does the feeling of having an obstacle in 
the cooperation arise? Is the modern consensus possible as a status quo, 
agreed upon among many partners? How could we look for the universal 
on a European scale when some of the Eastern European nations, we have 
not achieved that real “optimum” which some countries have; could we 
think about the better of that “best” when we are at the level of the worse 
that real “best”?
In the second part of my paper I state that I will be thinking about 
the problematic issues of Europe in a practical sense. I am aware that here 
I follow the style and the experiences of Montain and the confessions of 
Roussea.
The modern individual searches for his identity through his partner-
ship in collective identities. He chooses those communities which allow 
him to feel at his best, and which allow him to realise his potential as a 
personality, to test himself, to learn to cooperate, to change.
There lies the realisation of the modern identity of the European man, 
who embarks upon a journey towards the otherness when he decides to 
take part in cooperative project work. This is an opportunity for a new 
group identity – entering a group with European membership, people 
who are different in languages, social experience, or systems of values. 
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Upon entering that European mini-community the personality has 
the opportunity to go beyond its realisations to new aspects.
I accept the argument of Jean-Claude Kaufman (“Inventing Oneself. 
A Theory of Identity”, Paris, 2004) that in a community we tend to first 
establish the differentiation and then the unity takes place (p.169).
The European Union is constituted on the principles of voluntary ac-
tivity, which means investment of time and efforts into working together. 
At the same time this type of work needs weekly electronic contacts, as 
well as developing knowledge of the language of communication.
Projects work involves not only group meetings in real physical space. 
It is also a manifestation of identities. The first reaction of the project par-
ticipants is confidence, based on their own social context, after that it 
changes in the appreciation of the difference of the others. Every partici-
pant initially does a presentation – who they are, where they come from, 
how they work, what kind of product they have created (general infor-
mation, form, parameters, innovation, process of manufacture). One can 
spot the difference in two aspects of identities – similar to one’s own and 
different from one’s own. 
If the Bulgarian presentation is rationalised emotion, which is never 
totally “subdued”, then in a Swedish project team there is a tone of quiet 
bonding, restraint of outer _expression in poor non-verbal communica-
tion techniques. The Swedish spirit is one of inner peace, balance, strong 
emotions, and an impressive vigilance for disproportion (in relationships, 
work rhythm, and work/entertainment routine). The Swedish spirit reacts 
spontaneously to unfairness with the express wish to restore it to a status 
of fairness (Aristotle would have termed it “justified fairness”). Besides, 
this spirit is strong with its mediator’s mission, which the Swedish people 
accomplish with a feeling of pride and gratification. To act as a media-
tor means to help traditionally different standpoints come together. The 
Swedish spirit reflects an ecologically approached nature, nature which is 
worshiped as a cult, communication with nature is a natural need (and 
this could explain the purity of the internal urge to communicate with 
different cultural traditions). The North European is spontaneous in his 
own way – he has natural movements, without reasonable limitation, with 
subdued emotions, which even in their maximum seem low pitched on 
the background of the East European emotional volcanic eruption of feel-
ings, movements, physical stylistics.
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Into the European team the Swedish representative brings calmness, 
a feeling of immeasurable spiritual space, a genuine desire for cooperation 
and indefatigable patience in listening to the arguments of the different 
from him. He is not capable of repudiating the partner because he is posi-
tive and open for contacts. He is reserved and this may be understood as a 
certain passivity but not coldness. There is an aspect of taking his time in 
waiting, there is an openness to be in contact with everyone, his mission is 
to be like a bridge in different directions, and to enhance mutual activity.
The Spanish spirit is strikingly stunning – the Spanish participant is 
with emotions which are shown on his face, and it always shows the busi-
ness mood, the joking mood, the caring mood. The Spanish representative 
comes into working mode with certain reservations – he does not feel very 
well when he is being organised. He feels that he has very special rational-
ism, indented by emotions, the emotions underlie him as an argument on 
all sides. When he tells a story, he not only acts it but also he co-experi-
ences it. He does not distance himself from the fact but he remains in it, as 
if to represent himself as inner felt emotion. He impresses with his strong 
attachment to traditions – strict, crude, lacking in subtlety and etiquette, 
but eloquent in its imaging. The Spanish spirit is full of emotional nuances, 
he balances them well and subordinates them to practical aims. He brings 
traditions together, he worships the distant different friend, who has come 
to him and brought a different aspect to enrich his world.
The Spanish representative makes the European spirit and spirituality 
richer in the desire to cherish the very core of the soul. He endeavours to 
show that it can be lively, therefore, emotional or reacting in every mo-
ment. This vitality is contagious, and coupled with the desire for contact, 
it revitalises the team, it makes it one lively whole, a group of people who 
openly show their emotions.
The Romanian spirituality is rational-sentimental. It is also very much 
attached to its traditions, it also cherishes its nature with its variations as 
a cult, it is in its own way a type of workaholic, with a marked element of 
openness towards the others and desire for cooperation.
There is also a small element of worry in the desire to be liked and 
appreciated at any rate. Therefore, it makes greater effort to be accepted, 
overdoing the self-presentation in the subconscious fear not to be shunned. 
When it recognises the signs of appreciation and acceptance, it becomes 
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natural and free, and it unveils itself – it shows itself as uncontrollable at 
times, introvert as far as its fears, and very cooperative and imposing of 
its understanding of the universal, as it sees it. It is also very hospitable, it 
craves to keep the different ones for itself. It would enrich the European 
cooperation with its natural energy, depth of spirit and attachment to the 
universal values. There is an aspect of the feeling of the universe in it, if I 
may use the phrase of Berdyaev.
I believe that these descriptions-reflections and insights into the merit 
of the “pieces” of the European identity prove that not only man is “mani-
fold and changeable” in the phrasing of Montain, but also
by being different, everyone enriches the European identity. Not only 
can we understand our difference on the background of the interpersonal 
relationships, but also we can use its positive side to enrich the potential 
of the European identity. The latter is not plain coming together and pre-
serving some European values, but it is mutual enrichment and mutual 
curiosity to find oneself through the eyes of the others.
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Milan Tasić D. 
ON SURPASSING (IN REASON) fORMS  
Of SOCIAL VIOLENCE; TOWARD 
(POLITICAL) ACTION Of WORLD’S 
PHILOSOPHERS, SCIENTISTS, ETC.
Philosophers have interpreted the world in 
various ways, but the matter is to change it. 
Marx: Theses on Feuerbach, 11.
If we take a look “from above’’ at social history, what “persistently’’ 
stands out– this time said without nuances – would be: 
1) a power of tyrants which has been conceived and perpetuated “be-
yond’’ humaneness; 
2) a suppressed or diffused resistance of a multitude of individuals 
which only periodically took on an organized form and followed through 
to a rebellion; 
3) a layer of people which truly thought over forms of living well in a 
community, but created it (somehow) “for itself ’’ without a visible effort 
to do so.
We have therefore a man who – if not in a bare (slave) form – did 
not cease to tempt himself with a heavy burden of non-freedom, of frauds 
and lies, nor to think of a (more or less) unbearable existence, at least the 
schematic and general forms of its abolition. But, although the quantity 
of knowledge about what is around him (nature), about a community of 
people (society), as well as about himself, always increased, we don’t see 
how he attentively thinks out effective forms of revolt and rebellion against 
a blind power over him, what could help him, at the beginning of millen-
nium, to not be – as from the beginning – to such an extent dependent, or 
roughly said – a slave.
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Let us choose, before an idea of a possible (general) teaching on re-
sistance, or of a study (science) itself on it, to examine if it gives oneself 
and to what extent to (several) basic methods of social sciences and let us 
take from them that which we find to be most appropriate. This is also true 
in how we view the subject of learning as social learning. 
In the later case, the answer is near trivial, if one takes the subjective 
reality of a human individual which “behaves’’ toward other individuals 
and (doesn’t cease) to think about standards of worthy relations in a hu-
man community, or values to be respected, so that a harmony of particular 
and different motives and wishes appears, to be twice “in act’’: both in 
the “holders’’ of a repressive power and in those over which this power is 
demonstrated.
From there, in the sense of a method, every rearranging of relations 
in a society can find a point of departure (and be interpreted) in the sense-
experience facts and this is the standpoint of (all) positivisms (E. Durkhe-
im and others) in sociology. Just as an axiological approach also naturally 
should find a place (M. Weber, H. Rickert) in this area which, it is said, 
by disregarding facts, is searching (only) for understanding and for the 
meaning of spiritual values that an individual promotes in a community. 
Two in fact contrary positions, for their “strong points’’ are disparate ones 
and mutually non-reducible: from one side subject (positivism), and from 
the other value (axiologism), in the first case we are looking for reason, 
and in the other one for motive, or once for explanation, and another time 
for understanding, etc.
We find here that some unforeseeable gap doesn’t separate the enu-
merated sequences, for if the matter is of an object-value “antagonism’’, 
where the “object’’ should bring something constant, unchangeable and 
the “value’’ – always different and changeable or, in gnoseological terms, 
the knowledge on the former should be “objective’’ and on the latter “sub-
jective’’ – at least from the viewpoint of non-realizibility (to the end) of the 
“thing-in-itself ’’ – we don’t possess (even) the same notions about things 
of real world. We do not know which definition to follow, for by going 
from philosopher to philosopher, it is different. At least in its formulation. 
Therefore, we do not succeed in reaching a sufficient definition of a “table’’, 
because of an extremely great number of forms that it can obtain or a mul-
titude of purposes it can serve. Therefore in such a thing resides necessary 
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vagueness so that the knowledge about it would be only approximate, just 
as in the case of moral categories which, throughout civilization, empha-
size no less diversity than things of the real world. And we should similarly 
express ourselves when the matter is of every parallel: cause-motive, fact-
standard, explanation-understanding etc. from the two spheres.
It is known also that “dialectic’’ methods convincingly justified the 
unity of object and method of knowledge, by following the same onto-
logical picture which has seen objects and phenomena – in the visible and 
non-visible world –as contradictory ones and development generally as a 
struggle of contradictions (along the line “thesis-antithesis-synthesis’’) etc. 
In our opinion, the last position gains an advantage over the two others, 
in that it “envelopes’’ them, though we find that – for the whole destiny of 
science – every partial approach is more fruitful, and (at least) the “end-
less’’ atomization of the domains of knowledge in the framework of the 
existing sciences points to it. Inasmuch as the (limited) human power can’t 
be brought in reasonable relation, even from afar, to any “theory of all’’ (a 
term of Stephen Hawking). Extremely simplified computer science where, 
we know, derivations are founded (only) on the two states of matter: “there 
is a circuit – there is not a circuit’’ in it (on the two numbers 0 and 1), 
confirms this standpoint, so that in this way can be realized both colour 
and sound, form and movement and gets itself the power that it has. Let’s 
call such teachings “merologic’’ – from the greek words μεροϚ (= part) and 
λογοϚ – and let us try to make sketches of two1 of them.
1) when the domain of interest is the “possessed’’ privatization of 
social property in the period of “transition’’ and numerous social groups 
would like to articulate their (different) – more humane – interests and 
bring them to a realization;
2) if the matter of fact is an urgent need of “men who know’’ to win 
the right to  a (social) power throughout the planet, and visible signs of 
different cataclysms we  anticipate are replaced by a realizible vision of 
harmonious life in the community.
1 We do it for we see that any of “atomic’’, singular, particular studies of this 
type of teaching is more possible than a general study of it, as historical material-
ism did not confirm itself in the practice, and on the side of opponents of holistic 
teachings, who are inclined to the science of society rather than to temporal sche-
mas, than to scientific laws that are known, say, to physics.
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By doing so we have taken (unintentionally) an inverse path: point-
ing out first a theoretical framework in which a possible social action can 
be interpreted, followed by a “spectrum’’ of particular operations which, 
taken together, would result in the same action. 
A general and the furthest basis to dissolve the repressive power that 
“permeates’’ mutual relations of members of an institution, who acquire 
the possibility for a (human) creation in liberty, would be (nevertheless) 
the vulnerable human nature, or (nevertheless) the vulnerable human 
mind, which don’t free themselves easily of the facts otherwise proclaimed 
as morally dangerous, undesirable, etc., but continue to last or to drop in 
the consciousness, so that it possibly could bear the (desired) changes. 
On the other hand, since there are schools and education exists in 
them, one proceeds with those more or less standard forms of moral 
comportment of an individual in society which are anew transmitted to 
generations of men, serving them in a (already) created and conceived 
social frame. But a highest truth in human reality would belong to such 
an educative impulse which would suggest to an individual patterns of 
possible (and always new) changes of reality – in the sense of the thesis 
of Feuerbach.2 So that we hold that a persistent transmission of a “perma-
nent’’ ideal for changes, still from the lowest age, would effectively reflect 
in the quality of a particular life, as well as in the community itself. If an 
objection here would take place, otherwise reasonable, that human nature 
is inclined to a conformity and that our mind is rather addicted to lazi-
ness than to the uncertainities that bring an action in freedom, the answer 
would be that it is actually so, but that the whole history of human thought 
convincingly shows what a ruinous influence any “inert’’ inclination to 
the prejudices, illusions, errors had.3 And from the other side the epithet 
“royal’’ really belongs to freedom, its borders being moved without end 
and releasing space at least to an “immeasurable’’ artistic creation. There-
fore to first encourage a human individual to adopt “positive’’ and irrefuta-
ble knowledge about the world etc., and then always and anew to instruct 
this individual its “vocation’’ to invent ways of creativity without end. We 
2 These 11. (See motto of the paper).
3 Francis Bacon calls them “idols’’. Racall also that, during Middle Age, the 
learned persons cited Aristotles by words: Magister diхit (“Teacher said’’).
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find in that framework the theoretical justification that a practical action 
toward changes in circumstances of a social nature is really possible.
Having explained for this instance a theoretical possibility of such 
merologic teaching, let’s clearly define (as much as it is possible) the sub-
ject of knowledge itself. It would be: such rules, standards of behavior of 
an individual in a firm which would replace the existing (authoritative) 
form of direction with a more democratic model, which should satisfy the 
interests of the greatest number of people. Then: such a corpus of rules 
would (already) free a hierarchy between them, so that by the force of it, 
their effectiveness in practice would be highest one.
Let us take for a zero (or an initial state) of a work organization such as 
one in a position where the social property over it would be canceled and 
it takes up a position of privatization. By an unwritten rule, suggested from 
an economic-social theory, from an (evidently) strange space this time, it 
will not be asked for the origin of money which will be used for its pur-
chase, furthermore the same social power will make all (what is paradoxi-
cal) such an organization, at least materially, to be made worthless, so that 
in a given moment its price would be sufficiently low. Then, roughly speak-
ing, outside every ethical codex, the manager gives into temptation and 
– brings workers to the brink of physical and spiritual existence, who from 
reasons we don’t quote, choose silence as their “categorical imperative’’. We 
have it in mind that further – according to a model –realized incomes will 
become his property, so that he alone would realize half of estimated value 
and “easily’’ induce workers, say, to take a loan from the bank, to see so far 
“their’’ company as really theirs. If they aren’t fit for a loan – they will obtain 
fictive confirmations that they are, and soon they will deliver money, in 
“exchange’’ for some receipt, assigned stocks and so on. Speaking further, 
for this occasion simply, now salaries are reduced for amount of credit in-
stallment, and consciously supported a bad dealing, and lowered the mar-
ket value of stocks to a negligible amount. Since the manager continues to 
choose his income as he likes, he comes to buy up all, or nearly all, stocks of 
the workers, which now “voluntary’’ agree to it, etc.
Thus, up to this moment, he is not especially motivated to advance 
dealing and increase earnings to workers, in addition he has the possibil-
ity, before the challenges of different investments, to easily join another 
business, where he could continue “to flow’’ the labor of employed people. 
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Time for which the competition would (possibly) strengthen and “move’’ 
our institution to a more unenviable place.
We find here that the furthest theoretical end point in the philosoph-
ico-psychologico-social sense belongs to the (confirmed) category of “con-
fidence,’’ and we put it at the center of all activities directed to a favorable 
exchange of relations we discuss. As we know, the most exact of all sciences, 
mathematics, is based (only) on the belief in the exactness of axioms, as 
in principles in physics, and every educational effort on the confidence of 
pupils in a teacher. So that these two words “confidence’’ and “activity’’ will 
meet, without doubt, between basic notions of a teaching on breaking of 
social force, founded in reason. Namely, confidence to be at the head of an 
organization deserving of only those who in earlier business realised visible 
results, or a constant growth of business success up to that time. And in 
waiting it becomes, it remains an activity to be developed which the existing 
repressive form will replace by a collective one of work organization. Then 
the income would be more righteously distributed and so on.
But how to attain it?
Taking into consideration postulated secrecy, a prevalent part of 
forms that know (public) nonviolent actions today in the world (mainly) 
aiming to overturn political dictatures, would be – inimaginable. We have 
here in mind: public speeches, signed declarations, slogans and symbols, 
boycotts and strikes,4 ... and others that can be easily supposed, so that the 
activities which are based on the two other basic notions in this area will 
take place: “anonymity’’ and “secrecy’’. And then those acts which would 
be thought out by a group of people rather than an individual, and by 
“people who know’’ rather than those interested in it would be more effec-
tive. Naturally, we are attracted by those constant principles, well formed 
and brought in an ordered relation, which would make up part of a most 
distributed educative effort in schools. If they are classified in groups, such 
methods – we have indicated it – could be classified in a triple schema:5 
4 From publication: Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Boston, 1973.
5 Every one of them could be supported by arguments of both philosophical, 
and psychological, and sociological nature, as well as the methods themselves – what 
we do not this time. This would not be also a complete form of it, but rather only a 
confirmed possibility that this type of principles could be thought through.
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1. convictions that categories of fate, of believing, of confidence, ...are 
the basis of conceptions of “all’’ human and social relations, and what – we 
know it in sciencies – extends to the science of nature (Hume);
2. convictions that the secrecy of spreading ideas about efficient ac-
tions perhaps are more powerful than public confrontation with forces of 
oppression;
3. messages to the bearer of repressive power that it can be under-
mined, if the resistance would sufficiently grow and manifest to a destruc-
tive power, so that it would sway him in its regime of management.
And a particular prolegomenon to such an activity would represent 
some constant caution “the ideas of change’’ do not come in the hands of 
informers and spies. They would be “easily’’ recognized by insincerity, in-
consistency, contradictions in their “support’’ for such changes, etc.
ad 1. Say:
1. The matter is about a “renowned’’ firm which has visible indexes of 
progress over decades.
2. The person at the head of a corporation impresses others with the 
“unity’’ of his moral character and an “image’’ as a businessman.
3. The website of the organization is www.... Copies from this site are ...
4. In a declaration by the manager of the company, a clear interest is 
expressed in their investment in our company. 
5. In figures, it would mean they give at once such and such, in a year 
such and such, and for three years ...
6. The employees would be insured in their retirement with a foreign 
company which has a hundred year long tradition long.
7. New modern (productive) capacities and new business offices 
would be built and equipped, and working conditions essentially facili-
tated. In addition, the entire complex would be architecturally attractive.
8. The political option in which we trust is in favor of it and local fac-
tors can “easily’’ help us etc.
Here: passing from one member to another we find that (already) they 
are “many-sided’’ founded, being expressed in coordinates of past, present 
and future, of an individual and of a community of peoples, of material 
and spiritual values, of ethical and aesthetic categories and so on.
ad 2. Say:
1. The matter of changes being (already) of essential meaning for a 
man, why expose the idea of it to (arbitrary) factors which could be de-
structive for its realization.
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2. During history, what is realized as socially new and under a hard 
burden of oppressive power, might pass a secret path – at least in the be-
ginning. We see it from different micro-levels, through “fraternities’’ and 
religious communities, up to macro-forms themselves, such as revolu-
tions. 
3. To think out a model of action of which the governing structure 
would not possess consciousness and which is attainable only if we recog-
nize the power of conspiracy. 
4. Somewhere outside there would have to be a “center’’ of action, 
where events would be diligently monitored and ways discovered for the 
actions to be “advanced’’ in the spirit of a constant growth in the potential 
of resistance.
5. This time really there is no shortage of ways – technically – for 
messages to be registered and transmitted. (Public) telephone books make 
“access’’ to every person possible, and a certain secrecy is provided by tel-
ephone booths also.
6. Especially mobile telephones allow an immediate connection 
“without a trail’’ of an individual with many persons, by means of words 
or through letters.
7. In the indicated model, the place of every individual would be recog-
nized and clearly determined, and he would respect undertaken duties etc.
Here again: the increased power of technical means, several of which 
almost everyone possesses, with equally jagged organized forms of con-
nections and actions, favour the feasibility of this conspiracy project.
ad 3. Say:
1. Certainly, the messages would free here the idea of contents from 
the model of action 3. ad 2, but in the beginning one, both particular and 
“universal’’ hypocrisy would certainly take place: an enthusiasm for the 
existing forms of organization before the face of its holders and a readiness 
to oppose them on the other side.
2. A hypocrisy which would obtain diversity of manifestations: say, 
clearly not recognizible but hidden in the form of a boycott of leading per-
sons, of orders that come from them, of their own work obligations.
3. Anonymous letters of individuals to redactions of reviews, to the 
Ministry.
4. Graphics: caricatures, slogans.
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5. An agreed dress, identical or unusual, silence during work and in 
meetings.
6. (Anonymous) letters to the director.
7. (Natural) transition of qualified manpower to other work organiza-
tions, which offer more favorable work conditions, as well as higher salaries.
8. The dramatic events, next to each other, different in nature, resulted 
from quasi-legal situations to which the organization would be brought by 
quasi-legal behavior of individuals, etc. And finally
9. An open manifestation of demands of employed people for the 
abolition of privatization at the highest level by the highest institutions of 
the state.
Although poor in indications, the offered proposition of changes of 
social reality on a macro-level should offer the elements upon which a 
basis for sufficient general teaching can be founded.
* * *
Let us support this time a “macro–project’’ of advancing ideals for a 
“harmonious’’ existence of human community before threatening signs of a 
nuclear, ecological, or demographic disaster, after a “collectively’’ thought out 
means to avoid them, just from philosophers, scientists and “(all) who know’’.
Namely, the quantity of knowledge left from the population of phi-
losophers, scientists, ... on that which surrounds us (nature), about the 
community of peoples (society), as well as about man itself is truly impres-
sive – for we know more than anyone in time – so that it seems near para-
doxical that a “visible’’ transformation of the world still has not occured, 
after rules coming from the essence of it already seen as (anyway) a “social 
being’’, a “being of truth’’, “justice’’ and “beauty.’’ He didn’t cease to care 
for these patterns throughout the whole of history, though we recognize 
throughout it also “oases’’ of hate, injustice and evil, but we are witnesses 
to a “considerably’’ lost hope of organized social forces to see the light of 
day and to impose them as a model of living in a community. And already 
early history records utopian projects, but in the form of ideal organiza-
tions coming from reason, which didn’t succeed, for coming from “above,’’ 
from the head, they have been only constructions. Republic (Plato), City 
of God (Augustine), City of the Sun (Campanella), Utopia (Morus), ... have 
brought such projects whose destiny would be favorable if they were partly 
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supported by “positive’’ knowledge about man, society, nature. The case of 
“communist utopia’’ confirms the thesis, for it has been confirmed for a 
certain time in its initial phase – in socialism, and what has been justified 
by science, by knowledge of political economy and social history, ...
Therefore we plead for such forms of social engagement of “people 
who know,’’ different in numbers of their members, as well as in the scope 
of goals that they have in mind.
How could, say, the word of a philosopher, of a physicist, a chemist, a 
biologist, on a global level, effectively “prolong’’ until the creation of forms 
of living in community which would be in harmony rather than conflict? 
In the cases of:
a) problems such as the threat of nuclear or ecological disaster of the 
planet, or
b) (im)possibility of a European culture which would arise through 
the process of globalization over the “ruins’’ of national cultures or com-
munities?
ad a). We find here numerous and detailed inspections, diagnostics, 
warnings as well as solutions themselves, but which do not cease to re-
side in “ivory towers’’, being only pronounced, contained in books and 
proceedings. We do not register cases where philosophers, scientists for-
ward their ideas up to realization in practice, and after they have been 
convincingly diffused among the people, or “conceived’’ possible events 
in society, etc. Historically, an instructive example of this kind brings the 
founder of “scientific socialism’’ Karl Marx, who in this place didn’t stop 
at “the half-way point,’’ but his possible contribution to philosophical sci-
ence was pawned for work in the worker’s movement. And the project of 
the classless society – at least up to a certain measure and in a period of 
time – nevertheless has seen the light of the day, though it had as a start-
ing point a vague (social) concept of the “proletarian.’’ Or (even) being a 
particular amalgam of a philosophico-socio-economic theory, of ideology 
and of arms of class struggle ... – a way that followed equally projects of 
enlightenment, of liberalism etc., having inspired an effective potential of 
some social group for it to “carry on’’in practice.
Sporadically we find here movements, associations, unions which 
plead for (atomic) disarmament, peace, a healthy environment, but they 
are all rather on a mission to contest some imposed political project, to 
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point out “passively’’ a danger which is boding, to oppose the intentions 
of countries and governments. They come post festum and are based – if 
the matter is of radiation and ecological problems – on sporadic, partial, 
nearly complete knowledge from papers about harmful aspects of some 
economy, politics, ... Only as anonymous and “incidental’’ – if at all – some 
scientist as a “adviser’’ appears in a political office, though the effects of the 
knowledge he possesses are not visible in the decisions being made.
As in solving (every) micro-problem, we would start from a (fore-
seen) clear picture of disastrous effects which come from two spheres. 
Who should make it? The scientists alone and they by writting their papers 
rather “collectively’’ than individually. And then through scientific meet-
ings, symposia, and congresses would an optmal programme of confron-
tation with the dangers be made and offer a vision for survival for which 
we have to fight. But in which way?
Taking into consideration that all around the world are prevailing 
democratic forms of reign, and that political parties, after gaining power, 
can realize their decisions in practice, we propose philosophers, scien-
tists of all fields to form political parties, legalize movement under an 
“approximate’’ name “gnoseocrats’’, or subtitle “party (movement) of 
people who know.’’ In their sum they would make an (ordered) system 
of organizations, of international character, in such a way that – in other 
conditions – worked the International, but our intention here is to make 
a proposition and to justify somewhat the possibility of realization, rather 
than to expose whichever projection of the organization itself.6 
Who could say, for example, a reasonable word about “ the coming era 
of nanotechnology’’7, about all favorable aspects of a (dramatic) change of 
reality which it could make possible, as well as about the dangers which 
are waiting on this road? Naturally, the nanotechnologists themselves 
(chemists, biologists, ...) who would direct convincingly into the world of 
new things and beings, so far non existant, or rather to all “corrections’’ 
of living nature, as well as to consequences of such a state. If the role of 
a politician could seem further unavoidable in social events, it would be 
6 Even different “non-classic’’ forms of their organization would have place.
7 After title of book: Erick Drexler, Engines of Creation; The Coming Era of 
Nanotechnology, 1986.
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extremely disagreeable to a whole picture of the world to have nanotech-
nologists (only) for advisors –somewhere “in the shade’’ – of a politician. 
The two spheres therefore necessarily have to be brought close, and the 
other one to take an organized form, to free by itself the supreme potential, 
which would be effectively thought over afterwards.
Let us be reminded of what the subject is!
If it is sure that all nature consists of (chemical) elements, which en-
ter into the composition of compounds, a power to separate the elements 
themselves – even just enriched uranium – have laboratories to make 
atomic bombs. And if it has been already confirmed that (far) presenti-
ment of Democritus from Abdera that properties of objects – say, that 
a diamond is hard, sugar sweet, and milk white – is owed only to form, 
order and position of atoms, if we have opportunity to compose and sepa-
rate elements and to “manipulate’’ them, we acquire a power to drastically 
transform the world around us and us ourselves.
Namely, on the level of nano-structures (a “nano’’ is a billionth of a 
meter) machines called “assemblers’’ have been conceived for manipulat-
ing atoms and molecules, following a programme, to be recognized and 
brought into a desired order. Then, by acquiring a power (not necessary 
in natural conditions) for creation, first it would put an end to something 
that has always been a constant threat to the survival of humanity: food, 
water, energy, for food could be “reared’’ in the home itself etc. Or when 
tissue gets sick (after an injury, say) and the atoms of its cells are lead in 
another order, or where’’foreign’’ atoms (bacteria etc.) are present, to rees-
tablish their former order would mean to substitute health for illness, and 
generally, force – for weakness of an organism, and an arbitrary choice 
of time – for an average life expectancy. The blind will regain their sight, 
the deaf their hearing, and the lame an ability to walk, so the remedy for 
“incurable’’ illnesses (cancer, aids) is invented and on this side are certainly 
methods of biotechnology, genetic engineering and so on.
But an overturning role in all of that would certainly belong to me-
chanical creations which do not have any equal, and which imitate human 
intellect – to robots. (Machines a thousand times more powerful, which 
will think better than man itself). For to supply – no matter in which 
form – machines with intellect is a step which could be compared with 
those when in ancient times primates acquired such power.
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But the reverse of the vision offered, what will not cease to be a chal-
lenge for “endless’’ discussions, would be (equally) unforeseeable and neg-
ative aspects of the production of nano-particles for the “model’’ of the 
healthy environment we knew from the beginning. The automatization of 
production would disturb to a high degree the market of manpower, but 
problems of a moral nature would get the highest significance. We would 
meet such “creatures’’ which aren’t the human beings we know ...
ad b).Here again let us ask ourselves in the same way: Who could say 
such a (reasonable) word, having in mind the (im)possibility of a “euro-
pean’’ culture, which would replace the existing national cultures? As well 
as to convincingly support its realization in practice? For what comes up is 
part of a (near) unison of dissapproval of the idea of permeating different 
spiritual inheritances, but if the matter is of what a characteristic of every 
national culture is – say, rite, ritual, magic, myth, religion – such facts are 
studied to the highest degree from the ethnological, philosophical, and 
sociological standpoints so that we should not doubt the exactness of a 
justified “diagnosis’’. (As much as in the human sphere such end results are 
feasible, and are expressed in some schemas, as “general traits’’ etc., rather 
than being similar to the conclusions in natural sciences.)
And from where does the (unified) pessimistic tone come?
It seems that this is the _expression of the hypocrisy of (caste) lay-
ers and structures which, in these circumstances are losing social power, 
and to opposing “global’’ processes we join instead by inertia, by force of 
prejudice, by power of authority ... Or because the promoters themselves 
of these politics do not explain (more profoundly) the foundation of this 
idea, dealing with it as with something accepted as self-evident. 
Let us put forward at least several (simple) questions: 1) Did anyone 
require anywhere to put an end to national cultures, justifying that it is 
necessary no matter what the reason? 2) Is it in accordance with (whoev-
er’s) definition of man as a social being, a being of freedom that “fits’’ to 
him rather than patterns of an isolated, local, limited living? 3) Is it pos-
sible to imagine the (contemporary) development of a country other than 
as technological-industrial and is a closure more favorable, or the (widest) 
openness – of market, borders of countries, ...?
In spite of possible threats being an inkling of the identity, or origi-
nality of what is national – we can argue – it is maintainable in a “united 
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Europe’’, as well as in the world as a “global community’’ with only an or-
ganized form to realize it needing to be found. Do thousands upon thou-
sands of reports from scientific meetings of philosophers, sociologists, po-
liticologists dedicated to this subject not offer – in no matter what extent 
– a realizable project to which we should come? The work of the latest 
World Congress of Philosophers was themed: “Philosophy Facing World 
Problems’’, and the supreme meeting of Russian philosophers was also oc-
cupied with: “Philosophy and the Future of Civilization’’ and so on. But we 
see here only proceedings after meetings, without even one step stretched 
out further toward a realization of ideas, toward practice … This is why 
we pledge here for a “classical’’ or possibly some “non classical’’ forms of 
organization and (political etc.) actions of world philosophers, scientists 
and all those “who know’’.
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Борис Аксюмов
«Столкновение цивилизАций» кАк 
конфликт меЖДу трАДиционноСтью 
и СовременноСтью
Прошло уже тринадцать лет с тех пор, как в нашей печати по-
явилась ставшая уже знаменитой статья американского мыслителя 
С. Хантингтона «Столкновение цивилизаций?». Наличие вопроси-
тельного знака показывает, что для самого автора реальность по-
добного столкновения, скорее всего, не представлялась столь уж 
очевидной, а выдвигалась в качестве некой гипотезы, предположе-
ния. По крайней мере, С.Хантингтон вряд ли мог думать о том, что 
прогнозируемое им столкновение (или его генеральная репетиция, 
преамбула) начнется так скоро. Следует также отметить, что амери-
канский автор, как нам представляется, слишком был поглощен раз-
ного рода теоретическими моментами, классическими схемами про-
тивопоставления (Восток-Запад, ислам-христианство и т.д.), чтобы 
в полной мере уже тогда, в момент написания работы, ощутить всю 
эмпирическую реальность надвигающихся событий, призванных 
сформировать новый мировой порядок. Однако все это выглядит не 
столь существенным обстоятельством в сравнении с гораздо более 
значимым вопросом: насколько теоретическая схема, сооруженная 
С.Хантингтоном, адекватно отражает (или выражает) те реальные 
события, которые происходят сегодня в Ираке, а завтра могут про-
изойти в Иране? Тот факт, что определенное столкновение между 
различными государствами, различными группами людей имеет 
место в структуре отношений внутри современного мира не может 
вызывать абсолютно никаких сомнений; это нечто самоочевидное, 
аксиоматическое. Сложности начинают возникать тогда, когда мы 
пытаемся категориально охарактеризовать данную конфликтную 
ситуацию, сделать ее частью философского и научного дискурса, 
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преодолевая тем самым достаточно упрощенную, но в то же время 
гораздо более операциональную на данный момент политологичес-
кую парадигму.
Серьезное затруднение возникает уже при использовании в ин-
тересующем нас контексте слова «цивилизация». 
Практически во всех подходах под цивилизацией понимается 
определенное состояние общественного развития, характеризующе-
еся известным набором политических, хозяйственных, социальных 
отношений, высоким уровнем организации во всех сферах и техни-
ческим могуществом. В данном случае не столь важно, в каком – хро-
нологическом или территориальном – смысле берется понятие циви-
лизации. Главное заключается в том, что почти всегда цивилизация 
выступает своеобразной оболочкой, заключающей в себе конкрет-
ное содержание жизни, той формой, внутри которой осуществляется 
развитие социальной системы. В то же время на эмпирическом уров-
не цивилизация воплощается в материальных артефактах, становясь, 
таким образом, материальным субстратом общественной жизни.
Таким образом, можно сделать вывод о том, что цивилизация 
уже сама по себе, сущностью своего понятия предполагает опреде-
ленный уровень развитости наличного состояния социальной сис-
темы, по отношению к которой оно применено. Цивилизация не мо-
жет быть примитивной или слаборазвитой, существует некая планка, 
ниже которой она по определению опуститься не может. Термином 
“цивилизация” фиксируется некое итоговое состояние социальной 
системы, прошедшей долгий путь развития. Цивилизация – это ре-
зультат прогресса, усовершенствования изначально примитивных 
форм социальной организации; это определенная форма социаль-
ной системы, характеризующаяся высоким уровнем организации во 
всех сферах жизнедеятельности. Очень большой вопрос, подпадает 
ли в этом смысле во многом все еще традиционное восточное (в ши-
роком смысле) общество под понятие «цивилизация» и можно ли, 
следовательно, вести речь именно о «столкновении цивилизаций»?
Что же понимает под цивилизацией сам С.Хантингтон? Он оп-
ределяет цивилизацию как культурную общность наивысшего ранга, 
как самый широкий уровень культурной идентичности людей. По его 
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мнению 1, цивилизация – это широчайшие культурные общности, в 
которых язык, антропологические особенности, религия, образ жиз-
ни, социальные институты являются теми объективными моментами, 
которые определяют цивилизацию. Фактически С. Хантингтон отож-
дествляет цивилизацию и культуру, определяя одно через другое. По 
крайней мере, весьма трудно понять, в чем же заключается отличие 
цивилизации от культуры, и существует ли оно вообще. В сущности, 
американский исследователь вполне мог обозначить описываемую им 
конфликтную ситуацию и как «столкновение культур», и в смысловом 
отношении ничего бы не изменилось. Однако главное заключается в 
том, что и тот, и другой варианты обозначения проблемы чрезмерно 
абстрактны и сами по себе ничего не объясняют, а только указывают 
на наличие в данной области широчайшего проблемного поля, кото-
рое нуждается в более детальном внутреннем определении. Необхо-
димо выделить тот ключевой элемент, который можно было бы опре-
делить как проблемообразующий. Таким элементом, на наш взгляд, 
является антитеза «традиционность-современность». 
В последние годы в духовной жизни общества возрастает вни-
мание к традиции и традиционалистской проблематике вообще. 
Привычно связанное с достаточно ограниченной сферой культуры 
и быта, этническими стереотипами, обрядами, обычаями и ритуа-
лами, это понятие ныне обретает статус всеобщности и по частоте 
употребления начинает конкурировать с понятием прогресса. Сдвиг 
к резкому расширению смысла традиционности связан с именами 
У. Ростоу и К. Поппера. Как известно, У. Ростоу к традиционным от-
нес все доиндустриальные общества. Что касается К. Поппера, то он 
провел деление на закрытые и открытые общества. Закрытое обще-
ство, по Попперу, это “органическое”, тоталитарное общество, оно 
сковывает самодеятельность индивидов и, прежде всего, поэтому 
традиционно. Открытое же общество, как нетрудно догадаться, это 
общество, где есть рынок, демократия и правовое государство. 
Данную расширенную трактовку традиционности можно считать 
либерально-центристской, модернистской. Из всех трактовок, отож-
дествляющих современность с буржуазностью, а остальные отноше-
1 Хангтингтон С. Столкновение цивилизаций // Полис. – 1994. – № 
1. – С. 33–49.
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ния, которые не вписываются в те или иные модели индустриального 
и демократического общества, объявляющих традиционными, т.е. ус-
таревшими, вытекает одно: традиционное общество – это то, что надо 
преодолеть, либо так или иначе оно преодолевается само. 
Изменение содержания традиции ведет к переструктурирова-
нию категорий социологии и культурологии, социального знания в 
целом, ибо на сегодняшний момент традиционалистская проблема-
тика глубоко и противоречиво влияет на все наше мировоззрение. 
Данный тезис в полной мере можно отнести и к рассматриваемой 
нами проблеме «столкновения цивилизаций». 
Cоциокультурное пространство современного мира вновь ста-
новится разделенным на два противоборствующих лагеря, которые 
можно обозначить как современную западную цивилизацию, с од-
ной стороны, и традиционный афро-азиатский мир – с другой. Вы-
деление ведущих противоречий и чёткое определение их субъектов-
носителей становится важным этапом теоретического осмысления 
действительности. Исходное противоречие возникает между тради-
ционализмом и современностью, между реальным технико-техно-
логическим состоянием традиционного общества и необходимос-
тью его модернизации в условиях глобализирующегося по западной 
модели мира. При такой интерпретации соотношения современнос-
ти и традиционности современность ассоциируется с техническим 
и организационным могуществом, с истинными ценностями, кото-
рые считаются исключительно принадлежностью западного мира, 
идентифицируется с единственно правильно выбранной стратегией 
развития. Современность в данном случае являет собою идеал, свое-
образное средоточие добра и красоты, истины и совершенства. Весь 
остальной мир, в том числе Россия, должен в своем развитии ориен-
тироваться на этот, уже достигнутый, идеал. 
На сегодняшнем этапе развития мира проблема модернизации 
тесно смыкается с тенденциями к унификации и глобализации ми-
рового целого. Несмотря на то, что научное исследование процесса 
глобализации начинается по существу только с середины 90-х го-
дов ХХ века, глобализация и как практическое воплощение интег-
ративных процессов (прежде всего в экономической сфере), и как 
теоретический проект (а также рефлексия этого проекта средствами 
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философско-научного абстрагирования и конкретных эмпиричес-
ких исследований) прочно вошла в русло современной социокуль-
турной действительности. С одной стороны, процессы глобализа-
ции способствуют стабилизации экономической ситуации, катали-
зируют интегративные тенденции в политической сфере, отвечают 
духу таких стародавних и идеализированных принципов, как ин-
тернационализм и космополитизм (последнее, правда, практически 
не влияет на улучшение этнических отношений). Однако с другой 
стороны, логическим итогом глобализации будет снятие не только 
экономических и политических шлагбаумов, не только воплощение 
в реальность старой абстрактной идеи – Человечество, но также 
культурная и этническая унификация, элиминирование всего спе-
цифически национального. 
Однако практика мирового развития показывает, что данные 
процессы проходят болезненно: феномен этнического возрождения, 
усиление традиционализма как теории и практики, усиленное под-
черкивание многими странами своей самобытности и специфич-
ности – только некоторые знаковые препятствия и контртенденции 
на пути глобализации. Именно в этой точке, где сталкиваются про-
тивоположные интересы и тенденции, в пункте пересечения проти-
воречий между современной западной цивилизацией и остальным 
миром, зарождается современный конфликт ценностей, лежащий в 
основе «столкновения цивилизаций». 
Если современности соответствует возвышенный идеал, то тра-
диционность предстает как несовершенное, примитивное. Самими 
же носителями традиционности и идеологами незападного общества 
ситуация воспринимается наоборот: традиционность отождествля-
ется с самобытностью и специфичностью восточной цивилизации, а 
понятие современности в их мировоззрении полностью утрачивает 
тот пафосный и позитивно-этический оттенок, который оно имеет 
в западноцентристской трактовке проблемы. Достижения западной 
цивилизации признаются неприемлемыми для восточной цивили-
зации, вредными для нее и опасными, т.к. предполагается, что пере-
нимание западного опыта может привести к потере самобытности, 
к утрате той специфики, которая составляет основу восточной ци-
вилизации и из которой она черпает энергию для дальнейшего раз-
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вития. Типичной является точка зрения о том, что победа западной 
цивилизации будет означать крах восточных цивилизаций. Идеологи 
восточного мира склонны воспринимать данную ситуацию как конф-
ликт между различными, во многом противоположными социокуль-
турными системами, когда одна сторона стремится ассимилировать 
другую, а та, в свою очередь, всеми средствами этому противостоит. 
Очевидно, что столкновение цивилизаций, ставшее эмпирической 
реальностью современного мира, имеет под собой глубокие культур-
ные предпосылки, основано на определенной асинхронности в разви-
тии, вследствие чего корректнее говорить о конкретно-исторической 
манифестации социокультурных противоречий между современной 
цивилизацией и традиционной культурой. 
Таким образом, проблема противостояния западной и восточ-
ной цивилизаций, взятая в контексте соотношения современности 
и традиционности, получает весьма неоднозначную трактовку, что 
объясняется тенденциозным толкованием данного вопроса двумя 
противостоящими сторонами. С точки зрения теории западоцент-
ризма, ситуация выглядит так, что современность (подчеркнем это 
еще раз) – это все хорошее и положительное, это идеал и образец. 
Напротив, традиционность – это всё устаревшее и как бы обветша-
лое, все то, что безнадежно отстало в своем развитии и потому нуж-
дающееся в модернизации и вестернизации. Между Западом и Вос-
током лежит пропасть, и процесс модернизации – тот единственный 
мост, по которому традиционные страны восточного мира могут 
перейти на другую сторону и в какой-то степени присоединиться к 
компании передовых современных стран Запада.
С точки зрения Востока, традиционность является достоинс-
твом, а не недостатком. Она символизирует самобытность и специ-
фику восточного мира, является гарантией сохранения вековечных 
устоев жизнедеятельности и обеспечения непрерывной трансляции 
ценностей. Современная западная цивилизация во главе с США вос-
принимается как сила, стремящаяся разрушить самоидентифика-
цию восточного мира, лишить его тех оригинальных черт, которые 
составляют его самое дорогое достояние. В этом фундаментальном 
противоречии между современностью и традиционностью и заклю-
чается главное основание «столкновения цивилизаций».
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Виктор Авксентьев
ПоСткоммуниСтиЧеСкие 
иДентиЧноСти и «конфликт 
цивилизАций»
Тема «конфликта цивилизаций», занимавшая умы многих мыс-
лителей после публикации знаменитой статьи С. Хантингтона в на-
чале 1990-х гг., заметно утратила популярность уже во второй по-
ловине десятилетия, уступив место более прагматичному анализу 
мировых и региональных процессов. Однако начало XXI века обна-
ружило как новые черты глобального развития, так и вывело на по-
верхность глубинные социокультурные напряжения, находившиеся 
в латентном состоянии в течение 1990-х гг., аналитики заговорили о 
войне цивилизаций, а не просто о конфликте. 
В середине первого десятилетия XXI века в мировом общество-
ведении прослеживаются два подхода к анализу новейших тенден-
ций в социокультурных процессах. Первый – политологический, 
согласно которому ключевые процессы объясняются через интере-
сы политических акторов. И хотя во многих исследованиях влияние 
культурных разломов в различных регионах планеты также рассмат-
ривалось как конфликтогенный фактор, ему отводилась второсте-
пенная роль. «Сосуществование различных групп, действительно, 
проблематично и хрупко, – отмечает Р. Тоскано, – но в основании 
насильственного межгруппового конфликта (не просто напряжён-
ности, не просто различий и не просто противоречий) мы практи-
чески неизбежно видим сознательные, систематические и интеллек-
туально нечестные действия политических лидеров, направленные 
на убеждение группы: а) в ее исключительности и совершенстве; б) 
в негативной, достойной презрения природе соперничающей груп-
пы, при этом убеждение должно стереотипизироваться в абстракт-
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ных терминах, чтобы не допустить индивидуальных различий или 
исключений; в) в объективном характере определённых групповых 
интересов, определяемых как «неизбежные цели»;.. г) в абсолютнос-
ти соперничества по типу «игры с нулевой суммой». Согласно такой 
террористической установке все проблемы (употребление названия 
или флага, нескольких квадратных миль территории, берега реки 
или вершины горы) могут быть представлены как «жизненно важ-
ные» для самого существования группы» [1].
Такой подход в конфликтологии можно обозначить как «ре-
алистический», сильной стороной которого, по мнению самих ее 
представителей, является то, что это направление убедительно объ-
ясняет всплеск этнической конфликтности в 1990-е гг. такими фак-
торами, как распространение идеологии либерализма и особенно 
экономического либерализма, ослабление роли государственности, 
создание идеальных условий для этнического антрепренёрства. По-
добные объяснения были вполне валидными до тех пор, пока эти 
конфликты имели локальный или региональный характер. 
Второй подход к проблеме социальных расколов можно обоз-
начить как социокультурный, согласно которому культурные фак-
торы и идентичности рассматриваются как не менее важные, чем 
политические. Этот подход, представленный в 1970-е – 1980-е гг. 
многообразием школ и направлений, оказался на периферии обще-
ствоведческой методологии в 1990-е годы. Однако события начала 
и середины первого десятилетия XXI века актуализировали те 
объяснительные модели социальной конфликтности, в которых 
культуре отводится значимая роль. Сторонники социокультурной 
концепции в конфликтологии не отрицают, что в основе многих 
конфликтов лежат интересы, но исходят из того, что интересы явля-
ются не единственным мотивом конфликтного поведения людей. В 
научный оборот конфликтологии прочно вошёл концепт конфликта 
ценностей, нередко оспариваемый сторонниками «реалистическо-
го» видения конфликтов. Сформировалась теоретическая дихото-
мия «конфликт интересов – конфликт ценностей». 
Вопрос о мотивах и стимулах участия людей в конфликтах ос-
таётся одним из наиболее дискуссионных вопросов современной 
конфликтологии. Иногда в диаду «конфликт интересов – конфликт 
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ценностей» вводятся новые элементы: потребности (концепция Дж. 
Бёртона), идентичности. В концепции Бёртона эти два основания 
конфликта – потребности и идентичности – объединены в одно: 
Бёртон рассматривает идентичность в качестве базовой потребнос-
ти человека [2]. 
Конфликт идентичностей не всегда укладывается в простые объ-
яснительные модели. Как отмечает Дж.Ротман, «одним из атрибутов 
конфликта идентичностей является его «неуловимость». Другими 
словами, такой конфликт глубоко субъективен; соперники, оказавши-
еся в конфликте идентичностей, иногда сами с большим трудом мо-
гут объяснить природу своего соперничества... Субъективный опыт 
соперников формируется специфической культурной реальностью и 
историческим контекстом. Более того, восприятие соперниками друг 
друга совершенно различно. То, что одной стороне представляется 
как борьба за свободу, другой – как терроризм» [3]. 
Концепт конфликта идентичностей является ключевым для 
объяснения феномена «конфликта цивилизаций». По нашему 
мнению, конфликт цивилизаций – это не строгая научная категория, 
а научная метафора, но имеющая право на существование в совре-
менном обществоведческом лексиконе. Кризисное состояние иден-
тичностей во многих регионах интенсивного этнокультурного кон-
такта (Балканы, Кавказ, Ближний Восток) побуждает участников 
этих контактов рассматривать межцивилизационое взаимодействие 
через призму «конфликта цивилизаций». 
Конфликт идентичностей, являясь сложносоставным по сво-
ей природе, отражает транзитивное состояние не только Кавказа 
и Балкан, России и «новой Европы», но и всего человечества. Не-
однократно отмеченная в XX и XXI вв. европейскими философами 
исчерпанность потенциала развития западной цивилизации име-
ет множественные формы проявления: отрицательные величины 
демографических процессов, обширная миграция на территорию 
стран Запада инокультурного населения, меняющего цивилизаци-
онный облик западного мира, расползающийся терроризм, модер-
низационные проекты в исламском мире на незападной основе. Всё 
это вселяет тревогу в общественное сознание Запада, уверенного в 
единственности собственного пути развития. 
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Наиболее эвристически ценным объяснением «конфликта ци-
вилизаций» является дилемма безопасности. В силу динамики сов-
ременного социума и нарастающего числа контактов между пред-
ставителями различных культур усиление статусных позиций одной 
из сторон потенциально конфликтного взаимодействия восприни-
мается другой стороной как угроза её статусу, даже если снижения 
последнего не происходит. 
Распространённое определение современного межцивилизаци-
онного раскола по конфессиональному признаку не лишено осно-
ваний, хотя требует дополнительного объяснения. О религиозных 
различиях как важном компоненте мотивации действий людей в 
социальных конфликтах упоминают большинство конфликтологов, 
но вплоть до недавнего времени они, как правило, не заостряли вни-
мания на этом факторе, трактуя его как одно из многочисленных 
культурных различий, формирующих среду протекания конфликта. 
Однако ситуация постепенно меняется, и связано это с тем, что ре-
лигия выдвигается на роль ведущего социокультурного маркера сов-
ременного человека, вытесняя на вторые роли этничность. «Религия 
станет играть всё более важную роль в том, как люди определяют 
свою идентичность, – отмечают авторы доклада «Контуры мирового 
будущего». – Во многих обществах границы между религиозными 
группами и внутри них могут стать не менее важными, чем нацио-
нальные границы» [4]. 
Сравнительный анализ межцивилизационного взаимодействия 
в полиэтничных и поликультурных макрорегионах, каковыми явля-
ются Кавказ и Балканы, свидетельствует, что сами по себе конфес-
сиональные различия не являются конфликтогенным фактором, 
и на протяжении столетий совместного проживания произошла 
«притирка» христианского и исламского миров. В то же время в 
условиях нарастающей социокультурной динамики религиозные 
представления и установки влияют на мировосприятие и поведе-
ние индивида. Осознанная религиозная принадлежность, вне зави-
симости от уровня религиозности, побуждает человека к оценке и 
сравнению нравственных, догматических, жизненных устоев, при-
сущих его и другим конфессиям. В наибольшей степени это сравне-
ние по принципу «мы-они» актуализируется при получении новой 
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информации о других конфессиях, при взаимодействии с предста-
вителям других вероучений. Коллективное сознание с большим 
трудом принимает модели поведения, отклоняющиеся от принятых 
внутри общности образцов и установок. Тем более это относится 
к религиозным и этнорелигиозным общностям, сформировавшим 
мощную культурно-конфессиональную традицию, ставшую их це-
ментирующей основой. 
Исследование потенциальной конфликтности религиозной сфе-
ры в этнополитическом центре Северного Кавказа – Ставропольском 
крае – показало [5], что значительная часть христиан не готова вос-
принимать Россию поликонфессиональной страной и полагает, что 
православное христианство должно доминировать в религиозном 
пространстве страны. Мусульмане, наоборот, считают, что ислам 
– одна из основных религий в стране, хотя и не претендуют на гла-
венство. Большинство опрошенных в ходе исследования мусульман 
выступает за равное отношение государства ко всем конфессиональ-
ным объединениям, причём такое отношение должно выражаться в 
государственной поддержке различных религий. Среди христиан 
большинство выступает за поддержку прежде всего православия, 
причём, необходимо отметить, что среди мусульман оказалось 17,3% 
тех, кто выделил в качестве конфессии, которой необходимо оказы-
вать государственную поддержку, православное христианство; сре-
ди христиан лишь 1% опрошенных назвал в этом случае ислам. За 
равенство конфессий при получении преференций и поддержки со 
стороны государства выступает заметно меньшее количество хрис-
тиан – 28,6%. Эти результаты до определённой степени подтвержда-
ет предположение о том, что определённая часть христиан, в первую 
очередь, православных, на сегодня не считают возможным прирав-
нивать к своей религии иные конфессии и деноминации. 
Банкротство основных политических идей в постсоветской Рос-
сии – и левых, и праволиберальных, оставило религию фактически 
единственным духовным источником, обеспечивающим возмож-
ность сохранения гомогенного коллективного сознания и ощущения 
себя не только политической, гражданской, но и цивилизационной 
общностью, что весьма важно для социума, увязшего в перманен-
тном «состоянии транзита» и не восстановившего за весь постсо-
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ветский период своей позитивной идентичности. Утрата наднаци-
ональной, имперской идентичности и отсутствие заметных успехов 
в формировании новой общегражданской идентичности стимули-
руют укрепление этнической и конфессиональной идентичности 
граждан, что, в свою очередь, переводит процесс выстраивания от-
ношений с иными этническими и конфессиональными общностями 
в плоскость упоминавшейся выше дилеммы безопасности. Подобная 
«социальная призма» не способствует интеграционным процессам 
внутри социума и может привести к ещё большему отчуждению от-
дельных групп общества друг от друга и давлению на государствен-
ную власть с целью признания особого статуса своей этнической 
или конфессиональной общности и принятия мер по их защите. 
В ситуации конфликта идентичностей современным государс-
твам, как европейским, так и России, придётся либо принимать от-
дельную концепцию государственной конфессиональной политики, 
либо настаивать на жёстком соблюдении уже имеющихся правил 
и установлений, основанных на светском характере государствен-
ности. При этом, однако, не стоит полагать, что исключительными 
проводниками идей останутся т.н. традиционные конфессии – пра-
вославие, ислам, буддизм, иудаизм. Поиск духовной опоры немалой 
частью общества будет продолжен, значимость религиозной иден-
тичности будет возрастать и в этом плане европейским государс-
твам в ближайшее время придётся определяться с новой моделью 
государственно-конфессиональных отношений. 
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Василий Новиков
Духовное нАСлеДие великого 
княЖеСтвА литовСкого: рАзные 
культуры – оБщАя иДентиЧноСть
Вопрос “Возможна ли европейская идентичность и как она воз-
можна?” приобрел в последнее время особую остроту как в связи с 
известными проблемами в продвижении экономической и полити-
ческой интеграции европейских стран, так и в связи с острейшими 
конфликтами, обусловленными расовыми, этническими, религиоз-
ными, в конечном счете – культурными различиями разных групп 
населения современной Европы. Пылающий Париж, всегда считав-
шийся культурной столицей Европы, стал зримым символом кри-
зиса европейской идентичности, которая априорно включалась в 
идеологию европейской интеграции. 
Евроскептики полагают, что проблемы неразрешимы, так как 
укоренены в самом менталитете европейских народов, а сама ис-
тория Европы – это история перманентных конфликтов. Самые 
страшные из них, приобретшие характер мировых войн, пришлись 
на ХХ столетие и были развязаны европейскими нациями. Но разве 
становление этнической карты Европы не было результатом катак-
лизма мирового масштаба – Великого переселения народов, вызван-
ного экспансией с Востока? Разве европейским народам уже не при-
ходилось объединяться, например, в противостоянии арабской экс-
пансии, грозившей завоеванием всей тогдашней ойкумены? И разве, 
несмотря на постоянные конфликты, Европа не была в разные пери-
оды своей истории объединена разнообразными династическими, 
дипломатическими, экономическими, культурными связями? Так, 
в пору критического военного противостояния белорусских кня-
жеств с орденами крестоносцев в XIII веке совершались регулярные 
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взаимные торговые экспедиции между Ригой (“Готским берегом”) и 
Полоцком, Витебском и Смоленском, обеспечиваемые дипломати-
чески многочисленными договорами, а также политической волей 
правителей. Характерно, что в Смоленске в первой половине XIII 
века существовала даже немецкая кирха (“Немецкая божница”). А 
это можно рассматривать как одно из многих проявлений и веротер-
пимости, и взаимного доверия, не всегда просматриваемых на фоне 
эксцессов политической и военной истории. 
Но исторический процесс всегда многоаспектен, и делом гума-
нитариев (не только историков) должно быть раскрытие этой мно-
гоплановости, ее осмысление и превращение в элементы метаполи-
тического дискурса, предполагающего, кроме прочего, превращение 
общих ценностей европейской цивилизации в организующее средо-
точие и политики, и экономики, слишком часто подверженных сию-
минутной конъюнктуре. 
Исторический опыт (как положительный, так и отрицательный) – 
из категории такого рода ценностей. И, возможно, как раз историчес-
кий опыт народов Центральной и Восточной Европы, находящихся 
сейчас по существу на периферии европейских интеграционных про-
цессов, станет тем необходимым компонентом, которого так не хва-
тает для становления европейской идентичности, не разрушающей, 
но поддерживающей различия. Конечно, где имеются различия, там 
возможны и конфликты. Но только мертвое внутренне бесконфлик-
тно. Для жизненности необходимо многообразие целого.
Белорусский народ, как и другие народы Европы, имеет свой 
неповторимый опыт, ему знакомы высокие взлеты и жесткие паде-
ния. В этом опыте на протяжении многих столетий формировалось 
и самосознание нашего народа, его, как иногда говорят, менталитет. 
Современное общественное сознание белоруской нации имеет под 
собой реальную историю, берущую свое начало в более ранних со-
циокультурных образованиях, имевших особую организационную 
– феодальную – структуру: в так называемой Киевской Руси, Вели-
ком княжестве Литовском (ВКЛ), Первой Речи Посполитой. Почти 
тысячелетняя история существования этих образований сформи-
ровала во многом уникальное восточно-европейское социокуль-
турное пространство. Его уникальность была обусловлена тем, что, 
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во-первых, оно было открыто для различного рода мировоззрен-
ческих влияний; во-вторых, содержало в себе полиэтнические и 
мультирелигиозные компоненты; в-третьих, наша донациональная 
история дает уникальный пример реальной коллективной идентич-
ности, в которой практически отсутствовали репрессивные прак-
тики, носящие не социально-классовый, а этнический и религиоз-
ный характер.
Лучшая в Европе правовая система, развитое книгопечатание на 
языках всех народов, бывших подданными Великого Князя, уникаль-
ные памятники архитектуры, ментальность, сложившаяся в ВКЛ с 
его принципами веротерпимости, уважения к закону, любви к своей 
общей полиэтнической Родине – вот лишь наиболее яркие элементы 
нашего наследия. Многие проявления этого менталитета практичес-
ки забыты, другие известны только горстке узких специалистов, а 
третьи неоднократно трансформировались и приспосабливались 
для построения новых национальных идеологий. Поэтому сегодня 
существует, на наш взгляд, настоятельная необходимость в про-
ведении комплексного исследования духовно-философского наследия 
Великого княжества Литовского с такими его важнейшими компо-
нентами, как мультикультурность, поликонфессионализм, нацио-
нальная и религиозная толерантность. 
Наконец, крайне важен вопрос о судьбах этой великой культу-
ры, которая стала исходным материалом для формирования сразу 
нескольких восточноевропейских наций. Ибо разделенное духовное 
наследие, которое имеют сейчас белорусский, литовский, польский 
и украинский народы, не есть результат неких коллизий, которые 
вызревали внутри истинной истории Великого княжества Литовс-
кого, а тесно связаны с последствиями позднейших интерпретаций, 
вызванных стремлениями создать идеологические основы для ново-
го национального строительства. 
Поэтому у исследователей и возникают серьезные расхождения 
на уровне интерпретации культуры региона ВКЛ в контексте той или 
иной версии национальной истории. До сих пор не утихают споры о 
том, кто является правопреемником наследия Великого Княжества. 
Каким образом и в какой части его история коррелируется с нацио-
нальными историями современных восточноевропейских наций? 
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Обосновывая преемственность своей национальной культуры 
по отношению к духовности региона ВКЛ, историки, принадлежа-
щие к различным национальным школам, нередко допускают про-
извольные интерпретации некоторых сторон единой культуры в 
соответствии с более поздними национальными представлениями 
белорусской, литовской, польской, российской или украинской ис-
ториографии. 
Даже при самой профессионально выверенной авторской пози-
ции реконструкция ментальности Великого княжества Литовского 
часто производится с исходных позиций конфликта. Произвольно, 
субъективистски многих персонажей этого духовного ареала, кото-
рый во время его существования был образцом религиозной веро-
терпимости и этнической толерантности, делят на положительных 
и отрицательных, прогрессивных и регрессивных, толерантных и 
экспансионистских. Критерии такого деления часто совершенно 
необъяснимы, иррациональны и не имеют отношения к самому 
предмету исследования. И самое негативное здесь в том, что во мно-
гих случаях, будто по воле злого рока, отдельные исследователи охот-
нее занимаются поиском и анализом тех моментов в истории реги-
она, которые затем используются политиками и государственными 
деятелями для разъединения, конфронтации, противопоставления 
наших народов и культур, а не для их объединения и консолидации.
Сегодняшний момент в развитии европейской цивилизации 
трактуют как переход к постнациональной стадии. В условиях объ-
единяющейся Европы наиболее приемлемым концептом предполага-
ется модель некой общеевропейской идентичности, носители кото-
рой имеют не только одинаковые духовные корни, но и нераздельную 
историю. Однако для нас очевидно, что в таком случае общеевропей-
ская идентичность скорее может стать только очередной синтетичес-
кой конструкцией с тем же искусственным духовным компонентом, 
который сейчас имеют все современные европейские нации. Конечно, 
сегодняшних европейцев многое объединяет, начиная от исповеду-
емых религиозных принципов и кончая манерой одеваться. Однако 
выдвинуть очередной тезис, что на протяжении двух последних тыся-
челетий все они жили единой дружной семьей, изредка раздираемой 
мелкими коллизиями, было бы уже очевидной натяжкой. 
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Гораздо более продуктивно поиски моделей общей идентичнос-
ти могут решаться на более узком, региональном уровне. И в этом 
отношении Великое княжество Литовское дает уникальный при-
мер реальной коллективной идентичности с весьма либеральными 
отношениями к каждой этнической и религиозной группе, ибо на 
первое место здесь выдвигалась преданность Великому Князю и тем 
законам, которые издавались от его имени. В определенной мере это 
относится и ко всем государственным образованиям, которые воз-
никали и существовали на восточноевропейском пространстве на 
протяжении с IX по XVIII вв. – Древняя Русь, Великое княжество 
Литовское и Первая Речь Посполитая. Исходя из этих соображений 
о ментальной и социокультурной специфике восточноевропейского 
пространства эпох Средневековья и Ренессанса, вполне правомерно, 
по нашему мнению, выдвинуть тезис о том, что регион ВКЛ является 
не синтетической, а подлинной конструкцией, которая имеет ре-
альную, а не сконструированную историю, причем, как политичес-
кую, так и социокультурную. 
Представляется, что первичной посылкой при построении 
интеллектуальной истории региона ВКЛ должно быть его пони-
мание как единого социокультурного пространства, некоего веера 
интерпретаций единой ментальной конфигурации Великого кня-
жества Литовского, духовные и философские артефакты которого 
относятся к корпусу неосязаемого культурного наследия всех ее на-
ций-преемников. 
С этой точки зрения и исходя из требований ЮНЕСКО и Совета 
Европы по сохранению культурного наследия, можно полагать, что 
идеальным, по нашему мнению, был бы вариант написания интеллек-
туальной истории региона Великого княжества Литовского в рамках 
единой исследовательской программы, объединяющей ученых из Бе-
ларуси, Литвы, Польши, России, Украины, а также из других стран, 
заинтересованных в данной проблематике. При этом необходимо 
акцентировать не образы этого региона в повседневной жизни сегод-
няшних народов, населяющих эту территорию, а на восстановление 
первоначальных смыслов духовности, на создание таких интерпре-
тационных моделей, которые могут донести эти смыслы до наших 
современников, являющихся преемниками этого великого наследия.
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На основе этого можно предложить следующую методологию 
исследования. Категориальная основа культуры региона ВКЛ как 
сохраняемого культурного наследия может быть построена как мно-
гослойная структура. Любой элемент культурного наследия имеет 
материальную или интерсубъективную субстрату. Некая первичная 
символизация, являющаяся продуктом творческой активности ав-
тора или авторов артефакта, налагается на материальную или интер-
субъективную субстрату. Иными словами, мы видим здесь феномен 
овеществления субъективности. Любое культурное явление имеет 
также вторичные (третичные, четвертичные и так далее) символи-
ческие стратификации, которые следуют из восприятия первичной 
символизации и исторически следуют одна за другой. Естественно, 
первый и второй компонент всегда остаются постоянными, третий 
отличается чрезвычайной подвижностью. Эта подвижность опре-
деляется мировоззренческими ориентациями людей, наследующих 
определенную культуру, их практическими задачами по отношению 
к духовному наследию. 
Стабильная культура с устоявшимися мыслительными традици-
ями через некий разлом порождает существование нового, которое 
в свое время может настичь катаклизм. История восточно-европей-
ского региона – наглядный пример эволюционно-революционного 
пути, который отчетливо делится на ряд заметных эпох: Древняя 
Русь, Великое княжество Литовское, Люблинская Уния, Первая Речь 
Посполитая, ее разделы, борьба наследующих ее народов за свое на-
циональное возрождение.
Однако концепция эволюционно-революционного стержня – 
только первое приближение к проблеме обоснования периодиза-
ции истории региона ВКЛ. Это мультикультурное, полиэтническое 
и мультирелигиозное образование, очевидно, строилось, по край-
ней мере, на нескольких темпоральных стержнях. Это многообра-
зие временных ритмов может быть интерпретировано при помощи 
классической концепции долгой временной протяженности Ферна-
на Броделя. Долгая временная протяженность, или время большой 
длительности, совсем не обязательно означает продолжительный 
отрезок времени. Речь в данном случае идет о том пласте истории 
или пласте структур, который эволюционирует и изменяется мед-
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леннее всего. Долгая временная протяженность – это неторопливый 
ритм. Ее можно обнаружить и наблюдать и на относительно корот-
ких отрезках времени, однако она неизменно скрывается под исто-
рией событийной, под среднесрочным стечением обстоятельств�1. 
В нашем конкретном случае интеллектуальной истории региона 
ВКЛ долгая временная протяженность может означать символиза-
цию такого времени, когда ничего особенного не происходит, и од-
новременно время накопления взрыва. Причем, если политический 
взрыв обычно взламывает всю структуру социума, то можно гово-
рить о взрывах духовных (эпоха Возрождения с коренным переос-
мыслением принципов мироздания, Статут Великого Княжества 
Литовского с нормами права, совершивший настоящую революцию 
и, конечно, христианизация Руси и христианизация Литвы, которые 
для региона ВКЛ были двумя весьма отличными друг от друга спо-
собами культурной революции). Процесс инкультурации означал 
внедрение не только принципов христианства в языческие культуры, 
но и новых правовых, этических, эстетических норм жизни. Эти два 
направления культурных революций означали еще и привнесение в 
культуру региона ВКЛ всех коллизий, возникших в ходе возникно-
вения двух культурных парадигм, связанных с разделением Римской 
империи на восточную и западную. И, как следствие, возникновение 
в культуре данного региона двух самостоятельных духовных пото-
ков (православного и католического), которые отличались не только 
содержательно, но и структурно, в том числе и динамикой развития. 
По сути дела, мы можем говорить о двух самостоятельных конструк-
циях долгой временной протяженности, которые, впрочем, никогда 
не существовали автономно, а постоянно взаимодействовали, кор-
релировали друг с другом, переплетались и пересекались, вызывая 
возникновение вторичных структур долгих временных протяжен-
ностей. 
Таким образом, периодизация интеллектуальной истории ре-
гиона ВКЛ, видимо, должна быть, на наш взгляд, не хронологичес-
кой, а структурной. Необходим тщательный анализ всех возможных 
строений долгой временной протяженности, ее описание, изучение 
процессов внутренней корреляции, взаимовлияния и даже в какой-
то мере слияния. 
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С нашей точки зрения, социокультурное пространство региона 
ВКЛ может быть представлено как многослойная пространственно-
временная структура, объединяющая ряд переходящих друг в друга 
или пересекающихся между собой социокультурных и государственных 
образований: Древней Руси, Великого княжества Литовского, Первой 
Речи Посполитой и Российской империи, в составе которой заверши-
лось формирование белоруской, литовской и украинской наций. 
Вплоть до начала XX в. эти перечисленные геополитические об-
разования, с одной стороны, составляли единое социокультурное 
пространство, с другой, обладали почти полной культурной пре-
емственностью, сходной идентичностью и поэтому объективно в 
полном своем составе составляли актуальное прошлое нынешних 
восточноевропейских наций. И, наконец, попытки найти в феодаль-
ной истории региона что-нибудь чисто белорусское, литовское или 
украинское являются проявлением неуважения как к исследуемым 
культурам Древней Руси и Великого княжества Литовского, так и к 
своим нынешним нациям-соседям, ибо, повторим это еще раз, соци-
окультурные структуры Древней Руси и Великого княжества Литов-
ского являются первичными и самодостаточными по отношению к 
нынешним национальным государствам. 
Манипуляции с духовными культурами Древней Руси и Ве-
ликого княжества Литовского строились по различным схемам. К 
примеру, одним из таких путей являются игры на конфессиональ-
ной принадлежности тех или иных представителей элиты Великого 
Княжества Литовского. В частности, стало традиционным рассмот-
рение православных и католических компонентов в культуре Вели-
кого княжества как элементов, находящихся в постоянном антаго-
низме. Причем, в зависимости от сегодняшних конфессиональных 
ориентаций того или иного сообщества ученых, те составляющие 
культуры региона ВКЛ, которые не совсем соответствуют канонам 
православной или католической конфессии, либо отбрасывались 
совсем, либо объявлялись враждебными, либо рассматривались как 
второстепенный, вспомогательный компонент. 
Очевидно, духовная жизнь ВКЛ была гораздо сложнее, и, кро-
ме религиозных споров, в ней было и многое другое. Однако то, о 
чем говорили, спорили и даже конфликтовали элиты Древней Руси 
121
и ВКЛ, было их внутренним делом, не имеющим никакого отноше-
ния к процессам национального строительства эпохи модерна. Вы-
раженную выше посылку можно переформулировать следующим 
образом: дискурсы, которые существовали в то время и имели свои 
уникальные идентификаторы, были совершенно забыты и стали 
неактуальными в эпоху национального строительства. Новые на-
циональные элиты, заботясь о построении своих государств, про-
извольно выдергивали факты из общей старой истории восточно-
европейских наций, подстраивая их уже под свои, новые идеологи-
ческие потребности. Именно поэтому мы утверждаем, что история 
донациональной Восточной Европы должна пониматься как единая, 
неделимая, общая для белорусов, литовцев, украинцев и поляков. 
Исследование культуры региона ВКЛ следовало бы проводить, 
по нашему мнению, через реконструкцию подлинной логики социо-
культурных и ментальных процессов, проходивших в Древней Руси, 
Великом княжестве Литовском и Первой Речи Посполитой. Вышес-
казанное означает, что при исследовании как преднациональной, так 
и собственно национальной стадии ВКЛ, более продуктивно делать 
упор на восстановление первоначальных смыслов духовности и на 
создание таких интерпретационных моделей, которые могут донес-
ти эти смыслы до наших современников.
Каждый человек всегда имеет выбор из того набора символиза-
ций, который ему предлагается. Производя этот выбор, он добавляет 
к смысловой структуре духовного наследия новую символизацию, то 
есть рассматривает прошлое через своеобразные “концептуальные 
очки”. Структура таких очков динамически коррелятивна мировоз-
зрению личности, ее ценностным ориентациям, способу веры, сти-
лю мышления и поведения. Во всех этих случаях мы говорим о мо-
дернизации символической основы культурного наследия, которая 
производится согласно классической герменевтической процедуре, 
комбинирующей в себе восприятие, понимание и интерпретацию. 
Через этот философский образец (как правило, в неосознанной и 
неформализованной форме) духовное наследие входит в настоящее 
как один из способов объяснения смыслов существования. 
Создание национального культурного наследия может рас-
сматриваться как специальный случай интерпретации некоторых 
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культурных явлений для политических целей некой нации или го-
сударства. В ходе творения национального духовного наследия ар-
тефакты отбираются и интерпретируются под влиянием некоторой 
политической парадигмы. Операциональная модель национального 
культурного наследия может быть рассмотрена как трехуровневая 
структура. С одной стороны, государство как форма человеческой 
ассоциации должно строго выполнять обязательства по охране каж-
дого компонента культурного наследия. С другой стороны, как член 
мирового сообщества государство должно признавать универсаль-
ное наследие, то есть культурные активы, которые рассматривают-
ся всем человечеством как неопровержимые ценности. И, наконец, 
культурное наследие используется государством для его специаль-
ных целей: установления определенного политического порядка, ле-
гитимизации своих институтов, оправдания права управлять своей 
исторической территорией, поддержания патриотических чувств и 
т.д. С этой точки зрения мы можем говорить о национальном куль-
турном наследии как об одном из столпов национального самосо-
знания. 
Изменение смысла наследуемого – неизбежный процесс. Однако 
с точки зрения поставленной нами задачи сохранения первой (под-
линной) символизации духовной культуры региона ВКЛ, мы долж-
ны отличать правильное использование его культурных артефактов 
от злоупотреблений. 
В качестве методологической гипотезы можно предложить сле-
дующие критерии для дифференциации правильного использова-
ния духовного наследия от злоупотребления им. Наш подход к те-
оретическому обоснованию данного различения следует из общего 
понимания культурного наследия как многослойной структуры. С 
этой точки зрения: (A) Невозможно использовать культурное на-
следие для целей исключения. (B) Следующий добавленный смысл 
не должен приводить к фатальным искажением исконной символи-
ческой структуры. (C) Любое использование объекта духовного на-
следия не должно разрушать его первичный субстрат. (D) Наконец, 
это использование не должно закрывать пути для любой новой ре-
символизации. История не может быть материалом для построения 
любого рода идеологической пропаганды. 
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Для построения концептуальной модели интеллектуальной ис-
тории региона ВКЛ прежде всего предстоит осуществить детальную 
периодизацию духовной и философской культуры региона с учетом 
всех культурных потоков и временных ритмов, которые существова-
ли здесь, выработать единые подходы и методологию исследования 
этого феномена. Необходима большая источниковедческая рабо-
та, ставящая целью включение в контекст изложения максимально 
большого числа источников различного характера. Необходимо по 
сути заново перечитать и переосмыслить все те исследовательские 
труды, которые были созданы в ходе изучения культуры региона 
ВКЛ на протяжении двух последних столетий. 
Честная и профессиональная интерпретация прошлого прине-
сет большую пользу как настоящему, так и будущему восточноев-
ропейских народов. Она будет способствовать пониманию и при-
знанию исторического выбора, совершаемого народами в том числе 
и сегодня, росту сотрудничества и взаимопонимания между ними, 
преодолению тех разногласий, которые были вызваны прошлыми 
предрассудками. Диалог на основе общих корней – это самый продук-
тивный диалог.
И определенные шаги в этом направлении в Институте филосо-
фии НАН Беларуси уже делаются. Так, в прошлом году под эгидой 
ЮНЕСКО у нас прошла международная конференция «Духовное 
наследие народов Центральной и Восточной Европы в контексте сов-
ременного межцивилизационного диалога», в работе которой самое 
активное участие принял и Чрезвычайный и Полномочный посол 
Республики Болгария в Республике Беларусь, член-корреспондент 
Болгарской академии наук, доктор философских наук Петко Ганчев. В 
работе конференции также приняли участие философы из Литвы, Ук-
раины, Польши и России. Эта работа, безусловно, будет продолжена.
Такая исследовательская программа имеет, очевидно, далеко не 
узкорегиональное значение. Ведь проблема раздела общего наследия 
остро стоит и в других регионах Европы. Такова ситуация, напри-
мер, в регионе былой Австро-Венгрии, культура которой достигла в 
свое время невероятных высот, а общую идентичность которой пы-
таются символизировать концептом Mitteleuropa – Срединная Евро-
па. Несравнимо сложней ситуация на Балканах, где элементы общей 
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идентичности просматриваются на уровне фольклорно-этнографи-
ческом, но маскируются слишком продолжительной историей кон-
фликтного существования. 
Реальная европейская идентичность никогда не сформируется 
политической риторикой и выдачей желаемого за действительное. 
Она сможет родиться в результате воссоздания – идеального в те-
ории и реального в жизни – исторического опыта добрососедства 
и сотрудничества как в границах крупных социокультурных и гео-
политических образований, так и на межрегиональном уровне. Тог-
да, возможно, и проблема мигрантов станет видеться в новом свете. 
Ведь смогли же в свое время интегрироваться в этноконфессиональ-
ную и политическую структуру ВКЛ татары-мусульмане, сохраняю-
щие свою религиозную и культурную идентичность в составе бело-
русской нации.
Пока же пылающий Париж – символ слабости. Не экономичес-
кой – духовной.
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Nikolina Sretenova
IS THE IMPLEMENTATION Of THE 
EUROPEAN RESEARCH AREA POSSIBLE 
IN SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES?
(Summary)
As it is well-known the basic concept of the EU FP6 is ‘Euro-
pean Research Area’ (ERA). The expectation of the EU policy makers 
is that ERA might strengthen the capacity of the European research 
potential in a given field in the context of Lisbon strategy. This paper 
discusses the impact of EU FP6 on the shaping of the national pro-
grammes in Social Sciences and Humanities of the ‘old’ EU member 
states and current perspectives of the ‘new’ member states and acces-
sion countries, in particular Bulgaria.
The Challenge
The creation of ERA for Humanities and Social sciences (SHS) can 
serve as a powerful leverage for their reorganization and for restructuring 
the research in the respective areas at the national levels in order to pro-
duce a kind of synergy of their functioning at the European level.
The major challenge here is that Humanities and Social Sciences are 
strongly dependent upon different national settings, national research tra-
ditions and cultural contexts which results in their fragmentation at the 
European level. Then how an ERA could be build for them?
Generally speaking the research agenda of the national scholar com-
munities derives from and to some extent is determined by the national 
funding arrangements for Social and Human Sciences in the respective 
country.
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J. Smith identifies five types of national funding arrangements for So-
cial and Human Sciences research in the ‘old’ EU member states. They are 
as follows:
A. Strong research council system with both initiative and responsive 
mode funding schemes – Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Sweden 
and United Kingdom; Norway and Switzerland;
B. Strong research institution funding from several national sources 
– France and Italy;
C. Strong research council and institution funding with dominant re-
sponsive mode – Germany;
D. Mixed (but more limited) research council and institution funding 
with both initiative and responsive mode funding – Austria, Bel-
gium, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain;
E. EU Framework Programmes playing major role in the funding of 
research community activities and projects – Greece and Ireland.
Here ‘responsive mode’ funding schemes means open grant schemes 
where topics are not pre-determined or specified. Research communities 
determine the research topic proposals to be submitted. ‘Curiosity-driven’ 
research or ‘science-driven mode’ are another common terms used to de-
scribe the responsive mode research funding. The ‘initiative mode’ funding 
means calls for proposals for grants/contracts where the research topics are 
pre-determined and specified. These topic choices are made therefore on the 
‘initiative’ of funding bodies. ‘Targeted research’ or ‘policy-driven mode’ are 
another common terms used to describe ‘initiative mode’ research funding.
Following J. Smith the specificity of each type of national funding ar-
rangements for HSH might be described in following terms.
Type A: Strong research council system with both initiative and re-
sponsive mode funding schemes – Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Swe-
den and United Kingdom; Norway and Switzerland.
This type of national funding arrangements for Social and Human 
Sciences requires a strong presence of scientific administrative culture.
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Governing bodies of research councils which decide upon thematic 
priorities contain a broad representation of academics, government min-
istry advisers, the representatives from industry, non-government bodies 
and ‘user’ organizations. The research councils define strategic themes for 
national programmes with duration of 3-5 years and after then the experts 
develop the programmes’ content, work plan and budget. This exercise 
takes a year work. Within this type of national funding arrangements ap-
proximately one-third of budget resources are distributed through the ‘re-
sponsive mode’, while the distribution of the other budget resources uses 
‘initiative mode’. 
Type B: Strong research institution funding from several national 
sources – France and Italy – CNRS (France) and CNR (Italy)
This type of national funding arrangements for Social and Human 
Sciences operates in countries with strong institutional framework of spe-
cialized institutes (permanent infrastructure of institutes) with research 
careers. 
The case of CNRS: The CNRS operates a mechanism of interdiscipli-
nary research programmes (PIR) in topic areas such as environment, health, 
urban life and information and communication technology. The emphasis 
is on interdisciplinary research across all fields of science, including SHS. In 
this way CNRS provides initiative for its disciplinary –oriented institutes’ 
teams to adjust their research priorities and work together on a common 
agenda. Institutional mechanisms allow for, and encourage, therefore, new 
research agenda-settings within the permanent institute structures. Also 
new institutes are created (or institutes merged) to tackle new fields.
The CNR in Italy also created several new institutes in 2001 tackling 
new interdisciplinary approaches in SHS priority fields (e.g. on science 
policy and innovation, social welfare and democratic change).
The Ministry of research plays direct role in promoting ‘targeted the-
matic research programmes’, e.g. the French Ministry of research launches 
‘call for proposals’ for ‘targeted research programs’. The administrative 
culture within this mode of funding is based on expert input – extensive 
groups of national committees exist within the national funding agency.
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Type C: Strong research council and institution funding with domi-
nant responsive mode – Germany. Some of the specificities of the German 
case are listed below: 
– ‘Science-driven’ nature of setting research priorities through grant 
and programme themes;
– The important role and mission of DFG (German Research Society); 
emphasis on scientific excellence and innovation, peer review system 
of elected review committees; Board and Senate members of DFG 
are elected from the German scientific institutional landscape;
– DFG Priority Programs preparation by steps: research teams sub-
mit proposals for programmes to DFG, ‘call for proposals’, Inde-
pendent steering committee and the program coordinator for the 
approved programmes;
– Institutional funding, ‘policy-driven research’ promoted through 
government departments at the federal and regional level.
– The Ministry (BMBF) is also a federal funding partner in key social 
science research institutes; BMBF performs a coordinating role in 
encouraging German research Community to apply to the EU FP
– Strong administrative culture as in ‘Type A’
Type D & Type E
A common feature of the national funding arrangements for Social 
and Human Sciences of type D&E is crossing a threshold in terms of the 
size of SHS research communities and scale of resources devoted to SHS 
research. Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Greece and Ire-
land have smaller and disperse scholar communities and limited funding 
for Social and Human Sciences research. 
Type E: EU Framework Programmes playing major role in the fund-
ing of research community activities and projects – Greece and Ireland.
Greece and Ireland lack National programs in SHS.
J. Smith identify eight clusters of national thematic priority pro-
grammes in SHS research across the ‘old’ EU member states and studies 
the impact of the FP6 on their shaping. 
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Cluster 1: Economic Performance/Competitiveness
Cluster 2: Democracy/Governance
Cluster 3: Environment/Human Behavior
Cluster 4: Health/Living Conditions
Cluster 5: Knowledge and Learning
Cluster 6: Multi-Ethnic Societies/Cultural Diversity/Identity
Cluster 7: Welfare State/Social Cohesion
Cluster 8: Science/Technology/Innovation
For example the Cluster 5 ‘Knowledge and Learning’ involves pro-
grammes like:
– Learning and the Acquisition of Knowledge (Swedish Research 
Council)
– Information processing in Social Context (DFG, Germany)
– E-Society (Economic and Social Research Council, UK)
– Knowledge in Society, Power and Knowledge in Modern Societies 
(Danish Social Sciences Research Council, Danish Humanities Re-
search Council) and so on
These programmes correspond to the 6FP themes: knowledge pro-
duction, knowledge society, life-long learning, role of media, etc.
On its turn the Cluster 8 ‘Science/Technology/Innovation’ involves 
the following programmes:
– Ethics, Research and Policy (Netherlands Research Council, 
NOW)
– Science in Society (Economic and Social Research Council, UK)
– Public Understanding of Science (Ministry of Science and Culture, 
BMBWK, Austria)
– Ethical, Legal and Social Aspects of Biotechnology (Norwegian 
Research Council)
– Studies on Science and Science Policy
– (Academy of Finland)
with the 6FP connecting themes: Science and Society, ethical values; 
communication of uncertainty and risk; scientific expertise, science and 
government.
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The EU policy-makers designed within the 6FP a new and innova-
tive instrument for building ERA in all fields of research including Social 
Sciences and Humanities research area. The name of this instrument is 
‘ERA-NET’ scheme which aims at supporting of transnational network-
ing and coordination of national research programmes, i.e. the scheme’s 
participants are programme managers working in national Ministries 
and funding agencies. The objective of the ‘ERA-NET’ scheme is to set 
up cooperation and coordination of research activities (i.e. programmes) 
carried out at national or regional level in the EU member states and as-
sociated states through the networking of research activities including 
their ‘mutual opening’ and the development and implementation of joint 
activities.
In short the new ERA-NET’s ultimate ambition is to establish an in-
strument for common research programmes on topics with shared prior-
ity among all members, with joint calls and shared evaluation systems.
It deserve noting that during the first Call for SSA under this scheme 
32 ERA-NET projects received initial funding (preparatory grant) from 
the EU 6FP in order to prepare proposals for ERA-NETs in different re-
search areas. Among these 32 successful ERA-NET projects there is one 
ERA-NET in the field of Humanities and one ERA-NET in the field of 
Social Sciences research.
ERA- NET in Humanities “The Humanities Speaking with One 
Voice” (ERCH project launched by an association of European Re-
search Councils)
The key terms of this ERA-NET are: Ethics, values, culture and gender.
According to the applicants of this ERA-NET project the scope of 
the humanities ranges wider still. Such issues as ethical standards, values, 
culture and gender are widely debated at all levels, and academic research 
in these important areas requires support to ensure closer contact between 
researchers and society. Parts of the humanities are still weak in cross-
border co-operation. Europe has always had an outstanding tradition of 
research in the humanities but, unlike science and technology, these ef-
forts have been largely confined within national borders. This is no great 
surprise since studies of language, culture and history have strong asso-
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ciations with individual nation states and are traditionally bound up with 
concepts of national heritage and identity. Change is in the air, however.
The annotation of this project states:
The humanities are closely associated with national heritage and iden-
tity, but can also contribute insights into broad issues of ethics, values, cul-
ture and gender – key issues for Europe’s progress towards a competitive and 
sustainable economy. ERCH will collect information about national prac-
tices and programmes, and will suggest possible joint research themes and 
infrastructure projects to be implemented through a future ERA-NET in the 
research field of humanities.
The ERA-NET project in Social Sciences is titled “The Next Step for 
Social Sciences” (New opportunities for research funding co-operation in 
Europe – a strategy for social sciences).
Bulgaria currently participates in one ERA-NET project: ‘SEE-ERA.
NET’ (‘Integrating and Structuring the European Research Area in South-
east Europe’) This is a networking project aimed at integrating EU-mem-
ber states and Southeast European countries in the ERA. The project is 
co-ordinated by Austria and involves 17 institutions from 14 European 
countries, including all countries from the Balkan region.
The objectives of SEE-ERA.NET are stated to be:
– to enhance research cooperation in Europe by fostering integration 
of Southeast Europe into the growing European Research Area;
– to add value to existing bilateral S&T agreements through multilat-
eral coordination;
– to improve interregional research cooperation following the princi-
ples of the stabilization and association process in Southeast Europe;
– to contribute to the ‘EU-Balkan countries Action Plan in Science & Tech-
nology’ adopted at the Thessaloniki Ministerial Conference in 2003.
The SEE-ERA.NET objectives will be met through:
– systematic exchange and dissemination of information and best 
practice models on bilateral RTD activities. This will contribute to 
a sound understanding of research systems and policy approaches 
in the SEE-ERA.NET partner countries;
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– needs analyses from the viewpoint of researchers, RTD organiza-
tions as well as policy makers in the target countries, concentrating 
on international RTD cooperation;
– support of the policy dialogue on ERA-integration of countries re-
ferred to as West Balkan countries and related awareness raising 
activities in the European Union;
– identification of complementary approaches followed by the im-
plementation of joint instruments and initiatives, including a joint 
evaluators database and joint calls for research proposals in 2007 
and in 2008.
Social Sciences and Humanities in the Reality Shows of Transfor-
mation: The Bulgarian case
(The Impact of EU fP for re-shaping of research agenda of EU can-
didate countries)
1. Funding of Social Sciences and Humanities in the ‘new’ EU Mem-
ber States and Accession Countries. The Bulgarian case
None of the above described five types of national funding arrange-
ments operates in the ‘new’ EU member states and accession countries. To 
obtain a complete picture of the funding arrangements for Social Sciences 
and Humanities in Bulgaria we have to trace the distribution of research-
ers across R&D sectors and across fields of science and to connect these data 
with the respective R&D expenditure by sectors and fields of science.
Table 1: Distribution of Bulgarian researchers across R&D sectors, head 
count and percentage, 2000
Bulgaria
Business 
Enterprise 
(BES)
Higher 
Education
(HES) 
Government 
(GOV) 
Private 
Non-profit
PNP 
All Sectors
Total 1225 11,6%
2 488 
23,6%
6 763 
64,2%
51 
0,5%
10 527 
100,0%
Source: European Commission, ENWISE Report, 2003
133
Table 2: Numbers of researchers (and % of women among them) by 
main field of science of GOV +HES in Bulgaria in 2000
field Natural 
Sciences
Engi-
neering 
& Tech-
nology
Medical 
Sciences
Agricul-
tural Sci-
ences
Social 
Sciences
Humani-
ties
Bulgaria 2 720 (51%)
2 122 
(28%)
1 063 
(50%)
965  
(50%)
504  
(47%)
934  
(57%)
Source: European Commission, ENWISE Report, 2003
From Table 1 is evident that 64.2% of the Bulgarian researchers are 
employed in the GOV R&D sector and 23.6% – in sector ‘Higher educa-
tion’. Social and humanities scientists are more likely to be found in the 
GOV research and HES institutions than in enterprise (BES sector). Table 
2 shows that Bulgarian researchers are concentrated mainly in ‘Natural 
Sciences’ and ‘Engineering & Technology’. Only 504 social scientists and 
934 humanity scientists are employed in Bulgarian GOV and HES sectors, 
i.e. the research community is relatively small. Let us now connect these 
data with R&D expenditure by sectors and fields of science per capita re-
searcher and in Euros. (Romania, Czech Republic and Slovenia and taken 
for comparison)
Table 3: R&D expenditure, in Euros per annum, per capita re-
searcher and by R&D sector in 2001
Sector
Country BES HES GOV Total
Bulgaria 12 470 2 830 7 254 6 791
Romania 8 854 2 832 4 853 6 301
Slovenia 
(for comparison)
105 651 16 718 40 137 45 313
Source: European Commission, ENWISE Report, 2003
The data presented in Table 3 show that the financial resources avail-
able per capita researcher per annum in Bulgaria and Romania are compa-
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rable – 6 791 Euro and 6 301 Euro respectively, but they are very low in 
comparison with Slovenia – 45 313 Euro and indeed incomparable with 
the EU -15 average of 178 868 Euro per capita researcher per annum. 
Table 4: R&D expenditure, in Euros per annum, per capita re-
searcher (women + men combined) and by fields of science in HES and 
GOV sectors in 2000
 field Natu-
ral 
Sci-
ences
Engi-
neer-
ing & 
Tech-
nology
Medi-
cal 
Sci-
ences
Agri-
cultural 
Sci-
ences
Social 
Sci-
ences
Hu-
mani-
ties
Total
Country
Bulgaria 5 584 5 700 2 661 20 247 4 264 4 606 6 753
Romania 3 975 6 857 7 892 10 194 7 662 3 173 5 841
Czech 
Republic 35 333 43 057 42 079 35 052 26 781 22 287 35 909
Slovenia 55 192 51 191 34 791 40 528 37 142 28 390 44 589
Source: European Commission, ENWISE Report, 2003
From Table 3&4 is evident that the access of a Bulgarian researcher in 
the GOV R&D sector to research funding is approximately 6 times less in 
comparison with his/her Slovenian colleague, while the respective figures 
for a Bulgarian social and humanity scientist in GOV and HES sectors are 
respectively – 8.7 and 6 times less respectively. Table 4 also shows that the 
gap in resource allocation between hard and soft sciences is very narrow in 
Bulgaria and Romania, which is not the case with Slovenia, Czech Repub-
lic and the other ‘new’ EU member states.
The presented data are indicative that all Bulgarian researchers (both 
in hard and soft sciences) employed in the GOV sector face one and the 
same trouble related with their access to financial resources. The research 
carried out in the GOV sector is funded from the state budget via Bulgar-
ian Ministry of education and science. As a matter of fact the allocated re-
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sources to the GOV R&D sector cover only researchers’ salaries and partly 
the function of the research infrastructure (the cost for phone, electricity, 
heating, etc.). The so-called ‘research money’ in practice do not exist in 
Bulgarian GOV R&D sector. It means that the attraction of finances from 
the EU Framework Program and other EU funding bodies are a matter 
of survival for the researchers employed in this sector be they engaged in 
hard or in soft sciences research. Therefore in medium-term perspective 
the scenario ‘E’ of the above national funding arrangements of the EU-15 
seems more close to the Bulgarian case.
2. After the political change of 1989 in all post-communist countries, 
including Bulgaria was established within the respective Ministries of sci-
ence new grant-giving bodies, i.e. new funding mechanisms for R&D on 
the basis of a grant system were introduced. However the support offered 
by these granting bodies should be considered as additional income to-
wards the resources allocation to the GOV R&D sector, which is financed 
mainly from the state budget. 
For example in the Slovak Republic, 0.59% of GDP in 2002 was allo-
cated to the R&D sector, from which 0.30% of GDP was financed from the 
state budget. The special state bodies – Agency for Science and Technology 
and VEGA (Scientific Grant Agency) deliver research grants on the basis 
of competitions. 
In Hungary governmental R&D financing constitutes about 65-70% of 
the total funding of the Academy and the universities. The grants awarded 
by different governmental granting bodies such as OTKA (Scientific Re-
search Fund), MÜFA (Technological Development Fund) and NKFP (Na-
tional Research and Development Programme) contribute to this funding.
In Bulgaria the subsidy from the state budget comprises about 80% of 
the income of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and the grants from the 
National Research Fund (a state body, which deliver grants on the basis of 
competition) is about 3% annually.
3. Immediately after the political change in Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries emerged new research institutions (the so-called ‘think 
tanks’) funded by private resources mainly from USA which shaped the 
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Private non-profit (PNP) R&D sector and provided stimuli to develop 
SHS fields. Some innovative Private non-profit R&D1 emerged outside the 
GOV R&D in all post-communist countries. 
For example in Poland, following the introduction of a market econ-
omy, private R&D institutions came into being, and independent branch 
institutes were established. New, autonomous research centers, such as the 
A. Smith Institute in Warsaw or the Case Foundation, were also set up. 
The institutions mentioned here are set up as foundations, thus they are 
financed by private funds. They describe themselves as independent, pri-
vate, non-commercial, non-profit institutions. 
In Hungary the Bay Zoltán Foundation is the largest research founda-
tion in the country. It was founded in 1993 by the National Committee for 
Technological Development and it has three research institutes: the Insti-
tute of Biotechnology, the Institute of Material Science and Technology 
and the Institute of Logistics and Production Engineering. It is financed by 
grants, R&D contracts and interests (non-governmental funding).
The Private non-profit R&D sector is still negligible in Bulgaria but 
currently it competes with the GOV R&D in attracting EU funding.
4. Turbulent state-of-the-arts in SHS – introduction of new theoreti-
cal and methodological approaches, but also a great fragmentation of re-
search communities. This is an outcome of the completed EU FP5 funded 
project “The State of Three Social Science Disciplines in Central and East-
ern Europe (Economics, Political Science and Sociology)”. The project 
was carried out by the Collegium Budapest, a Hungarian PNP research 
organization. Within this project was organized a workshop in Budapest 
during which social scientists from all CEE countries debated on the new 
research agenda – building related with the ‘EU-entry’ priority themes and 
issues and its potential impact upon the national funding arrangements 
in their fields. A key speaker at the opening of this workshop summarized 
the state of Social Sciences in the CEE countries with the statement: ‘We 
are increasingly getting the grants but we do not have enough influence on 
1 According to the Frascati Manual, the R&D activities are heading under 
the four sectors of economy: Higher Education sector (HES), Government sec-
tor (GOV), Business and Enterprise sector (BES) and Private non-profit sector 
(PNP).
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the setting and content of the research agenda’
Conclusion: In order to survive the social sciences and humanities in 
Bulgaria have to adapt their research agenda to the EU Framework prior-
ity themes and issues.
References:
1. J. Smith, Implementation of the European Research Area in the Social 
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and governance in a knowledge-based society, 2003.
2. M. Kaase and V. Sparschuh (Eds.) Three Social Science in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Handbook on Economics, Political Science and Sociol-
ogy (1989 – 2001), Social Science Information Centre (IZ), Bonn/Berlin 
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Cafer Sadık Yaran
A NON-RADICAL RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 
fOR A PEACEfUL DIVERSITY IN UNITY
Introduction: The principle of “unity in diversity” or “diversity in 
unity” is a perennial formula for multi-religious, multi-racial, and multi-
cultural societies. It may easily be found in many ancient philosophical 
and mystical traditions of various religions, civilisations and cultures from 
the East to the West particularly as “unity in diversity” in a pantheistic and 
onto-theological fashion. Today, however, it is still valid and even much 
needed in the post-modern world of new religious movements and many 
new minority groups and sub-cultures in almost all countries of the world, 
especially as a principle of “diversity in unity” rather than unity in diversity 
in a pluralistic and socio-cultural fashion. 
In this paper, I will advocate diversity in unity and a non-radical reli-
gious pluralism to arrive at a peaceful and practical achievement of cultural 
and religious diversity in unity in Europe and in the entire world from the 
perspective of the philosophy of religion and of the Islamic faith. First I 
will mention cultural diversity in unity in a few sentences, and then I will 
explore religious diversity in unity, and finally I will point out the basic 
principles of Islamic diversity in unity.
Cultural Diversity in Unity: We note with growing concern that very 
large segments of the people of contemporary societies including Euro-
peans sense that they are threatened by massive immigration and by the 
growing minorities within their borders that hail from different cultures, 
follow different practices, and have separate institutions and loyalties. Peo-
ple of both parts, majorities and minorities, are troubled by street vio-
lence, verbal outbursts of hate, and growing support for various extremist 
parties. These are unwholesome reactions to threats people feel to their 
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sense of identity, self-determination, and culture, which come on top of 
concerns evoked by globalization, new communication technologies, and 
a gradual loss of national sovereignty. The challenge before us is to find le-
gitimate and empirically sound ways to constructively address these con-
cerns. At the same time, we should ensure that these sentiments do not 
find antisocial, hateful, let alone violent expressions.1 In other words, the 
deadly dilemma of our day is that the assertion of one’s own distinctive-
ness seems too easily to imply attacking others simply because they differ, 
ignoring and destroying all bonds of unity; whereas the effort to achieve 
unity is interpreted as requiring the suppression of the access of peoples to 
the cultural and religious wellsprings of their identity and thereby the very 
roots of their sense of unity with others.2 
Two approaches should be avoided: promoting assimilation on the one 
hand, and unbounded multiculturalism on the other. Assimilation-which 
entails requiring minorities to abandon all of their distinct institutions, 
cultures, values, habits, and connections to other societies in order to fully 
mesh into the prevailing culture-is sociologically difficult to achieve and 
unnecessary for dealing with the issues at hand. It is also morally unjusti-
fied because of our respect for some normative differences. Unbounded 
multiculturalism-which entails giving up the concept of shared values, 
loyalties, and identity in order to privilege ethnic and religious differences, 
presuming that nations can be replaced by a large number of diverse mi-
norities-is also unnecessary. And it is also normatively unjustified because 
it fails to recognize the values and institutions undergirded by the society 
at large.3 
The basic approach we should favour is diversity within unity. It pre-
sumes that all members of a given society will fully respect and adhere to 
those basic values and institutions that are considered part of the basic shared 
framework of the society. At the same time, every group in society is free to 
maintain its distinct subculture-those policies, habits, and institutions that 
do not conflict with the shared core. Such diversity within unity allows one 
to fully respect basic rights, the democratic way of life, and core values, as 
1 www.gwu.edu/ccps/dwu_positionpaper.html, 20.05.2006.
2 www.crvp.org/seminar/seminar_94.htm, 22.05.2006.
3 www.gwu.edu/ccps/dwu_positionpaper.html, 20.05.2006.
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well as those minority values that do not conflict with it. We observe that 
such diversity within unity enriches rather than threatens the society at large 
and its culture.4 In our present condition this is not a formula but a destiny, 
not an ideology but a task, not a utopia but a direction. But how can this be 
achieved?5 In addition, diversity in unity in the sense of living in one geo-
graphical or political boundary is not only a contemporary but also a his-
torical fact for many people in the world. However, what is important and 
urgently needed is to succeed in living in a peaceful and practical diversity in 
unity, not only in theory and discourse. In order to achive peaceful and real 
diversity in unity in multi-cultural and multi-religious societies, it is almost 
necessary first to arrive at a consciousness and consensus about the religious 
framework of diversity in unity. And for this purpose, now I will deal with 
specifically diversity in unity from the religious point of view. What are the 
ultimate religious principles for diversity in unity which can promote living 
together in peace, happiness and cooperation? What sort of theory should we 
have to understand religious diversity, all asserting to be true and the best? 
Religious Diversity in Unity (or a Non-Radical Religious Plural-
ism): In order to attain to the ideal condition of peaceful diversity, most 
religious people need a paradigm shift in looking at the other religions, 
which constitute of the primary basis of civilisations and cultures. As we 
have already said about cultural diversity in unity that two approaches 
should be avoided, namely promoting assimilation and unbounded mul-
ticulturalism, likewise we should defend in relation to religious diversity 
in unity that parallel two religious approaches should also be avoided, 
namely, religious exclusivism and radical religious pluralism. Rather than 
a radical religious exclusivism of the mediaeval and modern times and 
also rather than a radical religious pluralism of the post-modern process, 
what is needed is either a religious inclusivism or a non-radical religious 
pluralism for bridging the religious people who adhere to various religions 
and denominations. For while religious exclusivism extravagantly empha-
sizes diversity without unity and radical religious pluralism similarly em-
phasizes unity without diversity, religious inclusivism lay emphasis upon 
4 www.gwu.edu/ccps/dwu_positionpaper.html, 20.05.2006.
5 www.crvp.org/seminar/seminar_94.htm, 25.05.2006.
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unity in diversity and a non-radical or moderate pluralism lay emphasis 
upon diversity in unity. 
The absolutist rhetoric of Medieval theology and the dualistic rhetoric 
of modernity were naturally reflected into the modern conception of reli-
gion and into the theories concerning the plurality of the world religions: 
a true, good and salvific religion on the one hand and the whole other re-
ligions on the other, briefly and technically stated, religious exclusivism. If 
the truth is only one as some sciences of that time showed, and my religion 
is the truth, then any religion outside my religion is automatically false 
religions. Although exclusivism has always been popular among religious 
people of any religion in any time, it possibly arrived at a higher point in 
modern times, as the increase of the function of missionary at that time 
has showed. Thus, there seem to be a considerable relationship between 
the general dualistic values of modernity and the religious exclusivism.
Together with certain positive affects of the modern developments in infor-
mation and communication technologies, and in the movements of immigra-
tion and increasing tourism,6 religiously exclusivist paradigm has started to be 
criticized like the other one-sided and exclusivist perspectives of modernity. 
Although exclusivism may be natural and normal for devout people 
who were brought up in an exclusivist environment and education, or for 
some people who were in a position of self-defense in relation to religion, 
it may be argued that it is one of the excessiveness and implausibility of 
the middle age and modernity. For it is an obvious fact that basic religious, 
spiritual, and ethical truths and values do not belong to only one religion; 
and the other religions are not devoid of them completely. In addition, 
since God has the attributes such as mercy, justice, and wisdom, God will 
pay to everybody what he or she deserves exactly and justly in the here-
after, to whatever religion he or she belongs. Moreover, it is known that 
families usually play an important role in belonging to a religion; and it is 
not easy to change a religion and to convert to another one psychologically 
and sociologically. Although it usually stems from a strong belief and a 
sincere religiosity, when it is thought empathetically, one can understand 
6 John Hick, “Whatever Path Men Choose is Mine”, in John Hick and Brian 
Hebblethwaite (eds.), Christianity and Other Religions, (Glasgow: Fount, 1980), 
pp. 171-74.
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that an absolute religious exclusivism cannot easily be defended even in 
religious terms. In this case, almost any kind of exclusivism including reli-
gious one should possibly be left any more.
Inclusivism may be said to be between exclusivism and pluralism, and 
also between modernity and posmodernity, both historically and theo-
logically. It is usually accepted to start from the years of 1960s with the 
studies of Karl Rahner and with the declarations of the Second Vatican 
Council. For inclusivists, their own religion is still at the centre or zenith 
of the religions in truth and salvation, but the other religions can also have 
some amount of similar truth, and their members can have some possi-
bility of a more limited amount of salvation in some special cases. This is 
the enterprise of widening the circle of the salvation to a certain extent in 
a religiously responsible and self-possessed manner so that this widening 
neither contradicts with basic religious doctrines and scriptural expres-
sions nor endangers the religiously importance and even superiority of 
that religion in the eyes of its members.
Inclusivism is a positive development in a right direction. Looked at 
from the religious point of view, it does not require religious people to 
make too much radical changes in their theological conceptions of their 
own religion and the other religions. Although it rejects to see the one 
religion as the unique source of religious truth and salvation, it does not 
diminish the believer’s belief, trust and love to his or her own religion. 
However, it seems to us that inclusivism is a narrower concept than exclu-
sivism and pluralism. Moreover, Christian inclusivists’ ideas about seeing 
the members of the other religions as anonymous Christians and the other 
religions as preparation to Christianity are too particularistic and anach-
ronic views. The historical period in which one religion may be seen as 
preparation for the other must be over for a long time. 
Some Muslim approaches to other religions, which may perhaps be 
called as Islamic inclusivism, also seems to us as good but insufficient de-
velopment. For they seem to widen the circle of religiously considerable 
truth and salvation so as to cover the three Abrahamic religions, in other 
words, the People of the Book, and apparently not more.7 It is good, but 
7 Süleyman Ates, “The Attitude of the Koran Towards Divine Religions”, 
Kuran Mesajı: Ilmi Arastırmalar Dergisi, 1999-2000, Vol. 22, 23, 24.
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there are also millions of sincerely religious people worshipping and pray-
ing God [in the most general sense of the word] and doing good deed for 
the purpose of salvation [again in general sense] outside these three Ab-
rahamic faiths. Is it fair and plausible to overlook them? The Qur’an does 
not condemn the adherents of any religion to the Hell totally, and says that 
there are good people and bad people among every religious community. 
For example, the Qur’an says about Jews in a verse (5: 66) that “there is 
from among them a party of the right course: But many of them follow a 
course that is evil.” There is another verse which seems to show the divine 
principle on this issue more obviously: 
“Not all of them are alike: Of the People of the Book are a portion 
that stand (for the right); they rehearse the Signs of Allah all night long, 
and they prostrate themselves in adoration. They believe in Allah, and the 
Last Day; they enjoin what is right, and forbid what is wrong; and they 
hasten (in emulation) in (all) good works: They are in the ranks of the 
righteous. Of the good that they do, nothing will be rejected of them; for 
Allah knoweth well those that do right.” (3: 113-115) 
Therefore, it seems better to go beyond inclusivism, too, and to try 
to solve the problem of religious plurality and religious peace under the 
terms of religious pluralism.
John Hick is the main representative of the religious pluralism after 
modernity. His pluralism has both theological and philosophical dimen-
sions. In his earlier and more theological writings, he suggested a Coperni-
can revolution in the theology of religions. The “needed Copernican revo-
lution in theology”, according to him, “involves a shift from the dogma 
that Christianity is at the centre to the realization that it is God who is at 
the centre, and that all the religions of mankind, including our own, serve 
and revolve around him.”8 In his later and more philosophical writings, he 
presents religious pluralism as a particular theory, which is philosophi-
cally dependent mainly on some Kantian ideas. Based on Kantian distinc-
tion between noumenon and phenomenon, or between the Real an sich 
and the Real as variously thought and experienced by human beings, Hick 
8 John Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths: Essays in the Philosophy of Reli-
gion, (London: Macmillan, 1988 [1973]), s. 131.
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argues that, in the particular cases of religious awareness, there appear to 
be two basic concepts through which the Real is humanly thought and 
experienced, the Real as personal and the Real as nonpersonal. 
For Hick, “we never experience the Real an sich but always as it is 
finitely, inadequately, and no doubt often distortedly thought of and per-
ceived by different human communities of faith…. Like the ancient para-
ble of the elephant and the blind men … so it is with the different religions: 
each identifies the Real in terms of its own partial experience of it.9 So the 
religions are equal in the fact that none of them knows the real properly; 
and so there cannot be any superiority among them. They are also equal 
to be “a range of human responses to a transcendent divine reality.”10 There 
cannot be ethical criteria to compare and contrast the religions, either. 
Therefore, all the great world religions are equal among themselves; for 
none of them knows the Real properly, all of them are human responses, 
and all of them transform human existence from self-centeredness to real-
ity-centeredness
Even if religious pluralism is getting widespread in intellectual envi-
ronments in recent decades, as even Hick himself points out sometimes, 
it has not been in a central position among the religious people yet. Why 
is it so? Is it a structural problem or not? It seems to us that the popular 
Hickian religious pluralism has some philosophical, particularly Kantian 
dimensions, which may seem too radical to some people, and may cause it 
to remain marginal. However, such a dimension is neither necessary nor 
useful for a properly or sufficiently religious version of religious pluralism. 
Then, it may be useful to make some criticisms and suggestions to turn to-
wards a non-radical and more moderate and religious version of religious 
pluralism. There should be such concept of religious pluralism that, while 
it submits the right of the other religions in truth and salvation, it should 
not shake or weaken the believers’ faith and trust in his or her own reli-
gion, either. We can enumerate some of our tentative proposals towards a 
non-radical pluralism.
9 John Hick, “Religious Pluralism,” in The Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. Mir-
cea Eliade, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, London: Collier Mac-
millan Publisher, 1987), p. 333.
10 Hick, “Religious Pluralism,” p. 333.
145
(1) First, it seems to us that, while Hick’s Copernican God-centered 
revolution in theology is perfectly all right, his Kantian distinction between 
the Real an sich and the Real as variously thought and experienced by hu-
man beings, and his assertion based on this distinction that this type of 
dualistic concept of God as personal and non-personal can be found in 
every religion are neither necessary and useful for a theory of religious plu-
ralism nor easily acceptable for the believers of the monotheistic religions. 
The main theological emphasis of Islam, for example, is the oneness and 
uniqueness of God; and even an implicit dualism is quite alien to Islam and 
does not sound well to the ear of any ordinary Muslim. Then, a non-radical 
pluralism should be far from any suspicion or flavor of dualism.
(2) Secondly, Hick’s Kantian emphasis that all religions’ experience 
and knowledge of the Real are always finitely, inadequately, and often dis-
tortedly, like the ancient parable of the elephant and the blind men shows, 
is again neither necessary and useful for a theory of religious pluralism 
nor a desirable fact to emphasis from the religious point of view. Although 
it is true that nobody can experience and know God, or the Real, in God’s 
absoluteness and uniqueness, the emphasis must be on the positive side of 
what the religions know or tell about God similarly to each other rather 
than on the negative side of the fact that none of them properly knows 
God, the Real. For this approach associates agnosticism, whereas religion 
and especially common-sense religiosity do not live on too much agnosti-
cism. Religiosity usually depends on believing in and trusting to the truth 
and goodness of what scriptures or prophets said on their exceptional au-
thority. Then, a non-radical pluralism should also be far from any suspi-
cion or flavour of excessive agnosticism.
(3) Thirdly, Hick’s general description of religions as “human re-
sponses to the transcendent” also seems to be radical, in other words, to 
be more excessive than necessary for a religiously acceptable theory of 
religious pluralism. There is a belief in the transcendent here; so it is not 
naturalism, which sees religion as just a human projection. However, the 
emphasis of “human response” in explaining the religions seems to imply 
that human beings were the only actors in the formation of the religions 
and that God or the Transcendent was completely passive probably as a 
non-personal reality. It associates the exclusion of divine or transcenden-
tal factor in the religions through revelation, inspiration, providence, or 
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some other ways. God’s personal dimension and personal relation to hu-
man beings, namely, theistic conception of God, seems to be undermined 
or at least underestimated from the perspective of monotheistic religions. 
In a famous metaphor, which Hick often quotes, the Muslim Sufi poet 
Rumi wrote about the different religious traditions: ‘The lamps are differ-
ent but the light is the same: it comes from beyond’.” (cited in Hick 1987, 
332) The last phrase of this sentence, “it comes from beyond” should not 
be neglected in any non-radical pluralism. In the simple formulation of 
“human responses to the transcendent”, God seems to be too deistic, and 
religion seems to be too humanistic. Then, a non-radical religious plural-
ism should not be too open to the criticism of humanism (in its restricted 
sense) and of deism. 
(4) Fourthly, the religions have both various worldviews (belief sys-
tems, theological doctrines and teachings) and various forms of life (ritu-
als and norms for ethical behavior). Some of them are the same or similar 
among some religions and some of them are completely or relatively dif-
ferent and incompatible among them. It is good to emphasize the more 
common and compatible points rather than different and incompatible 
ones; but this desire does not take somebody to claim that the most com-
mon point among the religions, for example, the transformation of human 
existence from self-centeredness to the Real-centeredness, is really impor-
tant but the other theological, ritual, ethical and historical dimensions are 
not so important. Pluralism should damage neither to the total structure 
of any religion nor to its total value in the eyes of its believers. It should be 
far from subjective and selective reductionism. 
(5) Fifthly, non-radical pluralism should not emphasize the equality 
and identity of religions too much, as radical exclusivism emphasized the 
inequality and differences among them. For both attitudes would end up 
abolishing people’s freedom of choice among religions. If the whole other 
religions are false, as in the case of exclusivist attitude, you do not have 
a real freedom of choice, you must necessarily remain in your own reli-
gion as a reasonable person. And similarly, if the whole religions are com-
pletely equal, as may be in the case of radical pluralism, again you do not 
have a proper freedom of choice, and again you must naturally remain in 
your own religion as a reasonable person. People should be forced neither 
to change nor not to change his or her religion. Freedom of choice and 
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change should always be open. A non-religious pluralism should also be 
far from a kind of soft or implicit totalitarianism. 
(6) Sixthly, a more coherent and a more peaceful pluralist attitude 
seem to require being pluralist and tolerant against alternative theories 
concerning religious plurality and diversity, namely, exclusivism and in-
clusivism. Whereas, for example, Hick can accuse exclusivism as “atti-
tude of religious imperialism”11 and Paul Knitter can accuse inclusivism 
as “open to colonialist or imperialist distortions.”12 Some of exclusivists 
and inclusivists can really be as they accused; but most of them cannot 
have had such negative ideas and ideals. In addition, almost the same rea-
sons for defending religious pluralism seem to be valid for believing in a 
pluralism of the theories of religions. All of them are equal in being an 
explanatory theory for religious diversity. And most defenders of any of 
these theories were born in a family or society already believing according 
to that theory. So a non-radical pluralism should be careful not to fall into 
a different kind of exclusivism.
(7) Sevently, from the perspective of Socratic philosophy, for example, 
one can believe in God and talk about God although he or she is aware of 
the fact that the knowledge arrived at is very limited. Philo-sophia means 
the love and search of wisdom in spite of the fact that one will never arrive 
at the real wisdom. In addition to this, as everybody knows, Socrates talks 
about God’s inspiration to him in his decisions. For him, his thoughts and 
beliefs are not only his human responses to transcendent; the transcend-
ent inspires him, too. Philosophically, Karl Popper’s critical rationalism 
can also supply inspiration or insight to a non-radical religious pluralism. 
Like critical rationalism, he also defends a critical pluralism against a rela-
tivistic one, which, according to him, takes the society to the hegemony of 
violence. In his critical pluralism, the thought of truth, or better to say, the 
search for truth has a very considerable place. These philosophical ideas 
seem illuminating for a non-radical religious pluralism, too. So a non-
radical religious pluralism should be based on a critical or spohialogical 
epistemology rather than an unbounded relativism. 
11 Hick, “Whatever Path Men Choose is Mine”, p. 172.
12 Cited in Harold Coward, 2000, Pluralism in the World Religions: A Short 
Introduction, (Oxford: Oneworld, 2000), p. 41.
148
Briefly speaking, non-radical religious pluralism should be far from 
any suspicion or flavor of dualism, agnosticism, deism, reductionism, to-
talitarianism, exclusivism, and unbounded relativism. On the contrary, it 
should emphasize upon understanding and respecting religious differ-
ences and diversities while celebrating a moderate and critical common 
ground or unity of diverse religions like moral and spiritual evolution of 
souls and societies in this world and in life after death.
Islamic Diversity in Unity: If we look at the issue first from the unity 
perspective, we see that God is one and has created and sustained the en-
tire universe, animate or inanimate. God sent messengers or prophets to 
every nation. The Qur’an obviously points out that “… there never was a 
people, without a warner having lived among them (in the past)” (35: 24). 
It also points out that the essence or common core of their message was 
one and the same: “For We assuredly sent amongst every People a Messen-
ger, (with the command), ‘Serve Allah, and eschew Evil’…” (16: 36). These 
two commands, “serve Allah and eschew evil”, constitute of the united es-
sence of the diverse prophets’ messages. Since all the great religions have 
these two basic essences even if in general sense and different degrees, that 
means they have a common core and a shared value system. Similarly, the 
Qur’an also mentions three basic and united essences shared particularly 
among the Abrahamic religions; and it adds that they will have what they 
deserve justly in the hereafter: “Those who believe (in the Qur’an), and 
those who follow the Jewish (scriptures), and the Christians and the Sabi-
ans, any who believe in Allah and the Last Day, and work righteousness, 
shall have their reward with their Lord on them shall be no fear, nor shall 
they grieve” (2: 62; see also 3: 64). The three basic features, namely, to be-
lieve in Allah and the Last Day, and to work righteousness, are the basic 
religious characteristics which unite the diverse religions. 
Unity is the need of human beings. But emphasizing unity is not the 
total negation of diversity. Islam teaches that diversity is, first of all, a fact 
of natural world. God has created the whole universe with diversity (see 
the Qur’an, 35: 27-28). Then, there is diversity among human beings. They 
have variety of genders, colours and languages and multiplicity of races 
and tribes. These diversities are considered natural and are called “God’s 
signs” in the Qur’an (30: 20-22). Islam rejects ethnocentrism when it is 
focused on a particular race, be it white, black or yellow, or any other one. 
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The difference of races is part of the one humanity and their equality with-
in this one humanity is a divine rule and a sign of the Creator to all these 
colours and races. The diversities of races, tribes, and cultures also have a 
healthy and constructive purpose, viz. that “you may know each other”. It 
is pointed out in the Qur’an (49: 13) as follows:
“O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a fe-
male, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other 
(not that ye may despise each other). Verily the most honoured of you in 
the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you….”
In addition to these natural and cultural diversities, there are also re-
ligious diversities, which Islam recognizes and respects. Religious central-
ism that wants the universe to profess one creed is refuted by Islam, for 
the Islam considers diversity of faiths as a divine rule that can neither be 
changed nor altered. Indeed, the Qur’an mentions both the divine factor 
in the diversity of religions and the ideal attitude of religious people in the 
face of the reality of religious plurality: 
“To each among you have We prescribed a Law and an Open Way. 
If Allah had so willed, He would have made you a single People, but 
(His Plan is) to test you in what He hath given you: so strive as in a race 
in all virtues. The goal of you all is to Allah; it is He that will show you the 
truth of the matters in which ye dispute” (5/48). 
This verse may be considered to summarize the theoretical essence 
and practical principles of a non-radical version of religious pluralism, or 
of a peaceful diversity in unity: Diversity among us is completely natural 
and acceptable because of its divine origin; and the unity point among us 
is just “to strive in a race in all virtues”. This is the most essential and per-
haps universally acceptable principle of unity in diversity. For the three 
common Qur’anic features mentioned above, repeatedly, to believe in 
Allah and the Last Day, and to work righteousness, were more specifi-
cally valid among the adherent of Abrahamic religions; the two common 
Qur’anic features mentioned above, repeatedly, serve Allah and eschew 
evil, were seemed to include believers in God or the Ultimate Reality in 
general; but the last feature mentioned in the last verse, viz., to strive in a 
race in all virtues, is such a universally acceptable feature that can include 
and unite even the atheists who have ethical consciousness and moral 
values. 
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As a result, one can say that cultural, religious or Islamic diversity in 
unity based on a non-radical religious pluralism shall neither be too exces-
sive to break the bound of national or religious unity and loyalty, empha-
sizing exclusively or extravagantly similarities and equalities among cul-
tures and religions, nor lead to national racism or religious fanaticism and 
fundamentalism, stressing excessively the elements of differences and di-
versities. Diversity in unity will allow us, whether we should be a member 
of majority or minority group in any country, both to protect our cultural 
and religious identities, and to respect to the others’ rights and values, and 
also to be able to remain loyal to our greater responsibilities as citizens of a 
country, or just virtuous and wise human beings of this beautiful world. 
151
Bogdana Todorova
THE ROLE Of RELIGION TODAY  
AND THE EUROPEAN fEARS
Today Europe feels metaphysical horror by the shaking insight that 
it has to accept new members, which are not only poorer but also show 
cultural differences. If the first ten accepted countries in 2004 are poor and 
former communist countries from East Europe, and also basicly Catho-
lic and Protestant, and these countries threaten with potential invasion of 
cheap labour force and deep delay of economic speed, today’s candidates 
to join are basicly Orthodox (Bulgaria and Romania) or that is worse – Is-
lamic (Bosnia and Turkey). We are interested in ontological sense of this 
European fear. The fear which leads Europe risking to take the decision for 
consolidation of relations with the USA which is opposite of the European 
statement about the American invasion in Iraq. It is not clear how the 
European self-fixation, which proceeds from existential fear, will combine 
personal rights (by more deeper limits of greedy, individual Ego) with the 
collective rights of the Muslim word where spirituality and publicity are 
basic values. Human rights are important only for the West where indi-
vidual is the fundamental of society. But today the world changes dynami-
cally and European values cannot stay the same. It is impossible to forbid 
people to look for a better life in the Promised Land of democracy. That is 
why, it is very important Europe to make a real civilization choice. It is a 
fact that Islamists represent between officers in the Turkish army, in mu-
nicipalities, police, or between intellectuals. What happens with Europe in 
case of disintegration of the State in Turkey since Europe cannot save itself 
not involving in problem? That is the reason that Bulgaria is strategically 
important for the European Union in the sense of a real barrier against 
fundamentalism and chaos, which is described by European specilaists 
even by the Arabian term “fitna”.
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What is Europe afraid of today? In my paper, I stress on three basic 
problems:
1. Religious renovation as return.
2. Radicalism of young Muslims and non-Muslims, and the new phe-
nomenon – “salafitian jihadizm”.
3. Balkanization (or fragmentation) of the Continent.
Across Europe the conflicting currents of secularism, Christianity 
and Islam are compelling Europeans to wrestle with their values as never 
before. Religion’s role in public life, and its influence on politics, have been 
center-stage questions worldwide since Sept.11, 2001. But the debate in 
Europe has been complicated by the continent’s difficulty in integrating its 
fast-growing Muslim immigrant minority. It has been sharpened by trag-
edies such as the bombing of a Madrid train station last March, and the 
brutal murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gohg by an Islamic extremist 
lasdt fall.
Two events last year neatly frame the challenge: in the United States, a 
California man tried to remove “One nation, under God” from the Pledge 
of Allegiance. 90% of Americans wanted to keep the phrase-and on June 
15, the Supreme Court halted the bid on procedural grounds. Three days 
later, in Brussels, officials agreed on the final text of the European Union’s 
new Constitution. The charter made no mention of God, despite calls that 
is recognize Europe’s Christian roots.
“The clash between those who believe and those who don’t believe 
will be a dominant aspect of relations between the US and Europe in the 
coming years, says Jacques Delors, a former president of the European 
Commission./1/ Those incidents “will reinforce secularism” in Europe, 
predicts Patrick Weil, a sociologist of religion at the Sorbonne in Paris. 
“The tendency now in Europe is to say we have to be clear on the limits to 
religious intervention in public life. We are not going to sacrifice women’s 
equality, democracy, and individual freedoms on the altar of a new reli-
gion.”/2/
Today, only 21 percent of Europeans say religion is “very important” 
to them, according to the most recent European Values Study, which 
tracks attitudes in 32 European countries.A survey by the Pew Forum on 
Religion and Public Life found that nearly three times as many Americans, 
59 %, called their faith “very important”.
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Although a Gallup poll found last year that 44 percent of Americans 
say they attend a place of worship once a week, the average figure in Eu-
rope is only 15 percent, although the picture varies widely across the Con-
tinent.
Luis Lopez Guerra, wonders why in a country where less than half 
the population ever goes to church, he should have found a Bible and a 
crucifix on his desk, along with the Constitution, when he was sworn in as 
undersecretary at the Ministry of Justice a year ago.
Spain is currently the front line in the Vatican’s rear-guard battle to re-
tain church influence over public policy in Europe. But with public opin-
ion ranged firmly on the government’s side, there seems little it can do but 
make its displeasure known.
The Spanish government’s plans to legalize gay marriage this spring, 
to liberalize divorce and abortion laws, and to permit stem-cell research, 
do not represent an attempt to impose an atheist state religion, he insists. 
Rather, he says, they “extend civil rights and make the law independent of 
Catholic dogma”. He adds, “The government has a responsibility to repre-
sent the majority of the people. Our policy has to depend on the people’s 
will, not on the preferences of the Catholic church.”/3/
There is an important statement of the new Iraqi President Dzauad al-
Maliki, who has the support of the Shiits, Sunits and Kurds: “Democracy 
means to accept the opinion of majority. I am going to create a family that 
is not based on religious or ethnic grounds”.
The changes in Spain, Chatolic church leaders worry, are part of a 
broader trend. Cardinal Renato Martino, head of the Pontifical Council 
for Justice and Peace, recently attacked “a new holy inquisition… motivat-
ed predominantly by prejudice toward all that is Christian.” The president 
of the French Protestant Federation, Jean-Arnold de Clermont, warned of 
a climate of secularist zeal that was undermining all faiths.
The renovation and reformation in Islam have their features that are 
different from that ones of the Europeans and the North-American world. 
The renovation in Islam is not an introduction of new religious and social 
principles, but it is considered restoration, return to the prime sources of 
Islam – Koran and the Suna. Loui Massignon determines two patterns 
of the historical Islamic society./4/ The first is this one of integral society 
which is consolidated in all the aspects – social, political and mental, and 
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it exists in the Age of Muhammad and the right Khalifs. The second is 
that one of the empire Islamic society, which is based on the structures 
of former Near-East societies. For example, the dynasty of the Abassides, 
which is influenced by the Sassanids administrative traditions, rules over 
Bagdad (661-1258) and by its government appears the most popular term 
for State – daula. Inspite of the existence of this second pattern, one can-
not speak about distinction between State and religion in Islam. Islam al-
ways will be “din ua daula” (Religion and State). This is most popular point 
of view of many Western researchers and Muslim authors such as Ahmad, 
Asad, Fadlallah, Ghannouchi, al-Mawdudi, al-Turabi. According to mod-
ernist Fazlur Rahman, the last is pure demagogy. The slogan that in Islam 
Religion and politics are inseparable is used to mislead common people 
that politics and State serve the long-term ends of Islam while Islam be-
gins to serve the short-sighted purposes of party politics ./5/
Political theory in the Muslim world finds more concrete expression 
accentuating historical tradition. The tradition in this case serves for legiti-
macy of criticism of status quo and for support of evolutionary and revolu-
tionary changes. Quoting the Golden Age of Islam is used by both reforma-
tors-modernists and religious activists to confirm the need of reforms in 
Muslim societies showing compatibility of Islam with the common values 
of the Modern Ages: democracy, social justice and human rights. Even rep-
resenting defenders of the tradition, religious scientists use it for a mean of 
power and control. According to Syrian philosopher Sadik al-Azm, fun-
damentalism in the forms of both Christian or Islamic is based on princi-
ple routine, and he shows the possibility of “Islamic secularism”. Although 
fundamentalists could adapt themselves to the needs of modern world, this 
can become triumph of secular reason. In a long-term plan actual secular 
reality surely is outlined against the misitc cover of Islam./6/
Paradoxically, Islam defends itself and, at the same time, produces 
conditions to be overcome. We do not claim following modern Christi-
anity that “through religion asking to leave the religion”, but we should 
notice that the concrete forms of political socialization which were born 
by Islam grow weak the ideological prescriptions which are defended by 
itself. In the late 19 century starts the intellectual school known as Salafia 
(by Salaf, Islam ancestors), which looks for inspiration in the early Muslim 
society. The grand-son of Sudanese Mahdi, who leads the revolt against 
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the British in 19 century, Sadik al-Mahdi, considers the Age of “the right 
Khalifs” perfect because of the purity of faith in the early Muslim commu-
nity./7/ Radical Islamists (the term Islamist, although it turns to popular 
in the end of the 20 century, first appears in the Middle Ages in the work 
of Abu al-Hasan al-Aw’ari “The theses of Islamists”, which exerts influence 
on ibn-Taimia) relate the respect to prime-sources with the supreme place 
which they give to the concept “jihad”.
This non-harmonic symbiosis between Salafism and jihad which is in-
spired by Saudi Arabia leads to forward position the created Muslim trans-
nationalism in today’s events. Many members of “salafits jihadizm” seek a 
refuge in European countries and start to build their structures there. In 
Great Britain live three key persons: Syrian Abu Musab, Palestinian Abu 
Katada and Egyptian Abu Hamza. Up to 1992 radical Muslims concen-
trate in the area between Kabul and Peshavar, but today their dispersion 
over Europe is shocking. Three main factors prevent natural consolidation 
of the Muslims in Europe. First, Western political, cultural, social and eco-
nomic influences keep the Muslims in a position of lower class. The sec-
ond comes from the framework of the same Muslim societies – it is the 
confrontation between the Muslims from different countries, cultures and 
traditions. Third, it is the intensive differentiation because of the activity 
of European media.
The Muslims in the European cities come from different cultural stra-
ta and groups which concerns their religious practice, and this turns into 
a reason for their reluctance to consolidate in the new countries that are 
their second home. For radical leaders this is a good reason to collect these 
people under the slogan of Uahabits Islam (the term “uahabizm” is an ex-
act abbreviation, but the Saudis refuge it being afraid that it misrepresents 
their ideas like seprete sect in Islam, and they use the term Muuahhidun, 
or unitarians, who express the absolute Good’s unity), but such a strat-
egy impedes Muslims going into higher social position and power in the 
framework of the new extended European Union. The same concerns also 
the children of emigrants-Muslims, who live between open West society 
and the culture of the homeland of their parents. They are permanently 
in contradiction and fight with their own attachment to ideas and reality. 
Radical Muslim groups stake on this and try to involve them helping to 
find job, school and education.
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The fear from Islamization of Europe is a fact. But more alarming is 
the fact that the point here is for radicalisation not only of the Muslim, but 
also non-Muslim youth. Even contemporary specialists on the problems of 
the Near East strongly discuss the possibility next suicidal terrorists to be 
European. How much are the radical Europeans who are followers of Bel-
gian Muriel De Kuk? “Teheran recruits white British shahides for Israel” is 
the shocking head-line of “The Guardian” of April this year./8/ “Islamizm 
or democracy?”, or who wins, asks rhetorically philosopher Mezri Hadat in 
“Liberasion”. In fact, European specialists do not turn their attention to the 
real problem – about existing crisis of leading positions in the European 
Muslim communities where radical Imams wage serious war for practising 
a policy keeping with the prescription of Islam. Ahmad Abu Laban is Imam 
of Palestinian origine, and with radical uahabits views. Living in Denmark 
a quarter of century, he speaks Danish with difficulty, but in return for it 
he translates his own sermons in Arabian, and he also distributes tapes of 
his records (he practises the so-called resounded Islam, or al-Islam al-sauti, 
which becomes a serious competition of “the written Islam”).
Islamizm proposes young unemployed population a hope of escaping 
its problems and a feeling of safety about its position in the society. It is 
attractive for proletarian students who build the stratum of the so-called 
lumpish intellectuals, according to Roy, on the analogy of the attachment 
of the West-Europeans to communism in the 30-s of the 20 century./9/ It 
is it considering that Islamists provide education through mosques, sport 
facilities and health services while public schools become worse. Today 
the population of Teheran is nearly 8 million people as the poor South 
districts of the capital are densely populated by poor new-comers from 
villages and immigrants. Nevertheless, the capital proposes educational 
privileges compared to villages, and better perspective for the future. The 
same situation is in Pakistan and Turkey, and right the big cities are centre 
of Islamists groups. They immediately ask for support the new-comers, 
who are afraid about their own social status in the big city. That is why, it is 
not surprising young age of the participants in Islamists movement.
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, twenty years after the revolution most 
part of the population do not know the Regime of the Shakh. It is the pop-
ulation which is not educated by the routine social order and repressive 
morality of religious hierarchy of Homeini. The election for Parliament 
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(18. 02. 2000) is earned by the reformators which is a sign that the soci-
ety supports politics of Hatami against the social and moral order which 
is the legacy of Homeini. The discussion about the transition from the 
Islamist Age to post-Islamizm reminds of the discussion about post-com-
munist period of the former Soviet societies. What is paradoxal is that 
Marxist speech is interpreted by Homeini in Islamic one which helps him 
to collect the poor and downtrodden for revolution. Even the model of cell 
structures of Islamists movements is influenced either by secular Nazi and 
Marx-Lenin structures or the structures of Sufi organs.
European reality creates difficulty and contradictions for the activity 
of radical Muslim leaders. On the one hand, their wish is to live practically 
under the Muslim law, but, on the other hand, they would not reject local 
liberal law since it gives them freedom of speech and consequently a room 
to sermonize on European society. Although a good deal of the European 
media keep anti-Muslim rhetoric, there are many Europeans who try to 
find a solution of social problems which are reasons for tension regarding 
the European Muslims.
The Danish cartoons and the other of the Bulgarian “News-caster” are 
a sign for urgent necessity of dialogue and co-operation. We do not have to 
speak about Muslims but keep dialogue with them. But the Europeans, in-
cluding the Bulgarians, have to think how much and what kind of freedom 
are they able to afford, which is the freedom which does not hurt someone’s 
feelings. It has to be discussed real essense of freedom, which may prevent 
us from racism and discrimination, but, at the same time, keeping the fun-
damental of our society. It is obvious that European development contains 
constructive initiatives but the last could be shaken if moderate Muslims 
do not want to take the responsibility which has to be taken they to show 
resistance against radical elements and destructive leadership.
European democratic society is founded on the principles of secular-
ism and liberalism, but we should have in mind that in Islam community 
of believers is a religious-political community where everything is per-
formed “in the name of Allah” but not people. The global issue today is 
whether we may expect pluralism that is natural for Christianity to be kept 
by the rest world religions, including Islam.
There is a lack of discussion about the various traditions in Islam (this 
religion is not really clear for Europeans as well as for the same protesting 
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Muslims), and also the Balkanies are not precisely explored which leads to 
appearance of the new European fear – the fear from Balkanization (or sepa-
ration in groups). When 80-million Turkey enters in the European Union all 
the European population will contain 20 percentage Muslim, but in this sense 
we have to consider also the population of Bosnia, Kosovo and Bulgaria.
All the above happens parallelly with the contemporary process of con-
solidation of the Muslim Shiits and Christians which is a part of the new 
war inside Islam itself. The religious middle class of Islamic society look for 
new allies, once, between the partners non-believers, and then, between the 
Christians in a country with religious variety. As an argument to intimacy 
of Christians ans Muslim Shiits in Lebanon it is showed the coincidence of 
the cult to the Virgin Mary and the Shiits adoration of Fatima, daughter of 
the Prophet and wife of Ali, who is “mother of the believers”.
Trying to approach to the European left-wing, charismatic orator 
Tariq Ramadan (grand-son of Hasan al-Bana) proposes an alternative of 
the politics to oppose to the West. He tries to inscribe the Islamic mobi-
lization into the mobilization against imperialism showing that most of 
the victims of imperialism are Muslim. We have to remember that first 
ali-Shariati uses Marx opposition of the depressed and the arrogant (as he 
calls the arrogant leaders who do not respect God). Tarik Ramadan con-
siders European democracy a mean for defense against despotism, which 
reigns over most Muslim countries, and he requests his fellow-citizens to 
use the rights given by civil society.
Ramadan suggests that Muslims in Europe should overcome the Dar 
al-Islam and Dar al-Harb dichotomy, in which they are either in a state 
of peace because Islam prevails or a state of war because they are in the 
minority. He also rejects the concepts of Dar al-Amn (space of security) 
and Dar al-Ahd (space of treaty) for Europe, proposing instead that the 
position of Muslim scholars and activists in secular Europe is similar to 
the Meccan period. This concept, known as Dar al-Da-wa (space of tes-
timony) is indeed very similar to that spelled out in the new pope’s 1991 
publication, “Turning Point for Europe”.
In conclusion
Both Christianity and Islam in Europe can benefit from 1) the estab-
lishment and expansion of a secular public sphere, in which debate and ac-
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tivities are carried out free of the direct influence of religious institutions; 
2) the introduction of equal rights for both religious and non-religious 
players, so that they can all participate in the marketplace of ideas on a 
level playing field.
However, neither Christianity nor Islam can accept the following:
1) radical secularism, which strives to remove religion completely 
from the public sphere and make it a purely private matter
2) discrimination against faith-based players by proponents of the 
three modernist master narratives (Liberalism, Conservatism, Socialism) 
which seek to portray Europe’s past and future in purely secular terms.
Finally, in order to better understand the future of the religion/poli-
tics interface in Europe I encourage you to do the following:
1) use the currently predominant Hegelian idealist-dialectical ap-
proach, in order to grasp the clash or interaction of ideas and civilisations
2) make better use of the Marxian materialist-dialectical approach, 
thus introducing political economy to the study of Islam in Europe.
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Stanka Hristova
THE ECONOMIC ETHOS Of ORTHODOXY 
AND OUR EUROPEAN fUTURE
In the last two decades, especially following the break-up of state 
socialism and the ensuing necessity of the former socialist countries to 
join Europe, a new concept, though not always manifest, sprung up – the 
concept of an European model of economic ethics based on the values of 
Catholicism.
Several fundamental arguments support this idea.
The first argument is related to the emerging process of de-seculari-
zation.
The binding of economic mentality to any one system of religious val-
ues in an intrinsically secular society such as the European would look like 
an anachronism if the processes of de-secularization and resurgence of faith 
did not recently emerge. After the secularity of modern age, those processes 
represent “God’s revenge” in Samuel Huntington’s words. Characteristic of 
the years until the mid-20ieth century, the beliefs of religious decline and 
the beginning of a post-Christian era have been seriously shattered since 
the mid-1870s by the emerging initial phase of religious resurgence as a 
reaction to the processes of economic, cultural and social modernization.
According to research, the church as an institution, as well as the 
big religious denominations, still remains secularized, but de-seculariza-
tion and resurgence of faith at an individual level can be observed. In this 
sense, it is not so much the institutional Orthodox Church but the men-
tality based on Orthodoxy that can be perceived as reacting against the 
processes of Euro-integration of the Orthodox countries.
The second argument is related to the sources of European identity.
It is beyond doubt that one of those sources is the Judeo-Christian tra-
dition. The question is whether or not this tradition as a whole has formed 
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the European identity or in different historical periods different Christian 
denominations have given meaning to it. In his famous book “The Clash 
of Civilizations and the Re-making of World Order” published in 1993, 
Samuel Huntington uses the fact that during the last decades a number 
of Catholic nations have chosen the road to democracy, as well as his own 
conviction that Orthodoxy is an “anomaly” in Europe which is predomi-
nantly Catholic and Protestant to argue that the “third democratic wave” is 
in itself Catholic because of the processes of democratization in the 1870’s 
and 1880’s in Portugal, Spain and Latin America.
The question of the role of the different Christian denominations in 
relation to economic ethics is quite topical. Its importance is reinforced 
by the fact that the process of Euro-integration requires a minimum set 
of societal and mutually-shared values in the spheres of economics and 
economic behavior. It’s important to note that unlike the beginning of the 
Modern Age when modernization and the accelerated development of 
capitalism were related to the Protestant economic ethics, contemporary 
capitalism has nothing to do with the protestant virtues; it is rather related 
to the new post-material values associated with the Catholic economic 
doctrine and practice.
The concept of the existence of modern economic ethos based on 
the Catholic doctrine has been set forth by Michael Novak in 1981 in his 
book “The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism” and further developed in his 
book “The Catholic ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism” in 1993. Criticizing 
M. Weber for neglecting the Eastern, Judaic and Catholic traditions and 
their role in the formation of the “spirit of capitalism”, he contends that 
the Catholic ethics is much more relevant not only to the reality of today’s 
world but also represents an inspiring handbook for the future. That is why 
we need a new framework for re-interpretation of Catholicism so that new 
values which make it compatible and consistent with modern capitalism 
can be deduced. This framework is based on human creativity put inside 
man by Creation and Incarnation though which man acquires the power 
to become co-Creator, free to evince initiative and take responsibility.
The separation of interpretation from man’s creative abilities corre-
sponds directly with the commonly accepted in the last decades idea of 
the significance of the so-called human capital for the development of 
economy. It synthesizes the individual, cultural and religious determi-
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nants of the labor and consumer ethics and combines the idea of rational-
ity with the idea of innovation. M. Novak creates six doctrines of the the-
ological doctrines within Christianity, which in his mind, are common to 
all Christian denominations. He contends that those six doctrines – the 
Original Sin, the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Competition, the Separa-
tion of Church and State and Caritas – are the real powers in the history 
of mankind. All of them are intrinsically connected to democratic capi-
talism.
The third argument is based on the fact that some of the former So-
cialist countries on the road to Europe are Catholic nations and, there-
fore, any economic ethics based on Catholicism would be readily accepted 
despite all the years of indoctrinated socialist ethics.
The forth argument is based on the M. Weber’s idea of “the doc-
trinal incompatibility between Orthodoxy and the “spirit of capital-
ism”. Because a number of the annexing former Socialist countries are 
Orthodox and because Orthodoxy is ineffective in creating strong eco-
nomic ethics, those countries should be offered a set of economic eth-
ics different from the one based on Orthodoxy. The Protestant ethics 
is economically unproductive, while the Catholic ethics is much more 
applicable to the new realities, therefore, it is the latter that those coun-
tries should adopt. Whenever he writes about Catholicism and the Spirit 
of capitalism in both his books M. Novak means the Judeo-Christian 
tradition which incorporates all Christian denominations. That is why 
he argues that the political system of democratic capitalism is applica-
ble to all developing countries, including the Orthodox countries of the 
former Communist bloc.
This idea has been supported by the Roman-Catholic Church, as 
well. In 1991, in the encyclique “Centesimus Annus”, when he asks what 
should be done after the collapse of communism, Pope John-Paul II actu-
ally means what kind of system could be offered to the former Socialist 
countries and to the Third World countries. Since the collapse of Socialism 
is due to a large extent to the inadequate use of human spirit, personal ini-
tiative and creativity, he believes that the capitalist model supported by the 
modern Catholic ethics could be offered to those countries, including the 
Orthodox ones, because Orthodoxy is much closer to Catholicism than it 
is to Protestantism.
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At first glance, one could say that this pro-Catholic contention is at a 
dissonance with the popular opinions1 that Europe must accept Christian-
ity because it enjoys the same rights as all other European religions.
The main argument is the size of the Orthodox representation in 
Europe. So far there has been only one Orthodox country in Europe – 
Greece. However, soon there will be three more Orthodox countries 
– Rumania, Bulgaria and Cyprus, and five more where the influence of 
Orthodoxy is huge: Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia. As 
was noted by the Orthodox Bishop of Vienna Illarion, 94 percent of the 
Orthodox Christians in the world reside on the Old Continent.
The second argument results from the danger that the fundamental 
principles of Orthodox religion could be neglected to the extent that the 
western liberal ideology could assume the status of being the only model 
for social development in Europe. According to Bishop Illarion2 the mod-
ern western ideology is formed on the basis of secular humanism and the 
idea that there exist universal values common to mankind. “Common to 
mankind” does not mean common to all people and religions, but only 
to liberal humanist ones relying upon the right and freedom of man to 
choose his own way of life so long as it does not infringe upon the right 
and freedom of other people.
In religious traditions, however, not all that does not infringe upon 
the interests of others is morally acceptable. That is why the obtrusion of 
this ideology to people raised in a different moral tradition and set of val-
ues represents a danger to their religious identity which could possibly 
result in religious fundamentalism, the adaptation of religion to the liberal 
standard (on the analogy of Protestantism) 3, or the dialogue between re-
1 See: Гобъл, П. “Православният Евросъюз” В: «Вашинтон Таймс” 1 май 
2006 http://www.vsekiden.com/news.
2 See: Епископ Иларион(Алфеев) Благословение или проклятие? 
Традиционные и либеральные ценности в споре межзу християнством и 
западной цивилизацией. Доклад на Мировом общественном форуме “иалог 
цивилизаций”, Гавана(Куба) 27-30 март 2005 http://bishop.hilarion.orthodoxia.org.
3 The pathos of bishop Illarion is oriented toward the harmful moral conse-
quences of secularism and Protestantism. Instead of defence of Christian values 
the protestants betray them giving its consent for legalization of the homosexual 
marriage, euthanasiaq etc. That is why he insist that the future of Europe could be 
built on the Christian – Catholic and Orthodox, but not protestant values.
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ligion and the principles of liberal humanism, so that a balance between 
the liberal democratic model of western society and the religious beliefs 
and mode of life of citizens can be achieved. Catholicism and Christianity 
pursue common aims in this process, therefore they can and they must act 
together on the basis of their common values. The unity is necessary be-
cause according to Ilarion the EU represents a secular super-state built on 
humanistic principles inherited from the Enlightenment, which is why the 
dialogue between the Enlightenment and the two denominations – Or-
thodoxy and Catholicism – is very difficult and so far practically impos-
sible. We hope that when the new European constitution is adopted this 
dialogue could become possible because the new Constitution is expected 
to endorse universal values which are the foundation of a new Europe and 
which are, in turn, founded on the cultural, religious and humanist herit-
age of Europe.
Moreover, both the Roman-Catholic and the Orthodox Churches 
have endorsed documentation that accentuates the priority of religious 
values over the interests of man’s earthly life; the freedom and dignity of 
man interpreted in the spirit of Christian tradition, as well as justice and 
solidarity amongst people which could be the basis of the new social, eco-
nomic and political order. 4 In other words, Europe’s future is possible on 
the basis of the Christian-Catholic and Orthodox values rather than those 
of Protestantism which are now a past stage in the development of Euro-
pean identity.
The third argument is identical in its premises to some of the argu-
ments offered by the followers of the idea that we need an economic eth-
ics based on Catholicism but it interprets them in favor of Orthodoxy. 
What is meant here is that there exists proximity between the Orthodox 
4 Such kind of document of the Catholic Church is a «compendium of the so-
cial teaching of the Church», eleborated by the Papal comission «Justitia et Pax» and 
published in 2004, also and the published in 2000 document «Foundations of a social 
conception of the Russian Orthodox Church». See:. Епископ Иларион(Алфеев) 
Благословение или проклятие? Традиционные и либеральные ценности в 
споре межзу християнством и западной цивилизацией. Доклад на Мировом 
общественном форуме “иалог цивилизаций”, Гавана(Куба) 27-30 март 2005 
http://bishop.hilarion.orthodoxia.org.
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economic doctrine and the postmodern and post material values con-
ditioning economic behavior. It is thought that it’s the postmodern society 
that Orthodoxy is doomed to play a major role in since it corresponds bet-
ter to the peculiarities of modern capitalism.
In his book “Modernization and Post-modernization. Cultural, Economic 
and Political Change in 43 societies”5 the prominent American sociologist Ro-
nald Ingleheart does a thorough research on the alterations in the values and 
positions of people in 43 countries in the world in the period 1981-1990, on 
the basis of a research titled “World Survey of Values”. His research shows that 
the industrially developed societies change their social-political trajectories 
in two cardinal aspects: system of values and institutional structure.
The accent that Protestants place on the industrial economic values is 
one of the reasons that made modernization possible, whereas a change to 
material priorities has diminished the significance of the obligations to the 
municipality and has brought about the acceptance of social mobility. Any 
movement to post-modernism makes the supreme priority of economic 
achievements step aside giving way to an accent on the quality of life. By 
the same token, disciplining norms get superseded by the individual free-
dom and choice of life-styles.
As industrial society develops, the changes in the institutional struc-
ture in the process of modernization – the hierarchical bureaucratic or-
ganizations, the line production, the hierarchical corporation and so on, 
get closer and closer to the boundaries of their functional efficiency which 
makes people refuse to accept human expenditure related to bureaucracy 
and the observance of strict moral norms. It is the high state of welfare and 
sense of safety created in the process of and as a result of modernization 
that diminish the necessity for strict moral norms and absolute rules such 
as religious sanctions. That is why, post-modern society is a witness to a 
decline of hierarchical institutions and strict social norms at the expense 
of widening the sphere of individual choice and a decline of the priority of 
economic efficiency at the expense of self-expression.6
5 Inglehart R. Modernrzation and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic and 
Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1997.
6 See Инглхарт Р. Постмодерн: изменяющиеся ценности и изменяющиеся 
общества. В: Политические исследования, 4 1997, с. 9 – 11.
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It is thought that the peculiarities of the Orthodox economic doctrine 
which determine the proximity of the Orthodox economic ethos to post-
material values relate to the organization of labor, labor and consumer 
moral, the attitude to property and the richness in modern economy. Or-
thodoxy does not consider labor as a means to achieve material success 
since earthly possessions are transient and perishable but rather as a means 
to achieve spiritual elevation and self-recognition. It stresses spiritual in-
centives not outside usefulness; inside essence not material achievements 
and status; creativity not routine. That is why “Orthodoxy pays special at-
tention to who does what rather than what is done.”7
Orthodoxy defends the idea that man should be a jack of all trades 
rather than a narrow specialist. In other words, ideally one should have 
a variety of skills rather than a single skill developed to perfection. Or-
thodoxy is the only religion amongst all Christian religions which does 
not oppose against each other the different forms of property which cor-
responds to the diversity of forms of property in post-industrial society. 
Orthodoxy does not follow the individualistic ascetic model of Protestant-
ism; it is rather closer to the hedonistic type of man of post-materialism. 
Wealth is not an individualistic and egotistic purpose, but rather a social 
and collective one. It is justified only as being a good to all and the size of 
wealth is justified through a just distribution. Congregation finds its mod-
ern analogue in cooperation and productivity of common efforts, etc.
However, deducing economic ethics directly from the Orthodox doc-
trine cannot be a reference point as far as our propensity to adapt our-
selves adequately to the European economy is concerned. We should take 
into consideration not only the doctrine, but the functioning labor and 
consumer morale of the Bulgarian people which is a function of different 
influences which have formed our specific Orthodox-Slavic-Balkan men-
tality.
The barriers to the economic Euro-integration of the Orthodox coun-
tries are related not only to the doctrinally-determined and functioning 
economic ethos but also to some general conditions. The first one has to 
do with the level to which the specific religious traditions of Orthodoxy 
7 See Коваль, Т. Этика труда православия В: Общественные науки и 
современность, Изд. Наука, Российская Академия наук, 1994 кн. 6, с. 62
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are compatible with the institutions and values of liberal democracy and 
market economy which are the dominating forces in today’s Europe and 
could hardly be changed despite what the Catholic and the Protestant 
Churches want. The important question here is whether or not Ortho-
doxy will succeed in adapting to or winning over them. As was noted by 
Peter Burger in his report “Orthodoxy and Global Pluralism” delivered 
in Vienna on 7-9 March 2005 at the “The Spirit of Orthodoxy and the 
Ethics of Capitalism” conference held by the Institute of Human Sciences, 
in order for any religious institution to survive in the current situation it 
must have the ability to act as a voluntary association. However, there are 
no indications at all in the history of Orthodoxy that it has been prepared 
for such an alternative.
As long as Orthodoxy continues on following the historically placed 
principle of synphony – the harmonious relations between society, state 
and church – it will be difficult for it to get accustomed to the values of 
liberal democracy; moreover, the idea of the congregation will remain an 
obstacle to accepting market economy because it is regarded as an expres-
sion of ruthlessness and greediness.8
The second condition is related to the fact that the resurgence of re-
ligion in Europe does not follow the framework established in the rest of 
the world. Europe is much more seized by the spirit of secularism un-
like the other countries of the world. That is why it is not without reason 
that P. Burger classifies “euro-secularization” as a special type of culture 
of secularity acting as a foundation to the European identity and ardently 
defended by Brussels when adopting the European Constitution.
One could hardly expect from the EU to ignore the principles of secu-
larism in the sense of Bishop Illarion, i.e. to realize the principles of a real 
institutional de-secularization. In the spirit of secularism, in all European 
countries, citizenship and religion are separated; the validity of the state 
law, rather than canonic law, is established, and the citizens of Europe fol-
low the logic of economic changes without altering their national and reli-
gious identity. The resurgence of faith even at an individual level, let alone 
at an institutional, has not been met with enthusiasm in Europe which 
8 See. Burger, P. “Orthodoxy and the global pluralism” In: Demoiratizatsiya: The 
Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization. Summer 2005 http://www.findarticles.com.
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can be seen by the changes in legislation related to the demonstration of 
external manifestations of religious affiliation.
Secular Europe recognizes the right to personal faith, religious con-
victions and values; it is, however, against decisions taken on the basis of 
religion instead of on law. P. Burger’s expectation is that “the more a given 
society gets closer to Europe, the more it will suffer from the influence of 
European secularity.”9
The third condition is related to religious pluralism, as well as the 
so-called “market of religions” based on it. None of the contemporary re-
ligions can count on its traditional presence in an individual’s life passed 
on hereditarily. De-secularization, to the extent that can be currently ob-
served, does not represent an automatic reversion to the traditional reli-
gion of our forefathers and is not based on the unity between religion and 
society but rather, in the words of Peter Burger, represents an individual 
choice of religious values.
The fourth condition has to do with whether Europe, in the spirit of 
its religious tolerance, will choose the unity of Christian tradition as is 
proclaimed in the blueprint of the European constitution, or it will rather 
continue to tolerate Protestant values.
It will be the answer to those questions that will determine whether 
or not there will be a clash of denominations in addition to the clash of 
civilizations.
9 See Burger, P. “Orthodoxy and the global pluralism” In: Demoiratizatsiya: The 
Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization. Summer 2005 http://www.findarticles.com.
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Nina Dimitrova
BULGARIAN NEO-PAGANISM  
AND THE PROBLEM Of NATIONAL/
EUROPEAN IDENTITY
“From a religious point of view, the fact of it being entirely Chris-
tianized makes Europe a unique phenomenon among the continents.”(1) 
These are René Raimond’s words, defining Christianity as a “trademark” 
of the continent. At the same time, a deep crisis occurs inside Christianity 
all over the continent, starting in the middle of the past century. This leads 
authors such as Rorty, Habermas and others, known for their skepticism 
towards religion, to the conclusion of an emerging process of de-secu-
larization. Nevertheless, the revival of religiosity in contemporary Europe 
doesn’t initiate a second rise of Christianity but causes different attempts 
for “invention” of religious traditions. Religious revival, that is to say – re-
turn of societies to their pre-atheistic state, is characteristic also for the 
countries from the “eastern bloc”. A major tendency in this process is the 
rebirth of pagan religious complexes.
Today’s “New Age” type of spirituality develops as an alternative of 
Christianity and scholars often identify it with the ongoing eruption of 
paganism. Undoubtedly, very strong similarities exist between these two 
spiritual phenomena, which justify their identification. Such analogical 
element is the deep reverence of nature (it is not an accident that a lot of 
people from among the “greens” and the followers of the different ecologi-
cal movements declare themselves as “New age”-ers or pagans.)
The female image of a triumphant deity, returning to the world, is 
another major likeness, which is the cause of the feministic accent in both 
movements. In fact, the difference between them is like the one between 
genus and species – the spirituality of “New Age” is adequate to the glo-
balized post-modernity (or whatever name we should give it, using the 
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prefixes – post-, hyper-, etc.), being global, comprehensive and “omnivo-
rous”. (This spiritual movement is characteristic mainly for the West, but 
it also has its followers in Bulgaria, without being an overly peculiar phe-
nomenon.)
“New Age” consists of pagan complexes that belong to the different 
ethnos around the world, but being a totalistic religious syncretism, its 
core is a universalism similar to the theosophical one. Paganism does not 
deplete the spiritual content of the movement. In fact it carries an oppo-
site energy charge – the revival of this phenomenon is characteristic with 
its specific attitude towards Nature, it is also motivated by the desire for 
establishment or restoration of local and native traditions. If “New Age” is 
a kind of postmodern religion, then the different types of modern pagan-
ism – Wicca, the Druid cult, the apology of Shamanism, etc., are in direct 
opposition to the process of cultural universalization and the neglecting of 
national traditions and peculiarities.
Being a typical dimension of the de-secularization process, today’s 
pagan “emancipation” isn’t a restoration of the native antiquity, regardless 
of the constant declarations. Obviously, it’s not a naturally developed and 
gradually established religious phenomenon either. What is happening can 
be defined as attempt to “construct” a religion. Russian author Ilya Aga-
fonov points out that: “Neo-paganism is in no way a “traditional” creed; 
it is a purely contemporary phenomenon that has been caused and pro-
voked by the general crisis of today’s views of life and spirituality.” (2) As 
Victor Schnierelmann aptly indicates: “The term “neo-paganism” should 
be read as – a distinct, “national” religion, artificially created by city intel-
lectuals, using fragments from real ancient beliefs and rituals with the aim 
of “revival of the national spirituality”. In fact what we’re speaking of is not 
really an attempt for revival, but one for construction of the ideological 
basis of a new social and political community, corresponding to the new 
conditions of the modern era.” (3)
Among the diverse pagan phenomena in modern times, the worship 
of nature is an irrevocable constant. An article, published on a Bulgarian 
pagan website reads: “Paganism is an open informational system, presum-
ing its constant renewal out of the inexhaustible wisdom of Nature. This 
is the main superiority of the pagan movement over the egalitarian and 
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dogmatical systems of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, which are based 
on given and unchangeable precepts, recorded in sacred scriptures. Our 
ancestors have never confined themselves only to the authority of such 
scriptures and legends. They have always induced their beliefs from the 
eternal archetype – Nature, and have counted on the wisdom of Heaven 
and Earth, of stones, trees and animals.” (4)
But homage to the elements of nature in their quality of an immanent, 
impersonal god is not the chief characteristic of the revived pre-Christian 
teachings of our time. The main accents now are: On one hand – clear 
and unconditional differentiation from Christianity and the declaration of 
these beliefs as a unique, genuinely native and even national religion – a 
kind of “national creed”, which, in fact, is the name of another Bulgarian 
website on paganism. (Rodnoverie is the name of an analogical spiritual 
movement from Russia. (5)) Special attention is given to specifics of the 
topos, or “the place” where the old/new gods re-emerge. An article on wo-
tanism by David Lane has been translated in Bulgarian and published on 
the website of “Dulo Society”. In this article he points that “Only a religion 
that is proper for given people, is capable of preserving and protecting 
its identity.” (6) So, if “New Age” is the religion of a world undergoing glo-
balization, the re-emerging pagan movements express the religious princi-
ples of anti-globalism. Local religions often have strong relation with ultra-
nationalist organizations, and although being, in Bulgaria for instance, a 
phenomenon of marginal importance, its connection with radical nation-
alism grows more and more evident. (The ideologist of Russian national-
socialism Dobroslav claims that in ancient times religious and nationalist 
sentiments simply coincided, that is to say paganism represented a combi-
nation of the tribal cult with the tribal social system. (7)) The anti-Chris-
tian pathos of neo-paganism is woven into political extremism, especially 
when speaking of the restoration of the Aryan cult. “We, Bulgarians, are 
Aryans, and our ancient religion – the Tangrism, isn’t any different from 
the other Aryan religions” – writes Ivan Mitev/Shegor Rasate in the be-
ginning of his article – “The gods of Bulgaria” (published on the site of 
“Dulo society”). In this article he defends the principles of racial theories. 
The general message is this: religious cults are conditioned by biological 
facts. “God and race are one unified nature” is the paradigmatic assertion 
of Mitev/Rasate. Accordingly Tangra – the Bulgarian god, couldn’t be a 
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universal god, that is to say – God-Absolute, but more so – “the god of our 
higher racial essence”.
It is important to mention that Bulgarian movement for native ori-
gins differs from similar organizations in countries, belonging to the Slavic 
world – Russia, Belarus and Ukraine – by the fact that among pagans in 
our country the Slavic element isn’t highly respected. The revival of the 
“creed of the ancestors” is related mainly to the cult of Tangra – the Thun-
derer god, closely connected to the Teutonic deity – Wotan. (Neverthe-
less, a website dedicated to Slavic neo-paganism and “The eternal Slavic 
fire” exists – http://slavpagan.hit.bg. Other, “proto-Bulgarian” websites, 
such as “Warriors of Tangra”, “Dulo society”, etc., are far more influential). 
The difference becomes even more evident when we compare the pseudo-
nyms used – Rasate, Eltimir, Malamir, Sevar, Hunor, etc. with the ones of 
their Russian “colleagues” – Dobroslav, Veleslav, Velimir, Svetoyar, Velena, 
Ladomir, etc. Despite the absence of specifically ethnical – in this case Rus-
sian – deities and the orientation towards the more general ancient Slavic 
pantheon, a tendency towards nationalistic views (“Aryan nationalism” to 
be more specific) can be sensed in the ideologies laid on a great number 
of such Russian websites. In his effort to substantiate Bulgarian pagan-
ism Mitev/Rasate claims: “We respect the tradition of Orthodox Christi-
anity as a traditional creed of the Bulgarians but our critique is aimed at 
the Judaic-Christian doctrine that is the foundation of all the Christian 
churches and hasn’t really been altered from the very birth of Christian 
faith. The doctrine is alien to our racial virtues and does not offer an idea 
of salvation, applicable in real life.” (8) This sounds quite familiar and isn’t 
really restoration of ancient beliefs but, in fact, an echo from far more con-
temporary views. Urged by today’s unprecedented revival of pagan energy, 
Mitev/Rasate draws the conclusion that paganism is a fundamental con-
cept for understanding Bulgarian national identity. His meditations about 
the ethnic (Aryan) descent of Bulgarians, about the importance of pagan 
clergy, being a kind of elite of the nation, etc., are used as arguments and 
are published on the website, mentioned above.
Obviously the problem of the European identity of contemporary 
Bulgarians is a complex one and has specific interpretations among the 
new followers of Tangra. These kinds of new “local” religions tend to put 
an accent on the native and original aspects of a nation’s life, and com-
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bined with their strong anti-Christian charge they end up being a centrifu-
gal force, shaking the unity of “the oldest of Christian continents”.
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Nonka Bogomilova
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS  
IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE:  
CORPORATE IDENTITY OR DIVERSITY?
It is generally considered that, in the developed Western democracies, 
there are three basic models of Church-state relationships, characteristic 
of the epoch of secularisation: 1) the model of a state Church expressing 
a predominant religion (Finland, Greece, Great Britain); 2) the model of 
divided existence and co-operation, where the Church is separated from 
the state but is part of society (Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain); 3) the strict 
separation of church from state (France – the only European country with 
a categorical separation between Church and state)1 .
Another proof of the secular nature of European statehood is the absence 
of any reference to confession-based religious theses and ideas in the pream-
bles to the constitutions of the European countries. Such references exist in 
the preambles to the Greek and Irish constitutions. Whereas the French prin-
ciple of laicité accepts that the state must be completely neutral with regard to 
all religious matters, the German tradition allows the so-called Invocatio Dei; 
this difference is reflected in the contrary positions of these two countries on 
this issue in connection with the European Constitution. 2
The secular principle of separation between Church and state is evi-
dent in the new constitutions of the countries of Central and Eastern Eu-
rope: in some of their preambles there is reference to God (Poland, the 
Ukraine); others refer to their religious traditions (Czech Republic, Slova-
1 Horvat,V.Church in Democratic Transition between the State and the Civil 
Society, in: Religion in Eastern Europe, XXIV, April 2004
2 Shmid, K. In the Name of God? The Problem of Religious and non-Reli-
gious Preambles to State Constitutions in Post-atheistic Contexts, in: Religion in 
Eastern Europe, vol. XXIV, N1, February 2004
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kia); still others make no such reference or simply have no preambles to 
the constitution (Romania, Latvia, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan). In the 
most frequent case there is no reference to God (Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Russia, Slovenia, Serbia and Montenegro).3 
The basic legal acts and documents that establish the principles of 
state-Church relations in developed democracies are the following: 1) 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), art.18; 2) International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of the United Nations (1976), 
art.18; 3) European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (1953), art.9: “1. Everyone has the right to free-
dom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to 
change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community 
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance.”
In assuming the freedom of religion to be a core principle of European 
identity with regard to state-Church relationships, the international docu-
ments in this sphere affirm the rights of separate countries to take into 
account in their legislature their national and cultural specificity (Art. 
22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU; Amsterdam treaty 
Declaration N11 on the status of Churches and non-confessional organi-
sations).4
Examining the various emphases and even the philosophy of this leg-
islature in Germany, France, Great Britain, Spain, L.Bloß writes that it: 
“appears to draw a highly differentiated picture of the European Union as 
a whole being divided into several major legal approaches in this arena.”5 
But these European models of state-Church relations are not static. There 
is a trend towards reduction of the relative weight of state Churches and 
towards granting greater rights to other confessions; in recent years this 
tendency has become evident in Sweden and Finland, in Italy, Spain, and 
Portugal.
3 Ibid.
4 Bloß, L. European Law of Religion – organizational and institutional analy-
sis of national systems and their implications for the future European Integration 
Process, Jean Monnet Working Paper 13/03, in: www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/
papers/03031301.rtf
5 Ibid.
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The same author points out several basic stresses in European legisla-
ture with regard to the freedom of religion: freedom of worship, individu-
ally and collectively; a certain degree of church autonomy; financial relief 
in the form of direct support and/or tax relieves; participation and/or rep-
resentation in mass media and school systems; support on an equal basis 
in the cultural and social realm. 6
The comparative picture of the current state of the legal framework of 
state-Church relationships in some Balkan countries (Bulgaria, Macedo-
nia, Serbia and Montenegro) shows:
– In all three (now – four) countries modern democratic constitu-
tions have been adopted, which guarantee equal civil rights and 
liberties with regard to thought, conscience, religion, association; 
also guaranteed is the equality of national minorities and of reli-
gious communities. However, the legislature regulating relation-
ships between state and Church, which is meant to give a concrete 
and effective legal framework of the general constitutional asser-
tions, is at a different stages for each of the countries: 
– Since 1993, when the Law on the Legal Situation of Religious Com-
munities in the Republic of Serbia was annulled; there is a danger-
ous legal vacuum with regard to the relationships between state 
and religious communities: since 2002, three draft laws have been 
worked out and presented for discussion; they met with criticism 
on the part of small religious communities, national and interna-
tional human rights organizations, and even some of the tradition-
al churches; currently an improved version is being prepared of the 
draft “Law on Freedom of Belief, Churches, Religious Communi-
ties and Religious Associations” of July 2004.
– Since 1997, a Law on Religious Communities and Religious Groups 
was passed in the Republic of Macedonia, the basic articles of which 
were rejected by the Constitutional Court as unconstitutional and 
not in harmony with international legal tools in this sphere. This 
fact makes the law inadequate as a regulatory tool; currently a new 
draft law is being worked out.
– Since 2002 there is an operative Religious Denominations Act in 
the Republic of Bulgaria, which takes into account the basic Eu-
6 Ibid., p.16
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ropean standards and international legal tools, but which has pe-
riodically been criticized on separate points by some parties and 
human rights organizations and by the structures of the European 
Commission, which implies that this law will evolve and be per-
fected in the future.
This slow and painful evolution is a result of the complex situation of 
the legislator in the studied countries. He has to move between the Scylla 
of European imperatives and standards, presented in the criticisms by 
NGOs and by small religious communities, and the Charybdis of internal 
political circumstances, mass attitudes, the real social authority and social 
status of some of the religious communities, and xenophobic attitudes.
This is where the deeper meaning and philosophy of our analysis of 
national legal texts lies; they are not only components of a universal, global, 
and standardized legal universe, but are embedded in a specific social con-
text and the people involved, the balance between people generate the texts. 
Moreover, even if the texts of the laws were to be literally adopted and copied 
from the developed democratic countries, still the question of the applica-
tion of these texts would remain with so much the greater weight, the ques-
tion of their acceptance as an organic part of the respective culture.
The religious education in public schools is an important aspect of 
the Church-state relations. Many European countries’ education systems 
prefer the non-confessional (not connected to any particular faith) teach-
ing of religion – Sweden, Norway, Denmark, England, Scotland, Holland, 
Slovenia etc. It offers knowledge and understanding of religion and hu-
man experience and does not form confessionally oriented devotees7. This 
alternative has been actively discussed in Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo. 
While in Serbia there exists confessional education for 7 traditional (his-
toric) religious communities, there is no solution to the problem in Mon-
tenegro and Kosovo yet.
Prof. S. Tomovich, Minister of Confessions of Montenegro believes, that 
before one sets on learning and changing the world, one needs a spiritual 
support to overcome the dramas in life, like the loss of loved ones, to have 
hope, to become a better person; he believes one needs not history of religion 
7 Kodelja, Z.,T.Bassler. Religion and Schooling in Open Society, Ljubljana, 
2004, Open Society Institute
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as a cold registration of facts, but religious spirituality and inner harmony8. 
A 2004 sociological survey in secondary school students in Kosovo ti-
tled: “Should the subject of Religion be taught in schools in Kosovo?” found 
that: the majority of students would like to know more about religion, but the 
ways in which this should happen, are different. Those who accept the neces-
sity of studying religion at school expect that it would help them solve their 
emotional problems and overcome such negative issues as alcohol and drugs; 
the predominant opinion is that school studies must provide knowledge of 
all religions with focus on their moral values, ie. with that which unites them, 
not the dogmas and the rituals that divide them9. In response to such ex-
pectations, it would be useful to include in the textbooks ideas and views of 
some of the significant religious philosophers like M. Buber, N. Berdyaev, F. 
Schleiermacher, who focus on this side of religion.
The sociological survey on the social opinion concerning above issue 
in Bulgaria gives some light on the reasons for that: 46.7% of the inter-
viewed accept that the religious education should be realized by the fam-
ily; 38.1% – by the school; 10.6% – by the religious institutions. 80.5% give 
preference to the optional subject on religion and to the teachers and not 
to the theologians.10 
The subject “Religion” in school should: give knowledge on religion as 
culture – 46.5%; form spiritual values – 17.4%; form moral values – 15.5% 
(Sociological Agency ACCA “M”, March, 1996).11
I think that some specific features and even paradoxes of the religious 
education in some countries could be understood within the framework of 
the inner and more differentiated approach to the local religious profile.
8 Образованье и васпитанье (Education and Instruction) N4, 1997, Podgo-
ritza, in Serbian 
9 Rogova,V. Kosova, in: Z. Kodelja, T.Bassler. Religion and Schooling in 
Open Society, Ljubljana, 2004, Open Society Institute, p. 46-47; Basdevant-Gau-
demet, B. Education et religion dans les pays candidates a l’Union Europeenne, 
in: Le statut des confessions religieuses des etats candidates a l’Union Europeenne, 
ed. F.Messner, Milano, 2002
10 Bogomilova, N. Religion, Law and Politics in the Balkans in the End of the 
20th and the Beginning of the 21st Century, Sofia, 2005, Ed.Iztok-Zapad (bilingual, 
Bulgarian and English), p.228
11 Ibid., p.229
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Rumen Mudrov
CONfESSIONAL CULTURE  
AND LATITUDINARIANISM
Existence of democratic civil society has been always one of the most 
important conditions for exercising almost all of the human rights and 
obligations. But this cannot be one society of peace where violence is 
maintained in silence forcibly or voluntarily. This has to be one society of 
freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, and fair laws valid for everybody. 
Exactly because of this not even one institution or personality cannot rep-
resent itself as authorized one or to assume right only it to define which to 
be categorized as moral and which not, what is the meaning of the human 
life, of the private happiness, what philosophy to prefer, which religion to 
follow, and which to deny. It is known that human rights cannot be nei-
ther given, nor held for life. They just have to be achieved and should be 
deserved again and again. If necessary a person has to deserve it day by 
day. Even now, in the beginning of the 21st century, the Convention of the 
human Rights shouldn’t be taken as something turned into reality only 
desire, or only as abstract good wish. It has to be assumed as a real practi-
cal manual for action to every contemporary person.
Civil society, progress, and democracy should be connected to one 
another, for not letting some dissimilarity to lead to mutual intolerance, 
conflict, and even aggression between different groups, strata, and reli-
gious communities. The system, fallen in 1989, maybe had turned bigger 
attention to the equality, turning a back to freedom. The present system, 
really concentrated on freedom also is coming to the same grief if it forgets 
the equality.
Actually, globalization hides the real danger of unification, depersoli-
zation of the national cultures. On a high level this strengthens in many 
people the desire to turn to them and to withdrawn to themselves to rid off 
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all influences. Otherwise, their inner and individual opposition can turn 
into object of various influences, in this matter religious, ideological, cul-
tural, or nationalistic. That’s why the contemporary educational system in-
sists not only on learning but also on critical thinking training. This man-
ner of thinking will give the opportunity for realizing and understanding 
the changes in the public, economic, and private life, to added new values 
and to forge their destiny without any quaestors, in this matter religious 
and theological. We cannot speak about confessional culture after part of 
the Bulgarian Orthodoxy clergy and some theologians are trying most of 
the time to confess us that only the Orthodox Church is good, impeccable, 
and can be the only keeper of the authentic Christian faith and rituals. I 
cannot and I don’t accept suggestions for principal immorality of people 
who don’t believe in God. I cannot unreservedly or complete to accept or 
agree with the statement that Bulgarians had survived as nation only be-
cause of the Orthodox Church. I don’t agree in Constitution to be written 
that the traditional Bulgarian religion is Orthodoxy, even less the Islam 
far ago is also traditional religion. We are not even talking that in this case 
to orthodoxy is given meaning of ethnography or explanation. So, even it 
is like that, why we don’t write in the Constitution that the wooden pipe 
is traditional musical instrument from Rhodopa Mountains, or that on 
Christmas time in Bulgaria is accepted to slighter a pig, etc. But no! There 
is specified only the orthodoxy. No matter of the constitutional character 
in some religious and political writing figures, in Bulgaria and in West 
Europe in it some discrimination elements towards other confessions in 
Bulgaria, and even to the non believers, who are deeply confessed that 
the EU is more non attentive are we or not believers or atheists. In the 
Constitution is written also this our right, except of the right for religion 
selection and it is not compulsory this to be Orthodoxy. The EU is most 
interested in none depriving corrupt, and of the non ability of our juridical 
system to act more operative.
In this manner of thoughts Brussels continue to act in tolerant way 
to the “poor” Bulgarians and Romanians, not because that by tradition we 
are Orthodox or that in some way we are connected to the Christian faith 
and history, but because the secular tolerance is much above the confes-
sional. Europe is not fanatic religious, but relying on the good in the Or-
thodox tradition without forgetting the idea of the Enlightening and the 
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price of Democracy continues to be defender of latitude, generosity, and 
solidarity. So the people’s minds to be orientated more to the future and 
less to the pass.
Obviously the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and its clerk already 17 
years couldn’t understand that the continuous staring at our historical 
past and apologizing the religion usual sound not only archaic but also 
conservative. Neither in Europe, nor in Bulgaria will anyone be excited 
of the epic fights of the Orthodoxy against socialistic totalitarian state. 
Obviously, the Bulgarian Orthodox church management is incapable to 
understand that the tiredness of such a long economic and political stage 
during the government of different parties a reason for that hole in the 
relationships between politicians and voters. And with the schism and its 
“frays” to the State part of the priesthood reproduce disgusting archetypes 
of groveling, and lack of primary moral, and greed, and the lack of ever 
what kind of far-sightedness alienate not a few believers. more than absurd 
was the “ bless” made by official church servants of the Bulgarian rangers 
going to Iraqi. And because it was not enough, on TV we saw detailed 
reporting of Bulgarian bishop, giving them Bibles and joining of some of 
them to the Christian faith in public. Such thoughtlessness destroys the 
authority not only of the Bulgarian orthodoxy but of the whole our na-
tion, because according to the Church we are Orthodox. I don’t want to 
be Orthodox because I am adversary of crusades and Bulgarian Orthodox 
priests made their best to present it in this way. I hardly listen to the end-
less sermons about Christian morality’s greatness on our national media 
because I heard the “silence” broadcasted by the Holy Synod during the 
bombing of other Orthodox nation in former Yugoslavia.
I see nothing constructive in Bulgarian Orthodox church’s activities, 
because a lot of its figures couldn’t “realize” that the party model of gov-
erning in Bulgaria gradually is changing to oligarchy. In this reason their 
flirtation with party leaders is more than short-sighted and repulsive. Bul-
garian clergy also didn’t realize that democratic adjustment of Bulgarians 
are stronger than patriarchal and many young people are more interested 
about their personal professional and social realization, than the fact are 
they ethnical Bulgarians caring Orthodox faith in their souls.
Is Bulgarian orthodoxy ready for the European integration after re-
ceiving official definite answer by our state? Is superior clergy conformed 
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to the voice of reason and pragmatism that the biggest and most important 
checking about the maturity of each of the Bulgarian institutions, includ-
ing the church one is providing now. The church has to respond imme-
diately to pro-European signal no single institution to start vain debates 
and unusual tribunals. Otherwise it stimulates euro-skepticism of many 
Bulgarians on the age of despair. Poor is church that relies on such laity 
only, or anathematizes block busters as PR action, screening itself behind 
sacral aura. It reminds me of “Silabus”/reasons/, the application named 
“Reasons for the Biggest Delusions of our Times” in Pii IX encyclical from 
8th December, 1864 year.
Finally Bulgarian Orthodox church has to realize that its philosophy 
can’t be based on the presumption that people are mindless creatures which 
needs religion and nothing else. Of course the socialism restricted its ac-
tivities, but the totalitarian authority restricted not only religious freedom 
of people, but their rights to be informed and to have own opinion too. It’s 
even more thoughtless that in period of anathemas like that our Church 
shifts the responsibility upon the state again and in the same time stops 
it to take the whole care about decreasing of poverty, helping people to 
find occupations, problems with drug addictions, prostitution. As it seems 
our clergy pays attention only about reproducing of religiosity and doesn’t 
interested of the models of Christian charity, sympathy, missionary work. 
You cannot speak about tolerance and ask the state institutions to ban film 
broadcasting in the same time. Having disagreements with the author is 
not the same as anathematizing. It may be interpreted as frustration.
Is Bulgarian Orthodox church prepared for open discussion not only 
with its followers but with the whole society? Has our modern Church 
moral power not to distance from so called “revival process, according the 
fact that metropolitan Kiril, who was ready to stop trains, deported Jews 
with his own body, is the author of “Measures for the complete make Bul-
garians of people from Rhodopes and Bulgarian Mohammedans” special 
plan.
When we speak about the democracy in Bulgaria we have to say that 
neither Bulgarian “democrats,” nor Bulgarian Orthodox church’s activ-
ists, believers or atheists make the totalitarian regime to fall down. Even 
more, our Democracy as every kind of ideology and political practices 
carried out almost without our participation. The Western civilization and 
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economical power mainly of USA destroyed so called “socialistic system.” 
We received our political freedom almost as a gift so in near future it is 
unlikely for us to receive our spiritual, cultural, religious, or economical 
freedom. Bulgarian Orthodoxy have never had “theoretical theological” 
competitors, except physical cruel pressure during the centuries of slavery 
and political pressure during totalitarianism.
In the fact totalitarian authorities persecuted Bulgarian Orthodoxy 
to a smaller degree than other Christian denominations, connected with 
the Western countries. The competition becomes stronger in Bulgaria and 
it should be not only economical, but spiritual and religiously-theological 
too. The both of Western denominations comes with a lot of funds, with 
great traditions of missionary activities and charity, with perfect prepared 
activists and very often more educated than our clarity. In Western Europe 
and USA beside equality if rights of the religions people can criticize each 
religion (except Islamic as we saw), without seeing the ghost of commu-
nism in these actions. Obviously Bulgarian clarity still can’t realize that 
there is laic, scientific, and philosophical criticism except “communistic” 
one to religion and to the Church too and it doesn’t frighten anybody and 
nobody finds bad thoughts as it happens with critics of Islam.
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Stoycho Yotov
POSITION Of RELIGION  
IN CONTEMPORARY GLOBALIZING WORLD
Religion is one of the elements in human society which firmly 
presents in its history. In considerable periods of the development of so-
ciety religion plays a main part in all the spheres of social life – such as 
ideological, political and even economic one. Of course, this role always 
has its concrete dimensions – for one or another historical period, for one 
or another world area, for different political events. Changes in social-
historical development of humanity set – directly or indirectly – their 
mark also on the position and role of religion in people’s life.
The last decades of the 20-th century and the beginning of the new 
century contain a series of important events and processes, which lead to 
big changes in world economic, political and ideological order. Three of 
them should be outlined: globalization, the fall of East-European so-
cialism, the war against terrorism.
Globalization is indisputably a process which runs to various direc-
tions. Of course, it is not a new phenomenon, and it does not start right 
in our lifetime. In all human history we find efforts for world domination, 
cases of peoples migration, export and mixture of cultures: the wars of 
Alexander the Great, the Catholic crusades, invasions of the Mongolians, 
the Tatars and the Turks, colonization of the American and African con-
tinent by European countries and people, the two world wars. Of course, 
transforming and disseminating local or national cultural and scientific 
advances happens not only by war. A special importance for this have 
trade relations between seprete countries and nations, and the last grow 
quickly through the development of shipping and the Great geographic 
discoveries.
Indisputably, contemporary globalization processes are mainly in-
fluenced by some factors: the revolution in information systems, estab-
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lishment of trans-national industrial and economic alliances as well as 
international or world financial authorities.
Globalization could have either positive or negative consequences 
concerning concrete country and people. On the one hand, modern in-
formation systems (which actually continue to develop) ruin all the bar-
riers and national borderlines giving the possibility everyone to commu-
nicate and to take any kind of information from any place of the world. 
At the same time, this surely sets mark on national cultures and national 
identity of different races and people, on their view of life and value sys-
tem.
History eloquently shows that the countries which have economic 
and military domination in some historical period as a rule start to devel-
op empire ambitions to impose dependancy or slavery on other countries 
and people, to impose their culture, language, religion, value system, etc.
The fall of communist system in East Europe and transition to cap-
italistic social relations in former communist countries lead to radical 
changes in international economic, political, military, cultural, and reli-
gious relations, etc.
First we should mention that one of the most important results of 
the fall of communism is the recognition of the USA as an ultimate world 
leader, which tries to judge of any world question, of course, regarding 
the same American interests.
Another important consequence of the fall of communist system is 
determination of terrorism as the enemy number one for democratic 
changes and democracy in general.
As it is known, during the Cold War the main enemy of Western so-
ciety and the USA is the communist camp and the Soviet Union above all. 
Ideological opposition between the two social systems (beside economic 
and military one) is performed in all the spheres of people’s mind includ-
ing religious field. It is known that in this ideological struggle religion is 
one of the basic ideological tools against atheistic communism. Nowa-
days there are clearly shown the special deserts of the Catholic Church 
and the pope Joan Paul II for the struggle against communism. Of course, 
the side of the capitalists against communist atheistic ideas is taken on 
principle not only by the Catholic Church but also all the rest religions 
and churches.
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Here we call atheistic ideas communist entirely consciously. We do 
not need to demonstrate that atheism as a phenomenon and a view of life 
was born yet in antiquity, and it is ridiculous any atheist to be called com-
munist. But statements like this have big influence when they are used for 
ideological purposes, and they are still used, upon believers’ psychology.
One of the paradoxes of American public consciousness, which 
means the popular one, is the wide-spread intolerance to atheism. It is 
a paradox considering that the USA is a leading country in scientific 
progress in all the world, besides, the USA history and development go 
just in the frame of the past two centuries. It is important to notice also 
that in the USA religion and State are divided, and the relation to any re-
ligion is more liberal than it is in the rest of the world. American popular 
faith shows tolerance to any religious features even to the most exotic and 
strangest kinds of religion, moreover, it is showed more loyalty to the ide-
ology of the Satan Church than the persons with atheist view of life.
In fact, we can explain this initial paradox through American bour-
geois ideological system. In the process of establishing American society, 
religion becomes an inseparable part of the American value system. Not 
only the first ones but any American president till now needs to follow 
some religion. The second American President D. Adams claims: “A pa-
triot without faith is the same paradox as an honest man without fear 
of God”. And almoust two hundred years later D. Eisenhower is explicit 
that, “Our government makes any sense without deep religious faith – I 
do not ask which exactly faith is this”, (Quoted by D. E. Furman “Religion 
and social conflicts in the USA”, Moscow, 1981, p. 89).
The last part of Eisenhower’s statement clearly shows two details. 
First, American society is not subordinated to a concrete religion, or 
precisely, any religion has leading role. According to American ideologi-
cal system, all religions are allowed on the condition that they confirm 
American value system, which inseparable part is religion. The term pure 
American, which term is strange for European mind, does not mean per-
son of American origine, but any individual irrespective of one’s origine 
who shares American value system and the American way of life. Ameri-
can ideological system is related with a system of rituals, which includes 
complicate interlaced ideological symbols: State ones, national and reli-
gious. The religious symbols support the State ones giving them a reli-
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gious sense. Each new president takes an oath upon the Holy Bible, and 
a Protestant pastor, a Catholic priest, a Judaic rabbi, and an Orthodox 
priest until 1957, pray for God’s blessing on the President. By prayers start 
sittings of the Congress, congresses of the two parties, priests serve in the 
American Army, prayers are hold in the schools and there are read texts 
from the Bible.
We turn our special attention (although sketchy) to the position and 
role of religion in American ideological system because of two reasons. 
First, examining this question is easy to explain the relation of American 
politics to religion outside the USA. Second, this way we not only explain 
but also we can surely prognosticate the future of religion in our own 
country.
As it is already noticed, any religion is allowed in the USA but only 
on the condition that it defends and confirms, or idolizes the American 
way of life, American politics, the right of the Americans to judge in all 
of the world. That is why, the American Government, frankly or under 
cover, makes efforts to extend worldwide the sphere of influence of all 
religions, but mostly of these which were born in the USA or which are 
accepted there. The former are above all some Protestant, or close to the 
Protestants creeds and Churches, which arise in the 19-th and the 20-th 
century in America, the latter are also Protestant forms coming from the 
Reformation in West Europe, but today they are set and develop in the 
USA keeping missionary activity abroad. As an example we could show 
our own country. In the end of the Turkish Slavery starts the propaganda 
for Methodism and Congregationalism, after the Liberation come Bap-
tism, Adventism, and the Pentecostals. After 1989 the so-called democra-
tization of society gives the possibility (of course, under political pressure 
outside) in our country fluently to come and to be legalized a big deal of 
creeds and religious organisations (not only Protestant), which number 
till now is nearly eighty. In general, the relation of the USA to the Ortho-
doxy, the Catholicism and Islam, is much more distant and sometimes 
negative. First, it is since in many countries ethnic origine and religious 
affiliation are considered identical – Russian or Bulgarian means Ortho-
dox, Polish – Catholic, Arabian or Turkish – Muslim, etc. The second that 
is, of course, more important is that the same religions often turn against 
the politics of the USA for world domination, and they defend their do-
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mestic interests. Although one of the American presidents, J. Kennedy, is 
a Catholic, the Vatican does not want to support entirely American poli-
tics since it understands well and feels anti-American statements amongst 
many Catholics in the world, especially in Latin America.
More complicated and contradictory is the relation of Islam to the 
USA after the declared anti-terrorist war and the conflicts (including 
military ones) in many Muslim countries. While the USA and their allies 
consider the war in Iraq and the war against terrorism at all a struggle 
for democracy, many Islamic countries consider it a war of the Christian 
West against the Muslim East, and that is why for most Muslims the con-
flicts are not economic and political but religious ones.
All the above shows that the worldwide advance of religion after the 
fall of the communist camp comes not only because of pure religious 
reasons, but religion turns to as much important factor for international 
ideological, political and economic life as in the past.
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Евгений Степанов
роль регионАльных Элит  
в оБеСПеЧении взАимоДейСтвия 
влАСти и грАЖДАнСкого оБщеСтвА  
в роССии
Вопрос о роли региональных элит и социальной эффективнос-
ти или деструктивности их деятельности – один из важнейших для 
интенсивно развивающейся ныне в России региональной конфлик-
тологии, концентрирующей свое основное внимание на выявлении, 
осмыслении и концептуальном интегрировании конфликтогенных 
факторов (политических, экономических, социально-психологичес-
ких, этнических, культурных, религиозных и т.п.), вызывающих и 
обостряющих типичные конфликтные ситуации в общественных 
взаимоотношениях, складывающихся в различных регионах стра-
ны, в особенности – на тех из факторов, которые ведут к разного 
рода принуждению и насилию, на раскрытии дестабилизирующих и 
деструктивных последствий действия этих факторов, а также на 
поиске и обосновании с помощью всего этого возможных мер по их 
нейтрализации и по приданию социальным конфликтам характера 
и форм, содействующих общему улучшению социальной ситуации и 
движению всего общества к развитой демократической стадии.
В этой связи все более обостряется и становится настоятельно 
необходимым научно обоснованное решение проблемы моделиро-
вания и реализации политики адекватного воздействия на возника-
ющие в регионах социальные напряжения и конфликтные ситуации, 
что становится возможным на основе соответствующей оценки и 
корректировки действий и мотивирующих эти действия политичес-
ких, экономических, культурных предпочтений их основных иници-
аторов и активных участников – субъектов политического процесса, 
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а также на основе выявления факторов, содействующих их заинтере-
сованности в урегулировании и разрешении, а не интенсификации и 
эскалации напряжений и конфликтов. Среди такого рода субъектов 
ведущую роль играют, разумеется, региональные элиты и их пред-
ставители, поскольку само их руководящее положение в основных 
региональных структурах, – по общепринятому в настоящее время 
определению как раз и позволяющее зафиксировать их принадлеж-
ность к элитной группе, – побуждает их в первую очередь к тому, 
чтобы контролировать и в нужном, с их точки зрения, направлении 
изменять ситуацию как в этих структурах, так и в регионе в целом. 
Для актуального и действенного конфликтологического анали-
за сложившейся ныне в стране ситуации, как представляется, необ-
ходимо сосредоточить внимание на проблемах моделирования и реа-
лизации не региональной политики в целом, а прежде и больше всего 
– на положении со всем этим в отношении социальной политики 
в регионах, поскольку именно с ней связаны основные и наиболее 
острые социальные напряжения и конфликтные ситуации во вза-
имодействии региональных элит как с населением регионов, так и 
между собой и с общероссийскими элитами. 
Следует напомнить, что в Конституции РФ, принятой в 1993 г., 
в ст. 7 п.1 записано: «Российская Федерация – социальное государс-
тво, политика которого направлена на создание условий, обеспечи-
вающих достойную жизнь и свободное развитие человека». Однако, 
приходится с сожалением констатировать, что осуществление ради-
кальных социально-экономических реформ, направленных, по уве-
рениям их инициаторов и проводников, как будто бы на решение 
именно этой задачи, в действительности сопровождалось сниже-
нием общего уровня жизни населения, безработицей, разрушением 
привычных жизненных стереотипов мышления, ломкой имевшихся 
социальных гарантий. Все эти и многие другие социально-экономи-
ческие факторы, пережитые всей страной, всеми ее регионами в пос-
леднее десятилетие, вызвали такие негативные социальные последс-
твия, как неуверенность основной массы населения страны и регио-
нов в завтрашнем дне, превышение смертности над рождаемостью, 
появление безнадзорных и беспризорных детей, так называемых со-
циальных сирот, рост психических стрессов, неврозов, суицидов и 
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целый ряд других опасных «болезней» общества, подрывающих его 
безопасность и угрожающих самому его существованию.
Поскольку из сказанного само собой понятно, что возникнове-
нию и усилению всех этих своих болезненных состояний российс-
кое общество вообще и его регионы, в частности, обязаны «в первую 
голову» поведению элит всех уровней и направлений, своими «ру-
ководящими» действиями не только не обеспечивших движение к 
социальному государству и соответствующей социальной политике, 
но и прямо, намеренно препятствующих тому и другому, то единс-
твенно действенным лекарством от них может служить, как все на-
стойчивее подчеркивают многие российские обществоведы, только 
обращение всей совокупности российских элит к действительно 
сильной и эффективной социальной политике, способной обес-
печить экономическую и политическую стабилизацию положения 
российского населения как в целом по стране, так и по отдельным ее 
регионам, привлечь инвестиции для перевооружения и устойчивого 
развития их экономики и создать на основе всего этого достаточно 
мощный потенциал для повышения – достаточно быстрого и эффек-
тивного – народного благосостояния1. Они прежде всего должны от-
четливо понять и внутренне принять ту достаточно простую и вряд 
ли опровергаемую истину, что проведение социальной политики не 
является благотворительной деятельностью государства и соответс-
твующих органов и институтов власти, деятельностью которых они 
руководят. Это – насущная необходимость как для общества, так и 
для самого государства. Социальная политика – один из способов 
производства и воспроизводства бытия общества и социального 
бытия человека. Последовательное и организованное проведение 
социальной политики с соответствующей данному уровню развития 
общества материальной базой должно являться непременной со-
ставляющей государственного управления. Это обусловлено следу-
ющими факторами: социальная политика способствует сохранению 
и приумножению физических и духовных сил личности и нации в 
целом, сохранению и накоплению производственного и професси-
1 См.: Вопросы современной социальной политики: региональный 
аспект. Ярославль, 2002, с. 56-57
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онального потенциала работника, укреплению психического здоро-
вья человека. Тем самым социальная политика благоприятствует 
сохранению человеческого капитала, укреплению благосостояния 
общества и отдельного человека, становлению устойчивого и 
стабильного общества2. 
Возникает, однако, достаточно важный и неотложный вопрос: 
в какой мере наши российские элиты вообще, региональные в осо-
бенности готовы к соответствующей переходу к сильной социаль-
ной политике «перестройке» своего поведения и своих ориента-
ций, насколько они ощущают и осознают их необходимость? Если 
исходить из имеющихся данных конфликтологической экспертизы 
и становящегося в настоящее время «на ноги» во многих регионах 
конфликтологического мониторинга, ответ пока что выглядит ма-
лоутешительным. Эти данные показывают, что элиты всех уровней 
и направлений по-прежнему озабочены в основном обеспечением 
своей собственной выгоды: политические, – как центральные, так 
и региональные, – обеспечением и укреплением контроля за влас-
тными рычагами, усилением его превосходства над всеми другими 
механизмами и факторами влияния на общественные процессы, 
позволяющим бесконтрольно и безоглядно распоряжаться обще-
ственными богатством и достижениями; бизнес-элиты всех уровней 
– обеспечением, расширением и усилением эксплуатации собствен-
ности, сосредоточением в своих руках и для распоряжения в своих 
собственных интересах всеми сырьевыми, трудовыми и технически-
ми ресурсами общества, его территорий и населения; интеллекту-
альные элиты – обеспечением бесконтрольного манипулирования 
общественным сознанием через средства массовой информации в 
интересах «укрепления терпимости» (отождествляемой с терпели-
востью) всего «рядового» населения, его отказа от борьбы за пре-
жние идейные и культурные ценности3. 
2  См.: Акопова Т.С., Титова Л.Г. Социальная ответственность политической 
власти в формировании социальной политики.// Вопросы современной 
социальной политики: региональный аспект. Ярославль, 2002, с. 74
3 См.: Самарин А.Н. Становление элит в современной России: проблемы 
и перспективы // Современная конфликтология в контексте культуры мира. 
М., 2001
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Не случайно поэтому многочисленные и разнообразные ис-
следования, отслеживающие процесс десоциализации российской 
власти в центре и на местах, демонстрируют не исчезающее крайне 
негативное отношение всех слоев российского населения к государс-
тву, бизнесу и СМИ, которые сегодня не в состоянии обеспечить га-
рантированное существование, благополучие и удовлетворенность 
жизнью, ее нынешними условиями не только социально ущемлен-
ных слоев населения (молодежи, инвалидов, пенсионеров и т.д.), но 
и достаточно обеспеченных групп4. 
Конфликтологические исследования фиксируют также острые 
претензии, к тому же нарастающие и обостряющиеся по выражению 
степени неприязни, предъявляемые населением и собственно к ре-
гиональным элитам, прежде всего политическим и экономическим. 
Так, в проведенном Центром конфликтологии Института социоло-
гии РАН совместно с нижегородским 
региональным Центром конфликтологии экспертном монито-
ринговом исследовании выяснялось, в какой степени гармонично 
или конфликтно выстраиваются взаимоотношения между властями 
региона и населением, в том числе – насколько однозначно воспри-
нимают острые и значимые проблемы региона и власти, и население. 
Оценивалось также, насколько власти «отзывчивы» к требованиям 
и сигналам, идущим снизу, от населения (проблема канализации ин-
тересов и запросов общества), каковы степень доверия к админист-
рации, характеристики стиля ее деятельности, возможности влия-
ния простых граждан на власть, включая общественное мнение, и, 
наконец, какова идентификация граждан в качестве сторонников 
или противников администрации. Его основные результаты пред-
ставлены в материалах специального выпуска серии «Социальные 
конфликты: экспертиза, прогнозирование, технологии разрешения» 
на тему «Региональные конфликты: моделирование, мониторинг, ме-
неджмент».
Общее представление об отношении нижегородцев к своим ре-
гиональным элитам можно составить хотя бы из их ответов на воп-
росы «Может ли простой человек отстоять свои законные права пе-
4 См.напр.: ж. «Конфликтология – теория и практика», 2003, № 1, 2004, № 1
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ред региональными и местными властями?» и «Прислушивается ли 
администрация к общественному мнению при решении значимых 
проблем»? На первый вопрос только около 10% респондентов дали 
утвердительный ответ, тогда как свыше 75% высказались отрицатель-
но. В ответе же на второй вопрос более 60% опрошенных указали на 
то, что региональная власть не прислушивается к мнению местного 
сообщества. Таким образом, степень отчуждения властных органов 
от населения оказывается очень высокой. Это свидетельствует так-
же о том, что авторитарные тенденции в действиях политической 
элиты на региональном уровне не только не слабеют, но в чем-то 
даже и крепнут. Тем самым наблюдается тенденция к концентрации 
и консолидации региональной власти во главе с ее исполнительной 
ветвью, которая, по сути, стремится стать самодостаточной и 
самовоспроизводимой, практически независимой от общества5.
Не менее деструктивно население оценивает действия регио-
нальной бизнес-элиты, соотнося теперешнее неблагополучие своего 
собственного материального положения в первую очередь с ростом 
экономических преступлений среди предпринимателей, связанных 
с незаконным присвоением собственности, доходов, с финансовыми 
спекуляциями, рэкетом и т.п.6 
Вместе с тем, исследования фиксируют наличие конфликтных 
ситуаций и противоборств и между самими элитами – как цент-
ральными, так и региональными. Так, по свидетельству известно-
го отечественного специалиста по политической конфликтологии, 
А.В.Глуховой, одной из главных примет политической жизни Рос-
сии последнего времени стали структурно-институциональные 
конфликты в регионах. Под ними автор имеет в виду противоборс-
тво различных институтов и уровней власти в регионах, главным 
5 См.: Никовская Л.И. Экспертиза и мониторинг социально-политической 
конфликтности в Нижегородском регионе// Социальные конфликты: 
экспертиза, прогнозирование, технологии разрешения. Вып.20: Региональные 
конфликты: моделирование, мониторинг, менеджмент. М., 2003
6 См.: Валиулина Г.Р. Опыт регионального конфликтологического  мо-
ниторинга //Социальные конфликты: экспертиза, прогнозирование, тех-
нологии разрешения. Вып.20: Региональные конфликты: моделирование, 
мониторинг, менеджмент. М., 2003
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образом между законодательными и исполнительными ветвями 
власти, региональными структурами и институтами федеральной 
власти в регионах, между областными властями и местным самоуп-
равлением. По ее оценке, в последнее время число таких конфликтов 
нарастает в Красноярском, Приморском краях, Омской, Екатерин-
бургской, Смоленской, Ульяновской, Воронежской и других облас-
тях. Их причинами, как правило, становятся:
– борьба за разделение предметов ведения и круга полномочий 
между органами государственной власти Центра и регионов, за рас-
пределение бюджетных средств между ними; 
– необоснованные переделки уставов, положений, структур уп-
равления, перенос сроков выборов глав исполнительной власти ре-
гионов и местного самоуправления; 
– низкая политическая и правовая культура конкурирующих 
группировок региональной и местной элиты и т.д. 
Весьма важную роль играет и субъективная заинтересован-
ность федеральных властных структур в поддержке или ослаблении 
определенных группировок в структуре региональных и местных 
властей, поддержка мэров крупных городов в их борьбе против об-
ластных администраций и т.п.7
Последнее замечание, думается, не только нельзя оставить без 
внимания, но и необходимо тщательно рассмотреть и оценить. Ибо 
оно, как представляется, с одной стороны, фиксирует не только кон-
фликтную, но и достаточно рисковую, опасную для региональных 
элит ситуацию потери ими если не всей вообще, то, во всяком слу-
чае, весьма существенной доли своих собственных руководящих и 
контролирующих возможностей по отношению как к власти, так и 
к бизнесу и пользования информацией. Однако, с другой стороны, 
именно эта угроза может и даже должна сыграть конструктив-
ную роль в плане корректировки отношения региональных элит 
к социальной политике и своему участию в ее эффективной реа-
7 См.: Глухова А.В. Роль региональных элит в российском политичес-
ком процессе // Социальные конфликты: экспертиза, прогнозирование, 
технологии разрешения. Вып.20: Региональные конфликты: моделирова-
ние, мониторинг, менеджмент. М., 2003
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лизации. Дело в том, что в плане выбора одной из альтернатив по 
известной формуле «либо молотом взвивайся – либо наковальней 
стой» региональные элиты в складывающейся ситуации оказыва-
ются в промежуточном положении между «молотом» и «наковаль-
ней»: «наковальней», – которую они до сих пор старались сделать 
из населения регионов, стремясь подчинить его своему диктату, ре-
ализации своих собственных интересов и выгод, – они сами стать 
не хотят, а быть по-прежнему «молотом», из-за неравенства сил и 
возможностей со своими конкурентами из центральных, общерос-
сийских элит, действующих как достаточно сплоченные и органи-
зованные «кланы», – не могут, не в состоянии. И потому у них ос-
тается, по существу, единственная возможность сохранить хотя бы 
в какой-то мере свою свободу, руководящую роль и контроль над 
региональной ситуацией, т.е. собственно «элитарность»: обратить-
ся за поддержкой к самому подвластному им пока еще населению 
своих регионов, мобилизовать, поощрить их к этому. Но это уже 
невозможно осуществить «пустыми обещаниями», к которым все 
региональные элиты уже не раз так или иначе обращались, осо-
бенно в периоды предвыборных кампаний, и которыми население 
повсюду на местах уже вдоволь «наелось», по существу, перестав им 
верить и проявляя все большую готовность противостоять им ре-
шительными протестными действиями. В этом отношении весьма 
показательным примером служит, скажем, протестное голосование 
жителей Нижнего Новгорода при выборах мэра, когда процент про-
голосовавших «против всех», по существу, почти сравнялся с пози-
тивным голосованием «за» нового мэра (а по некоторым оценкам – и 
«переплюнув» его, составив более 30% от всех принявших участие 
в голосовании)8. Этот своеобразный сигнал одной из весьма влия-
тельных региональных элит, – к тому же пользовавшейся в данном 
случае весьма основательной поддержкой со стороны центральной 
власти в лице Полномочного представителя Президента РФ в При-
8 См.: Соколов С.В., Акулов К.М. Выборы мэра Нижнего Новгорода 
как показатель социальной конфликтности в регионе и выражение полити-
ческой зрелости его населения // Социальные конфликты: экспертиза, про-
гнозирование, технологии разрешения. Вып.20: Региональные конфликты: 
моделирование, мониторинг, менеджмент. М., 2003
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волжском федеральном округе, – отчетливо показывает, что теперь 
она, да во все возрастающей мере и элиты других регионов могут по-
лучить поддержку местного населения, только демонстрируя дейс-
твительную помощь и реальное участие в удовлетворении его на-
сущных потребностей и интересов, в проведении соответствующей 
этому региональной социальной политики. 
В этой связи им предстоит, видимо, внимательно учесть опыт 
построения социальной политики в развитых западных демокра-
тиях, в которых, по существующим оценкам, власть народа реали-
зуется в механизме представительства, которое, по определению, 
предполагает известное соглашение между властью и обществом 
по поводу того, кто будет выражать в определенных институтах со-
циальные интересы определенных социальных групп. Разумеется, 
основной проблемой здесь является степень реализации властью 
своих сущностных социальных целей – регулирования социальных 
отношений, артикуляции и агрегации интересов. 
Как показывает практика современных развитых стран, эта 
проблема не сразу решалась демократическими обществами, про-
ходившими долгий путь от формальной к реальной демократии, от 
исключительно политических до социально-экономических и куль-
турных прав и их экономического обеспечения. Лишь появление 
развитого, эффективного и социально, в том числе и патриотически 
ориентированного среднего класса, занимающего главное место в 
социальной структуре развитых стран, и обеспечение его деятель-
ности поддержкой со стороны региональных и национальных элит 
всех уровней и видов показало, что эти общества обладают реаль-
ными возможностями обеспечивать и удовлетворять насущные 
потребности основной массы населения, притом – при активном 
участии самого населения, активно и охотно объединяющегося в 
разного рода корпорации, общественные и профессиональные объ-
единения как структуры гражданского общества, обеспечивающие 
самодеятельное участие различных его групп и органов в реализа-
ции разнообразных социальных проектов и программ.
Думается, и нам, нашим региональным элитам в том числе и 
даже, быть может, прежде всего предстоит пройти примерно тот же 
путь в процессе формирования и воплощения эффективной соци-
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альной политики. Можно констатировать, что кое-где в регионах, 
в которых уже осмыслена и воспринята эта необходимость, такое 
движение уже началось. Это хорошо поняли, скажем, организаторы 
социальной работы в мэрии Ярославля, заявившие устами замес-
тителя мэра города по вопросам социальной политики и культуры 
А.А.Ипатова: «существенной частью этого процесса (разработки и 
реализации социальной политики – Авт.) является координация де-
ятельности общественных институтов и социальных групп населе-
ния по поводу активизации самозащитных действий людей, а также 
оказание помощи тем, кто действительно не может себя защитить»9. 
Ибо все это и «является инструментом общественного согласия, 
интеллектуальной основой гражданской консолидации, способом 
понижения избыточного социально-политического напряжения.»10. 
Как представляется, такая постановка проблемы правильно ориен-
тирует как региональные элиты, так и население региона и может 
служить «примером для подражания» на всей территории России.
Одну из наиболее значимых и эффективных мер по осуществле-
нию этой задачи составляет всемерная поддержка становления и 
укрепления органов местного самоуправления как основных коор-
динаторов и реализаторов объективно необходимых гражданс-
ких инициатив. Ибо местное самоуправление – один из способов 
производства и воспроизводства бытия общества и социального 
бытия человека. Последовательное и организованное обеспечение 
эффективной деятельности осуществляющих его органов с со-
ответствующей данному уровню развития общества матери-
альной базой должно поэтому являться непременной составляю-
щей современного государственного управления. 
Это обусловлено следующими факторами: местное самоуправ-
ление способствует сохранению и приумножению физических и ду-
ховных сил личности и нации в целом, сохранению и накоплению 
производственного и профессионального потенциала работников, 
укреплению психического здоровья всех российских граждан. Тем 
9  Ипатов А.А. Новые подходы к формированию социальной политики в 
г. Ярославле// Вестник социальной работы. Ярославль, 2001, № 1-2, с.11-12
10  Там же, с.13
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самым эффективное местное самоуправление благоприятствует 
сохранению человеческого капитала, укреплению благосостояния 
общества и отдельного человека, становлению устойчивого и ста-
бильного гражданского общества и соответствующего успешному 
осуществлению этой задачи государства11. 
По своей сути, местное самоуправление представляет собой 
широкое, заинтересованное, активное и инициативное участие 
самих граждан в решении проблем, их непосредственно касаю-
щихся. Отсюда ясно, что оно представляет собой институт граждан-
ского общества как такой совокупности социальных отношений и 
структур, которые функционируют хотя и под контролем государс-
твенной власти, однако, вместе с тем, относительно независимо, авто-
номно от нее, выстраивая свои с ней отношения “снизу вверх”, “от 
периферии к центру”, на основе развития прямой, непосредствен-
ной демократии, расширения гласности, повышения действенности 
общественного мнения и т.д. Это предполагает активность всех ря-
довых членов организационной системы местного самоуправления 
при решении общих для них вопросов, развитие различных форм их 
собственной инициативы, в том числе – в выработке и принятии уп-
равленческих решений12. 
Осуществляться местное самоуправление может как через сло-
жившиеся управленческие структуры, так и через вновь возникшие, 
созданные по инициативе самих граждан; как с использованием 
местных государственных органов власти, так и с участием само-
деятельных общественных организаций13. Причем, чтобы самоуп-
равление было как действительным, так и эффективным, эти 
структуры, органы и организации, как показывает историческая 
11  См.: Цейтлин Р.С., Сергеев С.А. История государственного управле-
ния и местного самоуправления в России. Москва, 2004
12 См.: Дилигенский Г. Что мы знаем о демократии и гражданском об-
ществе? Pro et Contra. T2, №4. Гражданское общество. М., 1997; Гильманов 
А.З. Перспективы становления местного самоуправления //Социологичес-
кие исследования. 1998.  №11
13 См.: Щербакова Н.В., Егорова Е.С. Местное самоуправление в России: 
теория и практика. Ярославль, 1996.Ершов А.Н. Возможна ли собственная мо-
дель самоуправления? // Социологические исследования. 1998.  № 11, с. 39.
200
практика и самой России, и развитых демократических стран 
Запада, должны действовать не вместо одна другой, а вместе 
одна с другой, координируя и согласуя свои решения и действия и 
обеспечивая тем самым свое социальное партнерство. Иначе су-
ществует реальная угроза того, что самоуправление либо вообще не 
состоится, либо бюрократизируется, став иллюзорным, существую-
щим только формально, «на словах»14.
Одной из основных проблем здесь является степень реализации 
властью своих сущностных социальных целей – регулирования со-
циальных отношений, артикуляции и агрегации интересов и граж-
данских инициатив, выдвигаемых и выражаемых системой органов 
местного самоуправления. В этой связи российским властям всех 
уровней предстоит, видимо, внимательно учесть опыт построения 
социальной политики, соответствующей интересам местного само-
управления, в развитых западных демократиях (Германии, Фран-
ции, Англии, США и др.), в которых, по существующим оценкам, 
власть народа реализуется в механизме представительства, которое, 
по определению, предполагает известное соглашение между властью 
и обществом по поводу того, кто и как будет выражать в определен-
ных институтах социальные интересы определенных социальных 
групп15 . 
Как представляется, в определенной мере этот опыт учтен в 
двух тесно взаимосвязанных законах – №79-ФЗ «О государственной 
гражданской службе Российской Федерации» и № 131-ФЗ «Об об-
щих принципах организации местного самоуправления в Российс-
кой Федерации», первый из которых принят в конце июля 2004 г., 
а второй, хотя и принят в начале октября 2003 г., однако вступил в 
действие позже (что представляется не случайным) – лишь с 1 янва-
ря 2006 г. Впрочем, в ряде регионов – например, в Ставропольском 
крае – закон о местном самоуправлении уже прошел активную прак-
тическую проверку и получил определенную оценку с точки зрения 
14  См.: Абрамов В.Ф. Теория местного самоуправления на отечествен-
ной почве //  Политические исследования. 1998, № 4 
15 См.: Игнатов В.Г., Бутов В.И. Местное самоуправление: российская 
практика и зарубежный опыт. М., 2005 
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как своих позитивных положений, так и тех, которые нуждаются в 
определенной корректировке, в том числе – и в плане его взаимного 
согласования, сбалансированности с определенными положения-
ми закона о государственной службе, призванного реформировать 
структуру и функционирование административных органов власти 
в интересах их дальнейшей демократизации.
Определенная сбалансированность обоих законов обеспечива-
ется прежде всего тем, что в их основу заложена ставшая ныне уже 
вполне очевидной общая идея о том, что в современных условиях не 
может быть создано эффективное государство без развитого граж-
данского общества – и наоборот, а потому реформирование госу-
дарственного управления должно проводиться с оглядкой на орга-
низацию и работу структур гражданского общества, а организация 
и работа последних, в свою очередь – на состояние и достижения 
органов государственной власти. 
При этом закон о государственной службе акцентирует основ-
ное внимание на четком выполнении государственными органами 
и их сотрудниками социальных обязательств государства по со-
зданию организационных и правовых основ жизни и деятельности 
граждан в различных сферах общественных отношений – политике, 
экономике, культуре, науке, образовании, семье, а также по обес-
печению безопасности как каждого из них, так и всего общества в 
целом. В нем учитывается также, что, в соответствии с Конститу-
цией РФ, существуют три системы органов власти – федеральная, 
региональная (субъектов Федерации) и местное самоуправление, а 
потому требуется четкая разработка их полномочий и механизма их 
реализации в интересах обеспечения согласованного ведения дел. 
Ибо недоработка предшествующего законодательства в данной об-
ласти, как показал повсеместный опыт российских регионов и его 
осмысление во множестве научных исследований и публицисти-
ческих констатаций, выступает одной из основных причин сложив-
шейся политической и социальной напряженности, а также подрыва 
доверия граждан ко всем уровням государственной власти. Вместе 
с тем, эта недоработка оказалась чревата такими негативными пос-
ледствиями, как нечеткость полномочий и ответственности феде-
ральных органов исполнительной власти, неопределенность их вза-
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имоотношений с исполнительными органами субъектов РФ, а так-
же слабость поддержки ими процесса развития системы местного 
самоуправления, инициатив граждан и их объединений, нарушение 
их неотъемлемых прав и свобод. Например, в федеральных положе-
ниях о министерствах отсутствовала четкая регламентация связей с 
соответствующими органами субъектов РФ, ясное распределение их 
полномочий и ответственности. Ни федеральными, ни региональ-
ными нормативными актами не решался также вопрос о том, как и в 
какой мере должны рекомендации и иные положения, разрабатыва-
емые федеральными органами исполнительной власти, соблюдаться 
соответствующими органами власти субъектов федерации. Скажем, 
если в Положении об МВД РФ устанавливалось жесткое подчинение 
деятельности его структур федеральным и региональным органам 
власти, то в Положениях о деятельности федеральных и региональ-
ных органов Министерств труда, культуры, здравоохранения – та-
кого подчинения не предусматривалось.
Как представляется, принятый закон о государственной служ-
бе, более гармонично соотнесенный с задачей содействия развитию 
гражданского общества и учета нужд и интересов граждан, позволя-
ет более конструктивно подойти к реформированию государствен-
ного управления, основываясь на принципах целесообразности и 
дополнительности взаимодействия государственных и обществен-
ных структур, разработать и осуществить более эффективную сис-
тему распределения ответственности и полномочий между феде-
ральными органами исполнительной власти, субъектами федерации 
и органами местного самоуправления, а также обеспечить правовой 
контроль за ее надлежащим функционированием и совершенство-
ванием. 
Это, разумеется, не означает, что в будущем, по мере осмысле-
ния и оценки опыта реализации основных требований данного за-
кона, не может возникнуть необходимости его дальнейшего совер-
шенствования и дополнения. Уже сейчас можно предположить, что 
такого совершенствования и дополнения потребуют те положения 
закона, которые призваны обеспечить заинтересованность госу-
дарственных служащих всех уровней – особенно регионального – в 
максимальной реализации интересов общества, обеспечении прав и 
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свобод его граждан, в нейтрализации их подмены своими личными 
и групповыми (корпоративными) интересами, а также повышение 
персональной ответственности чиновников за принимаемые и реа-
лизуемые ими решения.
Примерно так же можно оценить и содержание нового закона 
о местном самоуправлении, который, содействуя реализации граж-
данами своего права на участие в определении и реализации задач 
государственного управления и развития, вместе с тем, явно нуж-
дается уже сейчас в усилении тех положений, которые определяют 
условия и средства обеспечения финансовой и ресурсной базы для 
поддержки местных инициатив и реализующих их общественных 
структур, а также определяют и регулируют вмешательство органов 
государственной власти в их деятельность.
В целом, можно заключить, что, содействуя дальнейшей прак-
тической реализации административной и муниципальной реформ, 
а также их большей сбалансированности и демократической ори-
ентации, оба закона создают необходимые юридические и полити-
ческие основания для того, чтобы, следуя их требованиям, властные 
структуры – центральные и особенно региональные – повернулись 
лицом к людям и их основным потребностям и интересам и начали 
плодотворное сотрудничество с широкой общественностью во 
всех российских регионах в искоренении таких крайне опасных для 
состояния самого российского государства недостатков, как рав-
нодушие и невнимание к судьбе, правам и жизненному положению 
подавляющего большинства населения страны. 
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Анатолий Самарин
нАуЧное СооБщеСтво роССии  
в уСловия лиБерАльных реформ
На судьбе российской науки самым драматичным образом ска-
зались те неблагоприятные макросоциальные процессы, которые в 
течение последних двух десятилетий развертывались в мире и в на-
шей стране, доведя её до крайнего упадка. Эти процессы могут быть 
поняты лишь в непосредственной связи с натиском глобализации 
извне, которая слишком напоминает империалистическую экспан-
сию. Ни западные глобалисты, ни отечественная квазиэита никак не 
заинтересованы в сохранении и развитии страны. С определеннос-
тью можно выявить обратное.
Из США поступают ясные ориентировки вдохновителей реформ 
о том, что свой порядок они собираются строить за счёт России и на 
обломках России, как чётко выразился Збигнев Бжезинский. В до-
кументах Международного Валютного Фонда с середины 90-х годов 
содержались рекомендации о троекратном снижении потенциала 
российской науки и образования. Во многих отношениях реформа-
торами это указание уже перевыполнено.
По данным доктора физико-математических наук Л. К. Фионо-
вой, за последние пятнадцать лет: 
– количество научных и проектных организаций сократилось в 
7.8 раза; – конструкторских бюро – в 3.6 раза; 
– научно-технических подразделений на промышленных пред-
приятиях – в 1.8 раза; 
– финансирование науки уменьшилось в 10 раз и в настоящее 
время в 200 раз ниже, чем в США; 
– число научных сотрудников снизилось втрое, ныне оно не бо-
лее 600 тысяч человек (включая и вузовскую науку- А.С.);
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– средний возраст работающих в науке перевалил 60 лет.
По справедливой оценке этого же автора, «осуществляемый 
«реформаторами» разгром науки приведёт к тому, что в стране не-
кому будет учить и лечить, а уровень образования населения будет 
падать, что сделает невозможным подъём экономики, снизит куль-
турный уровень, качество жизни и оборонный потенциал»1. 
Совместными усилиями внешних заказчиков и внутренних лоб-
бистов упразднения наук воспроизводство знаний было сознатель-
но посажено на голодный паек с самого начала «демократических 
реформ». Так, если в 1994 г. на развитие науки предполагалось вы-
делить 2,6% бюджетных средств, а в 2000 г – 2%, то на 2007 г. плани-
руется лишь 0,9%. Особо впечатляет последняя, уже символическая 
цифра, которая появилась при самом благополучном финансовом 
положении страны. Но ведь, как неоднократно отмечалось экспер-
тами, ни разу за постсоветскую эру даже такие показатели реально 
не выдерживались, фактическое финансирование оказывалось мно-
го ниже планового. Тем самым и наука, и образование в отсутствие 
средств были обречены властью на деградацию уже в течение деся-
тилетий.
Происходящие сегодня в науке и образовании процессы угро-
жают уже не одним этим сферам, но и самому будущему России. 
Бывшие в недавнем прошлом гордостью страны, ее великая наука и 
выдающаяся система образования реально приходят в упадок, что 
является очевидным следствием неолиберального разрушения рос-
сийской экономики, ее деиндустриализации вплоть до развала вы-
сокотехнологичных производств. 
Ставка на узкую сырьевую модель развития приводит к невос-
требованности научных результатов, высококвалифицированных 
специалистов, да и всего культурного воспроизводства. Послед-
нее привело к многочисленной эмиграции ученых и к внутренней 
«утечке мозгов», перетекающих в другие сферы деятельности даже 
в самой России. Не менее значима утрата важной технологической, 
геофизической, геологической и др. информации, которая ускорен-
1  Зачем России наука? - Круглый стол в редакции газеты «Время», № 
11-12, 6 апреля 2006 г.
206
но выводится за рубеж. Эти потери суммарно могут быть исчисле-
ны, по меньшей мере, десятками миллиардов долларов, если не бо-
лее. Наконец, деиндустриализация, демодернизация и дезинтеллек-
туализация российского бытия привели к снижению объективного 
социального спроса на образование, что заметно отразилось на его 
уровне, а также на общекультурном состоянии народа.
Еще меньше в научной деятельности и высокой культуре нуж-
дается та линия на расточение и расхищение национального богатс-
тва под флагом пресловутой приватизации, которая возобладала в 
постсоветский период и которая подчиняет себе всю социально-эко-
номическую сферу. 
Путь зависимого, периферийного полукапитализма, по кото-
рому идёт теперь Россия, сильно напоминает латиноамериканскую 
модель социального изменения с концентрацией основных ресурсов 
в руках ничтожно малого компрадорского слоя и латифундистов, с 
нищетой и вырождением масс, с консервацией социальной отста-
лости, из которой большинство стран этого континента не могут 
вырваться столетиями. 
Исчезновение социального слоя, кровно заинтересованного в 
развитии страны, формирование олигархических империй, занятых 
перекачкой ресурсов на Запад и озабоченных лишь вывозом капи-
тала, предопределили негативное отношение либеральных «элит» к 
системам науки и образования. Ученые стали «лишними людьми» 
на фоне господствующих потребительских установок и целенаправ-
ленного отказа псевдоэлит от созидания. Внимание реформаторов 
привлекают лишь материальные ресурсы науки и вузов, в первую 
очередь, – в виде недвижимости, содержание научного знания они 
просто не в состоянии оценить. Интеллектуальные ценности и сами 
специалисты интересуют их лишь в том случае, если их можно не-
медленно продать, «толкнуть на рынке», говоря языком этой среды. 
Регулярно принимаются даже меры для активизации «утечки моз-
гов» и распродажи отечественных «ноу-хау».
Погромщики науки и просвещения руководствуются одновре-
менно многообразной, но всегда деструктивной мотивацией. С од-
ной стороны, добивая науку, они непосредственно исполняют ука-
зания, поступающие от западных дирижеров реформизма, с другой, 
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они, подобно мародёрам, жаждут поживиться на приватизации уч-
реждений науки, их ресурсов. Наконец, потенциальное устранение 
учёных с общественной сцены, с их точки зрения, уменьшило бы вал 
критики в отношении деструктивных реформ, то есть в реформа-
торском накате на науку и образование присутствуют и ясные идео-
логические мотивы. 
Двадцать лет реформаторы урезают и громят то, что создавалось 
веками, разбивая всю ту культурную матрицу, на которой держится 
уже и без того хрупкое национально-государственное единство. Де-
лают это они вполне целенаправленно, в условиях, когда противни-
ками запущен проект «распада» Российской Федерации. 
До настоящего времени, хотя и сильно обветшавший, бастион 
академической науки ещё уцелел, и, кроме того, сохраняется высшая 
школа с остатками её научного потенциала. Они то и обозначены 
как очередные и главные мишени для атаки. 
Групповой корыстный интерес компрадорских группировок, 
как указывалось выше – не единственная мотивация к разрушению 
академического мира. Есть мощный социальный заказ извне со сто-
роны внешнеполитических конкурентов на интеллектуальное ос-
лабление России. Основные идейные вдохновители реформаторов в 
лице МВФ и Всемирного банка в своих рекомендациях на снижение 
научного потенциала нашей страны были более чем настойчивы и 
последовательны, начиная с середины 1990-х гг. В первую очередь 
отсюда возникали те радикальные проекты «реформирования» этих 
сфер, которые, как из рога изобилия, появлялись в течение послед-
него десятилетия. Их общий знаменатель сводился всегда к тому, 
чтобы приватизировать весь имущественный комплекс этих об-
ластей жизни и перевести на рыночное «самофинансирование» то, 
что, либо по своей природе не продаваемо (как, например, фунда-
ментальная наука), либо то, что, при ограниченной платежеспособ-
ности населения России, не сможет выжить в рыночных условиях 
(образование). 
Цели зарубежных инициаторов смертельной хирургии (а ясно, 
что летальные решения по нашей науке принимаются там) состоят 
в том, чтобы, во-первых, в итоге разгрома получить дополнительно 
кадровое приращение за счет эмиграции учёных и преподавателей, 
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во-вторых, добиться критического ослабления интеллектуального и 
оборонного потенциала страны. Там прекрасно понимают, что до тех 
пор, пока сохраняются его крупные секторы науки и образования 
точка «невозврата» в инволюции современной России не пройдена. 
Да, «оборонка», развалена, но есть ещё люди, знающие как её 
восстановить. Да, кадры во многих стратегически важных сферах де-
квалифицировались, но ещё можно подготовить новые. Ликвидация 
же целого социального пласта, способного сделать это, и есть сверх-
задача новейшей псевдореформы. Если связать развитие подобного 
процесса с развертыванием иностранных военных баз вблизи и по 
всей периферии нашей территории, то решения по науке всё больше 
напоминают спецоперацию по снижению нашей обороноспособ-
ности перед лицом возрастающих рисков агрессии. 
Упразднение науки в России означает на практике сведение 
национально-государственной безопасности к нулю. Только смена 
стратегических целей государства: возвращение на путь отстаива-
ния национальных интересов, развитие реального сектора экономи-
ки на базе высокотехнологичного производства позволит востре-
бовать науку и образование, и даст шанс на сохранение российской 
цивилизации. 
Любимая реформаторами М. Тэтчер однажды изрекла, имея в 
виду именно Россию: «Нация, которая пренебрегает своей наукой, 
обречена». Преобразователей это не смутило, как, впрочем, и г-жу 
Тэтчер, вполне удовлетворенную тем, по ее словам, что «Россия 
больна, она умирает». Уже одного систематического недофинанси-
рования было вполне достаточно для исчезновения русской науки 
в течение ближайшего десятилетия, но кто-то из заказчиков счел 
необходимым поторопить реформаторов и приступить к более 
активному выметанию из России (как из обреченного «государс-
тва-неудачника») ее интеллектуального и культурного потенциала. 
Преобразовательные пароксизмы, «концепции», продвигавшиеся в 
течение последних двух лет, возымели необходимое действие: «утеч-
ка мозгов» только за текущий год выросла, по экспертным оценкам, 
примерно на 20 % по сравнению с предыдущим, что, вероятно, вхо-
дит в планы изобретателей «концепций». Подобно загонщикам на 
охоте они гонят свою квалифицированную «добычу» в очень опре-
деленную сторону – в эмиграцию. 
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Все это означает, что все разговоры о внедрении инновацион-
ных технологий и грядущем в связи с этим подъеме производства 
беспочвенны: крах науки и просвещения поставит крест на любых 
планах модернизации, включая и остро необходимую модерни-
зацию обороны. Не понимать этого даже неолибералы, читающие 
хотя бы М.Тэтчер, не могут, сохранение института науки и тем паче 
образования – есть сегодня условие национального существования. 
Следовательно, те, кто атакует область производства знаний, в со-
хранении страны и народа явно не заинтересованы. Некоторые из 
зарубежных и даже наших экспертов говорят о происходящем как 
о спецоперациях по интеллектуальному разоружению России перед 
лицом назревающих угроз. Похоже, что мы имеем дело с разверты-
ванием самой серьезной из таких операций после разрушения СССР 
и разгрома отечественного ВПК. 
Пока сохраняется культурная матрица, заложенная в том узком 
слое, который связан с производством и воспроизводством знаний, 
большинство чудовищных потерь последних двадцати лет (за ис-
ключением человеческих) может быть восполнено. С утратой этой 
матрицы будет необратимо потеряно едва ли не все. Вот почему де-
баты вокруг судьбы науки и образования в современной России при-
обрели столь серьезный размах, и вот почему российские ученые, в 
том числе и виднейшие – представители самых разных направлений 
научного знания, от философии до физики и математики, а также 
работники сферы отечественного образования столь жестко, остро 
и нелицеприятно – обсуждают волнующие их социальные и органи-
зационные вопросы нынешнего состояния и перспектив развития 
российской научной и образовательной сфер жизнедеятельности 
современного российского общества. Ибо речь сегодня идет зачас-
тую о невежественном, недальновидном уничтожении того дела, ко-
торому была посвящена жизнь многих поколений ученых, более того 
– о гибели величайшего культурного континента, сосредоточенного 
в научных и образовательных институтах. Развалом научно-образо-
вательных институтов под сомнение ставится фактически наше кол-
лективное существование как самостоятельной цивилизации. 
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Ivan Katzarski
BULGARIA IN ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA
Bridges between cultures in the first place presuppose mutual knowl-
edge of each other.
During the post-communist period, the interest in Bulgaria on the 
part of western and world mass media has increased significantly. Their 
attention has been attracted mainly by the political changes and especial-
ly by the moments of severe social and political crises related to them. 
During/In* the last few* years the interest in our country has increased 
because of its accession to NATO and the real possibility for EU mem-
bership. Particularly during the current year, Bulgaria has gained quite a 
negative image among western mass media as a place where corruption 
and organized crime flourish and state authorities are either not willing or 
lack the capacity to cope with them.
Here I have made an attempt to reconstruct Bulgaria’s image the way 
it is shaped in a milieu different from that of mass media, that is what 
makes the country popular and how it is presented in academic milieu. 
Formulated in this way, the topic has many aspects and it is impossible 
for one researcher to cover it, especially in a study of this type. I decided 
to make my task simpler and analyze Bulgaria’s image as presented in En-
cyclopedia Britannica (Ultimate Reference Suite on DVD, 2005). The ad-
vantages of this source determining my choice are: (1) it contains a large 
amount of information concerning all significant phenomena; (2) there is 
ample evidence about Bulgaria and Bulgarians referring to various spheres 
of academic treatment; (3) the representativeness and authoritativeness of 
the source are unquestionable; (4) the last electronic edition of the ency-
clopedia is very convenient to use.
The present reconstruction is based on an analysis of the following types 
of information units: articles, parts of articles, images and multimedia.
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Table 1
Information units containing evidence about Bulgaria,  
Bulgarians and everything concerning them.
Number
Basic author’s (signed) articles on Bulgaria 4
Unsigned articles on Bulgarian realia and phenomena 96
Paragraphs presenting Bulgarian realia and phenomena with-
in articles concerning non-Bulgarian issues
77
Paragraphs or short articles where the mentioning of Bulgaria 
is rather 
neutral in relation to whatever image
451
Images (including charts and diagrams) 9
Multimedia 5
There are four author’s (signed) articles on Bulgaria in Encyclopaedia 
Britannica: the major article „Bulgaria” (by Francis W. Carter, University 
of London and John D. Bell, University of Maryland, Baltimore|); “Year in 
Review 2003: Bulgaria” (from Richard J. Crampton); “Boris I” (Wassil T. 
Gjuzelev, University of Sofia`); “Bulgarian literdture” (Liliana Brisby, free 
lance editor and writer on East European affairs). Most unsigned articles 
are short. The greatest number of them deals with Bulgarian towns (31) 
and persons (32). Besides the specially designed articles for Bulgaria and 
Bulgarians, they often appear in the following contexts: Balkans, Byzan-
tine Empire, Ottoman Empire, Eastern Orthodoxy, Slavs, Slavonic lan-
guage and culture, modern history of the Balkan countries and European 
history.
Further on I will attempt to present the main features characterizing 
the image of Bulgaria and the Bulgarians according to Encyclopedia Bri-
tannica.
Bulgarian nature. Plains, mountains, valleys, rivers, lakes, the Black 
Sea and its gulfs, climate, soil and mineral resources are revealed. Emphasis 
is laid on the variety of Bulgarian nature. Close association between nature 
and economy is typical. Industrial development of the country after World 
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War II (metallurgy, machinery construction, chemistry) has been recorded 
but the branches assigning Bulgaria a special place on the international 
scale are possible only in the unique nature and climate of the country. On 
the international scale Bulgaria is famous for its grape and wine produc-
tion, rose plantations and rose oil production; it is also known as a tobacco, 
vegetable and fruit growing country. Marble extraction and processing 
have also been pointed out. Bulgaria is also mentioned as a tourist coun-
try which is linked, of course, also to its natural landmarks (nice beeches, 
beautiful mountains) and to its cultural and historical heritage. 
Technical innovations. As truly Bulgarian such have not been men-
tioned. Bulgaria is indicated as a place where ancient peoples have devel-
oped metallurgy and gold and copper processing (V c. BC). According to 
the Encyclopaedia, John Atanasoff was the inventor of the first electronic 
computer. He is presented as an American physicist and mathematician 
from Iowa State College without mentioning his ethnic Bulgarian origin.
The Bulgarian Language. The history of language has been traced 
back, its special place in the Slavonic language family has been revealed as 
well as similarities and differences in comparison to the languages of the 
other Balkan peoples have been pointed out.
Folk culture. Single, although short articles, depict the Bulgarian 
dance horo and the national folk instrument gusla. Special attention has 
been paid to the Bulgarian rhythm, variety of musical metre, which ac-
cording to the Encyclopedia has influenced some works of XX c. compos-
ers such as Bela Bartoc and Igor Stravinsky. Bulgaria is mentioned as a 
country where fire walking is practiced. Bulgaria is among the countries 
where late heroic poetry has been written – an epic about the heroic deeds 
of tsars and heroes presented orally accompanied by a stringed instru-
ment. This kind of epic genre is almost died out in modern times but the 
ancient tradition „is still alive among certain illiterate and semiliterate 
peoples living in remote communities. In the late 19th and 20th centuries a 
wealth of new heroic literature was collected from native storytellers”.
State and political history. This has been a key issue considered in a 
great number of articles. In its essence, it assigns a historical significance 
to Bulgaria on a regional (Balkan) and European level. One gets a firm 
impression of this significance being much more apparent during the pre-
Ottoman period. Even a small number of titles in the historical section of 
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the article „Bulgaria” – “The First Bulgarian Empire”, “The Second Bul-
garian Empire” are indicative of that. Samuel’s state has also been called 
an empire stretching from the Adriatic to the Black Sea. The nationalis-
tic dream “Bulgaria touching three seas” has become reality only during 
the pre-Ottoman*** period. At that time Bulgarian elites have not only 
won remarkable military victories but have also demonstrated instances 
of great and skillful diplomacy and a capacity to carry out an important 
cultural mission among the Slavonic countries.
The time of the Third Bulgarian state definitely seems pale against this 
background. As a whole, the impressions one gets about that period are 
not that favorable: after the liberation “Bulgarian government did little to 
encourage industrialization, preferring to use the state budget for finance 
the growth of bureaucracy and to maintain as powerful army as possible 
in the hope of territorial expansion. Bulgarian military expenditures on a 
per capita basis were the highest in Europe and brought the country the 
reputation of being the Prussia on the Balkans”. The firs accomplishments 
after the Liberations (the Unificaton between Principality of Bulgaria and 
Eastern Rumelia, the victory in the Serb-Bulgarian War) were followed by 
military catastrophes. The first of them (The Second Balkan War, 1913) 
which actually prepares the following (the unfortunate involvement in 
World War I) to a great extent was prearranged for reasons of diplomacy: 
by „the great mistake of Bulgarian diplomacy to organize a war against the 
Ottoman Empire without first clearly resolving” the competing claims of 
the allies. The country keeps lagging behind compared to the West. The 
parties have no clear identity and rather resemble “partnerships for the 
exploitations of power”. Authoritarian and later totalitarian governments 
appeared, at some points having a repulsive bloody physiognomy.
The presentation of the communist period in Bulgaria is equivocal. On 
the one hand there are the severe repressions immediately after overthrow-
ing of the former regime, the massive violation of democracy, repressions 
not only against political opponents but against ethnic minorities, religious 
groups and institutions, and forcing the country to become a most faithful 
satellite of the Soviet Union. An unique trait in Bulgarian political history is 
the attempt at staging a coup against Todor Zhivkov (1965) – “the first ever 
within a communist regime”. On the other hand, the accelerated industri-
alization of the country leading to substantial increase of life standard and 
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culture of the greater part of the population is considered as a positive proc-
ess. After World War II Bulgarian villages “have undergone a transforma-
tion from sleepy, backward, and poverty stricken settlements that typified 
much of the region for centuries. Almost all of the rural population lives in 
villages supplied with water and electricity; three quarters of the houses are 
recent constructions, replacing the older lath and plaster structures, most 
of the villages have paved and asphalted streets. Processing plants have 
been built in many villages, so that rural areas are increasingly industrial-
ized”. Besides this the state provides “free education at all levels”, “a free 
medical assistance of all types”, even cultural development of the regions. 
The negative aspect of industrialization, environmental pollution, has also 
been stated. At the end of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s most indica-
tors (yearly nitric and sulphur oxide emissions) show that environmental 
pollution in Bulgaria is at the level characteristic of Eastern Europe and at 
a much higher level compared to Western Europe (the latter however has a 
higher level of carbon dioxide emissions per capita compared to Bulgaria).
In fact, systematic observation of Bulgaria (history, economics, ad-
ministration, culture, etc.) in the Encyclopaedia end up about 1991-19921. 
This generates a serious problem concerning the actuality of presentation. 
The reader gets the impression of Bulgaria as a country running quite a 
booming economy controlled by the state, providing free education and 
health care, etc. It looks like phenomena such as inflation and unemploy-
ment have emerged just now. This is definitely not true concerning nowa-
days. The profound transformation in Bulgarian society in the last 15 years 
has not been presented. Consequently, one can be quite astonished jump-
ing from the impression of the beginning of the 90s to the picture of the 
country in 2003 (the last year of review in the Encyclopaedia. The peaceful 
and prospering society under state control proves to be stricken by cor-
ruption and organized crime and the administration is unable or does not 
want to handle the problem.
1 It cannot be said that this is a demonstration of a particular attitude towards 
the country. Systematic observation of Romania, Greece and Turkey also ends up 
somewhere at the beginning or the middle of the 90s. Countries that sprang up 
from the division of Yugoslavia seem to be “privileged” in this respect. This dis-
solution, the conflicts and the resulting wars obviously could not have been left 
without consideration.
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Literature and cultural heritage. In this sphere too, accomplishments 
of European and world impact are due to cultural elites of pre-Ottoman 
times. Centers of Slavonic literature and culture were established in the 
country which play an important role in the mission of incorporating the 
Slavonic world into Christianity and civilization. The onset of the Bogomil 
movement (quite a long article in the Encyclopaedia has been devoted to 
it) is also indicative of the intensity of the social and cultural processes 
going on in the country; it has spread far beyond the confines of Bulgaria 
including Western Europe as well. On this background the New-Bulgar-
ian literature and cultural heritage have been revealed by processes and 
accomplishments important to the country but not on a universal scale. In 
literature, as well as in the other spheres, the country rather makes up for 
the lagging behind, acquires European models.
A big drawback of the article on Bulgarian literature is that its de-
velopment has been presented in detail just to the beginning of the com-
munist period (1944). А следващите десетилетия съвсем не са били 
безплодни. 
Careers. The Encyclopaedia makes the impression that nowadays a 
Bulgarian could achieve great accomplishments exceeding the national 
boundaries in the sphere of sports allowing direct competition and stand-
ardized measurement of the score. Leading positions that Bulgaria has had 
in sports like weight lifting, running, volleyball, sambo have been men-
tioned. Special attention has been paid to Naim Suleimanoglu whose per-
sonality and success have been discussed in quite an unusually detailed 
article. One could hardly find a reasonable answer what has generated this 
special treatment. 
In the field of science and culture it turns out that Bulgarians could 
achieve widespread popularity if they work out of the country and more 
precisely in the West. The inventor of the first computer (1939) John Vin-
cent Atanasoff has been presented just as an American physicist and math-
ematician. In the sphere of arts and spiritual life, universal significance is 
attributed only to Christo Javacheff ’s environmental sculpture, Julia Kris-
teva’s works and the performances of “Le mystere des voix bulgares”. All of 
these cases relate to creative works and projects realized in the West, in a 
non-Bulgarian cultural environment. Only tame will show however how 
long their fame will last.
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Странно защо в полезрението на Енциклопедията не са попад-
нали например имената на световно известни оперни певци като 
Boris Christoff, Nikolay Geuroff, Rayna Kabaivanska и др.
If we ignore the obvious drawbacks pointed out, the picture of Bul-
garia presented in Encyclopaedia Britannica could be accepted as correct. 
The name of Bulgaria is associated with two categories of phenomena 
– the first has to do with the national history and culture, the second go 
beyond this context and carry a more universal implication, regional and 
European significance. We cannot miss the fact that the second category 
of phenomena on the one hand we owe to generosity of nature and on 
the other – to achievements of people and generations belonging to the 
remote past. The perspective of Bulgaria’s integration into the EU, I would 
like to believe, is a chance to expand the horizons of Bulgarian society and 
culture and to overcome the provincialism typical of the period of New 
Bulgarian history (the way it actually is in the history of the other Balkan 
nations during that same period).
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Latjo Latev
THE TRANSfIGURATION Of  
THE BULGARIAN SPIRIT DURING  
THE LAST TWO CENTURIES
There is a great deal of hesitation when the phrase “Bulgarian spirit” 
is used. It is not certain if there is any such thing at all and if there is – 
what it means. If there is, indeed, it is something quite ambivalent, filled 
with mutually exclusive features. In the beginning of the 19th century Sof-
ronius complains as a martyr about the outrages of the Ottomans. Later 
on Botev supports him as well. But roughly around the same time period 
P. R. Slaveikov illustrates pictures of peaceful co-existence of Bulgarians 
and Ottomans in the villages of Stara Zagora. Also, there is a conspicu-
ous contrast between the elevated revolutionary rhetoric of Rakovski, 
Karavelov, Botev and the impartiality of the common Bulgarian people. 
Furthermore, many of the participants in the April Revolt and the bat-
talions of Botev were betrayed by Bulgarians. Thus, there is hardly such 
a thing as a uniform “Bulgarian spirit”. But when such is mentioned, it 
is probably assumed of the spiritual manifestations of such rank that are 
important for the meaningful historic events. For example, the aspira-
tions of the spiritually elevated representatives of the Bulgarian people to 
national and political emancipation virtually result in what we call Lib-
eration with capital L.
Another point of the conceptual instability is the use of the predicate 
“National” for the “spirit”. It is hard to tell what exactly is outstanding or 
special in the Bulgarian or any other national spirit. In the attempt to do 
that there is always the chance to either go into exaggerated generalization 
or excessive individualization. For example, we often hear claims that Bul-
garians like something, but whatever this something is it obviously cannot 
be liked by every single Bulgarian. In the same way the claim that Bulgar-
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ians are characterized by some trait (like hospitality and diligence) can be 
a claim of every nation.
It seems obvious that the most substantial element of a national spir-
itual culture is the national language. Along with it, prominent national 
forms can be found in folklore (music, dances). At the same time there are 
other spiritual manifestations which can hardly be added to the national 
forms but have a substantial meaning in the national life. They are related 
to the historic events and have a program value. They create a perspective 
of the historic activity. These are ideas and concepts which guide the na-
tional aspirations in a particular direction. They are declared by historians 
as an expression of the common collective will. It might be said that as 
emanation of the national aspirations and interests they are first line of the 
historic eventfulness, although they are on a second line in the collective 
memory and the traditional national customs.
In our history the road to national Renaissance is the beginning of 
such a program. At first this is the cry of Paisius and later on of Sofronius 
and other early writers of the Bulgarian national revival. With this cry a 
program for ethno-national self-determination rises; for the recognition 
of the Bulgarian national identity. It is accentuated on the awakening of 
the Bulgarian self-awareness, because it, exactly, was menaced by erasure 
because of the spreading of the Greek culture amongst the Bulgarians.
Later, for a few decades in the 19th century this program undergoes 
certain transformations. With the bringing in of elements of reform in the 
conservative Ottoman Empire the Bulgarian writers of national revival see 
the need and the opportunity the Bulgarian national self-determination to 
be secured institutionally. This happens under the form of an aspiration 
to acquire spiritually national independence. Remarkable in this case is 
that the religious affiliation becomes a represent of the national affiliation. 
Eventually with this trick the program turns out to be working and in the 
beginning of the 70s Bulgarians achieve independent Bulgarian church.
At the same time another program is activated – the program of the 
national independence on political basis. It is an initiative of the revolu-
tionaries – Rakovski, Karavelov, Levski, Botev. The efforts result in the 
April revolt, which as a revolt is a failure to the program, but inductively 
leads to its ultimate success because of the attention it attracts from the 
outside world. 
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After the Liberation the national ideal again undergoes a transforma-
tion with correspondence to the current reality. Because parts of the Bul-
garian people remain outside of the borders of the newly formed country 
the new ideal is unification of all the Bulgarians. With the price of many 
victims and a few national catastrophes this ideal is unsuccessfully fought 
for until the end of the Second World War.
After the War a new transformation of national ideals and goals oc-
curs – for creating a society with social equality. In the context of the geo-
political and other realities of the time this seems to be a lost cause. A 
torturous transition follows which is undefined with regard to the national 
ideas or ideals. But eventually the image that stands out and becomes more 
and more actual is the image of Europe. This turns out to be a relatively 
unifying idea which was being widely discussed in different forums.
Regarding the last two centuries, the Bulgarian idea of Europe has dif-
ferent aspects. Mainly it is about a political stereotype. This is because of 
the assumption that the European status of the social process is the highest 
standard and as such is worth following. When Paisius appeals to Bul-
garians to realize the importance of their national identity he intuitively 
makes his point on the basis of the European concept that it is the right of 
each person and nation to determine their own status in national, ethnical, 
and religious aspect.
Secondly, Europe is an economic model. It is the synonym of eco-
nomic prosperity which has no better alternative as a perspective of the 
more slowly developing European communities.
Thirdly, the following of the European model has a moral importance 
as well. It is an overcoming of some historic social injustice, establishment 
of a more just condition or realization of some virtues.
It is notable that there is a particular historic dynamics in the de-
velopment of the image of Europe in the Bulgarian culture. During the 
Bulgarian Renaissance and up to the 20s of the 20th century it was almost 
an exact pattern to follow. During the 30s there is some adjustment of 
the model to the Bulgarian reality. During that period the idea of the 
importance of the national culture prevails and thus an uncertainty that 
the European model should be followed in its every single aspect occurs. 
Regretfully, with the coming of the Second World War this tendency died 
away, and especially under the weight of the new all-embracing social 
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experiment. Also, in modern times, regretfully, this tendency is almost 
forgotten and the image of Europe is again most often a cliché which 
guides all national aspirations. This is probably the case because the cur-
rent image of Europe to Bulgarians is marked with the same abstraction 
as it was two centuries ago. Often in speeches the perception of Unified 
Europe is the perception of the “normal countries”, with disregard to the 
fact, that in the European Union there are such differences, that the sepa-
rate countries cannot define each other as normal. The “normality” here 
is very abstract, a fact that often serves political manipulations. It is much 
more serious to study particular aspects at the edge of compatibility and 
the opportunities for a common European identity, as we strive to do in 
scientific forums as this one.
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Hristina Ambareva
IMAGE-MAKING AND PERSONAL IDENTITY
The purpose of this presentation is to show what are the basic ele-
ments used in the construction of personal image and how they create the 
power of personal image.
The word “image” has come into Bulgarian language (with transcrip-
tion [imidg]) as part of the international vocabulary and is used in the 
meaning “deliberately chosen vision of oneself and the related behavior/
appearance consistent with this vision”. 
“Image-making” means that a man constructs and follows a desired 
image of himself and tries to behave in a way that harmonizes with this 
image. The presence of “image” is associated mainly with business and 
commercial arts. It is explained as self-positioning on the market or as aes-
thetic self-presentation. This concept however affects all spheres of human 
life, because always and everywhere there have been a strong dependence 
of identity on image.
It is often said that there are two major ways for a man to know who 
she/he is: by looking at his/her image in the mirror or by knowing what 
others think of him/her. The image in the mirror reflects our appearance. 
The image in the public’s eyes reflects our reputation. In the first case, we 
speak about the image literary and in the second – metaphorically. 
In both cases, we strive to achieve the ideal parameters of one desired 
image of oneself that includes a vision how we would like to look and be in 
other people’s eyes. This is strife for identity, as well.
All you know that personal identity is a very complex structure. 
Huntington enumerated nearly 50 factors that influence the description 
of personal identity. Some of these factors are: age, gender, race, language, 
religion, nationality, ethnic factor, place of birth and life – region or con-
tinent, political orientation, profession, industry, social environment and 
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social status and many others. He separated six major types of identity: 
prescribed, cultural, territorial, political, economic and social identity.1 
In my presentation here I want to concentrate on culture as a fac-
tor, which influences understanding of personal identity and more spe-
cially – description of personal identity. However I won’t speak about spa-
tial parameters of culture, about its geographical dimensions, but about 
its changes in time and the influence of these changes on the ways for 
description of human personality. This is a step to the understanding of 
how image-making combines deeply rooted in human history symbols 
and beliefs.
According to the anthropologists human cultural history has devel-
oped from the pre-literacy times of oral culture, throughout the literacy 
time of written culture to the post-literacy world of “image” culture today. 
These periods of culture are really real, but they are also quite conven-
tional too, because the time frame of oral culture for example is not strictly 
situated by the time of 1500-1700. There are societies, tribes, whose cul-
tural tradition is still transmitted by oral communication. Only 60 years 
ago I know that in one town of Bulgaria, Koprivshtitsa, the news was an-
nounced by a public crier.
On the other side, first writings appeared 5000 years ago (cuneiform 
and Egyption hieroglyphs). Written culture was not developed then be-
cause first of all, the complexity of the scripts made the general literacy dif-
ficult. They were understood only by the limited circle of people – scribes, 
officials, doctors, priests. Even the first drawings date from thousands of 
years ago. So it obligatory to specify that oral, written and image elements 
of human culture always have existed together. However one of them 
dominates in certain time and society.
1.What are the main features of oral tradition and what 
follows from them for the description of identity?
1. Knowledge transmitted by this tradition is subjective. It is always 
told by someone who we know – grandmother, grandfather, parents, priest, 
doctors, officials and no difference between knowledge and the one who 
1 Хънтингтън, С. (2004) Кои сме ние?
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knows is made. So, the knowledge conveyed by oral tradition is a question 
of belief, trust, suggestion or influence, not of analytical proof.
2. The main carrier of oral tradition is language. This is a culture of 
sound and hearing. The relevant instrument for identification of a man 
depends on sound and hearing too – this is the name. In this respect, the 
ethimology of the Chinese hieroglyph for “name” is very indicative. The 
hieroglyph is composed of two symbols, the symbol of “darkness” and the 
symbol of “mouth”. That is to say, the name is equal to the voice by which 
someone recognizes you in the darkness. Name is generally perceived as a 
carrier of a identification, which people recognize by its very hearing.
3. Knowledge transmitted by oral tradition is always situational – it 
is about experience and everyday living. This knowledge is always contex-
tual – as the information is related directly either to some ritual, holiday, 
celebration of growth, or to some other social event, it has obvious relation 
to practice and fulfils clearly set purposes in the life of community. The 
power of word under these circumstances is enormous, because in the 
mind of man words equals things and this reflects directly the symbolic 
power of name: name equals existence.
The symbolic importance of a person’s name is manifested clearly in 
the anthropologists’ descriptions of taboos concerning naming traditions. 
In some cases, for example, personal names are kept in secret, because 
of the belief that knowing the real name of something/someone means 
controlling it. Fear exists that the knowledge of a personal name could 
be used in vicious magic. In some societies, there are strict rules of ad-
dressing one’s own husband, wife and respective relatives-in-law without 
mentioning their given names.2 In China it was forbidden for example to 
write and pronounce the names of Chinese emperor and his ancestors.3 
There were also taboos with regard to the deceased relatives, whose names 
for some periods had not to be uttered.
All these taboos, bright traces of which exist in our highly advanced 
rational civilization, give prominence to the strong power the name pos-
2 Frazer, Sir James George, The Golden Bough, § 2. Names of Relations ta-
booed, http://www.bartleby.com/196/56.html
3 Naming taboo, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Naming_taboo; http://www.answers.com/topic/naming-taboo
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sesses over human mind. The following are some points that describe the 
belief in the symbolic power of name:
1. The thing that has a name is more important than a nameless thing. 
To deprive you of your name is a severe moral punishment. To have 
no name means to be cast out of society, beyond the borders of hu-
man culture and humanity as well. A nameless thing is dangerous.
2. The sound of a name calls for identity and lots of sounds were 
forbidden as sounds of the evil. The name, it is superstitiously be-
lieved, expresses an essence to such extent that it calls for the exist-
ence it signifies. Even now the commandment of not mentioning 
in vain the name of God is respected.
3. It is much easier to change a name, than to change the negative 
message the sound of this name is associated with. It is very popu-
lar practice for musicians or actors at the beginning of their career 
to choose brightly sounding names and make their professional 
identities associated with the message of these names.
4. How destination or man’s inner nature is believed to be given in his 
name is obvious in the fact that man is still explained in terms of 
his/her name by some popular mantic practices. There are names 
that are considered unsuitable for someone or something, just be-
cause they do not correspond to the anticipated nature or purpose 
of the thing that should be named. A simple example, it is not ap-
propriate to give to a boy a female name. This directly reflects the 
conviction that the name is of essential importance for the ade-
quate description of personal identity and violating this rule can 
invoke disorientation and problems. 
5. There is a strong suggestion in taboo traditions, that the name spo-
ken by voice is generally approved, because according to the com-
mon belief only what is locked in silence could be dangerous. 
How these beliefs affects the contemporary image-making? They re-
sult in several simple rules:
1. The name is a symbol of existence. So, in order to exist, you need a 
name.
2. The name should be “good” and adequate. The adequate name is 
of essential importance for the description of personal or brand 
identity. Name is a mark of character – of nobility or disgrace. The 
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power of a “good” name, allows the use of the name as an equiva-
lent substitution for any written agreement. The good name is as-
sociated with truthfulness and commitment to any engagement 
created on the base of oral word. So, the efforts of image-making to 
explore the resources of the “good name” are justified by the moral 
code of oral communication. 
3. The name that is not well-known looks suspicious. The book that is 
not reviewed in a popular edition does not seem so valuable. The aim 
of any advertising campaign is make the name popular and familiar. 
To create the deceptive impression of personal attitude to something 
it is necessary to repeat the name of this thing as many times, as it 
is necessary to make the name sound familiar. This is part of the 
suggestive mechanism of advertising campaigns. Popular name wins 
over the unknown one, because it is better situated in a familiar set 
of associations. This set fights successfully against fear and suspicion 
and helps the name to be associated with distinct values of life.
2. What is the contribution of written culture to the de-
scription of identity and how it supports the symbolism 
in image-making?
Although the first writings appeared 5000 years ago, the slow and dif-
ficult process of reproducing writings and books keeps them away from 
the illiterate multitude for centuries. At the beginning written tradition 
was only developed in particular institutions and only some classes had 
admission to it (religious institutions, monasteries, universities; the high-
est stratum of society) 
The real upswing of written culture comes no sooner than the inven-
tion of printing press (in 1436 by Johann Gutenberg) and the increased 
percentage of educated people. Then the availability of books and newspa-
pers grows quickly and gradually creates the world of “information”.
Written culture is a culture of signs. Its major carrier is the written 
word. And written culture needs people, who are trained to understand 
and recreate it.
In contrast to the oral tradition, when man lives through a culture in 
the everyday experience, during the time of written culture, man informs 
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about culture(s). Acquaintance with cultural tradition pushes the “know-
ing person” to isolation in the library or cabinets. My point here is that 
written knowledge turns things into concepts, into signs as well. Things 
become subjects of analysis. Researchers and explorers get acquainted 
with things, not necessarily being involved in them. 
How this affects the concept of identity?
Name is still a symbol of existence, but existence is already mediated 
by signs. So, to exist now means to have your name written in the social 
registers. Verification and consequently falsification of identity adopts spe-
cific dimensions; identity is not verified unless there is a sign to prove it.
The technique of writing transfers identity from the full-blooded life 
to the page and, nevertheless formal and conventional, it proves a useful 
instrument to confirm or represent identity beyond limited space and 
time. 
Written culture creates person’s graphological identity (in terms of 
handwriting and signature), which is easy – literary – to preserve and car-
ry in space. Graphological expertise allows experts to identify for example, 
Charles Dickens’ handwriting and signature and this way to testify for the 
authenticity of a document. 
I would like you to pay attention to the abbreviated signatures, called 
“Manu propria”, which from Latin means “signed with one’s own hand”. In 
the Middle Ages Manu propria was widely used to testify authenticity of 
hand written documents. This kind of abbreviation is still used in Bulgaria 
as a confirmation of personal identity along with hand written signatures. 
I think that this clearly testifies about the presence of strong written tradi-
tion in our society even on the threshold of the new digital age. 
Signature as a sign of identity opens new sources of symbolism. Meet-
ing a famous person, many people are eager to ask for autograph. The 
one who has obtained a signature (autograph) of a famous book-writer, 
tennis-player after his bright victory, music star feels special. Giving and 
taking autographs becomes a ritual of communication and then benevo-
lent attention to a person takes her/him out of anonymity and directs to 
her/him a small beam of somebody else’s glory. Receiving autographs is 
met with great deal of emotion – autograph is a kind of ownership of a 
piece of one’s identity. It is a symbolic appropriation of some features of 
this identity, too. 
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The personal signature suggests personal attitude in the time of writ-
ten communication, when distance between people is growing and be-
comes a source of alienation and social anonymity. In the time of written 
culture benevolent attitude of a famous person paying attention to a man 
is an important event. Autograph presents a symbolic connection between 
people. The book, signed by its author, does not change in content, but the 
owner of the book believes that the attitude of the very book to him has 
changed. 
How image-making uses the symbolism of signature?
1. When the signs create signature not only for a person, but also for 
a company or brand, it becomes a symbol of style, quality, quantity, mark 
of status and social environment. People who use products that bear the 
signature (for example, the logo of “Adidas” on clothes or the sign of ex-
pensive designers on the suit) often do this in order to show their personal 
commitment to the demonstrated by the brand style of life, status and so 
on. In this case, the appropriation of the symbolic power of the signature 
of already established and strengthened brands helps in building a per-
sonal image. It is not only true that in the contemporary epoch people eat 
images, sleep on images, dress in images4, but also that by means of these 
images people create their own image. They identify with the brand of 
shoes and suits they wear, with the symbols of identity of their consumable 
environment.
2. The success in making personal image can be measured by the ex-
tent in which one’s signature (or logo) appears as meaningful symbol of 
identity, which somebody else will wish to sleep on, dress with, wear or 
demonstrate in public and make a part of its own personal (feeling of) 
identity. 
3. Symbolism of signature provides a reliable and common technol-
ogy for transmission of information that overcomes here-and-now of situ-
ation and proves capable to create invisible connections among people by 
means of recognizable signatures. Logo of a brand becomes a source of a 
group identity.
4 Rosen, Christine 2005, “The Image Culture,” in The New Atlantis, Number 10, Fall 
2005, pp. 27-46.”, http://www.thenewatlantis.com/archive/10/rosen.htm
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3. What is the contribution of image-culture to the 
description of identity and in the symbolism of image-
making?
Image culture:
1. Image-culture is an image-based culture.
Development of contemporary image-culture begins after the inven-
tion of camera in 19 century and with the devices for fast multiplication 
of images. Now images are major carriers of information and are the most 
important part of the “language’ of visual media.
1. Image culture is also a media culture. The image culture, as well 
as the written culture, does not create direct cultural experience like oral 
tradition and cultural experience is predominantly situated in the world 
of images, imagination and simulations. So the demand of active cultural 
life is substituted by the demand of images associated with video-prod-
ucts. We still have some real cultural experience, but the range of virtual 
cultural experience is growing.
2. The value of knowledge in the conditions of image culture is quite 
ambiguous. In the time of oral culture people were believers – they be-
lieved what they were told by the priestman; written culture allowed peo-
ple to be analytical thinkers that rationally, by means of arguments, de-
cided about truth and lie. In the time of image culture images as a source 
of knowledge are neither objective, not subjective source of information. 
They are reality, which is a question of vision. And, of course, technologi-
cal equipment. So people nowadays have to learn to be skeptic even about 
what they see by their own eyes.
Image:
When in the 19th century the camera was invented and the first photo-
graphs were made, there was no doubt that the image represents truly and 
untouched the real object. So, in the time of image culture image should 
be a carrier of the idea of reality.
However, the fame of photography increased when it became clear 
that this technology allows the manipulation of pictures5. It allows even 
to simulate realities. Sometimes images are true representations of real-
5 Sontag, S. 1978, On photography
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ity; sometimes they represent “imagined realities”. Anyway, now docu-
ments for personal identification are not considered valid without image 
attached to them.
What speaks the symbolism of images?
1. Photos are not just representations, but a powerful source of sug-
gestions and values. 
The modern techniques of retouching and beautification of photos 
for example, changed significantly the value system of societies with de-
veloped media-culture. The mass production of aesthetically retouched 
photos imports aesthetic values in the everyday life of society. And like 
the moral values, aesthetic values are aggressive. They are not meant for 
contemplation and relax, they actually influence and change behavior. 
2. Once we said that books are our window to the world. Well, now 
this window are images. Images always have been used and now are used, 
too, as a kind of symbolic codes that become windows to entirely new 
worlds. Even one image is powerful enough to open a new horizon of 
thought.
3. Having a photo of a person is some kind of “possession” of this 
person6.
How image-making uses the symbolic power of images?
1. Images as a source of values make image-making a profound value 
of image-culture. Image-culture turns the high-rated art of retouching 
photos into the art of retouching identity. Images are a source of imagined 
identity and the images of the “stars” (musicians, actors) are the brightest 
example of imagined identities. They perfectly demonstrate the illusion of 
having rich, richer, richest cultural experience and experience of activity, 
knowledge, moral, belief, life in a time when life of every ordinary person 
suffers the luck of cultural experience. We live in a reality full of images 
that symbolize quality of life and the strife to achieve quality of life now 
becomes a strife for personal image. 
2. The symbolic power of image to open windows and horizons of 
thought is used in the image-making as a successful way to create connections 
between a brand and some famous stories, symbols or myths. The popularity 
and the influence of these symbols and myths becomes associated with the 
6 Sontag, S. 1978, On photography
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popularity and influence of the brand. A good example is how the brand of 
Coca-Cola builds its image by means of the great myth for Santa Claus.
3. Images incite a desire for consummation and possession. They 
make the one who possesses or consumes them to feel oneself as a part of 
imagined stories, experience, myths. So attractive images of youht, beauty, 
happiness, health are “attached” to goods, brands, and people in order to 
make them an object of desire. 
ID cards
If we think for a moment about the content of our present ID cards, 
we can see that the identifying information in them consists of our name, 
our signature and some text-information, and our photographical image. 
No matter how common and routine their presence may seem, name, 
signature and image are more than just formal means for confirmation 
of our identity. We have got used so much to the convention of having 
personal name or recognizing ourselves in signs or numbers, as well as 
pointing at a picture and to saying “that is me”, that we have forgotten how 
name, written sign and image have a separate history of their own. 
These means of identification have developed in the course of human 
cultural history. Initially they come from different cultural contexts and in this 
way they represent not only particular signs of our identity, but distinguished 
symbols in the periods of culture, when they are considered main carriers of 
identity, produced by the predominant character of communication. 
Nowadays, we can be interested in the individual importance of each 
of these cultural phenomena. An identity can be described in terms of 
name, sign(ature) or image. On the other hand, we are witnessing the 
scope of their combined power. Image-making, as a major value in today’s 
media world, includes these three main elements, each calling for identity. 
In the use of these identifying elements image-making strives to intensify 
and to benefit from their combined symbolic power, deeply rooted in the 
history of human values and beliefs.
Identity as a product of image-making now is a combination of a 
name (chosen for the sake of euphony), a sign, a retouched appearance 
and a retouched reputation. And the success in making an image is meas-
ured by the extent to which the name turns into a legend, the sign tells 
exiting stories and the image makes a good show. So identity becomes a 
promoter of values and people wish to wear, to eat, to use, to sleep on it.
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Ivan Bozukov
GLOBALIZATION – A NEW SHELTER  
Of TURNED OVER LEfT THINKING
In the basis of this text are containing two interlinked hypothesis:
1) Contemporary world is not post-ideological, and, at all not – non-
ideological!
2) Today we are witnesses of unprecedented triumf of left thinking, 
wich “concealed” itself behind paternal phraseology of pseudo-right values!
Actually, what did exactly happen in 1989? May be the answer is as 
surprising as banal – nothing special. Presented just till now as
“fatal”,
“braking out”,
even “revolutional”!...
for the countries from Central and East Europe 1989 became nothing 
more than “storm in the cup of water”!
It was happen so, that (just) nothing of the dreams of dissidents from 
the “Cold war” period did not realize. The reason of this crush of illusions, 
on its row, have its roots in the circumstance that their – belongs to the 
dissidents – idea for democratic western world have been (and remaining) 
deeply wrong, even turned over!
The problem of dissidents from the countries of Central and East Eu-
rope is that they have not realized (and some of them going on to not 
realize) that in longing by them western world still then, in the time of 
socialistic Eastern Europe – more in the countries in Western Europe than 
in United States, – social opinion has already been fatal “infected” with left 
values’ “bacillus”, included with growing skepticism in respecting to free 
market and its just mythological in our times hipper-productivity!
One of typical left value which integration in western tradition of 
thinking has began still in Marxian time, and that today still more in-
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sistently (and even aggressively!) is imposing by so called “democratical 
political elits”, is cosmopolitanism. Namely this value, which contempo-
rary variant may be synthesized in the utopian maxima “Let’s live in world 
without borders!”,
entusiastic,
skeptic
and/or ironic,
but (nearly) never neutral,
we call “globalization”.
Why globalization is “left”, and not, for example, “right” or – as prefer-
ring to believe many our contemporaries – ideological “neutral”?
The answer to this question is directly connected to the problem with 
ideologies in the yesterday’s, today’s, and probably as well as tomorrows 
world.
At the end of the last century – especially after the “crush” of Berlin 
wall – some political theoreticians, including the famous prof. S. Hunt-
ington, speeded to promulgate advancing of ideologies end. Huntington 
insist that today ideological conflicts gradually have pushed to the back, 
retreating place for the clash between civilizations and cultures.
In the second half of 90-s years of last century this hypothesis have got 
greate support among sociologists, political scientists, culturologists and 
– quite surprisingly – among philosophers! Yes, even philosophers, which 
would have to be in awake with relatively big average prolonging of one, let’s 
use the Bjejinsky term, “metha-myth”, such like undisputable is this of the 
ideological perspective – so even philosophers have looked like fascinated 
of the greatness and speed of described by Huntington macro-tranzition 
from the “cage” of political extremism to the “prison” of ethno-religious 
fundamentalism! Now (already) at least philosophers don’t think so.
In any case ideologies, independently than connotations put in them 
later, were born not earlier than 18 century and today, when the first shock 
by 1989 has already past, many social and political thinkers still more 
brightly realize that it is early, too early for noisy promulgation of their 
“dead”. More over: as difference than 90-s years of last century now, just 
few years after triumphal entering in 21 century, ideologies not only are 
not thought as “dead”, but it looks like still stronger the mood that they 
(probably) are the most “live” than ever!
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What these new moods are due to?
At first place – to the restructuring of political space in European and 
worldwide plan.
It hapens so that something – in fact quite things – from already 
“dead” socialistic system, no suspiciously for us, East-Europeans, have 
been deeply inherent for other, western world, for the world behind “iron 
curtain” as well. More over: it seems as even part from so called “authori-
tarian stereotypes” found fruitful soil in West-European political systims 
and – in lesser degree – in that of the United States.
But the most surprisingly thing is that in many relations democratic 
societies in Western Europe has appeared as more “left” than these from 
the East part of the Continent!
To realize why it is so, we have to count “left” and “right” values, as 
their “centric” analogues. To do this, we have to inseard two important 
specifications:
1) Since time of its born til now “left” and “right”, as kinds of thought, 
meaning just the same things.
2) “Center” is relatively new knotion that has formed just in 60-s and 
70-s years of 20 century down the “pressure” of ecological movements 
and, to this reason, not always entries adequately enough in the “left-
right” scheme.
And so:
“Right” is – and has alwayes been – ideology of statuesque, and 
“left” – of change.
“Right” is – and has always been – deeply connected to pragmatic 
mood of, let’s call them, “sedate people”, and “left” – to romantic impulses 
of the restless minds.
“Right” is – and has always been – presentation of militaristic begin-
ning in human behavior, and “left” – of pacifism.
“Right” is – and has always been – indivisible from religiousness, and 
“left” – from secular thinking.
“Right” person has always keep very much to home and family, and 
“left” is often adventurer – person that can not keep him or her self at the 
same place very long time.
The representator of “right” thinking has always been “calculational” 
nature – person who calculate what and how much has gained, and the 
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representator of “left” thinking strives not toward material gaining, and – 
imagine! – toward intellectual satisfaction.
The last, but not least, “right” person definitely is patriot (or – what 
is the same thing – nationalist); he or she is sentimental connected to the 
country where was born and/or lives, and “left” person is cosmopolitan; 
his or her native land is the whole world...
What about “center”, it seems to hav only one authentic value – an 
idea for so called “equilibria development”.
Since, as it has already marked, political “center” is relatively later 
product in the process of ideological formation, it (naturally) inclines 
more toward the pole on the axis “left-right” that, in last result, have “man-
aged” to imposes as dominated in ideological struggle – as we shall see it 
is the “left” thinking.
Besides they almost in whole “borrow” by the ecological movements 
“their” ideology, that may be synthesized in the appeals
“Back to the nature!”
and/or
“Forward to ecological clean world!”,
like whole the “centrists” are more inclined to accept “left” than “right” 
values.
They are more often flexible than traditional; more inclined to ro-
manticism than to pragmatism; having greater affinity to pacifistic than 
to militaristic beginnings, as gentle to be the motives for respective war 
or forcing intervention; and, certainly, they are more cosmopolitans than 
nationalists.
This “rough” – and, for that, inevitable little inexact – scheme of values 
in the ideological specter on the axis “left-right” is useful because it may help 
us to explayn to ourselves the processes that are developing in the world 
through several last decades, and whose result is today’s – sooner demo-
cratic than authoritarian, sooner globalistic than particular – statuesque in 
borders of that which we often call “western civilization” or “culture”.
In spite of ideologies are as whole relatively later product of mod-
ern epoch, today, at the beginning of 21 century, we may say that in its 
development till now modernity is sooner “left” than “right”. This asser-
tion, although perhaps surprising for many people, has several important 
grounds:
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1) Modernity is time of changes. It is definitely connected to rejection 
of (first of all religious) statuesque of Middle ages world and to affirmation 
of new (most of all secular) values.
2) Modern person is deeply and “incurable” romantic. Marxian maxima 
that we not only have to strive understanding the world, but as well as chang-
ing it, is so “capture” that soon it is “engrosses” even minds of typical “right” 
thinkers – so called “libertarians”. More over: in this respect they get even more 
“left” than only “left”, believing that the world not just have to be changed, but 
itself, without helping of containing subjects, it will “crystelising” in self-regu-
lating chaos of free market – by this – imagine! – only because so called “free 
market economy” had been more effective than state planning!
3) In the years after Second world war the protests in Western Europe, 
especially these in France in 1968, have been inspired by pacifistic mo-
tives. The same may be saying about the protests in the United States – and 
at other places – against the war in Vietnam, as well as about powerful 
dissatisfaction against the last war in Persian Bay.
Pacifistic too – “Make love, not war!” – are many of hypparian move-
ments in Western Europe and the United States since 60-s years of last 
century till now.
4) In his book “The silent revolution” Ronald Ingelheart writes about 
moving of material values by post-material in the bounders of western 
world in the second half of 20 century. The Ingelheart’s thesis is support-
ing by still more growing recently readiness for charity of extremely rich 
representers of great business and even of whole industrial giants.
If capitalism is that which Max Weber maintains that it “is” – name-
ly strive to self-purpose gain – contemporary society is too hardly to be 
called “capitalistic”. In the same time contemporary person has empha-
sized affinity to intellectual satisfaction.
We bet to football meetings not so for the idea that we have to win, 
and as satisfaction of the play.
Still deeper crisis of roman that we witness today in great degree is 
result of circumstance that we still more read not so for the subject of the 
book, as for the satisfaction of style of the author.
Although it is not difficult for us to meet each other, many times we 
prefer to communicate through SMSes and on Internet for the satisfaction 
of being in virtual reality.
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5) Through last decades – especially in the years after Second world 
war – for still more people is still harder to lead sedate way of life. They 
turn back to the constancy for ephemeral beginnings with unsure results. 
Manifestation and sequence of this way of thinking is so called “projectile 
system” of financial support of the most variegated beginnings, many of 
wich appear to be with insufficient rentability or not so useful for these 
who they are designed to benefit. Often changing of job, home and inti-
macy partner is only one of the aspects of growing dynamism which is 
“enveloped” contemporary person.
6) Here we get to globalization. Although in the basis to be variant of 
manifested still in Antiquity cosmopolitanism, globalization is very spe-
cial kind of cosmopolitanism. It just is not exhausted with natural strive 
of every person to feeling like at home everywhere. Contemporary cos-
mopolitanism – globalization – is much more technical and technological 
problem than existential one. It is indivisible from – because it would not 
be possible without – contemporary technical means for moving, contem-
porary technical means for communication, technological lighten of pro-
cedure for passing state borders, and – certainly – without technological 
(first of all juridical) lighten of procedure for “renting” of cheap working 
hand in economical prospective lands from the poor countries.
More important is that this technical-technological form of globaliza-
tion has been inspired by one purely intellectual “left” appeal:
“Proletarians from all countries, get together!”.
Capitalism, independently if it just has ever existed, has never been – 
and will not be – provoked and maintained by inclination to overcome 
borders – less state borders. For difference of socialism, in which, in last 
result, may be synthesized all variants of the “left”, capitalism has never 
been, is not and will not be anything more than strive to maximal (because 
is self-purpous) win.
However the win in it self may not to be social ideal, since moral scru-
ples of many people would not let it to be widely shared position in the 
framework of any society. In other words, capitalism hasn’t its own social 
ideal, but in order to be imposed it must to be based on and to work for 
not inherent for it social ideals. It is paradoxical but it is appears that the 
win, the most wide spread now social practice – especialy after crush of 
socialistic regimes in Central and East Europe, – have to looking for and in 
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last result finds support in “left” values, which namely, but not capitalism, 
have forming ideological view of contemporary person.
As typical “left” value globalization affirms itself not because one rela-
tively closed economical system may not to function effectively enough – 
EU is example for contrariwise – and because it perfectly conceals “flour-
ishing” of powerful business interests!
It is public secret that powerful industrial giants and not users define 
what and how much/many to be produced. User uses that which produc-
er one sided has “decided” to impose him or her because it is meant for 
prestige, because respective client do like average user who leads himself 
on other users behavior, because – at the end – he or she has not other 
choice.
So user decide to buy car instead to use not more unqualified – may 
be even cheaper – services of the public transport, although he ore she no 
travel often out of settlement where lives; he or she buys computer to see 
films which by the same success – may be even cheaper – could see on vid-
eo; he or she buys legal software at high price, although has opportunity to 
use free “pirate” copies which would be no less useful for him or her...
Globalization in itself is deeply human social ideal, but its realizing – 
alas! – totaly doesn’t justify this humanistic “charge”. Contemporary per-
son still more tend to be global not because is cosmopolitan, and because 
the most liking directly related to globalization process technical and tech-
nological products.
American movie is global not because is no longer American, and 
because is the most preferring product on worldly movie market.
The Alps, as a difference from Rodopies Mountains or Carpates, are 
worldly famous mountain not because are more beautiful than the latter, 
and because are more successfully advertising.
The products of “Mycrosoft” are without competition by the side of 
other producers in the branch not because are better than these of alterna-
tive enterprises – as just it has such ones – and simply because they are the 
most famous trade mark...
It is paradoxical but globalization is much more manifestation of 
mass test, fashion and prestige behavior, than authentic expression of cos-
mopolitan thinking, as on the words of its theoreticians would have to be. 
It, however, is something more than this as well. Besides all other remain, 
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besides, so to say, “crossing point” of successful politics of industrial gi-
ants, globalization is something extremely “left” in order to be steady, even 
lasting.
As can be judged to great protest actions of opponents of globaliza-
tion in Western Europe countries and the United States, and to the silence 
on the side of labeled as its proponents nothing suspect citizens, contain-
ing majority of the population of these countries, it already – and perhaps 
for a long time? – has exhausted its consolidating resources.
At any case one is sure: today globalization is just “left” “cover” of as 
dominating of “right” values western societies.
The reasons of this “degenerating” of idea for globalization, certainly, 
are many. Here I want to finish with just one of them.
So called “transition” which society in half Europe began in 1989 in 
last result it seems just will not be appear as “right”. More over: it even is not 
“neutral”. By low popularity of autentical “right” ideas in the framework of 
West European countries in the years after Second world wa – indisput-
able result of disgust to Nazism and fascism – there has no how there to 
not “flourishing” “left” ideas, common noun for which is the notion “left 
intellectual”. Since it had to be respectful enough in order to make balance 
between two disgusts – to excessively “right” management, “fruit” of the 
moods after Second world war, and to “ultra-left” regimes in their own 
countries – dissidents from Central and East Europe have appeared to be 
long lasting unready for grotesqueness ideological symbiosis which has 
established and is still more affirm in contemporary world – paradoxal 
“alloy” of loosed its pathos “left” thinking and “pseudo right” values, and 
all this “jumble” abundant “garnished” with huge, even almost “indigest-
ible” portion business interests, which representatives, if not now, just in 
the future, easily would sacrifice all, including dreaming of many peoply 
democracy, in order to defend them.
Globalization is rather doubtful value, for which we may say that “to-
day is here, tomorrow not”.
Who knows, perhaps leading “players”, “hidden” monopolists in as 
equal market competition in one moment can to decide that it is already 
not need to them – purely because its products are exhausted! What does 
will hapen then? – Very simply, it will be replaced by any other value – 
this which at the moment is the most advantageous for legitimizers (and, 
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therefore the basic winners) in still more banal, but (still ) “captured” be-
cause “feeds” – and that which is may be more important, justifies – natu-
ral human egoism, play, pathetic called “free market”. Today’s society has 
just one advantage – it does not suffer by “deficit” of ideologems!...
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Ivanka Stapova
PLURALITY Of THE SELf  
IN THE EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY AND ART
From the very beginning of its philosophical self-rationalization the 
problem of identity of the Self preserves its inexhaustible ideological fresh-
ness, constantly live meaning, unfading aspiration for reaching the au-
thentic truth from the highest instance on the slipping out essence of this 
divine-earthly creation. Who am I and am I really the one who self-reflec-
tively treats this essentially eternal topic? 
There is no doubt that philosophizing about the world as early as 
from the hoary antiquity has been practically reduced to philosophizing 
about the human nature. Moreover, not a human being as a biologically 
constructed and practically united material essence (the bodily unity is 
almost beyond doubt), but becoming aware of a man as an I, “self ”, “ego”, 
personality.
It seems that in the program of a man the doubt as a constant determinant 
of his essence underlies even on the genetic level. When the thesis of a man’s 
unity, wholeness and compositional steadiness is maintained in philosophic 
reflections on the man, he starts doubting the expedience and impossibility 
in principle of such unity. When the position on his plurality is imposed, he 
begins to doubt the stability and exhaustive argumentation of it. 
Philosophic approaches to the problems of the two basic components 
of the gnoseological relation ”object and subject” have been developed by 
all philosophic schools and from different positions. Ancient philosophers 
treat the nature of the psychic activity, and there is almost no doubt that 
this problem will always continue to excite philosophic minds owing to 
inexhaustibility of different aspects of its interpretation. That is why inter-
pretations of the subject and object (in gnoseological aspect), of the Self 
and psyche (in psychological aspect), of the changes in interpretation of 
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the dominating component in the psychic activity of a subject (different 
psychoanalytical positions and opinions of the analytical psychology) in 
the present work have rather illustrative character and are not an object of 
special investigation.
Philosophers both give the problem on the essence of the Self a possi-
bly interpretable air and create its mysteriousness as a “fundamental knot”, 
“world enigma” or “Himalayan problem”. Practically all attempts “to de-
code the nature of the human psyche” appear to be new codes – still more 
complicated and intricate.¹
Points of view on the essence of a man are not missing; they can be 
met in various versions and all kinds of concepts – from religious-ritual 
through philosophic-theoretical ones, pass through clinical-pathological 
versions (schizophrenic manifestations of the many-faced ego) or unite 
positions and oppositions of literary-poetical revelations.
Presumably it is most easily (or most difficult) for poets and art crea-
tors to define man’s essence, its non-unity and bifurcation, because they 
shouldn’t by all means with exhaustive arguments prove the tossed in the 
process of poetical flight ideas. “The Motif for the Doubles” (Z. Freud), 
the bifurcation remains in philosophy and literature as “Faust’s motif ”, 
“Faust’s beginning”, (Tzv. Stoyanov), “Faust’s topic” (I. Passi), “the motif 
of bifurcation” (Ya. Yanev). The problem of the Self, of the core of a per-
sonality is put forward in the hoary antiquity – probably it starts from the 
myth about Narcissus who looks at himself in a strip of water and does 
not discern himself. Due to the lack of knowledge about himself as “ a 
body that discerns itself ”, “a face that is reflected in the water” he fells in 
love with himself. The strip of water proved to be the identification code 
of the first meeting of the Self with himself. Narcissus’s enlightenment that 
1. За природата на психичното и историческите форми на неговото 
развитие. See: Стъпов, р. Фундаменталният възел. Унив. Изд. “Св. Кл. 
Охридски”. С., 2001. Стъпов, р. Идеалното – от загадката до теорията. Изд. 
ГЪЛИКСО. С., 1998. In my work I don’t stop at length on the historical develop-
ment of the problem about the nature of the human psyche. It is comprehensively 
and with competence done in the above two monographs, and not only in them. 
The object of my work is plurality of the Self in the aspect of the idea about the dou-
ble, mainly through literary characters.
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the person looking at him from the water is he himself is a tragic cry of 
the self-conscious ego in the battle with his fate. But probably interpreta-
tion of identity is connected with ancient philosophers, with Plato’s philo-
sophic dialogues, in particular with the problem of dealing with the soul’s 
essence. “The middle position of the soul – between the idea and the thing, 
between the identical and the different, between the indivisible and divis-
ible – determines the duplicity of its function. On the one hand it is exis-
tentially and cognitively directed to the noetic cosmos, on the other hand 
– as a principle of movement and life in a sensuous world it constructs the 
whole somatic sphere. That is why the soul can never be fixed to a definite 
layer of the being; it is just the intermediate between the being and the be-
coming, the link between the immobile and the moving, the sense and the 
senselessness, the equal and the unequal, the good and the bad…”² With-
out going into the details of the Plato’s doctrine of the soul (I mention this 
accent on interpretation of the soul and its middle position again in the 
aspect of the problem considered by me), I’ll mention annotatively that 
from here starts the interpretation of a soul as a polyvariant component in 
the man’s wholeness.
On the way to the Cartesian “cogito ergo sum” (let’s remember that 
the authentic philosophizing on the Self starts from Descartes) there 
stands Augustine, who starts adopting the opposition of spirit to flesh 
by means of the Plato’s ideas on the difference between the sensuous and 
intelligible world. “Along with this duality Augustine accepted the whole 
magnificence of the eternal in contrast to subordinated to the time, that of 
the unchangeable in contrast to the constantly changing.”³
Cartesian dualism is used by many researchers of the relation between 
the soul and the body as an idea supporting their thesis. But it seems that 
considerable part of the authors interpreting the possible plurality of the 
2. Бояджиев, ц. “Неписаното учение” на Платон. С., 1984, с. 170-171. 
“According to Plato the essential oppositions are between soul and body, non-
material and bodily, eternal and changeable. Just they get greatest weight in Plato’s 
wordings.” Тейлър, Ч. Изворите на Аза. Формирането на модерната иден-
тичност. С., 2003, с. 215
3. тейлър, Ч. Ibid, с. 131; See also: Личев, В. “Аз”-ът като образ на култу-
рата. Автореферат на дисертация. С., 1993, с. 3-4.
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Self look for proving material rather in literary sources than in philosophi-
cal treatises. 
Ever since the man’s self-realization as exclusiveness there come the 
first opinions behind which take their stand the firmest adherents of in-
tegrity of the Self, its monolithic-unshakable wholeness, but also doubts 
regarding possibility of such wholeness. The entity of the Self is a calming 
possibility for existence of something complete and steady; its plurality is a 
flattering prospect for polyvariant character of acts, deeds, and positions.
Initially postulated non-unity of a personality inevitably causes the ap-
pearance of asynchronies of points of view on it. A person owes the privi-
lege of being whole and inviolable to the conventionally accepted initial 
self-agreement of the Creator his creation to be neither entirely divine nor 
completely material. The unity of a sparkle – emanation of the God, and 
ashes – structural component of the material, earthly – should remind 
of the eternally-transient nature and essence of the creation. The mate-
rial world itself provokes dual actions of a man. Eastern philosophers un-
derstood quite well that that the essence of the Self is a fiction (Hermann 
Hesse). “Every man is a unity as a body, as a soul – nobody… In the poetry 
of ancient India this notion (self – Iv. St.) is quite unknown. Heroes of Indi-
an epics are not individuals, but balls of personalities, incarnation rows.” 4 
In one of the books investigating the philosophy of yoga it is said: “Ma-
terial world is a world of duality. Today we endure summer heats, tomor-
row – winter frosts. In one moment we are happy, in the next – unhappy. 
In the material world of duality it is impossible to understand something 
without understanding its opposite. I won’t understand what honour is if 
I don’t know what dishonour is. I won’t understand what happiness is if I 
have never been unhappy. A man must rise above these dualities, but as 
long as he is in the body, he will be doomed to meet them.” 5 
Duality marks with lasting traces the life of the Self, who must “learn 
to endure duality”. 
There is no doubt that the attempts to explain the Self are divided be-
tween two extremes – on the one hand, there is the striving to ground the 
unity, wholeness of a personality, treating the inner castling as “self-adjust-
4. хесе, х. Степният вълк. Изд. “Христо Г. Данов”, Пловдив, 1980, с. 61-62.
5. Съвършенството на йога. С., 1992, с. 38.
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ments of the whole”. On the other hand, there are approaches to articula-
tion of non-unity, plurality of the Self in a clear or metaphoric way. There 
isn’t a single trace of the two beginnings – the divine, ideal and the mate-
rial-sensual, that isn’t present in every moment of the earthly life of the 
Self. Moreover, the collision between the two is considered to be the initial 
motive for man’s tragedy. “The tragedy of the earthly life begins with the 
act of splitting between freedom and law – with irony and horror of a mind 
covered with chains of substance, it turns into a lightning of despair and 
protest, after that it ascends to the heaven in the light of eternal life and 
sinks into the abyss of chaos. It ends with the song of the God or a man. The 
earthly man bears his cross of great pain and great shame. Riding the furi-
ous horse of life, he gallops from one end of the world to the other, chased 
by himself. The devil, whose tail girds the world as a marriage ring, runs 
on his one side, and on the other side runs the death. The body is made of 
soil and flame. On his hands he bears the icon of his own crucifix, on his 
forehead – a wreath of roses and thorns, and on his breast – the sign of 
redemption and rebellion.”6 
The divine-earthly parameters of a man make him apparently unified 
and not less apparently plural. His onlyness gives him consoling safety of 
protection, non-impairability and legitimacy, while his plurality gives him 
a flattering idea of productive creative work, flirtation with the fate and 
challenge to the initial creative power of the Creator. Good and bad fight 
for the essence of the Self, man’s soul is an inestimable trophy both for the 
God and for Satan’s aspirations. “Just because of it a man is a tireless clash 
of doubt and faith, flesh and soul, and this clash ends with apocatastasis, 
return of things to their divine initial origin. Plato’s dualism here assumes 
a pantragic character. …This motif of bifurcation and struggle underlies in 
the basis of the future philosophy…”7 
The clash of the united and plural in the wholeness of the Self adds 
a really tragic accent to his existence. The unity always dashes at the in-
expressible and in principle inaccessible divinity (Plato), while plurality 
reminds a man that he can master the tempting possibility of not being 
6. янев, я. Трагедията на човека. – Философски алтернативи, кн. 3/2004, 
с. 67.
7. янев, я. Ibid, с. 72.
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himself, of being someone else besides himself, of being different from 
himself, scraped in depth off the bosom of his nature doubts about him-
self and phenomenologically turned them into a pleiad of Selves (as Freud 
would tell), in a “sheaf of many “Selves” (let’s remember H. Hesse).
The Self – it is a united cosmos and plural small universes.
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Valeri Lichev
THE SPIRITUAL CITIZEN  
Of WHOLE EUROPE IN R. MUSIL’S NOVEL 
“THE Man wiTHouT PRoPERTiES”
R. Musil raises many complicated questions about value and social 
transformations in Europe in the beginning of 20th century in his novel 
“The Man without Properties”. As one of his characters – preacher of new 
spiritual order – states, the West European culture had lost the ground un-
der its feats because of its intellectualism. That imposes the need of find-
ing a new tower of strength which could contribute to building of a future 
social order (Музил 1984; 2: 183).
The author succeeds to reveal the contradictions and paradoxes of his 
contemporary age with a great mastership in a philosophical and psycho-
logical way. He traces out dead-end streets, in which his characters fetch 
up, against the background of life in Austro-Hungarian Empire. The rea-
sons for their bewilderments are the values which they accept as leading 
dicta of their behavior. One of these confused characters is the husband of 
the sister of the man without properties.
He is a professor of pedagogic who has overcome the “transient hy-
postasis of his provincial existing” through his scientific work. Thus he has 
attached himself to the most progressive and shining minds of his time. 
In this way he has become a citizen of Whole Europe, where he found his 
“spiritual home”. Unexpectedly the image, he has built in the course of 
years, has been exposed to the danger of public compromising through a 
turn twist of a fate. His wife went away to commit the body of his father 
to the ground. After the funeral she decided never to come back to her 
family home.
R. Musil draws the attention of his readers to the time of family live. 
It is the most abstract form, in which family relationships could be struc-
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tured or built up. This form remains empty. Because of that the family 
relationships have fallen apart. 
We can guess the way in which the life of a professor’s wife used to run 
through her relation to the calendar. It became a “dreadful symbol of her 
life” (Музил 1984; 2: 302). By this symbolic means she gives an account of 
her days, getting away in vain. The departure to the funeral of her father 
gives her matter for tearing off of the dreadful symbolism. The escape is 
the only way out of her exile in the prison of marriage.
M. Chaevalier and A. Geerbrant have pointed that every symbol re-
veals – depending on the point of view – two contrary sides: bright and 
dark. The same could be said about the symbol, which for professor’s wife 
meant her senseless running days. She turns her back to the dark side of 
this symbol without any interest in the way in which it will appear to her 
husband after her leaving the family house. Musil shows the sequence of 
personal transformations of his character exactly in the line of perceptions 
of this symbol of time.
Agatha’s husband never asks her how she had used to spend her time. 
After her departure he decides to stand in silence in memory of her being 
away from the family home. He refuses to update the date on the calendar 
in his home. He considers this way to pay the last homage to her, as if she 
had really died. 
Thus a small “speck of desolation“ is placed in the professor’s home 
(Музил 1984; 2: 303). The sense of this spot is to maintain vivid the profes-
sor’s recollection of his absent wife. The Frenchmen use to say that every 
painful parting is a kind of a small death. However, the professor under-
stands this proverb word for word. He allowed the desolation in the dining 
room of his house not because he is grieving for his wife, who will be away 
from home for a definite time, but because without it he will maybe forget 
her existing.
The husband is not ferocious man. The death of his wife has to be 
temporary. He fancies it in a mythical way. As long as it is lasting, he could 
return to his bachelor’s way of life. Thus he will regain the power he needs 
for maintaining relationships with his wife. It is obvious that he does not 
like carrying of a family ox-bow. He bears it because of the duty he pays 
to public opinion. Exactly this opinion will force him to a very serious 
internal personal conflict.
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As long as the happy returning to his bachelor’s years is lasting, the 
professor does not make out the absence of his wife in any way. He is using 
this time for carrying out of his official duties. Apparently the speck of the 
wall in his dining room does not make him any impression. It is the only 
representation of his absent family partner. Other mark for maintaining 
recollections of his wife’s – he could not find. Maybe without this speck he 
would forget that he is married.
However, the professor is very well orientated out of home in the pub-
lic time, because his whole life is running in it. When his wife returns 
home she will remove the speck of desolation. Then the time will resume 
its flowing in the dining room. The fact that the professor does not eat 
together with his wife in this room is without meaning for him. By that he 
will enjoy the happy imaginary returning to his bachelor’s years.
It turned out that public opinion – by contrast to professor’s memo-
ry – does not forget the existing of his wife so easy and soon. The profes-
sor’s friends and colleagues catch sight of the fact that his wife’s absence 
is lasting more than usual sorrowing over the death of a close man. They 
begin to ask uncomfortable questions about her emotional condition and 
about the day of her return. The lonely husband feels very embarrassed to 
answer their questions because he does not know the real reasons for his 
wife’s absence.
The manifestations of this useless concern forced him to cease his 
holiday return to bachelor’s years. He has to invoke his wife, who had sym-
bolically descended in the kingdom of dead persons. The time for her re-
turning to the world of married people has arrived. When she comes back, 
the speck of desolation will be removed from the wall of the dining room 
and the others will stop with their boring questions.
The professor begins to write open postcards to recollect his wife that 
the time for her returning to home has arrived. Naturally, he does not 
receive answer. His wife does not have any intention to come back to the 
tomb of her family life of which she had escaped. 
The form, chosen by the professor, is deliberately marked out by the 
author. It is an eloquent testimony to his distorted pictures of the way of 
constructing of personal relationships. First, the open postcard gives a small 
space, which could be filled with a written text. However, this space is enough 
for the husband, who is sparing of words, feelings and maybe of money.
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Second, the message, sent on an open postcard, could be red by any-
one. That means the professor does not acknowledge the parting between 
the private and the public sphere, which according to H. Arendt had been 
established in the antic police (Арент 1997: 59-62). Apparently the family 
life does not contain anything, which could not be revealed to the public 
gaze. Because that the professor chooses a laconic and concise form of 
communication with his life.
The reasons of this kind of indiscretion could be looked for in his per-
sonality. He has come – or he renders so – over his feelings and emotions 
in the spirit of Kant’s philosophy. Thus he has erased anything from his 
personality which could divert him from the execution of his duties to the 
others and to the future generations. Every particular and occasional fea-
ture in his nature is removed. He has built himself as a universal person.
However, it turns out that the professor’s dedication, without any res-
ervations to the others, leads him to serious internal contradictions. He 
has overcome the “transient hypostasis” of being provincial teacher but 
the same could not be claimed for his notions about marriage. He has 
found his home in the common spiritual European space, but he has no 
idea that he should built home with his own wife.
When the others begin to ask him questions about his better half re-
turning he discovers that he needs her presence, at least formally, because 
the divorce will throw shade upon his bright image. At that time his sup-
pressed feelings begin to force their way towards his mind. He begins los-
ing the control over his emotional condition simultaneously with losing 
the power over his wife.
He does not have any other arguments to invoke her expect his writ-
ten commands. However, this form of communication does not work. His 
wife expresses her unwillingness to come back by her silence. Thus she 
does not give her husband any reasons for her reluctance to come back. 
In this way she causes unwillingly an unexpected change in the house 
of her husband. In the state of agonizing suspense the time begins to run 
there in a new way. “The small speck of desolation”, which could be re-
moved without any difficulties, grows up and extends on the walls of the 
whole house. The questions of the others as if eat it up. The spot becomes 
a “running wound”, which could not be healed by the lonely professor 
(Музил 1984; 2: 303). The only remedy is the returning of his wife, but he 
can not find the way to gain over her heart.
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The ravage overcomes not only the house, but also the professor’s 
soul. He begins to perceive the absence of his wife in the space and in the 
time. Although he does not feel any emotional necessity, he needs his wife 
because of public opinion, which is a source of his pride, but also of his 
fears. Unfortunately, the time when he has to build the bridges between 
himself and his better half has passed away. The professor has become a 
spiritual citizen of whole Europe through his written scientific work, but 
he does not know – as one of M. Tournier characters has said – the secret 
of love writing.
One day the husband received a letter from his brother-in-law instead 
of his wife. It was written in a style similar to the professor’s one. Its con-
tent is short, laconic and polite, but decisive. The wife’s brother expresses 
the desire of his sister to divorce with her husband. The professor under-
stands from the letter of the brother-in-law that he does not care for his 
own feelings. Thus his image is seriously neglected. He perceives himself 
as an insect, which could be removed without any regrets from the leave, 
where it is perched.
The letter of the brother-in-law marks a new stage in the demolition 
of the idealized professor’s self-notions. The husband begins to diminish 
in front of the stronger arguments of his enemy like F. Chavka characters. 
The image of small beetle does not pass to his elevated notions of spiritual 
citizen of whole Europe.
Musil draws deliberately attention to the catoptrical symbolism when 
he pictures the relationships between these two characters. The only mir-
ror, in which the professor used to enjoy his bright image, is the public 
opinion. However, his brother-in-law gives him back an image, which is 
very humiliating. The beetle is an animal, which is possible to be removed 
from the leave without any efforts or regrets, because it does not posses 
any place in the world. 
The metaphor, chosen by Musil, has many layers of meaning. The 
professor does not overcome at all his feelings. He has erased from his soul 
only these, which could be related to the heart of his better half. However, 
he has preserved his patriarchal feeling of ownership of the wife. Exactly 
this feeling has been humiliated by his brother-in-law. On this basis begins 
the dialectic between the Master and the Slave, which has been investi-
gated in a psychoanalytical way by J. Lacan (Лакан 1998: 293).
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The professor perceives his wife’s desire of divorce as a violation of 
his sacred property. This notion corresponds to his proprietary feeling on 
emotional level. Similar relationship is allowed only to the slave, who has 
to give up his free will in the battle for acknowledgement. If we borrow one 
term from S. Buvoar, we can say that the brother-in-law had led the pro-
fessor to an existing, which is lower than the human, to the “under-man” 
(Бовоар 2002: 38).
However, the abandoned husband is not disposed to surrender with-
out fight. He has no intention to receive the conditions of capitulation, 
which are sent him from his brother-in-law. Hagauer is determined to re-
gain his wife at any rate. The consequences for her emotional condition, 
which would follow fulfillment of his desire, are of no importance for him. 
He does not ask himself the question about the feelings of the other. The 
most important thing in the world is his propriety feeling and his bright 
image in the eyes of the others.
According to the husband’s opinion the decision of his wife is a result 
of her immature will. If she overcomes it in the way of socialization, she 
will change her mind. This stand expresses the professor’s treating of his 
wife as an immature child. In the spirit of Kant’s pedagogic (Кант 1994: 
152) he thinks that his duty is to prevent her from accomplishment of 
some unconsidered deeds, which could do harm to her, because she can-
not demarcate the good for her personal development from the bad.
From this point of view the professor’s propriety feeling is morally 
legitimized. He has all reasons to insist on the tutorship on his wife, be-
cause he is a professional in this field. If she overcomes her feelings as he 
had done the same, she will give up her desire of getting divorce. From 
the letter of her brother it is obvious that she can not express her desire of 
parting. That proves her immature will.
The answer, sent by the husband to his brother-in-law is definitely 
“No”. However, the answer demolishes totally every professor’s hope for 
easy and fast success. This time the insistence for a fast divorce is accom-
panied with the threat for sensational public scandal, which surely would 
stain the bright professor’s self-image.
Now the husband is driven to the corner. He has to choose between 
the lesser of two evils. His wife refuses to come back from the kingdom 
of dead men to the bright world of married people. She becomes a ghost 
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which could extend its shade on the professor’s public image. In this way 
the most important thing, built by Hagauer, could be demolished.
Thus the husband loses his Master position. For the first time his 
brother-in-law humiliated his propriety feeling, whose object is his wedded 
wife. This battle for acknowledgement happens in the symbolic register. 
Modern law is against patriarchal feelings and claims. The professor has 
received recognition in a public sphere, but he can not deserve it in the 
same way in the field of the private relationships. He has overcome his 
feelings through his mind, but he can not put his will over the law. The 
epoch of possessing people has passed away. 
The professor had lost the battle with his enemy in the field of written 
communication, where is his strongest side. Because of that he is forced to 
reconsider his self-images. He is intimidated with public compromising and 
cannot do anything against this threat. The image of beetle is still hidden from 
the gaze of society. In spite of all he feels he is in two minds because of the split-
ting of the mirror, which reflects his self-images. He refuses to accept the di-
vorce because of the idealized notions, which he has for his personality. How-
ever, the maintaining of these ideas is impossible because of the immature 
desire of his wife and of the symbolic support she receives from his brother. 
Simultaneously with losing of his family power the professor begins 
to experience how the time runs in the position of the Slave. Before the de-
parture of his wife he used to know only the time of the Master, who does 
not care about the feelings of others. In the new situation he receives the 
possibility to perceive in a new way the time’s running. He takes the place 
of his wife and casts a glance at her “terrible symbol of life”.
In this situation the calendar does not receive the meaning of a “small 
speck of desolation” or of a “running wound”, but rather of an “orphaned 
child” 1984; 2: 305). Without the concern for his public image the childless 
professor would never arrive to this metaphor. A blood relationship exists 
between his wife and time. However, he thinks about the public, common 
for everyone time, not for the time of existence. The calendar is in his eyes 
a middle term, which used to be a mediator between him and his wife dur-
ing the time of their childless marriage. This symbolic means for measure-
ment of time becomes “orphaned” not after the departure of its “mother”, 
but after the brother’s-in-law threat of public humiliation.
The melancholic experience is the same. For example, the time ceases 
or reverses its flowing in the houses of T. Gautier’s characters because of 
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their desires to return to the golden age of their happiness. However, the 
professor does not have anything in common with melancholic experi-
ence. The metaphor “orphaned calendar” expresses the evaluation of his 
wife’s absence. The “running wound”, radiating desolation in the whole 
house, became a neglected child, leaved to the mercy of fate.
The professor forgot that he is exactly a professional in the field of 
pedagogic, a science, whose subject are the methods and principles of cul-
tivation and education of children, including these, who have lost their 
parents. If he makes use of his knowledge, he will apply it in a new field of 
experience. He will understand that human relationships are structured 
not only in the public time, but in the time of the intimate, private live. 
Hagauer has imposed to his wife a living only in the public, common 
for everyone, time. He does not suppose at all that there is another form of 
time, which has to be filled with a matter meaningful only for the spouses. 
He has renounced the possibility to become the “father” of this time be-
cause of his insensitiveness to the feelings of the others. In this way he has 
caused the “death” of his wife for their family live. 
The time of private life neither gives in to upbringing, nor to bringing 
under control. It can not be institutionalized, i.e. mastered by symbolic 
or other power. Actually the “orphaned calendar” reveals the professor’s 
helplessness to cope with the stopped time of his private life. Although the 
gaze of society can not penetrate through the wall, it has caught the inter-
nal alteration in the professor’s world through the absence of his wife.
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Ivelina Ivanova 
Todor Hristov
IS MULTICULTURALISM MULTICULTURAL?
1.
The philosophical notion of multiculturalism was essentially shaped 
under the influence of a famous essay by Charles Taylor called “Multi-
culturalism and the Politics of Recognition” (1992). The debate initiated 
by Taylor stimulated the elaboration of a theoretical framework generally 
believed to be one of the most successful alternatives to liberalism. 
Liberals required the authorities to treat any individual with equal 
respect and concern. Multiculturalists however claim such toleration 
to be essentially incomplete. A complete toleration would require, 
from a multicultural perspective, giving equal respect and concern 
not only to the individual persons, but also to their cultural identity. 
The national state however is generally geared at discriminating mi-
nority cultures in favor of the national cultural identity.
The national state authorities act on behalf of the nation. They are 
considered to act legitimately in so far as the population identifies itself 
with the nation, i.e. in so far as the population entertains an appropriate 
national identity. In order to secure its legitimacy, the national govern-
ment tries to develop a national identity, a sense of belonging to the nation 
it acts on behalf of, and hence – as rough as it may seem – the national 
government has to deal with the minorities inhabiting its territory. The 
national state tends to do so by means of various forms of exclusion.
One could differentiate the following forms of exclusion: (1) ex-
clusion by way of violence, as in the case of ethnic cleansing; (2) exclu-
sion by means of isolation as in the case of denying citizenship to im-
migrants or underrepresenting their interests in public deliberation, 
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or in case of any closure insulating the majority from the minorities 
(e.g. due to negative stereotypes, prejudices, or stigmatization); (3) in-
ternal exclusion as when requiring the members of a cultural minor-
ity, in order to join the general public, to develop a common identity 
based on the national political culture or on some notion what does it 
mean to be a citizen of the national state. [Taylor 1999]
Any type of exclusion however leads either to minority’s physical 
disappearance, to disappearance from the public sphere, or to isola-
tion in heterotopic localizations (e.g. ghettoes or minority areas).
What is more important, authorities resort to exclusion from the 
public sphere or to heterotopic localization not in spite of but rather 
in favor of democracy, and without violating the standards of treat-
ing the individual minority members as equal. Respecting the human 
rights of the minority members however does not make the exclusion 
innocent since it infringes upon their cultural identity and causes suf-
fering. The public exclusion still damages the very core of the mi-
nority members’ identity because it denies any value to the cultural 
horizon they live their lives in.
In order to alleviate that damage, multiculturalists propose a 
hole range of recognition policies: (1) educating the young minority 
members in the cultural traditions of their own ethnic group; (2) giv-
ing recognition to the customs and practices of the minority groups 
guaranteed by the legislative and state authorities; (3) fighting pov-
erty and illiteracy among the minorities; (4) developing autonomous 
cultural institutions (minority theatres, libraries, museums, literature 
etc.) Canada is commonly believed to be most successful in initiating 
that kind of recognition policies. 
The recognition policies consist in protecting, fostering or per-
haps even reviving certain cultural identities by means of state inter-
ference, so as to prevent their marginalization or annihilation under 
the influence of the dominant culture. Multiculturalists claim that this 
sort of state interference does not violate the principles of liberalism. 
In fact, they claim, liberal policies would otherwise be defective and 
incomplete as the paramount goal of liberalism is to protect individu-
als from suffering and humiliation, and bringing down one’s identity 
does exactly that. Therefore multiculturalism has a certain advantage 
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before the conventional liberalist doctrines since it protects individu-
als from suffering and humiliation, which conventional liberalism 
is unable to prevent (in truth, which liberalism is often guilty of, in 
view of the fact that public exclusion and heterotopical localization 
are usually justified by citing liberal tenets).
Multiculturalists tend to admit however that recognition poli-
cies should respect the following rights: (1) ethnic groups do not have 
the right to oppress their members; (2) ethnic groups do not have 
the right to be intolerant to members of other groups; (3) any mem-
ber should have the right to leave the ethnic group; (4) any ethnic 
group should treat its members with equal respect and concern. Fur-
thermore, recognition policies should respect the following practical 
consideration: (5) they could be legitimately applied only to living 
and viable cultures. One should also take into account an axiological 
stipulation: (6) recognizing the value of all cultures does not mean 
recognizing their equal value.1 [Raz 1998}
The principal task of multicultural philosophy is justifying the politics 
of recognition. Hence multiculturalism is embedded in the context of that 
type of politics, as well as in the specific nature of the United States and 
Canadian society. Nevertheless philosophers striving to develop a general 
theory of toleration have drawn consistently on the conceptual framework 
of multiculturalism. The most prominent philosophical project of that 
type is Michael Walzer’s On Toleration (1997):
It is generally held that toleration implies eradicating particular 
attitudes like racism or xenophobia for example. In fact, toleration 
implies satisfying only one condition: developing tolerant social prac-
tices.
One can distinguish five historical regimes of toleration: (1) the 
multinational empire: the center of the empire is rather disconnected 
from the ethnic communities and the imperial authorities interfere in 
their affairs as far as this is required in order to maintain peace allow-
ing the communities to develop whatever culture they choose to; (2) 
1 Taylor was perhaps the first to propose that stipulation. In our view however 
it makes the so-called recognition of value to any culture an ambiguous recogni-
tion harboring possibilities for discrimination (albeit more sophisticated one).
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international society: any state participating in the community toler-
ates whatever the other members do as long as they do it in their own 
territory; (3) consociation: a democratic state relying on the coopera-
tion of the elites of two or more ethnic communities each enjoying an 
extensive autonomy; (4) national state: a state built upon a national 
majority culture and geared at protecting it; (5) immigrant society: 
a democratic state trying not to support any ethnic culture, to toler-
ate the individual choice, and to develop a community membership 
based on will and consent rather than on ethnic origin. 
Any toleration regime has advantages as well as disadvantages: 
the national state for example, although being theoretically capable 
of toleration, in practice often does not tolerate minorities; the immi-
grant societies are most tolerant to individual choice, yet they compli-
cate and often even jeopardize the survival of the ethnic cultures. In 
fact, the most important ambition of multiculturalism is to put right 
this shortcoming by advocating policies able to secure the survival of 
the minority cultures.
We are not going to offer any extensive critique of multiculturalism 
here, yet we would like to point out that multiculturalists have not de-
veloped any practical criteria allowing one to identify the cultures viable 
enough to deserve a recognition, or the ones that prevent their members 
from leaving the community (e.g. do we stay Bulgarian because we do not 
want any other identity, or we do want other identity, but the Bulgarian 
society somehow prevents us from casting off the Bulgarian one).
I would also like to note that multiculturalism has an important stra-
tegic advantage: it allows one to get rid of some rather inflated or per-
haps eroded notions as majority and minority, and instead to portray the 
present-day societies as fields of interaction between differing cultures.
2.
The principal liberal theories of the 1970-ties tried to account for the 
struggle against racial discrimination in the United States, and to support 
the affirmative action policy. In order to cope with the challenge of mul-
ticulturalism however, they need to be adapted to the changing context 
of the 1990-ties. The most influential multicultural adaptation of liberal-
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ism is generally held to be the one offered by Will Kymlicka in Liberalism, 
Community, and Culture (1989):
Many liberals believe that different cultures should be treated 
with equal indifference. That is unfortunately impossible for the state 
inescapable discriminates between cultures as long as it makes one 
culture official, or uses its language or its holidays as state language 
or state holidays.
The most profound liberal philosophers of the 1970-ties, Ronald 
Dworkin and John Rawls, overlooked that problem assuming that the 
American society, notwithstanding the diverse cultural backgrounds of 
its members, could speak only one language.2 Yet they did not rule out the 
possibility of cultural minorities having group rights against the state.
On the contrary, the founding liberal principle of equal treatment 
implies that minority groups should enjoy special rights recognized 
by the state, if their culture is indeed in a disadvantaged position (e.g. 
because the members do not have the opportunity to educate them-
selves on their own language, or the authority to take autonomous 
decisions for themselves).
Recognizing minority group rights is important, because indi-
viduals choose their lives in a framework developed by their own cul-
ture and if their cultural framework is unfairly damaged, so is their 
freedom. Therefore, in order to protect the freedom, one should pro-
tect the cultural framework by preventing the majority from making 
political or economic decisions about its future.
One can produce also two supplementary reasons for granting 
group rights to a cultural minority: the intrinsic value of cultural di-
versity and the fact that such rights have been already stipulated by 
settlements made in the past (e.g. the settlements between the Native 
American communities and the United States government).
Such group rights however should respect one condition: they 
are appropriate only in mending a morally unjustifiable inequality,3 
2 Kymlicka claimed that the most important cultural inequalities emerged 
from the unequal status given to the language of one group via affording it the 
privilege to be the official language of politics and education.
3 Kymlicka proposed that a minority cultural group being in a disadvantage 
situation is morally as unjustifiable as racial segregation. 
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and after that unjustifiable inequality being set right, the group rights 
themselves should be abolished, because from that moment on they 
would do nothing more than a redistribution of resources. [Kymlicka 
1998]
One should also say that group rights depend on the cultural con-
text, and therefore Kymlicka’s argument does not necessarily apply to the 
Bulgarian situation (one could apply it only after having decided which 
cultural minorities are disadvantaged, what policies would fix their dis-
advantage, and after making sure that those policies would achieve more 
than a mere redistribution of resources). As it seems, the answer to those 
questions is still far from self-evident.
3.
Let me point in conclusion three problems multiculturalism could be 
undermined by, usually neglected by liberal philosophy:
• Notwithstanding the wide-spread idea, multiculturalists do not 
claim that all cultures are equal. Charles Taylor for example found 
it necessary to distinguish the recognition of equal potential from 
the recognition of equal factual value, and said that one owes the 
first to any culture, but claiming the last would be unjustifiable and 
unconvincing. That however harbors the risk that the equal treat-
ment of minority cultures and the relevant group rights could in 
effect turn out to be potential, but never factual ones.
• Taylor proposed that the claim that all cultures have equal value 
was convincing only if understood in the weak sense that all cul-
tures which had animated entire societies for a long period of time 
had something important to say to all human beings. That much 
weakened however, the claim for equal cultural value would ex-
clude all the cultural phenomena that had not animated entire so-
cieties, or did it only in a short period of time (e.g. many minority 
and immigrant cultures of the United States would not satisfy that 
standard and therefore would be unable to claim equal treatment). 
If o culture meets the standard however, it would ultimately remain 
unclear how important is the thing it tries to say to all human be-
ings, and in effect invites a more sophisticated cultural inequality. 
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A multiculturalist could plausibly claim for example that all the 
longstanding societal cultures have something to say yet some say 
far more important things than others. And what if the thing a cul-
ture has to say to humanity has only historical value, i.e. if it has 
value only to historians, or if the culture cannot speak the language 
of humanity? One could say that, ultimately, the weak multicul-
tural principle of equal treatment is multiplying instead of reduc-
ing inequalities, since it invites the exclusion of non-longstanding 
non-societal culture, and since it does not guarantee that some cul-
tures are as important to humanity as others.
• Taylor believed that Foucault or Derrida would attack him by say-
ing that values are in the end shaped by power (in our view, what 
Taylor had in mind was rather Rorty’s theory of solidarity, [Rorty 
1989]). Taylor believed that he would deal with that argument 
without any difficulty because if recognition was shaped by will to 
power, it would be more of benevolence than of recognition, and 
so it would fail to satisfy the claims of the minority groups and ulti-
mately fail as a policy. But if we make difference between Foucault 
and Derrida, which we should, since they had rather bitter argu-
ment and often advocated diverging research policies, we would 
not fail to see that the principal concern of the regimes of power 
and knowledge invented by the West European societies were not 
the values but rather the authenticity, identity, subjectivity. So what 
could be claimed to have been shaped by will to power are not the 
values but rather the identities, which multiculturalism takes for 
granted, as well as the very need for recognition and respect.
If multiculturalism fails to account for those dangers, the goal of its 
projects could easily turn out to be not the enhancement but the contain-
ment of cultural diversity, not cultural equality but rather potential equal-
ity masking factual inequality.
I will illustrate the danger by summarizing a postcolonial critique of 
multiculturalism developed by Rey Chow in her book Protestant Ethnic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism (2002): the benevolent tolerance advocated 
by multiculturalists has emerged as one of the pillars of the late capitalist 
biopower; it offers legitimation to a new inequality – between the toler-
ant cultures and the intolerant ones, and that is an extremely dangerous 
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inequality since it is able to justify any discrimination or violence against 
the intolerant cultures as far as it is done in the name of tolerance. What is 
more, multicultural tolerance succeeds as well at ruling out the possibility 
to speak of the factual inequality for now the discriminated groups are dis-
criminated in the name of tolerance and therefore any critique of their dis-
crimination would be an attack on toleration (hence the critique could be 
easily silenced or discriminated by force, again in the name of toleration). 
In a word, multiculturalist posed a question neglected by liberal philoso-
phers indeed, but not the one of cultural group rights. They rather posed 
the question how to resist a tolerant violence, or – if we rephrase Foucault 
– how not to be governed by means of tolerance. [Foucault 1984]
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СоциАльное ПАртнерСтво 
кАк Современный инСтитут 
Эффективного регулировАния 
ПротивореЧий и конфликтА 
интереСов рАБотоДАтелей 
и нАемных рАБотников в 
Современной роССии
Социальное партнерство в широком смысле слова означает гармо-
низацию основных интересов различных классов, социальных групп 
и слоев, в узком смысле – демократические взаимоотношения между 
работодателями и наемными работниками . С позиции современного 
обществознания социальное партнерство представляет собой систему 
цивилизованных отношений, действующую на основе согласования и 
защиты интересов наемных работников, работодателей, органов власти, 
местного самоуправления путем договоров и соглашений по актуаль-
ным проблемам экономического и социального развития общества (1). 
В основе теории социального партнерства лежит идея функци-
онального представительства как одного из важнейших каналов 
взаимодействия различных «групп интересов» и соответствующих 
экономических объединений не только друг с другом, но прежде 
всего с государством (2). Сторонники идеологии социального пар-
тнерства исповедовали идеи «социального мира», принципиально 
отличавшиеся от теории «классовой борьбы» К. Маркса. Им были 
значительно ближе суждения О.Конта о том, что «любое общество 
держится на согласии умов». Они опирались на этику Л.Фейербаха, 
на концепцию «гармонизации отношений» Л.Блана и П.Прудона, на 
идеи Ф. Лассаля и других теоретиков социал-демократического дви-
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жения, солидарных со взглядами Э. Бернштейна и таких представи-
телей либерального реформизма, как М. Вирт, О. Михаэлис и др.
В настоящее время развитие социального партнерства связы-
вают с научно-технической революцией, так как произошла опре-
деленная интеграция наемных работников в систему капиталисти-
ческих социально-трудовых отношений, изменилась их классовая 
психология. И собственники предприятий и компаний в целом отка-
зались от систематического злоупотребления экономической силой 
и властью, усиливают коммуникации с персоналом. В то же время 
профсоюзы исходят из необходимости существования юридически 
оформленных коллективных договоров, расширения своего участия 
в управлении производством.
Объективным условием реализации концепции социального пар-
тнерства служат достаточно высокий уровень благосостояния боль-
шинства населения экономически развитых стран и здоровая эконо-
мика. Речь идет о наличии среднего класса, составляющего большинс-
тво жителей процветающих стран, как необходимого условия эффек-
тивных партнерских отношений в сфере труда и производства. Ибо 
лишь в этом случае подавляющее число «групп интересов» адекватно 
отражает интересы и ценности именно этого базового слоя общества, 
а не маргинальных или экстремистских групп социума. Помимо отме-
ченных объективных условий социальное партнерство предполагает 
не только намерение, но и реальные возможности его основных субъ-
ектов – государства, работодателей и наемных работников под руко-
водством профсоюзов – эффективно сотрудничать друг с другом.
Фундаментом концепции социального партнерства является 
идеология трипартизма или трехстороннего сотрудничества ос-
новных «игроков» на поле социально-экономического взаимодейс-
твия. Помимо равноправия и паритетности всех заинтересованных 
сторон переговорного процесса в основе социального партнерства 
лежит ряд других принципов. К ним относятся: принцип многоуров-
невого сотрудничества (на предприятиях, в отраслях и регионах, на 
федеральном уровне); принцип добровольного и равноправного пар-
тнерства; принцип примирительно-третейского и арбитражного 
разбирательства трудовых конфликтов; принцип социальной спра-
ведливости, опирающийся на права и свободы человека.
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В соответствии с действующим российским законодательством со-
циальное партнерство – это система взаимоотношений между наемны-
ми работниками, работодателями (или их представителями), органами 
местного самоуправления, направленная на обеспечение согласования 
их интересов по вопросам регулирования трудовых отношений.
Укрепление системы социального партнерства тормозится целым 
рядом факторов, к главным из которых относятся: слабо развитые 
традиции культуры делового партнерства; недостаточная институ-
циональная оформленность его субъектов; неразвитость социальной 
ответственности всех сторон партнерских отношений вследствие сла-
бости законодательной базы, регламентирующей отношения «собс-
твенник – менеджмент – персонал» при заключении коллективных 
договоров; низкая правовая культура наемных работников и их про-
фсоюзов. Относительно последнего фактора полезным в российских 
условиях представляется опыт США и Канады, накопленный нацио-
нальными профсоюзами этих стран в сфере проведения переговоров 
с менеджментом предприятий с помощью неофициальных посредни-
ков. Подобные альтернативные технологии позволяют разрешать тру-
довые споры в течение нескольких недель, тогда как судебное рассмот-
рение отнимает годы. Большая роль профессионального посредника 
в повышении эффективности переговоров при заключении коллек-
тивных договоров, при разрешении трудовых конфликтов признает-
ся Федерацией независимых профсоюзов России, которая в качестве 
одного из направлений развития социального партнерства утвердила 
комплексный план ежегодной подготовки профсоюзных переговор-
щиков, проведения их обучения и повышения квалификации (3).
Однако при всей важности решения данной задачи оно не 
ликвидирует всех актуальных практических проблем становления 
системы социально-трудового партнерства в России. Необходим 
целостный комплекс взаимосвязанных социально-управленческих 
мероприятий, которые смогут поднять на качественно более высо-
кий уровень функционирование этого социального института сба-
лансирования и примирения противоположных экономических ин-
тересов сторон социально-трудовых отношений.
В современных условиях в России с функционированием пар-
тнерства на различных уровнях существует также так называемые 
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межсекторное социальное партнерство между «государством – биз-
несом» и «институтами гражданского общества – негосударствен-
ными некоммерческими организациями». Основными формами 
социального партнерства являются: коллективные переговоры, до-
говора, соглашения, консультации по вопросам регулирования со-
циально-трудовых отношений; участие работников в управлении 
организацией; досудебное регулирование социальных конфликтов 
и трудовых споров. В современной России реализуются несколько 
моделей социально-трудовых отношений: партнерская, патерна-
листская, неправовая, которую представляют так называемая тене-
вая «скрытая» и принудительная системы труда.
15 лет развития социального партнерства в России выявили ряд 
проблемных тенденций, среди которых важнейшими являются следу-
ющие (4).
1. Уровень и содержание современного социального партнерства 
во многом определяется характером взаимодействия частного и го-
сударственного секторов в экономике. Частный сектор в известной 
мере паразитирует на ресурсах госсектора. В нормальной конкурен-
ции отношения секторов должны действовать не по принципу «хищ-
ник-жертва» или «хищник-хищник», а образовать систему партнерс-
тва. В развитых странах экономическое взаимодействие между сек-
торами служит одним из аргументов, оправдывающих существова-
ние госсектора, который выступает в качестве стимула эффективной 
деятельности бизнеса. В России госсектор явно недостаточно развит, 
при этом частный сектор стремится эксплуатировать ресурсы и фи-
нансы государства в гораздо большей мере, чем свои собственные. 
Такое положение никак не может быть признано нормальным.
2. Негативно сказывается на состоянии и результативности со-
циального партнерства неразвитость организационно-правовой ин-
фраструктуры трудовых отношений, которые в этом смысле имеют 
релятивный, условный характер. Новый Трудовой кодекс РФ, вве-
денный сравнительно недавно, не может пока действовать в полной 
мере, так как для этого необходимо принять ещё 46 законов и реали-
зовать около тысячи поправок. К тому же для нашей страны очень 
важно вписаться в систему европейского законодательства и соот-
ветственно ориентировать свое нормотворчество.
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3. Отрицательное влияние на состояние и результативность со-
циального партнерства оказывает несформированность и неопреде-
ленность функций института работодателей. Кроме того, не все ра-
ботодатели готовы к цивилизованным действиям в сфере трудовых 
отношений, многие из них допускают грубые нарушения трудовых 
прав работников в виде несвоевременных выплат зарплаты, необос-
нованных сокращений и увольнений неугодных сотрудников, ис-
пользование принудительных форм труда и др. В известной мере под-
тверждением этого является крайне низкий уровень средних затрат 
на рабочую силу в России по сравнению с развитыми странами мира. 
Так, в расчете на один отработанный час в 2000году в промышлен-
ности Германии они составили – 23 доллара, в Японии – 22 доллара, в 
США – 19,9 доллара. По расчетам Госкомстата России в 2000 году, этот 
уровень составлял 1,2 доллара, в 2002 году он вырос до 1,8 доллара. 1 
Удельный вес заработной платы в затратах на рабочую силу рас-
тет медленно и составляет в 2002 году 71,8% (в 1995 г. – 60,5%) ; расхо-
ды на профессиональное обучение составили 0,3% и не увеличились 
за два истекших года; на культурно-бытовое обслуживание – 1%; по 
оплате питания и проживания работника –0,5% или 34,5 рубля в ме-
сяц в среднем на одного работника.
4. В современных условиях четко прослеживается тенденция 
принижения роли профсоюзов на предприятиях, в организациях 
и ослабление их позиций в сфере социально-трудовых отношений. 
Это объясняется рядом причин.
Во-первых, происходит вытеснение профсоюзов из сферы эко-
номической, финансовой деятельности предприятий и организаций. 
Большинство отраслевых профсоюзов лишены необходимой им ин-
формации по экономике и финансам под предлогом коммерческой 
тайны собственников и акционеров компаний.
Во-вторых, профсоюзы в условиях плюрализма форм собствен-
ности не осознали объективной противоположности интересов 
наемных работников и работодателей, предпринимателей, и не на-
учились строить рыночные отношения с новыми экономическими 
1 Материалы Госкомстата России. О составе затрат на рабочую силу в 
2002 году//Общество и экономика. 2004. №1. С.179-191. С.179-180.
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партнерами. Если прежде руководители предприятий воспринима-
ли профсоюз как неотъемлемую часть административной системы и 
как структурное подразделение своего предприятия, то в настоящий 
период работодатели, предприниматели и профсоюзные лидеры 
пока лишь созревают для конструктивного диалога друг с другом.
В-третьих, профсоюзные лидеры оказались не готовы к решению 
задач формирования фонда заработной платы, улучшения условий 
и охраны труда, реализации социальных гарантий. Профсоюзным 
работникам не хватает экономических, юридических, политических 
знаний. Многие из них признают, что не умеют обосновывать свои 
предложения по совершенствованию оплаты труда, использованию 
прибыли, что им тяжело оперировать финансово-экономическими 
показателями. Разумеется, профсоюзные комитеты могут в пределах 
своей компетенции пригласить независимых специалистов, экспер-
тов, способных профессионально оценить экономическую и социаль-
ную ситуацию холдинга, компании, и оказать им соответствующую 
помощь, но чаще всего не предпринимают такого рода действий.
В-четвертых, ослабление позиций профсоюзных организаций 
происходит в результате преобладания коньюнктурных, соглаша-
тельских, а нередко и коррупционных отношений с работодателями. 
В результате с молчаливого согласия профсоюзных лидеров подчас 
применяются внеправовые, насильственные методы решения воз-
никающих проблем, в том числе и во взаимоотношениях с органами 
государственной власти.
Поскольку подробно рассмотреть все упомянутые тенденции 
в рамках своего выступления невозможно, остановимся лишь на 
одном сюжете. Следует сказать, что в сфере социально-трудовых 
отношений действуют в основном две различные по своей модели 
концепции – патерналистская и партнерская. Однако некоторые 
аналитики считают, что они не могут сосуществовать, так как яв-
ляются антагонистическими по своей природе. Тем не менее они 
официально реализуются и в нашей стране и в европейских госу-
дарствах. Реально это означает, что время отказа от одной модели в 
пользу другой пока не пришло даже в экономически развитых стра-
нах. К тому же в системе социального партнерства в России участву-
ют всего лишь 5-7% хозяйствующих субъектов, то есть предприятий 
и организаций, имеющих коллективные договора.
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Вопрос о национальной модели социального партнерства тре-
бует глубокой научной проработки. Поиск данной модели должен 
идти по принципу осмысления российского и мирового опыта. При-
чем конструирование новых моделей должно осуществляться не за 
счет отказа от всех социальных завоеваний, которые были достиг-
нуты ранее, при социализме, а на основе анализа и обобщения рабо-
тающих социальных технологий управления, которые были разра-
ботаны и реализованы на протяжении прошлых десятилетий.
Но реализовать успешно данную модель можно, если изменится 
менталитет и система ценностных ориентаций работников, работо-
дателей, государственных чиновников, функционеров институтов 
гражданского общества, и они будут взаимодействовать как систем-
ные рыночные акторы. Если также в массовом общественном созна-
нии сформируется позитивный образ партнерских отношений, что 
позволит действовать по новым «правилам игры».
По мнению ведущих экспертов нынешние партнерские отноше-
ния не устраивают ни органы власти, ни бизнес, ни профсоюзы, ни 
большинство производственных и экономических организаций так 
называемого «третьего сектора». В более долгосрочном плане соци-
альное партнерство будет претерпевать трансформацию под влия-
нием новых сил глобализации.
Пока не ясно, какого рода отношения государство – бизнес при-
дут на смену той порочной практике, которая существует сегодня. 
Тем не менее имеет смысл посмотреть на возможную эволюцию этих 
отношений в перспективе.
С учетом реализации органами власти разнонаправленных функ-
ций поддержки и ограничения возникает четыре возможных вариан-
та развития взаимоотношений государства и бизнеса на основе поли-
тики меркантилизма, патернализма, невмешательства и легализма.
Степень
поддержки
со стороны
государства
Высокая Меркантилизм
(налоговая политика)
Патернализм
(опека
государства)
Низкая Невмешательство
государства
Легализм
(на основе закона)
Низкая Высокая
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Степень ограничений, налагаемых государством2
Согласно данной схеме Россия находится в ситуации, близкой 
к недостаточно развитой модели невмешательства, в то же время 
выбор экономической политики в пользу меркантилизма представ-
ляется маловероятным. Нет также твердой уверенности, что Россия 
на следующей стадии развития сдвинется и к патернализму, так как 
государство пока слабое.
Движение к легализму могут заблокировать чиновники госу-
дарственного аппарата, но для страны такой вариант может быть 
вполне осуществимым. В данном процессе государство должно ори-
ентироваться на создание более широких и прозрачных отношений 
«государство – бизнес», равно как и более эффективных институтов, 
обеспечивающих власть закона.
В этой связи одной из главных задач современной администра-
тивной реформы, полагают российские ученые, становится рацио-
нализация и упорядочение тех государственных структур, которые 
прежде использовались в режиме неформальных связей и норм. 
В данном контексте особую значимость приобретают трех, двух и 
многосторонние комиссии по урегулированию социально-трудовых 
отношений. Убедительным примером в этом отношении может быть 
деятельность Российской трехсторонней комиссии по социально-
трудовым отношениям, а также Общественных советов при Прези-
денте РФ по ряду отраслей культуры, образования, науки.
Наряду с этим представляется важной выработка процедур ве-
дения конструктивных переговоров, формирования системы конт-
роля за выполнением достигнутых соглашений, принятия конкрет-
ных мер усиления социальной ответственности сторон в системе 
партнерских отношений. 
Социальное партнёрство в современной России стало формиро-
ваться под эгидой государства, путем заимствования зарубежных мо-
делей при отсутствии достаточно разработанной концепции социаль-
2  См. Ионсонг Ли.(Корея) Российский капитализм в эпоху глобализа-
ции: задачи и перспективы// Мировая экономика и международные отно-
шения 2004. №2 С. 42-47.
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ного партнёрства, учитывающей российскую специфику 3. Такая Кон-
цепция была подготовлена Министерством труда и социального раз-
вития РФ с участием учёных, и после длительных согласований в 1996 
г. была утверждена на заседании Российской трехсторонней комиссии 
по регулированию социально-трудовых отношений. В Концепции 
были закреплены следующие формы социального партнёрства: 
– коллективные переговоры по заключению коллективных до-
говоров и соглашений;
– трёхсторонние (двусторонние) консультации (согласительные 
комиссии, советы, комитеты, фонды, совещания и т.д.), письменное 
согласование по проектам нормативных документов;
– участие представителей наемных работников в органах управ-
ления организаций (наблюдательных, производственных советах, 
специализированных комиссиях, комитетах и т.д.);
– урегулирование коллективных трудовых споров;
– упорядочение регистрации коллективных договоров; 
– совершенствование процедур присоединения к заключенному 
соглашению, порядка распространения действия отраслевых (ме-
жотраслевых) и профессиональных тарифных соглашений на рабо-
тодателей, не участвующих в заключении данного соглашения; 
– государственная статистическая отчетность в сфере коллектив-
но-договорного регулирования социально-трудовых отношений.
Однако указанная концепция, по мнению некоторых ее разра-
ботчиков, не оказала сколько-нибудь заметного влияния на норма-
лизацию социально-трудовых отношений в современной России, и 
прежде всего в связи с её низким правовым статусом. Если бы кон-
цепции придали форму Федерального закона, то её эффективность 
могла бы быть существенно выше. 
Сегодня механизм социального партнёрства определяется Тру-
довым Кодексом РФ, другими федеральными законами, а также за-
конами субъектов РФ «О социальном партнёрстве». В последних 
определены виды соглашений, правовой статус, принципы и по-
рядок формирования региональной трёхсторонней комиссии и др. 
3 См. Киселев В.Н. Российская модель социального партнёрства (Сущ-
ность, проблемы, факторы становления). К IV съезду ФНПР. // Труд и социаль-
ные отношения. Спецвыпуск научного журнала АТ и СО. - 2001. - С. 103-111.
273
Профсоюзную сторону в комиссии представляют, как правило, чле-
ны совета территориального объединения организаций профсою-
зов, председатели отраслевых обкомов профсоюза или председатели 
профкомов наиболее крупных организаций. Решения комиссий при-
нимаются по соглашению всех сторон. Проект соглашения обсужда-
ется, как правило, на заседании президиума территориального про-
фобъединения, а предварительно – в профкомах всех или наиболее 
крупных профорганизаций. Соглашение утверждается на заседании 
комиссии, при наличии разногласий составляется протокол.
Что касается региональных отраслевых тарифных соглашений, 
то они, как правило, являются двусторонними. В отраслях бюджет-
ной сферы, например, в здравоохранении, оно заключается между 
департаментом здравоохранения администрации субъекта РФ и об-
комом профсоюза работников здравоохранения. Имеется практика 
заключения в городах (районах) муниципальных соглашений по со-
циально-трудовым отношениям. 
В соответствии с Трудовым кодексом, социальное партнёрство 
определяется как система взаимоотношений между работниками (их 
представителями), работодателями (их представителями), органами 
государственной власти и местного самоуправления, направленная на 
обеспечение согласования интересов работников и работодателей по 
вопросам регулирования трудовых и иных, непосредственно связанных 
с ними, отношений. В России понятие «социальное партнёрство» впер-
вые использовано в Указе Президента РФ «О социальном партнёрстве и 
разрешении трудовых споров (конфликтов)» в конце 1991 г. и в дальней-
шем стало широко употребляться в практике социального партнёрства.
Система социального партнёрства имеет структуру, включаю-
щую стороны и субъекты, принципы, уровни и виды соглашений, 
формы и функции. Стороны – работники и работодатели в лице их 
полномочных представителей. Субъекты – стороны и другие учас-
тники социального партнёрства (органы государственной власти и 
местного самоуправления и др.).
Основными принципами системы социального партнерства яв-
ляются: законность, равноправие сторон, полномочность их предста-
вителей, свобода выбора вопросов для обсуждения, добровольность 
принятия обязательств, их реальность, обязательность и контроль 
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выполнения коллективных договоров, соглашений, ответственность 
сторон за их невыполнение и др. 
Система социального партнёрства включает следующие 9 уров-
ней (каждому уровню соответствует конкретный вид соглашений по 
социально-трудовым отношениям 4): 
1. Федеральный (Генеральное соглашение); 
2. Федеральный отраслевой (отраслевое тарифное соглашение);
3. Федерально-окружной (федерально-окружное соглашение); 
4. Федерально-окружной отраслевой (федерально-окружное 
отраслевое соглашение);
5. Региональный (региональное соглашение); 
6. Региональный отраслевой (региональное отраслевое);
7. Муниципальный (муниципальное соглашение); 
8. Муниципальный отраслевой (муниципальное отраслевое со-
глашение);
9. Уровень организации (коллективный договор). 
С мая 2000 г., в соответствии с Указом Президента в РФ функ-
ционирует новый уровень в системе государственной власти – фе-
дерально-окружной, в 7 федеральных округах назначены предста-
вители Президента. Уже в сентябре 2000 г. в федеральных округах 
были образованы представительства Федерации независимых про-
фсоюзов России (ФНПР), которые стали субъектами федерально-
окружной системы социального партнёрства. Сегодня практически 
во всех федеральных округах приняты двух- или трёхсторонние со-
глашения, основными задачами которых являются:
– формирование единого экономического пространства,
–  обеспечение социальных интересов жителей округа и трудо-
вых прав работников, 
– развитие социального партнёрства и др. Указанные соглаше-
ния позитивно влияют на социально-экономические процес-
сы в регионах 5.
Социальное партнёрство реализуется в форме: коллективных 
переговоров по разработке и заключению коллективных договоров 
и соглашений; взаимных консультаций (переговоров) сторон, обес-
4  Вид соглашения указывается в скобках вслед за названием уровня.
5  Подробнее см.: Киселёв В.Н., Смольков В.Г. Социальное партнерство 
на уровне федеральных округов. // Труд и социальные отношения. – 2002. 
– №1. – С. 54-62. - № 2. - С. 85-91.
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печения гарантий трудовых прав работников и совершенствования 
трудового законодательства; участия работников, их представителей 
в управлении организацией; участия представителей работников и 
работодателей в досудебном разрешении трудовых споров. 6. 
Отечественные учёные еще не выработали общего подхода к пони-
манию сущности, содержания, структуры, функций и моделей социаль-
ного партнёрства, в специальной литературе практически отсутству-
ют работы, посвященные функциям социального партнёрства. Для их 
выявления было проведено сравнительное исследование законов субъ-
ектов РФ «О социальном партнёрстве» (норм, определяющих задачи 
социального партнёрства), отличающихся большим многообразием. 
Обобщение результатов проведённого анализа позволило вы-
делить следующие функции социального партнёрства: экономичес-
кую, политическую, нормотворческую, организационную и тех-
нологическую, контрольную, регулятивную, защитную, охрани-
тельную, общественной стабилизации и профилактическую (5). 
Экономическая функция заключается в реализации социаль-
но-ориентированной рыночной экономики, выступающей основой 
устойчивого развития экономики организаций, отраслей, регионов 
и т.д., роста доходов и уровня жизни граждан на основе учета и оп-
тимального сочетания интересов сторон социального партнерства. 
Она включает обеспечение развития экономики области, эффектив-
ного механизма регулирования социально-трудовых и связанных с 
ними экономических отношений;
– обеспечение роста доходов трудящихся по мере стабилизации 
экономики;
– обеспечение устойчивого развития производства и стабильно-
го повышения уровня жизни на основе учёта и оптимального соче-
тания интересов сторон социального партнерства;
– создание благоприятных условий для дальнейшего развития 
производства, экономики и предпринимательства, обеспечения за-
нятости работников на территории субъекта РФ, и т.п. 
Политическая функция направлена на обеспечение выработки 
и реализации социально-трудовой политики в РФ и её субъектах. 
Она предусматривает:
6  Подробнее см.: Бородин И.И. Формы социального партнёрства. // 
Труд и социальные отношения. – 2004. – № 2. – С. 30-45.
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– разработку, принятие и реализация согласованной социально-
экономической и социально-трудовой политики; 
– обеспечение сбалансированности интересов работников и ра-
ботодателей;
– совершенствование законодательства, в первую очередь, – в 
сфере социально-трудовых отношений.
– проведение активной политики занятости и др..
нормотворческая функция выражается в участии субъектов 
социального партнёрства в разработке законов и других норматив-
но-правовых актов РФ и её субъектов, федеральных и региональных 
программ в области социально-трудовых отношений. К ней отно-
сятся:
– участие в подготовке нормативно-правовых актов в сфере со-
циально-трудовых отношений и связанных с ними экономических 
вопросов;
– расширение правовой основы для развития партнерских от-
ношений в сфере труда, многоуровневого договорного регулирова-
ния социально-трудовых отношений, согласования и соблюдения 
социально-экономических прав и интересов участников трудовых 
отношений;
– выработка эффективных методов правового регулирования 
трудовых отношений;
– разработка предложений по совершенствованию законода-
тельства в сфере социального партнёрства.
организационно-технологическая функция направлена на со-
вершенствование организации системы социального партнёрства, 
разработку и реализацию социальных технологий функционирова-
ния социального партнёрства. Это предполагает: 
– подготовку и заключение соглашений, коллективных догово-
ров в соответствии с законодательством РФ и Законом о социаль-
ном партнёрстве;
– согласование и учёт социально-экономических интересов ра-
ботников и работодателей при выработке общих принципов регули-
рования социально-трудовых отношений;
–создание эффективного механизма договорного регулирования 
социально-трудовых и связанных с ними экономических отношений. 
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контрольная и регулятивная функции призваны обеспечить 
контроль за реализацией коллективных договоров и соглашений на 
всех уровнях договорного регулирования социально-трудовых от-
ношений, а также эффективный механизм регулирования социаль-
но-трудовых и связанных с ними экономических отношений. Они 
предполагают: 
– достижение оптимального сочетания интересов сторон соци-
ального партнёрства, обеспечивающего устойчивое развитие произ-
водства и обеспечение мотивации производительного;
– развитие трудовой и предпринимательской активности насе-
ления области;
– обеспечение эффективного механизма регулирования соци-
ально-трудовых и связанных с ними экономических отношений, 
проведение коллективных переговоров, взаимных консультаций 
сторон соглашений с учетом географических, климатических, демог-
рафических и других особенностей области; 
защитная функция заключается в разработке и реализации 
механизмов защиты прав и интересов наёмных работников, других 
категорий населения, что предусматривает:
– предупреждение массовой и сокращение длительной (более 
одного года) безработицы;
– обеспечение занятости и социальной защиты населения; 
– содействие занятости и развитию рынка труда;
– социальную защиту наиболее уязвимых групп населения об-
ласти.
охранительная функция направлена на обеспечение охраны 
жизни и здоровья работников на рабочих местах.
Наконец, функции общественной стабилизации и профилак-
тики социально-трудовых конфликтов заключаются в обеспече-
нии социального мира общества на основе объективного учёта ин-
тересов сторон и субъектов социального партнёрства, а также – в 
предотвращении и эффективном регулировании конфликтных си-
туаций в сфере трудовых отношений. Сюда относятся:
– усиление роли органов исполнительной власти, объединений 
работодателей и профсоюзов как социальных партнёров в решении 
социально-экономических вопросов;
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– повышение уровня социальной эффективности деятельности 
органов государственной исполнительной власти и местного само-
управления. 
– предупреждение кризисных явлений и конфликтов в социаль-
но-трудовой сфере;
– содействие мирному урегулированию трудовых споров и со-
циальных конфликтов;
Учет и реализация всех этих функций и составляют необходи-
мое условие обеспечения эффективности процесса укрепления и 
развития социального партнерства в сфере трудовых отношений. 
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Ivailo Kutov
BULGARIA’S LONG WAY TO OCCIDENTALISM
The conception of nation is related to unity of origin and cultural de-
velopment. This same cultural commitment outweighs in the definition, 
the layer of culture going before the one of origin. Speaking about French, 
English or German nations, for example, this definition concerns unity of 
will, culture and legal order. Unity of origin, however, could be applied to 
these 3 mentions; each of them having endured major “incest”: so, Rome 
and German “blood” joined the Celtic root and the French nation. Anglo-
Saxon and Norman-French “blood” joined the British one and the English 
nation. And Celtic and Slav “blood” joined the German “blood” and Ger-
man nation. Nevertheless each of these 3 nations has clearly outlined unity 
in its historical and spiritual life, each of them being united through the me-
dium of language and customs, spiritual culture and historical memory.
Political unity is not nolens volens for National unity. One and the 
same nation can live in a number of states such as a number of nations 
can live in one and the same state. This comes to explain the difference 
between nation and people – its connection with state being inherent by 
origin and conception as its initial meaning is the one of detachment, of 
a special kind of military detachment (Weigand). This phenomenon ex-
ists in the conventional every day communication – for several centuries, 
for example, the population of Switzerland is named “people” including 3 
nationalities.
Since 19th century when the state clearly acts to preserve the peo-
ple’s being and culture (notwithstanding the doctrine veil – conservative, 
liberal or social-democratic – on the political strategies). Since then the 
nationality has transformed in a factor or extreme importance for the po-
litical and social functioning. Since then the mutual confrontation of the 
nationalities has increased in the mixed states. The stronger nation strives 
for domination going to exclusiveness in the frames of the state. Her wish 
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is to assimilate the national minorities attaching great importance to vari-
ous forms of language and religious strangulation. The oppressed nations 
manifest forms of “desperate” resistance and in case of favorable circum-
stances they search for contacts with their kindred nations outside the 
state and even with forces inimical to their state.
This way the oppression of the minorities becomes a duty to preserva-
tion of the state; the aggression and defense increasing to circulus vituosus. 
And so nations exchange accusations of infamous barbarity about what 
each of them commits against the national minorities within its frontiers. 
This logical absurdity is quite clear to understand in psychological aspect: 
each majority treats as bad and infamous everything that goes against its 
interests and vice versa – it approves and praises what is of its use or at 
least seems to be.
Only after the last World War this kind of contradictions become dull 
in Western countries in favor of truth, justice and cultural prosperity. To 
our mind this phenomenon has its roots and traditions which will be sub-
ject to our later discussion. Suffice it before to notice that instate combi-
nations like Switzerland or the United States and some countries of the 
historical and cultural space of Western Europe far before the last World 
War, the equality of rights of peoples and nationalities has become an ac-
knowledged and realized complex of spiritual standards.
A new adjustment of cultural traditions and political pragmatism has 
been achieved in the West European countries. The problem is put to dis-
cussion and settled in this way: which factor to be given a chance of superi-
ority – to the freedom from fear and institutional democracy or to the end-
less struggle for national dominations, incl. to attempts to control of will?
Obviously the conditions of the 18th and 19th centuries permitted some 
forms of assimilation and cultural abrogation of minorities to be applied. 
In the course of time these forms of pressure meet an increasing and wiry 
resistance towards the minorities but the modern constitutional state has 
not adequate instruments at disposal to oppress the minor nationalities or 
religions. The dilemma is between the constitutional order and the vicious 
circle of hostility. Its settlement in the spirit of roots and traditions is in 
favor of the constitutional order.
And yet why do the centuries-old syndromes of confrontation and 
outrages in the name of the national and religious exclusiveness lead the 
281
today’s movements to confederativism (in the face of the European Com-
munity) and powerful push to globalization? The reply is not difficult, it is 
simple and scientifically valid.
The outstanding socio-cultural areas reflecting today the attenuation 
of hostility between nations in favor of more general industrial and cultur-
al values have their exact historic and cultural genesis. On the base of this 
triple genesis (we anticipate to name it) Walter Lippman, Andre Sigfried 
and others have derived the notion of atlantism more than seven decades 
now on which they project this notion. Which are the supporting points 
of the Atlantism?
These supporting points the above-mentioned and some other re-
search workers find in cultural completeness realized in times long before 
they unite in construction known in geographical and especially in philo-
sophical plan under the name of Altantism. 
This cultural completeness is presented by the following:
• Greec-antique sense of harmony ;
• Rome state and legal experience and heritage;
• Judish-Christian dominant of the value of life and the inviolability 
of person.
These 3 supporting points we accept as generalized and purified from 
the strata and deviations in their real development. They are worked out 
for the needs of the system analysis and to profile the difference of the 
civilization spread from historical and geographical point of vue on the 
Western Mediterranean and finishing along both costs of the Atlanic. One 
of the first documents to fix the values of those differentiated civilizations 
is the well known Atlantic Chart adopted in August 1941 by the Presi-
dents of the United States and the United Kingdom Franklin Roosevelt 
and Winston Churchill. 
But when looking for the ancient roots the historic development and 
actual dimensions of the Bulgarian national identity some obvious diffi-
culty arises about its localization. In other words, by its substance, content 
and real movements the notion for Bulgarian national culture could not 
find its strict definition and peculiarity to particular and wider commu-
nity. Not only due to centuries-old “incest” on the lands within the con-
fines of the present day Bulgarian state. Without treating any subjects con-
cerning history, anthropology or ethnography we presume only slightly to 
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outline 2 major factors which even these days act in people’s subconscious 
and influence the nature of the Bulgarian culture and our national self-
confidence. 
Both factors give one noticeable reply (although incomplete for mak-
ing conclusion) about the opportunities to outline how far the Bulgarian 
cultures a distinct expression of the exigible unity in spiritual life and his-
tory, united by language and customs, spiritual products and historical 
memory. 
Do the inhabitants of our lands have had ethnic self-consciousness of 
Bulgarians at the end of the 14th century? (Here I discount some monu-
ments left by rulers who even in series of some modern foreign issues are 
hardly recognized as sovereigns of state with its inherent attributes.). Later 
on another question seeks for reply: Why only in Bulgaria do not exist 
inventories of towns and villages with names and number of families what 
is a regular practice in the 14th century for Easter Roman Empire (Byzan-
tium), the Ottoman Empire or Serbia? These two facts justify the Ottoman 
institutions to not recognize officially the Bulgarian nationality up to 1870, 
as well as the latest start of the Bulgarian National Revival which takes 
shape not on the background of revolutionary cataclysms like elsewhere 
on the Balkans but as a cultural and historical fact of aspiration for na-
tional recognition. This process makes progress moved by Bulgarian elites 
(mostly religious and worldly, but also foreign – by American missionar-
ies in Constantinople). The broad lower layers of the population have not 
been very active and stimulated the Revival much more lead by life motive 
and less because of conscious impulse to national identity.
All this (incl. the other nationalities on the Balkans) development of 
the Bulgarian history gives its logical reflect on the national self-confi-
dence and culture through the decades to follow after the Liberation. Then 
many factors accumulate and motivate the strong impulse of this young 
state and this new and young society. Just in the 70-ies starts the Ameri-
can whw\eat invasion on the European and other markets, the geographic 
situation leaving Bulgaria in the “feet” of the “Great Bear” (Russia).
Although the unfavorable factors the era of Ferdinand I (up to 1912) 
marks an unprecedented progress for Bulgaria (as compared to her neigh-
bours and more distant partners as well as to the entire new Bulgarian 
history) but in the field of culture this “progress” is not so rich in con-
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tent. The poet and Nobel laureate of literature for 1948 Thomas Elliot in 
Notas para la definicion de la cultura, Madrid,1947 outlines that culture 
interwins with all transformations in society. His doctrine is based on the 
conception of the grading society in which the elites are the highest form of 
expansion. 
To his mind the scheme is obvious and finally comes down to the 
conservative function of culture. Family is the most important element in 
the process of transmission of culture; no matter for the British poet the 
levels of culture and strata – if there is a will to avoid “decrease” of culture 
and preservation of the national identity, culture must be handed down as 
expression of one and the same interests, attractions and way of life.
If I remember Elliot it is to focus once more the attention on the Bul-
garian cultural development after the Liberation. No doubt his doctrine is 
applicable to societies with crystallizes as a result of centuries-old layers of 
authentic, social, industrial and customs individualism. This kind of indi-
vidualism in favor of society is mostly typical for the spirit and practice of 
Occidentalism. But it hardly could find positive consequences in the Bul-
garian conditions – since old times to nowadays – mostly because of lack 
of pronounced Bulgarian identity to be compared to one more universal 
area of culture.
So if we agree with Thomas Elliot (and also with many other protago-
nists on the same thesis) about elites we can not apply this same thesis to 
Bulgaria as a pattern of cultural policy. At the beginning of 20th century yet 
Bulgaria has bright particular spiritual elite whose main body and engine 
is presented by the Missal (“Thought”) circle. Its adherents dream for the 
“spreading” and adoption of Occidentalism in Bulgaria as ideal for cul-
tural, logical, spiritual and social life. Their efforts are not successful even 
in the period of unique industrial, politic and cultural progress (acknowl-
edged as substantial expansion of the opportunity for touch with cultur-
al welfare of wide social layers) up to 1912. The principal lack of clearly 
pronounced politic will and strategy to occidental orientation of Bulgaria 
comes from the permanent maneuvers of Ferdinand I and Bulgarian ex-
ecutive authorities between Western Europe and Russia. Even more, Bul-
garian authorities lack the purposeful policy of Russian rulers after Peter I 
and his successors, who converted Russia to authentic cultural inheritor of 
Europe with leading European personalities in the field of culture.
284
Just the opposite, Bulgarian policy as a whole (partly justified by our 
geographic situation) abandoned the country on the cultural periphery 
of Europe in quality of non-identified crystal between Occidentalism and 
Orientalism and under the overdosed Eurasian influence of Russia. There 
is no Bulgarian Nobel laureate among the basic Christian nations on the 
Balkans (in 2006 Turkey joined this laureate society with the prize for lit-
erature). How formal this criterion can be, several dozens of similar lacks 
of recognition could be mentioned.
To summarize, the conclusion outlines that without determined po-
litical will and inner political consensus, our national culture is doomed to 
be accepted as foreign to the spirit of Atlantism. One purposeful culture; 
policy is not allusion to one based on orders and commands. The most dif-
ficult problem in joining the Atlantic values comes from the everyday data 
that we are far from achieving sincere consensus to our full value cultural 
presence in the NATO and the European Community. As a result if we par-
aphrase one Rumanian analyzer from the latest weeks – the occidentaliza-
tion of Bulgaria for the Atlantic world will be as difficult as the present-day 
mission of the United States to democratize the whole Islamic world.
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II. Philosophy of Science, 
Ontology, Epistemology  
and Logic
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Mladen Domazet
PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN EDUCATIONAL 
TRANSMISSION Of CONTEMPORARY 
SCIENTIfIC KNOWLEDGE
Abstract: According to the standard 20th century view of scientific 
culture (‘naturalism’), that was to provide the principal world-view to 
be transmitted through educational practice value and meaning con-
stitute no part of the real world, and are undesirable in development of 
uniform rational autonomy of individuals through education. In line 
with more recent educational trends of individualistic initiation into 
social practices through education, all in service of increasing potential 
for satisfaction of individual wants, ‘naturalist’ world-view is portrayed 
as short-changing the individual student in dealing with the total-
ity of experience (which includes value judgements and sentiments of 
worth). Three discernible but connected issues are addressed in this 
context: (1) general legitimacy of scientific knowledge to be transmitted 
through education, (2) legitimacy of the primacy of scientific (‘natural-
ist’) world-view in educational practice, and (3) effectiveness of trans-
mission of scientific knowledge through educational presentation. It is 
suggested that modified ‘naturalism’ that incorporates open acknowl-
edgment of values inherent in and attributed to scientific knowledge, 
as well as limits the scope of its world-view in education, can provide a 
genuine interest in, as well as understanding of and respect for, science 
(and its technological achievements) amongst the students, without 
drawing the charges of inadequacy or dogmatic indoctrination. 
Key words: scientific knowledge, values, naturalist world-view, 
education, relativist critique, circularity of justification, scientific ex-
planation 
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What is, across Europe now, accepted as worthy of educational trans-
mission is the procedural and propositional knowledge and values1. In 
some areas of education (e.g. civics, citizenship education, and compulsory 
political education) the latter are of primary importance, and it is on them 
that the uncertain knowledge of each individual can rest and be evaluated. 
Whether or not this programme can indeed be successful, at first glance it 
does not seem to be a route open for the natural sciences education, as it 
should follow aims of its practiced discipline in being value free. 
According to the 20th century ‘standard’ view educational transmis-
sion of scientific knowledge is compelled to follow the canon of general 
scientific culture (Cooper calls this ‘naturalism’, and though a rough sketch 
it will serve for illustration here): 
• “ the world is the natural world as depictable, in principle, by the 
natural sciences; 
• human beings are entirely natural elements within that world;
• as value and meaning are not entertained by natural scientific en-
quiry, they constitute no part of the world, but are, say, ‘projections’ 
onto it by those unusual creatures, us;
• the realm of knowledge is exhausted by knowing that certain things 
are the case and by knowing how to do things, as there is no room in 
the naturalistic account of the world and ourselves for an understand-
ing of the way of things which eo ipso bears with it a ‘skill in living’; 
• understanding should be understood as it paradigmatically is 
among the scientists, in terms of submission to canons and criteria 
endorsed in a community of enquirers in which public, open de-
bate reigns; 
• an important ideal – this time not ‘projected’, but implicit in an ex-
emplary way in scientific practice – is that of rational autonomy of 
mind, achievable (unparadoxically) through participation in pub-
lic, criteria-governed modes of enquiry.” (Cooper, 1998:30-31). 
Thus the theoretical task in education, most notably natural sciences 
education, was to train the uninitiated mind in developing its rational au-
tonomy to be applied to certain spheres of experience (Cooper, 1998:32). 
1 Or at least an inclination to attain ‘valuables’, those things that are imbued 
with value. 
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We can raise at least three discernible but connected issues here, with a 
proviso that a solution proposed for any of those will heave a bearing on the 
other two. The first is the issue of the overall legitimacy of scientific knowl-
edge, especially when criticised by the relativist denials of the universality 
of scientific world-view. This, though, is an issue for general philosophy of 
science, not just its sub-class that ventures into education. The other is of the 
legitimacy of primacy of scientific knowledge, or at least the scientific knowl-
edge ideal, in the educational practice (e.g as it is sketched in the ‘naturalist’ 
position above). Of course a firm resolution of the first issue, draws conse-
quences for the second one, as it is not one of mere pragmatic choice con-
ducted by the educational policy makers, but of the genuine conflict for su-
premacy between different world-views. Finally, there is a pragmatic issue of 
the most desirable (e.g. efficient, if efficiency is desirable) way of educational 
transmission of any given body of scientific knowledge. Based on the success 
in achieving the defined pragmatic goal, resolution of this issue bears heavily 
on the second one as well. Naturally the second issue, the one of world-view 
primacy and its presentation and elaboration in education, also bears conse-
quences for the third one (c.f. Cooper, 1998 and Hodson, 1998). 
With regards to the issue of primacy of scientific education Cooper 
maintains that the opinions of US Pragmatists (James, Dewey, Putnam) 
ought to be instructive: when deciding between whole philosophical 
standpoints, questions of value legitimately intervene. Thus, all such stand-
points that can be shown to reinforce “a bad culture” should be abandoned 
“and only an artificial dichotomy between ethics and epistemology pre-
vents people from recognizing this” (Cooper, 1998:36). Cooper uses this 
to conclude that since the ‘naturalist’ world-view offers no guide through 
“the experience of rightness and wrongness, […], the significance or in-
significance of what there is in the world”, and yet those are some of the 
essential components of our culture, of our everyday lives even, it deserves 
to be abandoned in the wake of a “reflection on a pre-theoretical experi-
ence of the ‘lived world’” (Cooper, 1998:38).2 
2 This is not to say that legitimacy of scientific knowledge is denied alto-
gether, it is also not an argument against teaching science in schools, it merely 
advocates that such education be confined to an enclosed niche within the edu-
cational system. 
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Thus, the resolution of the third and pragmatic issue, in this case per-
haps providing education that best adheres with the everyday experience, 
decides on the second issue as well by minimising the overall role of the 
‘naturalist’ world-view in the educational process. For the sake of brevity, 
we can only warn of the practical problems facing such a solution, from 
the apparent lack of definition of what exactly “pre-theoretical experience 
of the ‘lived world’” calls for to the conceptual and experiential difficul-
ties of uninitiated approach to science (scientific world-view, though best 
justified for some spheres of experience is not straightforward and most 
obvious one to come by for a novice) (cf. Hodson, 1998). 
More importantly, in advocating education according to the world 
view that acknowledges the role of values to achieve universal applicabil-
ity, one must incorporate an assumption that there is a universally accept-
able distillate of values that are appropriate for all humans and whose ap-
propriation by students does not represent mere indoctrination. And this 
assumption is getting harder to justify in the contemporary western socie-
ties committed to value pluralism, as the condition they end up providing 
practically spells, through full-blown relativism, the end of any education 
based on values. This position turns out to be more damaging than liber-
ating for an individual, as it is desirable to instil in students (for, among 
others, pragmatic reasons outlined above) a set of values and show them 
that morality in general is more than an arbitrary choice between conflict-
ing alternatives. On the other hand, the value-pluralistic view is not an 
accidental by-product, but is a fact about contemporary society, as well as 
an outcome of application of reason to conduct of daily life. It is hard, if 
at all possible, to reasonably justify a choice of any given set of values over 
and above the said alternatives (Mendus, 1998).
Wider educational application of the above deliberations may be 
roughly illustrated by the turn in educational philosophy of Paul Hirst. 
In 1993 Hirst charts the transition in his educational philosophy from the 
dominance of analytical philosophy and rationalism in the 60s and 70s 
towards the 90s primary concern with social practices. This is partly due 
to realization that the former development of uniform rational individuals 
is detached from the real biological and psychological demands of human 
nature, as well as neglectful of individuality of every student. The latter 
utilitarian ideal of maximising the overall personal satisfaction in the so-
ciety sees rationality as mere guide and not a means in itself. Education, 
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then, is more than an acquisition of knowledge; it is an initiation into ra-
tionally enhanced social practices to secure the most efficient satisfaction 
of wants. Propositional theoretical knowledge here is of great importance 
in securing the wide-reach and efficacy of beneficial practices, but is only a 
second order category built out of critical reflection on first order satisfac-
tion of practical wants (Hirst, 1993). 
In the light of the above we might want to argue that ‘naturalist’ world-
view (though, of its own admission, aiming to be value free) incorporates 
the most universal and, in at least some domains of experience, beneficial 
social practice available today (cf. second issue above). Though initiation 
into social practices focused on the development of individuals is not found-
ed solely upon transmission of theoretical scientific knowledge, such knowl-
edge, as enshrined in the Western scientific practice, will prove to be of the 
most universal benefit. Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond argues in 2006, that if that 
may be so it is not because of some necessarily universal validity of Western 
science, but solely due to the contingent fact of its contemporary dominance 
in the global social practices. He bases such claim both on the overview of 
alternative, and in their own context successful, scientific practices through 
history, as well as the claim that some cultures have achieved dominance 
despite turning their back on scientific development (most notably Ancient 
Rome) (Lévy-Leblond, 2006:28; also Hodson, 1998:204). Accepting some 
such argument, we may still legitimise initiation into scientific social prac-
tice (sadly leaving that term in itself insufficiently explored, save for Coop-
er’s summary above), but not for the reasons such practice ascribes to itself. 
Such criticism can be further used to legitimise the abandonment of 
the ‘naturalist’ methodology as it cannot guarantee the provision of suf-
ficiently broad understanding of experience, for it deliberately leaves out 
an important segment of it (the value-based aspect). This acknowledges 
the failure of scientific attempts to strip the knowledge-gathering of all in-
essential disturbance and thus ‘speak the language of the world’ (cf. first 
issue above). ‘Relativist’3 critique demands that such thoroughgoing aim be 
3 This is just a sketch-name for purposes of illustration. It is hard to group so 
many different positions under one umbrella, and throughout this text the term is 
used to cover such schools/positions as postmodernists, hermeneutics, construc-
tivists and the like. 
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abandoned (to a varying degree depending on how radical the authors are) 
based on two ‘philosophical’ theses: (1) that there is no mechanical recipe 
for obtaining knowledge (based on the problem of satisfactory analysis of 
knowledge in epistemology and philosophy of science), and (2) that no de-
cision can be made between competing explanatory conceptual schemes 
(leading to a form of epistemological and ontological relativism) (Luntley, 
1995). As humans we do not seem to have a universal access to truth over 
and above the reasons, proofs and justifications we explicitly assent to. 
‘Naturalism’ can, on the other hand, accept that all processes of knowl-
edge production and codification are social (‘cultural’) and as such bear 
the marks of their context of production. Once we accept that all knowl-
edge is social in character, then this very fact stops being the demarcation 
criterion used in evaluation of knowledge. But the fact that all knowledge 
is socially produced does not mean that all knowledge is epistemologically 
(philosophically, theoretically) the same. For there is a crucial difference 
between production of knowledge and its emergent properties, we must see 
that even though socially produced, knowledge has the power to transcend 
the conditions under which it has been created (Moore, 2000). Thus dif-
ferent knowledge can have different not-socially-constructed value (along 
some widely-applicable scale) associated with it. Such legitimation of sci-
entific knowledge can be used to bear on the questions of the role of the 
associated world-view in educational practice.4 
An attempt to provide a foundation (to be used in legitimation of 
scientific knowledge) requires some conception of truth (and, perhaps, 
some conception of reality) without the presupposition of access to, or 
even the existence of, a ‘cosmic register of truths’. The solution most com-
monly proposed (e.g. by Luntley, 1995) has a limited scope with respect 
to a great many contemporary scientific theories (thus, perhaps, failing to 
be a workable solution at all) as it requires an agreement on a very basic 
4 Consider for example: “The emergent property of knowledge is itself in-
trinsically social – it is something that people do in a particular, socially organised, 
way. It depends upon a distinctive ‘configuration’ […] of values, principles and 
social procedure that became institutionalised and achieved sufficient autonomy 
from traditional sites of power (the state, religion) to constitute itself as a culture 
and model of social organisation in its own right (crucially, in the ancient univer-
sities of the West in the early modern period).” (Moore, 2000:32). 
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and limited conceptual scheme derived from a limited range of everyday 
observable phenomena: an ontology of limited size material bodies in 
space and time. An arduous task is then placed before scientific theories 
to rigorously prove that the complex (and often entirely novel) ontolo-
gies of contemporary scientific theories are in a satisfactory manner built 
on the aforementioned (common-sense) conceptual scheme. In that they 
seem to be expected to continuously follow a simple (mechanistic) meta-
phor of extended objects with physically defined properties and poten-
tials that provide a causal construction for a series of specific events whose 
consequence may be open to experience, or may entice further events, 
and which consequence follows from the nature of the objects (Turney, 
2004:218). 
But Kitcher complained that ‘causal relatedness’ is dependent on ‘ex-
planatory success’ and not vice-versa. “In learning to talk about causes 
[…] we are absorbing earlier generations’ views about the structure of 
nature” (Kitcher, 1989). He, thus, strongly advises comparative unifica-
tion of explanation, a way to economise the expenditure of thought, as the 
foremost defence against radical relativism. According to such an account 
explanatory value (‘explanatoriness’ in Kukla & Walmsley, 2004), particu-
larly as part of potentially all encompassing unified account, is the crucial 
emergent value-bearing property of scientific knowledge. 
Bear in mind, though, that the ‘relativists’ have not proven (according 
to the above sketch, they have not even tried as much) that the true states 
of affairs do not exist. Their criticism of knowledge rests on a claim that 
such states of affairs are not directly and inherently accessible to human 
enquiry. Though history of philosophy and science warn us that the ways 
in which we conceptualise the world, what we ground our experiences 
in, can be susceptible to human fleeting interests, it is still reasonable5 to 
5 Of course, relativists may cry foul here, and claim that what we may find 
reasonable or unreasonable is not universal but a product of our social and his-
torical context. In a possible parallel context then it may not at all be reasonable 
to assume that the correctness of our conceptualisations of the world depends 
on some ideally objective and real state of affairs, but on the whim of some om-
nipotent being, the workings of the reality generating deception machine or some 
such. Even this much may be conceded here, providing we keep in mind that none 
of our friends or foes, no member of our, or any other community we may come 
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assume that whether these conceptualisations are correct or not, wheth-
er they are true or false, depends primarily not on how we are inclined 
to construct them but on the state of affairs in the real world (cf. Carr, 
2003:130).6 These are unavoidable constrictions in every construction of 
knowledge, and a concept of ‘value’ that respects those could provide the 
grounding for cross-cultural applicability of the ‘naturalist’ world-view in 
at least some domains of experience. Alternatively, perhaps the said con-
strictions can provide the criteria of evaluation to adjudicate the worth of 
different segments of knowledge or pretenders to the title. 
A more detailed examination of the ‘naturalist’ canon above may al-
low for its modification that combines the epistemological fallibilism with 
ontological realism, and gives some idea of specific concept of value that is 
rooted in ‘naturalist culture’. There are limitations placed on knowledge by 
the independently existing reality though that knowledge itself is, at least 
in part, socially constructed (Smith and Hodkinson, 2002).7 Just as we are 
not in everyday life the fully rational creatures idealised by the ‘naturalist’ 
picture, so the great technological advances based on contemporary sci-
ence and used in everyday life of most cultures today cannot be attributed 
solely to chance or radical social constructivism, and the novel predictions 
of phenomena arising from contemporary science are unparalleled in 
their reliability by other cultural practices operating in the same domain 
of experience. Paraphrasing Goldman’s more technical account, scientif-
to interact with, is or can be such an omnipotent being or machine. The issue is 
not whether we are mistaken, or even deliberately deceived, about the detailed 
structure of some independent reality, but whether such a reality, as independent 
of our actions and will, does or does not exist. 
6 According to Carr the fallacious blurring of the distinction between truth 
and judgement is to blame for consequential epistemic relativism (ibid.). 
7 Furthermore, and this is especially important for science education, we 
have to be aware of a difference between knowledge as fact and knowledge as 
explanation of the given fact (Carr, 2003:129). The two are seldom interchange-
able for they may carry a vastly different deal of conviction (a fact may be objec-
tively accepted and verified, though its explanation may not be). Within scientific 
world-view there is currently a varying degree of success of provision of explana-
tion. Thus, the hard-to-defend examples need not carry conviction against the 
whole enterprise. 
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ic practices are more reliable predictors of interaction with the external 
world than any set of non-scientific practices available to human beings in 
answering the sorts of questions that science seeks to answer (Goldman, 
1999:247). But in educational context a sociologically motivated fact that 
scientific research and utilization of its products are not value-free cannot 
be ignored (Hodson, 1998:203). 
On the other hand it is frivolous to lump all relativist critique in the 
band of vulgar relativism ascribing all interpretations of sensory experi-
ence to a contingent set of social conventions. Serious relativist critique 
does not advocate an ‘anything goes’ scenario, but merely demands that 
we abandon the false hope of reading the cosmic register of truths (now 
and for ever in the future). We are still free to make judgements and pre-
fer some things to other, and will continue to do so. But they warn of a 
circle in naturalist reasoning (a circle that may or may not be vicious): 
to know the true state of affairs we must have a procedure distinguishing 
true from false appearances, to know that the said procedure is reliable 
we must know that it is successful in distinguishing the true from false 
appearances, but to know the latter we must already know (via some other 
method) which appearances are true and which are false (i.e. know what 
the true state of affairs is) (Smith and Hodkinson, 2002:293, attributing 
the precise formulation to Chisholm, 1973). Similarly, Kukla and Walms-
ley, 2004, argue that explanatoriness provided by science cannot be used 
as value in any argument that seeks to establish the values behind belief in 
scientific claims. Thus, we cannot too easily smuggle in some sort of value 
foundationalism to replace the epistemic one, but could perhaps offer dif-
ferent evaluative criteria for different stages of the supposed circle. 
Though it would be too ambitious to expect that any proposed ap-
proach to our third issue above can in and of itself provide a cogent solu-
tion to the first two, a tentative proposal may still be put forth. It seems 
that it is important to teach about science alongside of teaching science 
itself (cf. Hodson, 1998: 209-210).8 This may allow us to escape from un-
8 Though, we must also bear in mind Hodson’s methodological aspects of 
this general proposal: “[…] I recognise that telling students, too early, that scien-
tific inquiry is context-dependent and idiosyncratic could be puzzling, frustrating 
and even off-putting.” (Hodson, 1998:210). 
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desired epistemological relativism, into seemingly less problematic ethical 
relativism: science, like any other cultural practice, has its own set of val-
ues which are most appropriate to its limited aims (and for the purposes 
of contemporary education those can in fact be limited) and which al-
low every individual student to ground the knowledge appropriate upon 
the tentative adoption of those values (e.g. Goldman’s veritistic aim, 1996:
VIII). We must of course be careful to distinguish which sense of ‘value’ 
we wish to associate with scientific knowledge in education, whether in-
strumental value, value per se, intrinsic value etc. (Kirschenmann, 2001). 
Furthermore, any such programme must be wary of the general problem 
of universality of values, the problem of circularity in relying on explana-
tory unification to be enshrined as a value, and the weak sense of ‘value’ as 
pragmatic means to practical ends. 
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Anguel S. Stefanov
PHILOSOPHY AND REASON: CONTINUING 
MARRIAGE, OR A COMING DIVORCE?
In so far as the title question presupposes tendencies, wished or not, 
achievable or not, a conclusive answer to this question could hardly be 
produced “here and now”. What is possible, however, is the consideration 
of philosophical claims and modes of philosophizing that might envisage 
a definite answer, as well as the assessment of their efficiency, though in a 
curt and a sketchy way, with respect to their conceptual influence. I shall 
turn my attention to the contemporary philosophical receptions of three 
key themes to this effect: reason, thought, and rationality.
Reason
Even now, I presume, the contention that philosophy is drifting 
apart from reason would bring a discomfort to a lot of people tempted 
by philosophy. Yet whether this is so, or not, depends on one’s definition 
of philosophy, on the way one understands the subject of philosophy. I 
shall hardly be wrong if I say that different realizations of philosophy de-
pend on their supposed attitude to reason. If reason were accepted to be 
a superior cognitive faculty for human knowledge, and/or a legislator of 
human actions and deeds, then the marriage of philosophy and reason 
would continue to be flourishing. A reliable witness of this was Thomas 
Hobbes who taught in the 18-th century that philosophy was the activity 
of the natural human reason to investigate the order of all created things, 
their causes and effects. If, however, philosophy is construed to be a mere 
activity for concept creation, as G. Deleuze and F. Guattari have suggested, 
or is reduced to a kind of therapy, as R. Rorty has insisted, then the divorce 
of philosophy and reason is doubtlessly notified. There are philosophers 
who reject the cognitive role of reason even in the development of science 
299
that is traditionally accepted to be a paradigmatic example of a rational 
enterprise. P. Feyerabend’s “Farewell to Reason” was succeeded by a steady 
wave of relativism and social constructivism. This, in its turn, resulted in a 
reaction of realistically minded philosophers and scientists who produced 
instructive readings like the well known collection The Flight from Science 
and Reason.1
But what are the reasons in favour of the divorce, and are they reli-
able?
I shall divide them into two different types. The first type are articu-
lated arguments concerning the contemporary intellectual situation, the 
situation at least since the end of the 60ies of the 20-th century, influenced 
by new economic, social, and cultural changes. As Jean-Marie Domenach 
puts it:
L’individualisme déchaîné pose en somme le même problème à la 
politique et à l’épistémologie. Comment, d’une “pluralité de mondes inter-
reliés mais incommunicables”, tirer une unité de vues et d’action?2
The postmodern claim was raised that grand philosophical systems 
should be abandoned, that we now share a new form of intellectual life 
where the conceptual structures of these systems are already void of sense. 
Grand philosophical systems from Plato, through Descartes and Kant, to 
Hegel and Marx are, however, based on metaphysical thinking incorpo-
rating reason; so, a rejection of those and similar systems would imply 
a rejection of reason playing a central role in philosophy. And this is not 
regretful at all, other authors contend, adding to the first, a second claim, 
to the effect that grand schemes of reason inevitably lead to some kind of 
totalitarianism.
The first claim is doubtful in many respects, but I’ll touch on here 
a practical one. Contemporary philosophers, sharing the claim, could be 
viewed not to follow their own instruction. They can willingly reject Hegel’s 
philosophy for instance, and at the same time, not less willingly, can em-
brace Heidegger’s philosophy, in spite that the latter displays no difference 
in its pretension to be a fundamental ontology. An objection that reason 
is conceptually engulfed by the grand question about the sense of Being, 
is losing strength against the background of Heidegger’s chief intention. 
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The intention to have a look back at the ancient Greek philosophy as a way 
of life. The authentic arrangement of the Cosmos that was believed to be 
both perfect and reasonable defined the ancient views about the world. 
The present situation, as some wise thinkers notice, is just the opposite. 
Different contemporary world views, “incommunicable worlds” – to use 
the locution of Jean-Marie Domenach – define different pictures of the 
Universe.
As the second claim is concerned, the thesis that schemes of reason 
always lead to some kind of totalitarianism, I adhere to the following re-
flection:
A possible correction to this thesis, as it seems to me, may turn it 
from an incontestable claim into a mere useful warning. In the latter form 
this thesis will assert that schemes of reason might lead, in certain social 
and/or cultural contexts, to some kind of totalitarianism. In other words, 
reason is in no way causally related to a dogmatic order of thought, or 
a totalitarian practice, that allegedly appear in the end of its systematic 
application… What makes me believe in the plausibility of the corrected 
thesis, is the critical power of reason.3
The second type of motivation in favour of the divorce comprises in-
fluential ways of philosophizing that are not characteristic of some new 
born intellectual trend, but that have been present throughout the whole 
history of philosophy. What I mean here is the observation of David Hume 
on the different species of philosophy. The one, called by him “easy and ob-
vious philosophy”, pays special heed to the evaluation of human actions 
in different situations of ordinary life, and considers man “as influenced 
in his measures by taste and sentiment”.4 The other species of philosophy, 
called “accurate and abstruse”, is of a speculative brand. Philosophers who 
subscribe to it consider man as a reasonable, rather than an active being.
It is certain that the easy and obvious philosophy will always, with 
the generality of mankind, have the preference above the accurate and ab-
struse; and by many will be recommended, not only as more agreeable, 
but more useful than the other… The fame of Cicero flourishes at present; 
but that of Aristotle is utterly decayed. La Bruyere passes the seas, and still 
maintains his reputation: But the glory of Malebranche is confined to his 
own nation, and to his own age. And Addison, perhaps, will be read with 
pleasure, when Locke shall be entirely forgotten.5
301
If David Hume could have proved to be right in his prognosis about 
the future of philosophy of his times, the divorce between philosophy and 
reason might be a fact in our days. Fortunately, it is not. But let me re-
member that Hume’s observation reflects two real and live tendencies in 
philosophy. We witness them today even in more sharp contours. And if 
the metaphysical tradition – to mention Hume’s own examples of Aristo-
tle, Malebranche, and Locke – has not been forgotten, this is maybe due to 
the fact that reason has persisted to be a good lover to philosophy, so that 
their marriage is still happily lasting.
Thinking
Reason would be an odd philosophical notion, if there were no pos-
sibility of ascribing either some ontological status to a thinking subject, 
or some unity to consciousness that could “possess” objects of thought. 
Descartes has made the classical philosophical step in this direction by 
his cogito ergo sum, setting up “the age of reason” in modern European 
philosophy. The task of thinking is to think objects, to give meaning to 
different objects and their interrelations. But the result of thinking is dubi-
ous without the self-assurance about the reality of a thinking essence, as a 
thinking mind. For this reason Cartesian philosophy gave priority not to 
the “first”, but to the “second” cognitive intention, to the intention directed 
not to external objects, but to the thinking that thinks its own thinking. 
Through this second cognitive intention the notion of a thinking selfhood 
is created, whose existence is beyond any doubt, and whose substantive 
presence guarantees the existence of all knowable external objects. The 
philosophical notion of a thinking mind has been later developed into the 
Kantian concept of a transcendentally constituted knowing subject.
A similar philosophical operation is relinquished, however, by a post-
modern phenomenological project, known also as hermeneutic ontology. 
It is rooted in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, and pretends to be aim-
ing at revealing the sense of being, hidden by the reflective philosophy of 
modernity. The criticism of this project is directed towards the possibility 
of a self-reflective thinking, towards the transcendental way of substanti-
ating the possibility of knowledge. 
What makes the phenomenological project to seem quite promising 
is its main contention about the uncovering of an authentic world, in the 
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sense that every phenomenon is self-revealing, and not formally consti-
tuted by consciousness. The being of man is thus understood as a being 
that is revealing the being. Man has a direct cognitive access to things in 
the world, they are not concealed as “things in themselves” by the curtain 
of their appearance, and truth is grasped as openness.
If this is so, however, the role of reason in the phenomenological 
project is greatly diminished in the process of theoretical knowledge, even 
if not as a “practical” reason, presenting moral grounds for every human 
choice. Thus phenomenology would hardly fulfil the role of an epistemo-
logical project. If one is reluctant to explain the history of scientific knowl-
edge solely as a change of human horizons of meaning, then one must 
pay heed to the capacity of the “good old” speculative reason. At the least, 
because the latter is the source of heuristic ideas. They suggest the con-
stitution of contemporary scientific fields by the help of pure theoretical 
concepts, which rarely have observable referents. And this is valid both for 
the micro- and the mega-world, explained by theoretically constructed, 
and not by self-showing phenomena (quarks, multi-dimensional space-
times, superstrings, etc.).
Rationality
Reason and rationality are so closely related, that the popular defini-
tion of an irrational behaviour states that the latter is not guided by rea-
son. I shall stick here to the general assumption that rational behaviour is 
guided by reason, i.e. it complies with a set of consistent rules and some 
aim(s) to be followed. Problems appear, however, if either we accept that 
rationality displays more vices than virtues, or give a negative answer to 
the question “is there only one type of rationality?”
There was a time when a negative answer to the last question would 
seem to be impossible – a time, reigned by what is popular today as clas-
sical rationality. A negative answer during that time was unthinkable, be-
cause any other form of rationality would have destroyed reason, and thus 
would have appeared as a hidden form of irrationality. Now the situation 
has greatly changed, and we face a whole divergent field of possible philo-
sophical views, pretending to supersede classical rationality.
• Non-classical rationality. In fact, if one concedes a non-classical ra-
tionality, then the possibility is tacitly opened for many non-classical 
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rationalities. Some philosophers contend that they are related with dif-
ferent non-classical logics, or that the latter are their explications. True, 
or not, this additional claim is not a direct solution to the key problem 
how different types of rationality could be held together by one consistent 
reason. Since the problem is shifted to the sphere of defining the status 
of logics themselves: are they a canon of reason, an organon of reason, 
mere descriptive formal languages, or something else?
• Flight from rationality. I concede that such a flight is also a flight 
from reason, and assume that anyone who undertakes this adven-
ture must present and defend his arguments (if not willing to re-
main silent), so that we must not expect arguments on beside of the 
representatives of opposite views.
• Relativism. A possible, but methodologically week position.
• Critical rationalism. The closest philosophical stance to classical ra-
tionalism.
We can easily see the need of philosophical care and work here, if we 
are willing to defend the right of reason. Yet a final conclusion after what 
has been said up to now, could hardly be seen to support the claim that 
philosophy is going to say farewell to reason, if it still pretends to account 
for the possibility of human cognitive contact with the world.
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Howard Robinson
PROBLEMS fOR THE POWERS  
CONCEPTION Of MATTER:  
AN ARGUMENT fOR IDEALISM REVISITED
The idea that the material world has to be conceived of as consisting 
ultimately only of powers – forces, energies, dispositions and the like – is 
probably the most common current conception of materiality. (See, for ex-
ample, Blackburn (1990), Harre (1970; 1986), Harre and Madden (1975), 
Martin (1997), Molnar (2003).) Indeed, it can be argued that that is the 
only conception of matter available (Robinson (1982). As has been recog-
nized from the eighteenth century, however, this conception faces serious 
problems (Hume (1978)). I argued against this account of matter in Rob-
inson (1982), and I want now to review the argument, in the light of later 
responses.
In outline the case against the powers conception of matter is as fol-
lows.
A power is a power to produce some effect, but if everything is a pow-
er, it is the power to produce another power (presumably by modification 
of a power-entity already present, not by creation of a power from noth-
ing). Why this leads to a regress can be seen as follows. Let us call the first 
power A. We only know what A is if we know what kinds of thing the actu-
alization of its potentiality give rise to. In other words, we only know what 
A is if we know what it is a power to do, what states would constitute its 
manifestation. Let us call the power which A is the power to produce, ‘B’. 
So what A is, is the power to produce B. But this is not informative unless 
we know the nature of B. B, being a power, is the power to produce some 
further power state, call it C. (We could close the circle and say that it is 
the power to produce a power of kind A, but then we would be in a circle 
of the kind to which Hume objected in his account of solidity.) It seems 
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that we are moving into a regress. You can understand what a power is 
only by reference to a further power, of which one has no specific concep-
tion unless you know the power state which would be its effect, and so on. 
And though I have stated this argument in terms of what we could know, 
the argument is not essentially epistemological. One could equally well 
say that what the nature of A is depends on what it is a potentiality for, for 
what a power is, is given by what it is a power to do. What it is a power 
to do is a function of what would constitute its manifestation, and if the 
nature of this latter can have no determinate expression, neither can the 
power which is defined in terms of it.
If the physical realist is committed to the powers conception of mat-
ter, and if that conception is radically defective, then the physical realist 
is in trouble. Furthermore, his opponent will point out that, if the pure 
powers conception is vicious, then the powers that are supposed to con-
stitute matter must produce something which is not itself a power, but a 
monadic quality. And such qualities are to be found as sensible qualities in 
the sense-fields of perceivers. So the physical world is a structured capacity 
to give rise to experience, and this is an idealist conception.1 We must look 
more closely at the regress argument to see whether it is really vicious.
Disputes about whether a particular regress or circle is vicious tend to 
be between those who say that, so long as one can always name the next 
element along the line, the regress is not vicious, and those who say that, 
unless the process can be completed, nothing contentful has been pro-
posed. There are regresses of both kinds and the problem is to decide into 
which camp a particular regress falls. 
The crucial issue seems to be whether the content of the early mem-
bers of the series depends on the content of the later. Here is an example 
of a regress where the content of the earlier members do not depend on 
the later: if it is true that p, then it is true that it is true that p, and so on. 
No-one, so far as I know, thinks that this is a vicious regress. The reason 
is that neither the content of, nor our understanding of the content of, the 
assertion that p is true depends on the later elements in the list. No-one 
1 This is slightly too swift. For a more detailed spelling out of this part of the 
argument, see Robinson (1982).
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would suggest that you cannot understand what it is for p to be true unless 
you already understood what it is for it to be true that it is true that p. 
Another kind of non-vicious regress is where an infinite series ap-
proaches asymptotically to a limit, for in that case the earlier elements do 
not depend on the later. Pi is 3.14159..., with no end. But, although the next 
number will make the figure more exact as an expression of pi, the number 
we have so far (that is, 3.14159 without the dots) is both a complete numer-
ical expression in itself and accurate to a high degree of precision as a rep-
resentation of pi. The significance or content of what has gone before – or 
that it should have any significance or content at all – does not depend on 
what comes next. The matter is otherwise in the case of powers.
What it is to be a particular power does depend on what it is a power 
to produce, for to say that something is a power, without saying what it is a 
power to do, does not distinguish it from all other powers: which, if pow-
ers are all that there are, fails to distinguish it from anything else. So, for 
any given power, there must be a contentful nature to what it is a power 
to do, otherwise it is not differentiated from anything else. If ‘power to 
produce x’ is to be differentiated from any other power, there must be a 
specific content substitutable for x. If that content is ‘power to produce y’, 
this will have no specific content, differentiating it from any other power, 
unless there is a significant substitution for y. And so on. It is because the 
notion of ‘power to produce ...’ is an incomplete expression that trying to 
complete it by putting an expression of the same form into the blank does 
not improve the situation.
It might be productive to compare the regress of powers with one 
which, unlike pi or the regress of ‘is true’, is genuinely controversial. This 
is the regress of causes and the kin issue of whether the world could be 
infinitely old. There are those who think that the regress constituted by 
causes stretching infinitely back into the past would be vicious and those 
who think that it would not. Notice that here there is no question of the 
nature of any event or entity – say a present one – depending conceptu-
ally on the nature of the events or entities that went before. So, suppose 
that Aristotle were right and the world were infinitely old and humans 
had always existed. The essence of what I am – namely, a human being or 
a rational animal – would not involve essential reference in a regressive 
way to the previous members of the series. The definition can be given 
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complete and well-formed for contemporary humans in their own right. 
The controversy about a regress of causes relates to the legitimacy of actual 
infinities, not to anything about the nature of the things that are supposed 
to participate in the infinite series. This case is, therefore, radically differ-
ent from the regress of powers and defenders of the pure powers ontology 
consequently cannot seek any solace by appeal to a comparison with the 
dispute concerning an unending regress of causes.2
Contemporary discussion of the powers regress. Philosophers occasion-
ally acknowledge that the concept of matter is problematic in the way I 
have tried to make clear in the previous section, but, considering the im-
portance of the issue raised, it is not as widely discussed as one might 
expect. As it is absolutely fundamental to the issue of whether one can 
give empirical content to the notion of mind-independent matter, I want 
to consider three recent attempts to respond to it.
(i) The most enigmatic is Simon Blackburn’s (1990). Blackburn’s initial re-
sponse to the powers ontology is positive. He says of this picture of the world: 
‘Is this the way it has to work? I believe so.’(63) But he then considers a version 
of the ‘regress’ objection to this theory, accepting that the regress can only be 
ended because ‘[c]ategoricity in fact comes with the subjective view...’ (65). 
And he continues ‘[t]he trouble is that such events, conceived of as categorical, 
play no role in the scientific understanding of the world.’ (65) This appears to 
be a complete surrender to the argument. Blackburn’s only response is to lapse 
into a sceptical detachment. After remarking that ‘I leave the issue in Hume’s 
hands rather than Berkeley’s’ (64, n.7), (which, I presume, is a way of refusing 
to admit that it might have idealist implications), he concludes:
It almost seems that carelessness and inattention alone can afford a 
remedy – the remedy of course of allowing ourselves to have any idea 
at all of what could fill in space. (65)
This sceptical hauteur does not seem to me to help the realist come to 
grips with the challenge that the argument presents.
(ii) Stephen Mumford thinks that the argument rests on a view of dis-
positions which is akin to Ryle’s empiricist analysis where the ascription 
2 For lucid discussion, from both sides, of whether actual infinities are coher-
ent, see W. L. Craig and Q. Smith (1993)
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of a disposition is nothing more than affirming the truth of a subjunctive 
conditional.’ (33)
He is attacking the argument specifically as it is stated in Robinson 
(1982), but if the criticism is to have any general application, it must be 
an objection to any attempt to define powers or dispositions in terms of 
the states that constitute their actualizations, meaning by that the state 
brought about when they are activated. Mumford spells out his objection:
We need not look for the actualization of a disposition solely in its 
manifestation, however, for we understand dispositions to be actual when-
ever they are ascribed. This is the realist alternative that I will be defend-
ing. If we were to treat dispositions as actual properties that play a causal 
role in their manifestations, then we can understand why dispositions are 
actual even when not currently manifested. (33-4)
Mumford’s objection only works if essentially characterizing a power 
in terms of its actualization is equivalent to adopting the reductive ac-
count of powers and dispositions. Surely, however, the nature or essence 
of anything which is a pure power must reside in that which it is a power 
to do, whether one conceives powers realistically or reductively. I think 
that Mumford is misled by a possible equivocation in the sense of ‘actual’ 
in this context. The fact that a realist believes that a power is actual, in the 
sense of actually existing when it is not activated, does not mean that its 
nature is not expressed by reference to its actualization, in the sense of the 
manifestation of the power. Even when dormant, it is essentially the power 
or disposition to give rise to that actualization.
(iii) George Molnar (2003: 173ff) titles the regress argument ‘always 
packing, never travelling’. Although not a defender of the ‘pure powers’ 
ontology, he does not believe that it can be refuted a priori, as the regress 
argument purports to do. He has two main responses to it. His first ob-
jection has some similarity to Mumford’s objection considered above, in 
that it concerns the connection between the real existence of powers and 
the truth of counterfactual conditionals. When Blackburn states his ver-
sion of the powers ontology, he does so in a way that seems to imply that 
powers are either equivalent to, or at least imply, the truth of condition-
als. (He says, for example: ‘An electrical field can abide, certainly, but that 
just means that there is a period of time over which various counterfactuals 
are true’ (63, my emphasis).) Molnar points out that there has been con-
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siderable literature in recent years devoted to casting doubt on whether 
dispositions can be analysed conditionally, or even whether they entail 
conditionals (176-7). But the argument as I have stated it above does not 
make explicit appeal to conditional statements, only to the essentiality to a 
power of what would constitute its actualization or manifestation. No one 
would deny that the nature of powers and dispositions essentially involve 
what would constitute their manifestations, and any problem derived 
from difficulties in formulating the exact connection between powers and 
conditionals that goes beyond this is not relevant.
Molnar has a further objection directed against C. B. Martin’s state-
ment of the regress argument against pure dispositionalism.
Martin has also suggested that leaving out physical qualia at the lev-
el of the fundamental entities results in a Pythagorean ontology in 
which all is numbers, quantities, ratios and proportions, but there is 
no whatness, no quiddity, nothing that the numbers are numbers of 
and quantities of. Except of course further numbers, which returns 
us to the regress generated by pan-dispositionalism. I think Martin’s 
worry can be assuaged. If the property of exerting a certain force is 
a definite something that the numbers can measure, so is being the 
source of that force. That about the object that makes it a source of a 
force is a (quantitive) power property. It is open to the dispositionalist 
to say that this is where the quiddity lies, this is what the numbers are 
numbers of. (179)
The problem with this response is that it is hard to see what content 
one is supposed to attach to the italicised words in the claims that ‘the 
property of exerting a force is a definite something’ or that there is a ‘[t]hat 
about the object that makes it a source of the force’, if all the properties 
are pure powers. Molnar is talking as if that which lies behind the force is 
something other than the force itself, considered as potential or dormant, 
which on a pure powers ontology it is not. Assigning a numerical value to 
this potentiality clearly adds nothing relevant. Of course, it would make 
a difference if one could consider powers as Janus faced, by giving them 
some other nature additional to the capacity to act. I now want to turn to 
considering various ways that the physical realist might do this. 
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II. 3. Grounding basic powers. The dispositions, capacities and pow-
ers of complex objects are grounded in and explained in terms of the prop-
erties of the more minute structures that make up such complex objects. 
The problem that concerns us is with the powers of the ultimate elements 
of physical reality. If a pure powers ontology is not coherent, how should a 
physical realist think of basic powers as being grounded?
Harre illustrates what is wanted, taking the example of solidity.
Solidity is the alleged quality, the possession of which is responsible 
for the fact that two material things cannot occupy the same place 
at the same time and is logically connected with impenetrability, the 
power to resist penetration, in that the possession of the former is 
supposed to account for the manifestation of the latter. (1970:305)
Martin at one time held a similar theory, with any intrinsic quality 
treated as ‘a two sided dispositional qualitative coin...The dispositional 
and the qualitative are equally basic and irreducible; there is no direction 
for one being basic in a property and the other “supervenient”. (1997: 216, 
citing his previous view) He moved, however, from this ‘Janus faced’ theo-
ry, to one according to which the dispositional and the qualitiative are not 
different aspects of a property, but are identical.
...the qualitative and dispositional are identical with one another and 
with the unitary intrinsic property itself...
What is qualitative and what is dispositional for any property is less 
like a two-sided coin or a Janus-faced figure than it is like an am-
biguous drawing. A particular drawing, remaining unitary and un-
changed, may be considered one way as a goblet-drawing and dif-
ferently considered, it is a two-faces-staring-at-one-another-drawing. 
The goblet and the faces are not distinguishable parts or components 
or even aspects of the drawing, although we can easily consider the 
one without considering, or even knowing of, the other. The goblet-
drawing is identical with the two-faces drawing. (216-7)
The analogy does not look helpful. What is interpreted as a goblet or as 
two faces, is neither of these things, it is a line or lines on a piece of paper. As 
there is clearly nothing accessible which is seen as a disposition and seen as a 
quality, what is really present must be some mysterious third unknown.
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Such a mysterious unknown plays a part in Harre’s attempt to cope 
with the regress. Rom Harre played a major role in popularizing the pow-
ers ontology in the philosophy of science, and in drawing attention to the 
importance of Boscovitch in the historical development of this conception 
of matter (Harre, 1970, Harre and Madden, 1975). It is interesting to see, 
therefore, how he copes with the problems that face it.
Harre’s way of recognizing the problem is somewhat elusive. He refers 
to the dilemma that confronts anyone who tries to universalize the dispo-
sitionalist account of properties. It seems as if one must choose between 
the inelegant alternative of grounding science on ungrounded disposi-
tions, and the alarming prospect of an indefinite regress of groundings. 
(1986: 296. My italics)
Given that one is dealing with the ultimate nature of reality, it is not 
surprizing if it should turn out to be unfamiliar in a disturbing way, so the 
force of ‘inelegant’ and ‘alarming’ is unclear. Furthermore, it is hard to see 
what is inelegant about ungrounded powers, if the notion makes sense. 
Nevertheless, Harre does acknowledge it as a problem that he wants to 
solve. The immediate solution that he gives is as follows.
Ideally the dispositions which theoretical micro-regresses require 
physicists to ascribe to unobservable beings, like quarks and gluons, 
would be grounded, at least in principle, in observable properties of 
the universe. These properties would be occurent rather than dispo-
sitional, embracing such matters as the quantity and distributon of 
energy fields. (296)
This solution, which he derives from Mach, looks rather like a form 
of phenomenalism, because the subatomic world is being grounded, onto-
logically and not just epistemically, on the observable. (I put aside the odd-
ity of calling energy fields ‘occurent rather than dispositional’.) But later he 
develops the theory in a Kantian direction. The basic powers of matter are 
the product of the interaction between ‘the ur-stuff of the world’ – which 
he prefers ‘to nickname... ‘glub’, to avoid any of the metaphysical tempta-
tions that arise from the connotations of the word ‘stuff ’’ – and our obser-
vation apparatus.
Whatever this theory is, it is not straighforward physical realism. 
Harre compares his ‘glub’ to Kant’s noumenal world, having no character-
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istics accessible to us. The theory, therefore, seems to have more in com-
mon with Kantian idealism than with normal physical realism. 
A more empiricist option is to adopt the neutral monism that Russell 
(1927) once espoused. This is the line taken by Grover Maxwell (1978) and 
Michael Lockwood (1989, 1993). The bearers of the ultimate powers and 
the intrinsic qualities of matter are those qualities that show themselves in 
conscious experience. These are in fact the intrinsic nature of the matter of 
which our brains are made. This theory seems to imply that the intrinsic 
nature of, for example, an electron, will be something such as a blue quale 
or a slight itch. One might try arguing that it need not be a phenomenal 
entity of such a developed kind, but a proto-phenomenal quality. But what 
something is that is not phenomenal but which when combined with oth-
ers of a similar sort becomes phenomenal, takes us back to mystery. Fur-
thermore, given the difficulty in formulating a convincing version of the 
‘Janus faced’ account of quality and power, the connection between the 
qualitative core and the causal powers would seem to be entirely contin-
gent and, hence, not explanatory.
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Julia Vasseva
DUBIOUS SCIENTIfIC VALUE AND  
AD-HOC HYPOTHESES
This investigation has been provoked by the ideas of Popper and Laka-
tos relevant to the problem of demarcation between science and pseudo-
science. The differences between them instigate this speculation on the 
problem. The focal analysis in this paper is focused upon the so-called 
ad-hocness. The differences between Popper and Lakatos ideas concern-
ing the role for ad-hoc hypotheses into the process of knowledge, are good 
bases to discuss the problem of ad hocness into the problem of demarca-
tion. For this reason I will divide this work in three steps. The first one 
will present Popper’s criterion for demarcation. The second one, sets out 
Lakatos research programmes. Finally the third one, gives in advances my 
ideas relevant to the role of ad-hoc hypotheses and the problem of actual 
demarcation between science and pseudoscience.
One of the important issues for Popper in his book “Conjectures and 
Refutations”, concerns the possibility to make sharp distinction between 
science and pseudoscience. The problem of demarcation arises from the 
question: “…”When should a theory be ranked as scientific?” or “Is there 
a criterion for the scientific character or status of a theory”.” (Popper, K. 
Conjectures and Refutations. 1963 pp. 63). He seeks for an answer that 
would be capable to separate science from pseudoscience or a “genuinely 
empirical method” apart from “pseudo-empirical” one. This problem is 
getting complicated if we are having in mind that: “… science often errs, 
and that pseudo-science may happen to stumble on the truth.” (Popper, 
Conjectures and Ref. 1963, pp. 64). Astrology is a typical example for 
pseudoscience, but Popper stresses that it was not astrology, which led 
him to the problem of demarcation. Popper describes two situations in 
order to show the importance of the idea of demarcation. The first (situ-
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ation) concerns the general ideas of the three inflowing theories at that 
time: Marx theory of history, Freud psychoanalysis and Alfred Adler “in-
dividual psychology”. The second situation concerns Einstein’s theory of 
relativity. We have to mark that these four theories were very influential 
at that time. The two situations in Popper presentation of the problem 
of demarcation corresponds to two different ways of making knowledge. 
Popper analyzes these theories from three crucial, from his point of view, 
features: explanatory power; verifications of theory; confirmations. Guided 
by these principles, it would be possible to make a demarcation between 
science and pseudoscience. The explanatory power of a theory has a high 
level in pseudoscience not in science. In other words, if a theory can ex-
plain everything, it is not a scientific theory. The verifications of a theory 
can not prescribe scientific features. It is pseudoscience seeking for con-
firmation of its own theories, not science. Contrary to those theories Ein-
stein’s theory has an exact explanatory power, gives no verifications, but 
falsification, or seeking confirmation as a result of falsification. In conclu-
sion, Popper formulates seven principles or criteria for demarcation.
“1) It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every 
theory-if we look for confirmations. 2) Confirmations should count only 
if they are the result of risky predictions;… 3) Every “good” scientific the-
ory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen. The more a theory 
forbids, the better it is. 4) A theory which is not refutable by any conceiv-
able event is nonscientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of theory (as people 
often think) but a vice. 5) Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to 
falsify it, or to refute it. Testability is falsifiability; but there are degrees of 
testability; some theories are more testable, more exposed to refutation, 
than others; they take, as it were, greater risks. 6) Confirming evidence 
should not count except when it is the result of a genuine test of the the-
ory; and this means that it can be presented as a serious but unsuccessful 
attempt to falsify the theory. (I now speak in such cases of “corroborating 
evidence.”) 7) Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, 
are still upheld by their admirers-for example by introducing ad hoc some 
auxiliary assumption, or by re-interpreting theory ad hoc in such a way 
that it escapes refutation. Such a procedure is always possible, but it res-
cues the theory from refutation only at the price of destroying, or at least 
lowering, its scientific status. (I later described such a rescuing operation 
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as a “conventionalist twist” or a “conventionalist stratagem. “)” (Popper, K. 
Conjectures and Refutations. 1963 pp. 68-69).
In this paper I will discuss the role of ad-hoc hypotheses for the sci-
entific status of theories. As it can be seen from the quotation above, for 
Popper, ad-hoc hypotheses are an indication for dubious scientific value. 
The possibility to draw up a sharp demarcation prohibits the introduction 
of hypotheses that aim to protect the theory from refutation. The “conjec-
ture – refutation” model rejects the opportunity to pass over one of its cri-
teria. The condition to be scientific based on the condition to be refutable. 
That is the reason to avoid ad-hoc hypotheses in science. Nevertheless, 
there are many examples that put into doubt precisely this model presented 
by Popper, because some of the most important hypotheses in science are 
the ad-hoc hypotheses. For example, Pauli introduced the hypothesis of 
the neutrino as an ad hoc hypothesis and Adams and Leverrier concluded, 
regardless of theoretical calculations, the position of a planet – Neptune. 
Lakatos criticism on this theory offered by Popper concerning the role 
and epistemological status of ad hoc hypotheses, present a different view. 
He distinguishes three stages into Popper’s philosophy. The first, Lakatos 
named it “Popper0” and defined him as a “dogmatic falsificationist”. In this 
period Popper did not publish any work. More important for him are the 
next two periods in Popper’s philosophy. According to Lakatos the twen-
ties are the period of the so-called “Popper0” and “Popper1” stages and 
the fifties are the period of the so-called “Popper2” stages. According to 
him it is important to distinguish between naive and sophisticated form of 
falsificationism. The second one is named also as a “methodological falsifi-
cationism” (“Popper2”). Therefore, this Lakatos criticism on Popper’s ideas 
will help me to present the second definition of ad hocness, which I will 
call a positive one. Distinguishing three stages into philosophy of falsifica-
tion, Lacatos presents the idea of ‘scientific research programmes”. Con-
trary to Popper, he refuses to treat ad hocness as an obstacle to growth of 
scientific knowledge. According to him, “…ad hoc stratagems allows us to 
progress even on inconsistent foundations” ( Lakatos, Musgrave Criticism 
and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge Univ. Press. 1970, pp.182).
Here I will try to present the positive –as I decide to call it – Lakatos 
idea concerning a different kind of ad hoc hypothesis. Let me introduce a 
working definition of ad hoc hypotheses of my own: when a theory finds a 
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difficulty in the data, we try to explain it and introduce a hypothesis. This 
practice is not unusual in science. According to Lakatos, research pro-
grammes arise, live and die into the ocean of anomalies. This is the reason 
which led him to an idea contrary to Popper’s one. It is important to em-
phasize that there are different kinds of ad hocness. Lakatos mentioned 
three patterns of ad hoc hypotheses: ad hoc1, ad hoc2, ad hoc3. The first 
one – ad hoc1 – did not predict any novel facts. The second one – ad hoc2 
– predict novel facts, but they failed. The third one – ad hoc3 – is still un-
satisfactory, or is an isolated formula apart from the research programme. 
The examples he gives are: for ad hoc1 hypotheses stands Galileo’s theory 
of circular natural motion of terrestrial objects; for ad hoc2 hypotheses 
stands Bohr – Kramer – Slater theory of 1924; for ad hoc3 hypotheses 
stands Planck’s radiation formula of 1900. I just want to remind you that 
Lakatos’s three types of ad hoc hypotheses were based on Popper’s two 
types of ad hocness. If a theory makes a prediction and this prediction is 
confirmed (the example with the planet Neptune), then there is no prob-
lem with ad hoc hypotheses. This is the first type of ad hoc hypotheses, 
called natural addition to the theory. The content of the second type de-
scribes the ad hoc hypotheses as a speculation seeking to save the theory, 
in spite of the fact that the condition may happen to be falsifiable. This is 
the reason to point out the presence of ad hoc hypotheses as a criterion 
of demarcation. Thus means that Popper did not make a problem out of 
good ad hocness, but extrapolates the dangers coming from attempts of 
saving a theory from refutation. 
In conclusion, I will try to promote my idea about the possibility to 
apply ad hocness as a working criterion into the process of demarcation. 
For this purpose I will use both the negative (Popper) and the positive 
(Lakatos) points of view. I will claim that Popper was right in saying that 
ad hoc hypotheses put a dubious scientific value of a theory. But my defi-
nition differs from Popper’s one. I think that the introduction of ad hoc 
hypotheses can be used unproperly by theories apart from research pro-
grammes. In this way this type of hypothesis becomes a reason or a door 
for pseudoscientific attacks. It is easy to say from the inside of science what 
is science or to discuss the problem of ad hocness into scientific theories. 
Contrary to this, it is not easy to make a sharp distinction between scien-
tific theories and other knowledge. I find it fruitful to use Popper ideas 
319
about ad hocness, not to make doubts about scientific value of theories, 
but to show that in attacking this hypothesis, non-science is going to look 
like science into the eyes of society. In this connection, I think that Popper 
criterion of ad hocness into the process of demarcation is a good marker, 
not inside science but for society. It is useful to apply Lakatos ideas of three 
types of ad hoc hypotheses, if we want to analyze the growth of scientific 
knowledge. However, when we try to explain why it is not science, it will 
be useful to attach Popper’s convert criterion of ad hocnes. Let me give one 
example. In the last two years there was a great deal of attention towards 
the so-called Intelligent Design. Many scientists defended its ideas and 
conception. Here, I will try to give an argument against those positions. 
The ideas of ID (Intelligent Design) try to refute Darwin theory of evolu-
tion. For this purpose they try to demonstrate the untenability of ad hoc 
hypothesis introduced into the “protected belt” of the evolution theory. If 
we follow Lakatos, we will be able to show the impossibility of this state-
ment. In the first place – the Evolution Theory (ET) is a progressive re-
search programme. Secondly – ET survives in the ocean of anomalies by 
making ad hoc hypotheses. Last, but not least – despite the weaknesses of 
ET there is no better theory to replace it. For non-experts or generally for 
society it is reasonable to see in ID a better candidate for scientific theory, 
than ET. Here it would be better to apply the convert ad hoc criterion: if 
the only reason to attack ad hoc hypotheses is to save our beliefs, then it is 
not the way to build scientific theory, but remains speculation, which can 
not be examined. The problem of controversy between ID and ET is not 
a case of compatible theories. The analysis of the role and epistemological 
status of ad hoc hypotheses will give, I think, a good mean into the process 
of demarcation.
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Appendix
Popper’s problem of demarcation
“is there a criterion for the scientific character or status of a theory”?
• to separate science from pseudoscience or a “genuinely empirical 
method” from “pseudoempirical method”
• to have in mind that: “… science often errs, and that pseudo-science 
may happen to stumble on the truth
The features of science
(Popper)
• explanatory power
• verifications of theory
• confirmations
Popper’s definition of ad hoc hypotheses
i. Good ad hoc – there is an anomaly → we introduce ad hoc hypothesis 
only in order to predict new fact → then the prediction is confirmed. 
This is the so-called “natural addition” to the theory. In this way we 
protect the theory from negative evidence.
ii. Dangerous ad hoc – introduced to protect theory from refutations. 
This is a not a falsifiable hypothesis.
Ad-hoc hypotheses in science
• Pauli ad hoc hypothesis of neutrino.
• Adams and Leverrier ad hoc hypothesis of the planet Neptune.
• Einstein ad hoc hypothesis – the addition to the cosmological 
constant to relativity in order to allow a steady – state universe (the 
idea of dark energy).
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Two ideas of ad hocness
Popper Lakatos
• Negative.
• Model of Conjectures and Ref-
utations.
• Ad hoc criterion as a pseudo-
scientifical feature.
• Positive.
• Model of Scientific Research 
Programmes.
• Positive heuristic (protec-
tive belt) – save theories from 
anomalies. Negative heuristic 
(the hard core) – irrefutable. 
What is to be scientific theory?
• Justificationist – confirming instances of a theory.
• naive Falsificationist – refuting instances of a theory.
• Methodological Falsificationist – collaborating instances of a 
theory.
Three patterns of ad hoc hypotheses
(Lakatos)
• ad hoc1 – did not predict any novel facts.
• ad hoc2 – predict novel facts, but they failed
• ad hoc3 – is still unsatisfactory, or is an isolated formula apart from 
the research programme.
The examples:
• for ad hoc1 hypotheses stands Galileo’s theory of circular natural 
motion of terrestrial objects.
• for ad hoc2 hypotheses stands Bohr – Kramer – Slater theory of 
1924.
• for ad hoc3 hypotheses stands Planck’s radiation formula of 1900.
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Ad hoc hypotheses in science as a “door” for pseudoscience
	In attacking ad hoc hypothesis non-science looks as science in the 
eyes of society.
	Popper’s ad hoc criterion is a good mean for demarcation – not inside 
of science, but for society.
	Lakatos three patterns of ad hocness are fruitful, if we want to analyse 
the growth of scientific knowledge.
Popper’s convert criterion of ad hocness
	if the only reason to attack ad hoc hypotheses is to save our beliefs, 
then it is not the way to build a scientific theory, but remains 
speculation, which can not be examined 
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Engelsina Tasseva
SOME ASPECTS Of “DETERMINATION – 
DOMINATION” CORRELATION IN 
SCIENTIfIC KNOWLEDGE
Let’s consider a simple example. The first (iron) bicycle with a handle-
bar and pedals was shown in 1801 and was forgotten afterwards. So that 
much more primitive wooden prototype shown later in 1808 (in another 
social context) became actual predecessor of contemporary bicycles de-
spite all amazingly resembling the earlier 1801-prototype. That’s similarity 
through convergence – a phenomenon which can be observed in evolu-
tionary contexts of various fields (biology, history, sociology, ethnography, 
evolutionary epistemology etc.). It’s due to interaction of two different de-
terminations: functional and contextual. Interacting determinations are 
characteristic of forming and functioning of technical things, artifacts and 
various other objects having heterogeneous (bi- or polygenetic) nature. 
That refers directly to the much discussed question of determination-
character of the world, and of determinism as a philosophical principle. 
Science developments during XX century have provided enough occa-
sions for revising notions and views of causality and accident. Old philo-
sophical questions, such as “how is it possible to exist accident?”, or “how 
is it possible to account existing of accidental but not causeless things 
without contradiction?”, or “how can it be understood that accident and 
indeterminism are not identical?” etc. have been actualized by the virtue 
of a series of situations appearing in science and giving concrete character 
and sharpness to the fact that Laplace’s determinism and similar views are 
utterly insufficient as a means for treating the variety of objective determi-
nations in the world and cognition. I’ll mention some.
The main intrigue in mathematics and logic of XX c. lies in their 
foundational studies. Attempts to provide reliable and non-contradic-
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tory justification for mathematics, have led to discovery of essential in-
completeness, indefiniteness and insolvability in that kingdom of extreme 
exactness. Instead of reducing mathematics to logic, the logic itself has 
proved to be turned into mathematics in a very high degree (many math-
ematicians don’t recognize another logic but mathematical). The very 
foundations of logic have turned out to be problematic because of Gödel’s 
theorems and analogous results, logical and semantic antinomies, and be-
cause of pluralism of logical systems. Logical pluralism is a peculiar case. 
Variety of logical systems is so broad as amount and assortment that de-
fining them as logic relies mainly on intuitional notions and operational 
“habits”. The situation is deeply problematic not only because of annoying 
conceptual insufficiency of those two “foundations”, but because of serious 
tensions coming into being along the line of opposition between intuition-
ally contentive notions of the logical and ultimately formalized instrumen-
tal standards of “making” (mathematical) logic as well as along the line of 
perpetual confusing of empiric and theoretical aspects in philosophy of 
logic reflections. Utmost generality of logical categories makes a very dif-
ficult task to seek after unity of logic systems variety (existing or future) by 
interpreting it within the framework of a more general category apparatus. 
Attempts to conceptualize the general in different “logics” – I. g. “logic is 
a study of entailment” turn out either to be incomplete (some logics have 
no strictly defined entailing operator) or to be circular (by “entailment” it’s 
meant not any sort of entailment but a logical one). That can be avoided 
by defining logical entailment on the base of the more general category 
“determination” what makes clear why the logic of questions is recognized 
as logic for all that – it has no typical logical entailment but contains a 
defined structure of specific determinations intuitionally guessed and in-
strumentally treated as logical.
In physics, on the place of simple and clear atomistic ideas of 
determination character of the world settle indeterminacy (Heisen-
berg), relativity (Einstein) and chaos as an actively worked up theme at 
present concerning: 1. accident as manifestation of outward, nonessen-
tial, unstable, unique relations; 2. accident as a way of turning the pos-
sible into the actual involving existence of more than one independent 
possibility (bifurcations, polyfurcations); 3. certain explicit properties 
oriented beyond the intuitive idea of chaos as disorder – such as ho-
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mogeneity, equiprobability, stochastic equilibrium, fluctuating motion 
of elements etc.
Interdisciplinary system investigations have posed important and dif-
ficult questions like that of “elementarism – holism” correlation in deter-
mination and interpretation of system behavior: the topic of system ob-
jects nonaditivity (how does a system acquire specific properties, irreduc-
ible to properties of its elements, by the virtue of its structural continuity), 
or the problem of system objects self identity (how can a system function, 
change, exchange elements with environment, remaining the same object 
and how can be made distinction between system normal function and its 
destruction). As well as oversimplified versions of fatalism like Laplace’s 
determinism obviously are not to the point in interpreting of humanities 
and social sciences, because of their polygenetic, polycentric, and hence – 
polyparadigmatic nature. 
In philosophy those developments give rise to a broad spectrum of 
problem fields relevant to various deterministic aspects of concordance of 
the whole and a part, the local and the global, the discrete and the continu-
ous, the empiric and the rational, the fundamental, the causal and the phe-
nomenal, and of correlation between the correspondent, the coherent and 
the competitive in concepts of truth. Within practically all main science 
areas have been accumulated large massifs of facts and interpretations, 
requiring revision of a series of basic views on determination character 
of the world and determinism as principle. Accented indications that it 
has been noticed can be found in postpositivism, critical rationalism etc. 
mainly (but not only) as response to some Vienna circle views on deter-
minism. 
In short, the situation is: in logical foundations of scientific knowledge 
we come up against metaeffects like indefiniteness, indeterminacy, incom-
pleteness, incompatibility, insolvability, paradoxes, paraconsistent and 
other nonstandard models etc. requiring corresponding interpretation; at 
the same time there is no adequate enough conceptual apparatus, being, 
at first, suitable for treating such metaeffects in the aspect of determinism, 
and having, at second, paradigmatic status, I. e. having complete enough 
patterns of formulating and solving corresponding scientific problems and 
being popular enough within corresponding science society. It is natural 
to see ultimate views, appearing under those circumstances – predictions 
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of the end of determinism or, to the opposite, so named “butterfly effect”. 
It is relevant to note here at least four points: 1. Affinity to suchlike views 
is quite natural in areas of studying “clouds” (in Popper’s sense) – large 
aggregates of homogeneous and difficult of observational access objects 
– where statistic lows markedly prevail over dynamic ones. 2. When the 
end of determinism gets announced, by “determinism” usually is meant 
a kind of fatalism like Laplace’s, rather popular than actual and already 
much criticized. 3. Reports of determinism end and chaos total establish-
ing has proved strongly exaggerated – the notion of omnipresent simple 
chaos soon “turns” towards ideas of “deterministic chaos” which renounce 
reducing determination directly to causal interaction but don’t renounce 
deterministic principles at all: at present deterministic chaos theory devel-
ops fast, furthermore, it’s actively applied. 4. Thus the very chaos refuses 
end-of-determinism prognoses acquiring an image of a strictly instru-
mentalized deterministic subject corresponding with the fatalistic concept 
of “butterfly effect”.
“Butterfly effect” is the view that insignificant influences lead up to 
significant consequences of large dimension by a chain of causal deter-
minations. This view has its reason – the model of avalanche-like devel-
opment of non stable balanced situations. Contemporary technologies 
– electronics, nanotechnologies etc. also correspond with “butterfly effect” 
model. But understanding determinism as direct linear causal connection 
makes impossible to explain neither appearance of “butterfly effect” in 
mentioned special cases, nor the observational fact that its influence is re-
stricted, as well as the possibility to control it in cognition and technology. 
That involves necessity to extend the content of category “determination” 
conceptually. Attempts are made in this direction to introduce the notion 
“contextual determinacy” in connection with account of scientific theories 
resistibility to counterfactuals or to promote the idea that determination is 
relative by Popper’s “clouds” and “clocks” metaphor. Those attempts, how-
ever, are lacking in generality, system, and adequate concordance of defin-
itiveness and flexibility. As for dialectical treatments of the topic, in spite of 
being more general, flexible, and systematic they are lacking in paradigmal 
status as adaptation and popularity. According to dialectic views causal 
determination is foundation of other determinations but the latter are not 
reducible to the first. It allows considering and classifying different sorts 
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of determination: basic determinations (existential determination of es-
sences and substrata) and accidental ones: conditional, causal, correlative, 
structural, functional etc. This conceptual apparatus is ultimately general 
and remains in a certain sense indifferent to the concrete problem situa-
tions without due adaptation. An obvious point of contact of mentioned 
views is closeness of the notions “contextual determinacy” and “condition-
al determination”. It is as well the most appropriate point to search answers 
relevant to the questions of how is possible to exist accident, when and 
how determination chains interrupt, how is possible to control determina-
tions in general – I. e. questions referring to contexts of determination.
In the world and cognition things become realized under conditions 
of interaction, crossing, competition and counteraction of a variety of dif-
ferent determination factors. Taken in broad enough borders the complex-
ity of this system involves incompleteness, indeterminacy, incompatibility 
etc. Cognitional orientation and finding definiteness in such a complex sys-
tem of determinations is possible because it is not homogeneous. Certain 
substances, relations, states, conditions, aspects, characteristics prevail over 
others and can be outlined in reflection as essential against the rest that can 
be ignored as insignificant. Conceptual support point in interpretation of 
this picture can be found in the notion “domination”. The relation of pre-
dominating is closely connected with determinism. It is everywhere where 
realizing or not realizing determinations under conditions of competition 
of determination factors can be observed. Next two examples illustrate 
shortly the idea of domination: 1. As a result of interaction between two 
different opposite forces (able to “cause” corresponding acceleration to a 
body with given mass) the body begins to move in direction of the larger 
force – determination of the dominating factor realizes. If the forces were 
equal, the body wouldn’t get moving – for lack of domination equilibrium 
state gets established. 2. The terms “domination” and “dominant” are adopt-
ed in different fields by analogy with inheritance of dominant and recessive 
characteristics in genetics. As it is well known recessive characteristics pre-
senting in the genotype of a certain individual appear in its phenotype only 
if they are not in “competition” with dominant alleles. Else, as a determina-
tion of a given characteristic gets realized the genetic dominant. 
Domination may be considered separate of the types of determina-
tion mentioned above or can be assigned to some of them – I. g. to con-
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ditional or contextual determination. On the other hand it is opposite to 
logical determination in cognitive contexts because of being factual. It’s 
rather a type of quasi determination, being a characteristic of joint ac-
tion of different determinations. In any case, however, it has interesting 
peculiarities which outline it against enumerated sorts of determinations: 
1. Domination characterizes competitive aspects of determinism and can’t 
be considered separately and independently from situations of competi-
tive interaction of determinations; as well as it doesn’t involve elementaris-
tic interpretations being a pointedly structural entity. 2. Domination char-
acterizes non obvious quantitative aspects of determinism – it involves 
comparison (more active determining factor – dominant), degrees (more 
categorical determination), accumulation (strengthening or getting weak), 
and change (getting balance or changing direction of domination). 3. As 
far as it is binary or quasi binary relation in determinations field presum-
ably it is the simplest kind of determination interaction. So that it deserves 
attention, even taking no account of the fact that all XX c. philosophy of 
science looks into study dominations (of paradigms, hypotheses, theories, 
standards etc.).
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László Ropolyi 
SHAPING THE PHILOSOPHY  
Of THE INTERNET
About thirty-forty years ago a few engineers and computer scientists 
started to build up interconnected systems of individual computers. (Za-
kon 2006; Living Internet 2006) By now this technological initiative has 
entailed many infinitely complicated and extremely extended implications. 
People started to use the interconnected computers in many unexpected 
and unforeseeable ways in every fields of human life from the everyday 
praxis to the most abstract scientific or cultural activities. (Bakardjieva 
2005; Barabási 2002) In this way the systems of interconnected computers 
has been involved into many essentially different contexts of practices and 
meanings. In these new contexts the “original” characteristics of the com-
puter systems receded and some new characteristics were constructed. As 
an illustration let’s think on chating: the essential dimensions of it do cer-
tainly not relate to the computers, but about special interests of human be-
ings involved into chating. Inventing and discovering more and more basi-
cally different contexts for the interconnected computers a special kind of 
superorganism (or supersystem)1 has been built up. This superorganism, 
the Internet, consists of many fundamentally different organisms (or sys-
tems) and its characteristics are determined by the component-organisms 
and by their interactions. The most known component-organisms are the 
physical network of computers, the World Wide Web formed by the linked 
1 Because of some undisclosed ontological reasons instead of the concept 
of “system” we prefer the concept of “organism” in our description. Organisms 
are structured beings. “Beings as beings”, material and spiritual entities, i.e. living 
organisms and worldviews, furthermore systems, networks, worlds, etc. can be 
considered as typical organisms.
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web pages, real and virtual social networks, communities, activities asso-
ciated with the physical network or the web, and so on. 
In the last few years the presence of the Internet in every fields of hu-
man existence has became clearer and clearer, even the researchers of the 
Internet have started to speak about the ubiquity of the Internet.2 
Scientific and philosophical understanding  
of the Internet
Although we are able to realize the presence of the Internet every-
where, but we are not able to understand it, moreover its true identifi-
cation and acceptable description seems also to be an extremely difficult 
task. Is it a technological organism or rather a social or cultural one? Prob-
ably all of them, but in this case a new question arises: Is it an autonomous 
being or just a collection of coexisting components? In this paper we try to 
sketch some methodological ideas to contribute to a successful answering 
of these questions.
Perhaps we could follow the accepted scientific methodologies, i.e. 
the methodologies of information, communication or cultural theories. In 
this way we would confront with different hard difficulties: the extremely 
high number of such a theories even within one discipline, the uncertainty 
of conditions of their applications, the weakness of their predictions, the 
relatively narrow validity of a single discipline, etc. Notwithstanding of 
these difficulties, in the praxis of the Internet research huge number of 
studies are performed in this traditional scientific style. Researches based 
on these studies can show one or another aspect of the Internet, however 
in an unconscious way, because they do not reflect on their presupposi-
tions on the Internet itself. For example we can read a lot about the “new 
media” of the Internet, about the formation of information society, about 
the free accessibility of information and so on, without any reflections to 
the presuppositions on the real nature of the Internet. 
It is a rather natural observation, that because of the complexity or 
ubiquity of the Internet it is not easy to shape the discipline of the Inter-
2 The annual conference of the Association of Internet Researchers (http://
aoir.org/) was devoted to this topic in 2004.
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net research, a discipline which would be sensible to all the aspects or di-
mensions of the Internet. The territories of regular researches cover many 
various disciplines (from engineering to philosophy) and follow essen-
tially different methodologies. In this situation it seems to be evident that 
without a philosophical analysis there are no chance to create from these 
different disciplines with various methodologies a more or less coherent 
methodology for or discipline of the Internet studies. In the European cul-
ture only the philosophy can suggest a theoretical framework to ensure a 
conceptual understanding of a being as a complete entity, a whole, which 
consists of different components, as an organism with identity, integrity 
and reproduction. This means that, first of all, accepting a philosophical 
methodology we have to understand the nature of the Internet as a whole, 
i.e. to elaborate a philosophy of the Internet. Scientific methodologies and 
disciplines can contribute to the process of elaboration, and necessarily 
sustain its consequences. 
Realizing the success of the Aristotelian philosophy in the analysis of 
the nature of the beings and following some intuitions we decided with the 
elaboration of an “Aristotelian philosophy of the Internet”.
In the classical Aristotelian methodology we have to find out four 
causes of the beings for a proper understanding of the nature of the be-
ings: the material, the formal, the efficient, and the final causes. For the 
Aristotelian describing of the nature of the Internet we want to follow this 
method and try to identify four aspects, dimensions, or kinds of under-
standing for the Internet. The Aristotelian philosophy of the Internet will 
apply the following contexts for the complete understanding: the techno-
logical context, the communication context, the cultural context, and the 
organism context. We have no room to describe our motivations for these 
decisions, but it seems to be necessary to call the attention that we use the 
concept of context instead of the traditional Aristotelian cause. 
four contexts for the Internet studies 
Based on the above considerations the four interrelated contexts will 
be suggested for Internet studies. (Ropolyi 2006) Each context is equally 
fundamental, significant, and co-exists with the other three ones.
1. Technological context. The Internet can be considered as a network 
of computers. The technological context is fundamental if we want to de-
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scribe the role of the Internet in the satisfaction of human needs, as it can be 
seen in banking, shopping, e-commerce, etc. Comparing to the traditional 
technologies it is easy to find many common characteristics and to iden-
tify the specificity of the Internet: it is a kind of information technology. 
Characterization of information technology is based on an understanding 
of the concept of ‘information’ and leads to emphasizing of the role of ‘vir-
tuality’ and ‘openness’ in every situations. For a deeper understanding of 
the consequences of information technology a hermeneutic approach to 
the concept of information is very fruitful: every interpreted being can be 
considered as information. From this position the information technology 
is a “hermeneutical industry”, where the production is performed by inter-
pretation in the individual human minds. Engineers, computer scientists, 
lawyers, sociologists, philosophers of science and technology can contrib-
ute and use to the technological context of the Internet.
2. Communication context. The Internet can be considered as an ac-
tive agent of communication situations. The communication context is 
fundamental in the description of the role of the Internet in building up 
specific human communities, as can be seen in the cases of different online 
communities including mail, chat, news, etc. All sorts of communication 
is a technology of community building, because in the process of commu-
nication we want to share our mental states, views, experiences with each 
other, and in this way to create a community between us. The communica-
tion via Internet is a technology of virtual (open) communities. A deeper 
understanding of the communication via Internet is based on a commu-
nication situation analysis, including considerations on the active role of 
the media, and the specificity of computer as communication machine. 
Information and communication theories, their philosophical analysis, 
sociology, psychology, media studies, political studies, etc. are useful tools 
of the communication context of the Internet.
3. Cultural context. The Internet can be considered as a medium of 
culture. The cultural context is fundamental if we want to describe the 
role of the Internet in building up a new (not natural and not social) realm 
for human beings, as it can be foreseen from the perspectives of the crea-
tion and use of homepages, and from the very specific personal, social, 
political and cultural praxis in the Internet. Traditional culture creates a 
social world from natural beings by reevaluation of natural conditions, but 
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the ‘cybercultural’ praxis of the Internet creates a world of network-being 
from the social system by reevaluation of social values. Netizen is a citizen 
of three worlds: natural, societal, and the net. In this way we have a new 
organism consist of three (of course not Popperian) worlds. 
4. Organism context. The Internet can be considered as a specific or-
ganism. The organism context is fundamental if we want to characterize 
the specific (postmodern) organization principles of the Internet. The most 
significant principles are the followings: plurality, virtuality, fragmental-
ity, individuality, against outer power, and included modernity. Certain 
aspects of these principles can be seen in the specificity of the identity 
and the evolution of networks. The organism of the Internet is an artifi-
cial being created by (direct and indirect) interpretations. In this respect 
one of the most important tasks to study the Internet-related implications 
of the mind/body problem, the Internet/brain analogy. Cognitive science, 
theory and philosophy of (natural, artificial and general) systems can be 
associated to the organism context of the Internet.
Philosophy of the Internet 
The four Aristotelian causes are not really independent of each other. 
They tell us together that what is the being, what does it made of, how does 
it made of, and why? In the case of understanding of complex nature of the 
Internet we have a similar position in our Aristotelian philosophy of the 
Internet, in which all the four contexts can be applied. In this way we can 
conclude that the Internet is an organism created by human interpreta-
tions and practices, an organism which exists as a network of computers, 
and as an active agent of communication situations, and as a medium of 
culture, and as a specific organism. The functioning and the meaning of 
the Internet can only be described by a huge number of disciplines, i.e. en-
gineering, computer technology, law, sociology, philosophy of science and 
technology, information and communication theory and philosophy, so-
ciology, psychology, media studies, political studies, psychological, social, 
ethical, anthropological ideas and principles, cultural studies, philosophy 
of culture, theory and philosophy of society and personality, cognitive sci-
ence, theory and philosophy of (natural, artificial and general) systems. 
However, the Aristotelian philosophy of the Internet can disclose the most 
comprehensive common aim of all of these fragmented aspects: to build 
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up a more complex, more free, more individual – but virtual – realm for 
the netizens. 
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Rosen Lutskanov
GöDEL, WITTGENSTEIN AND THE VIENNA 
CIRCLE: SECOND LOOK AT BENACERRAf’S 
DILEMMA
It may be contended, that one of the main problems which every 
present-day philosophy of mathematics tries to solve is bound up with the 
so-called “Benacerraf ’s dilemma”. It was formulated in the seminal paper 
“Mathematical Truth” (1973) and may be rendered as an argument which 
substantiates the point that it is impossible to construct account of mathe-
matical knowledge which provides simultaneously explanation of its truth 
and argumentation for its knowability (Benacerraf 1983: 414). Obviously, 
the immediate import of this dilemma is that all traditional philosophies of 
mathematics fail to provide an adequate account of mathematical knowl-
edge which appreciates at the same time its ontological commitments and 
its epistemological characteristics. In view of the fact that Benacerraf ’s 
dilemma proved its viability by resisting all attempts to be settled or ex-
plained away, new philosophies of mathematics have emerged. They tried 
to evade the horns of the dilemma by the introduction of a new point of 
departure for the philosophy of mathematics, like the concept of “math-
ematical practice”, for example. As Thomas Tymoczko has put it, “the new 
directions in philosophy of mathematics is largely an attempt to under-
stand that concept – in contrast to such traditional goals as understanding 
mathematical objects (ontology) or mathematical knowledge (epistemol-
ogy)” (Tymoczko 1998: 385). Evidently, such modification of the foothold 
of traditional philosophy of mathematics is inspired by the Wittgenstein-
ian concept of “language game”, comprehended as “part of activity or form 
of life”. As I’ll try to show, this concept’s introduction was inspired by the 
formerly propounded theories which will be presently schematized: the 
Vienna Circle’s conventionalism and Gödel’s mathematical Platonism.
336
I’ll start with the Circle’s stand on the question of the nature of math-
ematical knowledge because it is clearly situated on the “epistemological” 
side of the alternative set out by Benacerraf ’s dilemma. As it was flatly put 
by Hans Hahn, he attaches himself to the position that logic is deprived 
of ontological posits (Hahn 1968: 45-6). In the same vein, Rudolf Carnap 
winds up his presentation of logicism at Königsberg with the following 
words: “Logicism proposes to construct the logical-mathematical system 
in such a way that, although the axioms and rules of inference are cho-
sen with an interpretation of the primitive symbols in mind, nevertheless, 
inside the system the chains of deductions and of definitions are carried 
through formally as in pure calculus, i.e., without reference to the meaning 
of the primitive symbols” (Carnap 1983: 52). This is to say that, sacrificing 
the semantical perspective, the Circle’s members concentrated themselves 
on the epistemological task to “understand the present century’s scientific 
picture of the world … in a unified perspective” (Haller 1991: 96). The 
main obstacle on the way to the accomplishment of this objective was the 
account of the epistemic status of logical and mathematical propositions 
– the received “Kantian” view treated them as synthetic a priori and in 
the same time the fundamental claim of the modern empiricism was the 
resolute “denial of the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge” (Carnap 
1959: 143). The adoption of Russell’s logicism and the Tractarian concep-
tion of logical truths as devoid of content tautologies provided the want-
ing solution: it made possible to view logical empiricism as compatible 
with the existence of the incontestable truths of logic and mathematics on 
account of their conventional statute (Detlefsen 2001: 55). But this theo-
retical account of mathematical knowledge, as far as it was founded on 
the “new logic” of Principia Mathematica, openly presupposed that we are 
capable to deduce in its deductive framework all consequences of the con-
ventional postulates governing the use of mathematical concepts (Carnap 
1959: 145). Unfortunately, Gödel demonstrated that this presupposition 
is unjustified, proving the existence of undecidable propositions, framed 
in the language of Principia (Gödel 1986: 145-7): the Circle’s undertaking 
failed and it turned out that new suggestions are needed.
This is the reason why Gödel placed himself emphatically on the 
“ontological” side of the dilemma by interpreting his result as indication 
that the mathematical concepts are not by-products of linguistic conven-
337
tions – the basic principle of his philosophy of mathematics is that “we 
are not creating mathematical objects by introducing conventions. In 
order to introduce conventions, we have to know the concepts” (Wang 
1996: 224). If we turn back to his incompleteness theorem, we see that 
he asserts that “the heuristic principle of my construction of undecidable 
number-theoretical propositions in the formal systems of mathematics is 
the highly transfinite concept of objective mathematical truth, as opposed 
to that of demonstrability” (Wang 1996: 242). The truth of undecidable 
mathematical propositions is established by informal metamathematical 
consideration which in its turn presupposes the presence of the faculty 
of mathematical intuition which mediates our proof-independent grasp 
of the objective properties of mathematical concepts “ (Gödel 1983: 484). 
This is to say that the limitations imposed on every formal system suscep-
tible to Gödel’s proof may be systematically discarded by supplementa-
tion of its mathematical formalism with intuitively motivated axioms. As 
Charles Parsons suggests, this picture establishes the a priori knowledge 
of mathematical concepts on the same footing as the empirical knowledge 
of perceptible things (Parsons 1995: 63-4). But the fact that the allegedly 
quasi-empirical character of mathematical knowledge is substantiated 
with the help of some mysterious source of knowledge bridging the gap 
between our world and the transcendent reality of pure mathematical be-
ing is the proper occasion for the greatest anti-metaphysician of the XXth 
century to enter the stage.
As I have stated in the outset, the relation between Vienna Circle’s 
and Gödel’s position on the nature of mathematical knowledge conforms 
to the relation between the two extreme positions confronted by Benac-
erraf ’s dilemma. On the one side, Circle’s members neglect the question 
of the truth conditions of mathematical propositions and view justifica-
tion conditions as constitutive for their meaning; on the other side, Gödel 
considers the truth conditions of mathematical propositions as the sole 
foundation of their intuitive justification. Apparently, these two extreme 
positions are vulnerable to the horns of Benacerraf ’s dilemma which, as 
was stated in the outset, has to be sidestepped in one way or another. One 
palpable way out of this situation is suggested by Wittgenstein’s theory of 
meaning as use which reduces to the claim that the meaning of both words 
and propositions is determined by the rules for their use. This theory stems 
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from Frege’s critical remarks about formalism, codified in the fragments 
of his Blue book “ (Livingston 2004: 34) and was originally expounded 
around 1932 in Wittgenstein’s lectures on the foundations of mathematics 
(Ambrose 1979: §2). The introduction of the “use” theory which super-
sedes the old Tractarian “picture” conception was definitely motivated by 
the emergence of Gödel’s limitative result (Shanker 1988: 235). As I’ll try 
to show, one of its primary concerns was to adapt logical theory to the 
newly emerged incompleteness phenomenon by casting serious doubts on 
the standard interpretation of Gödel’s theorem (Floyd 2000: 232). Witt-
genstein’s use theory evades this problem by focusing on the concept of 
proof thought as a function of “logical machinery” but as part of some 
particular language game (Diamond 1976: 194). The so thematized con-
cept provides us with the requisite common construal of truth conditions 
and justification conditions: on the one side, the proof fixes the context 
that the proven proposition occupies and thereby fixes its truth conditions 
by use of suitable modification of Frege’s context principle from words to 
propositions (Diamond 1976: 137); on the other side, the proof provides 
the justification conditions of the proposition, it not just establishes its 
content but displays the process by which its semantic assignment turns 
out (Wittgenstein 1956: 52). That is why “the end result of a proof is not 
isolated from the proof but is like the end surface of a solid. It is organi-
cally connected with the proof which is its body” (Ambrose 1979: § 9). 
This implies straight away that the mere idea of true but undecidable prop-
ositions in logic is self-contradictory when viewed from this standpoint 
(Wittgenstein 1990: 377).
If we now turn back to the starting point of this exposition, we may 
infer that the cogency of Benacerraf ’s dilemma is partly derived from the 
incompleteness phenomenon: separating the truth from proof it entitles 
the separation of truth conditions from justification conditions in the prov-
ince of mathematical knowledge. Wiping out the borderline dividing truth 
from proof, Wittgenstein removes the indispensability of Gödel’s platonis-
tic remedy: the mystical intuition of mathematical concepts (Wittgenstein 
1956: 51). In this way his unjustifiably neglected language-game approach 
opens up completely new perspective for the philosophy of mathematics. 
If we view the truthfulness of mathematical propositions not as transcen-
dentally grounded artefact but as spontaneous emergence descending from 
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the functioning of the various language-games played in mathematics, we 
may at last cast aside the restrictive foundational spirit from his ultimate 
stronghold. We may finally abandon the search for the right metamath-
ematics, realizing that there is no metamathematics, that our theories are 
self-validating pictures of reality (Kjaergaard 2002: 134-5). The distinctive 
trait of such conception was voiced in Wittgenstein’s last work: “I do not 
explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them 
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not 
fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it 
determines its immobility” (Wittgenstein 1993: 22). Benacerraf ’s dilemma 
shows that it is hard to fix once and for all the relation between our prede-
fined ontological and epistemological theories. But if we let “play and make 
up the rules as we go along”, we will be able to view our ontological posits 
and our claims for knowledge as mutually adjustable, as jointly constituted 
in our multiform theoretical correlation with the world.
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Nenad Miščević
ARMCHAIR KNOWLEDGE:  
A NEO-RUSSELLIAN APPROACH
Abstract
A neo-russellian account of candidate a priori beliefs is presented 
and briefly defended. Russell’s externalist proposals, like most externalist 
theories, seems to focus upon the ground-floor of our cognition, or, to be 
more precise, upon the primitive ground-floor of elementary logical abili-
ties. His internalist chapters, foundationalist-coherentist, either of intui-
tion-based or linguistic or expressivist stripe, seem to address the kind of 
knowledge available at a higher level of sophistication. This points to a two 
tiered (or two-level) theory of justification as the proper format for recon-
ciliation of contrasting considerations that fuel contemporary debates on 
the a priori.
Introduction 
Are some items of our knowledge justified a priori, without recourse 
to experience? 1 If no, why have practitioners (mathematicians, logicians, 
moralists) as well as philosophers for centuries been persuaded of the con-
trary? If yes, which ones are those? How is such knowledge possible? Do 
we have an a priori capacity of intuition? These questions concerning a 
priori knowledge and intuitions is at the very center of contemporary epis-
temological debate. I shall assume that some of our mathematical, logical, 
metaphysical and moral beliefs at least appear to be somewhat independ-
ent from immediate empirical justification. They are candidate a priori 
beliefs. In order not to prejudge whether they are deeply and strongly 
1 Thanks go to Marina Bakalova for inviting me to contribute, and to my 
audience at the Varna philosophy conference.
342
a priori, I shall call them armchair beliefs. In this paper I would like to 
present a very rough sketch of a general strategy of justification for arm-
chair beliefs. I shall take as my lead Russell’s idea from his later period that 
epistemology should integrate two different perspectives, an externalist, 
and an internalist one. The externalist perspective is built on sophisticated 
science, but geared to simple, more elementary kinds of knowledge. The 
internalist perspective is more of an armchair matter (although not exclu-
sively), and it starts from demands of doubt and relief from doubt.
Learning from Russell
In his later works, starting from The Analysis of Mind (1921), through. 
An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth from 1940, up to Knowledge: Its Scope 
and Limits (1948) Russell presents a two-component view of epistemol-
ogy, encompassing both internalist and externalist elements. 2 Here is how 
Russell presents the duality of externalist and internalist approaches to 
theory of knowledge.
There are two different inquiries, both important, and each having a 
right to the name “theory of knowledge”. In any given discussion, it is easy 
to fall into confusions through failure to determine to which of the two 
inquiries the discussion is intended to belong…
In the first form of theory of knowledge, we accept the scientific ac-
count of the world, not as certainly true, but as the best at present avail-
able. The world, as presented by science, contains a phenomenon called 
“knowing”, and theory of knowledge, in its first form, has to consider what 
sort of phenomenon this is. Viewed from the outside, it is, to begin with, a 
characteristic of living organisms, which is (broadly speaking) increasingly 
displayed as the organism (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, p.12-13).
The second, internalist project, is introduced through a problem in 
the externalist, naturalistic account. It appeals to science, and science seem 
to be at odds with commonsense, naïve realism.
2 Note that Russell’s externalism finds its place within a view of epistemology 
which is both descriptive and normative
The problem for epistemology is not “why do I believe this or that?” but “why 
should I believe this or that?” In fact, the whole subject is a product of Cartesian 
doubt. I observe that men err, and I ask myself what I must do to avoid error. 
(InqMT: 16)
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… naive realism, if true, is false; therefore it is false. And therefore the 
behaviourist, when he thinks he is recording observations about the outer 
world, is really recording observations about what is happening in him.
These considerations induce doubt, and therefore lead us to A critical 
scrutiny of what passes as knowledge. This critical scrutiny is “theory of 
knowledge” in the second of the two senses mentioned above, or “episte-
mology”, as it is also called. (p. 15)
The internalist project, described in the text as the second form of 
theory of knowledge “is a product of Cartesian doubt. I observe that men 
err, and J ask myself what I must do to avoid error.” 3 
The combination of causal reliabilism and a generous internalism (es-
sentially foundationalist but open to coherentist considerations) is sur-
prisingly up to date. It is in line with two-level views of Sosa and Alston, 
and seems nicely to bridge the gaps that have separated externalists from 
internalists and coherentists from foundationalists.
The general picture: the two tiers of justification 
Here is the beginning of a neo-russellian proposal: start with a thinker 
asking question about her belief that two plus two equals four She is per-
sonally reflectively justified in her belief, if she has valid reasons to trust its 
source. If the source is also de facto reliable, she is meta-cognitively justi-
fied tout court. The picture then features two tiers: the natural reliability 
of thinker ‘s capacities, and the internalist tier of reasons she has to trust 
3 The internalist/externalist duality has been foreshadowed even before late 
period. Tom Baldwin in his important recent paper (“From Knowledge by Ac-
quaintance to Knowledge by Causation“, in Nicholas Griffin (Ed.): Cambridge 
Companion to Bertrand Russell,CUP, 2003) notes that even in the early Problems of 
Philosophy there are traces of reliabilist sympathies. Russell notices that a lot of eve-
ryday knowledge is acquired without explicit reasoning from the data. What makes 
the relevant beliefs into knowledge is that it is suitably connected to its sources. 
So although he maintains a formal commitment to the gold standard of 
logical justifications for beliefs, he appears in practice content to accept the paper 
money provided by the causal connections inherent in his conception of psycho-
logical inference, It is, then, not going to be a big step to allow that where these 
causal connections are reliable enough, there is no need for a hypothetic discover-
able logical connection as well. (Baldwin, in CCR: 428)
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them. The second encompasses all the deliverances from the first one. All 
capacities might come into play: we thus test the memory by appeal to de-
liverances of perception and testimony by appeal to deliverances of both.  
Let us apply this to intuition-states and capacities. When discussing 
intuitions we are all in the position of a cognizer wondering whether her 
intuitive abilities are trustworthy. What is the relation between the inter-
nalist and the externalist accounts?
So, what should we do with the externalist grounding? A simple pro-
posal: take it as a first tier (maybe as a basic level, in the spirit of Sosa and 
Alston). The reliability of a thinker’s abilities is of course not necessarily 
accessible to the thinker herself. Take So foundationalist-coherentist con-
siderations stay on an upper level, and the externalist justification is the 
ground level
Now, the cognizer is able to reflect about her abilities and their reli-
ability, to raise the issue of how reasonable it is to trust them. Take this 
level of reflection as the second level. Here, the reasons are accessible, or 
“internal” to the thinker herself. Such reason bestows an “internal” justifi-
cation, as opposed to the external one, bestowed by reliability. If a cogni-
tive capacity is reliable (i.e. has external justification) and the cognizer has 
good reason available to herself to trust it (i.e. has internal justification) 
than the cognizer is justified in an absolute sense. This general picture cap-
tures rather well the historical and actual character of the debates about 
intuitive cognition. It fits in its general two-stage format Descartes’ quest 
for reflective certainty about the reliability of his natural belief-producing 
abilities that has shaped the debate for centuries. It captures nicely Hume’s 
contrast between spontaneous working of our cognitive nature and the 
philosophical doubts that arise a level about that spontaneous working. 
Most contemporary debate (Sosa’s virtue epistemology and Alston’s dox-
astic practice approach) is following the lead of these classics, with some 
interesting variation.
The externalist account: hyper-safety 
What is the right externalist requirement for reliability of armchair 
belief? The possibility of luck in a priori domain shows that definitions of-
fered in literature of what it is to believe by luck that p are inadequate, since 
they mostly rely on the possibility of it being the case that not-p. When p 
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is necessary, such a definition should be supplemented by one pointing to 
variation in belief, not in the fact believed. Here is what we aim to avoid:
Veritic armchair luck
It is a matter of luck that the agent’s belief is true.
The agent’s belief is true in the actual world, but in a wide class of 
nearby possible worlds in which the relevant initial conditions are almost 
the same as in the actual world–and this will mean, in the basic case, that 
the agent at the very least forms her belief in the sufficiently similar way as in 
the actual world–the agent has a false belief. 
A more remote possibility is the agent’s cognitive structure might have 
differed in a minimal way from the actual one, and beliefs. The parallel con-
sideration is even more important for derived armchair beliefs. We, the 
cognizers, should want to avoid the following (bad) luck:
Procedural veritic luck
It is a matter of luck that the agent’s true belief is a result of correct, i.e. 
valid inferential procedure, for short, that it is correct.
The agent’s belief is true and correctly arrived at in the actual world, 
but in a wide class of nearby possible worlds in which the relevant initial 
conditions are almost the same as in the actual world–and this will mean, 
in the basic case, that the agent at the very least forms her belief in the suf-
ficiently similar way as in the actual world–the agent arrives at the belief in 
an incorrect way. 
What should belief-generating procedures be like, if they are to avoid 
such pitfalls. Here is the closest equivalent to safety, a kind of truth-track-
ing that can be proposed for containing armchair luck. In contrast to 
safety, it does not trade on counterfactual stability of environment, but on 
counterfactual stability of the cognizer: even if cognizer’s ways of think-
ing and even capacities were to vary slightly, she would manage to arrive 
at the same true belief as in the actual world and thus continue to track 
truth. Call it 
Hyper-safety (or Agent Stability): 
For all agents, A, if an agent knows an armchair proposition p, then, 
in most nearby possible worlds in which she forms her belief about p in a 
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slightly different way or with slightly changed cognitive apparatus as in the 
actual world, that agent will also come to believe that p.
The next issue is the explanation of external reliability. Russell won-
dered about our reliability in our reactions to logical form. The univer-
sality of logi offers a nice explanation of having and of reliability of logi-
cal intuitions. Logic is universal, i.e. minimal rationality very probably 
involves practical understanding of logical constants. Being minimally 
rational very probably involves being minimally logical. This is common 
ground of naturalists and anti-naturalists). Therefore, any process that re-
sults in there being minimally rational creatures, also very probably results 
in there being minimally logical creatures. If evolution produces rational 
creatures, then it very probably produces minimally logical creatures. (The 
most relevant probability is the probability of this conditional). Given evo-
lutionary naturalism, minimal logical capacities are to be expected. Note 
that nobody would seriously question causal explanation on the ground 
that the emergence of life itself is relatively improbable, or that evolu-
tion of nervous system is antecedently quite improbable. The challenge is 
more geared to the alleged possibilities of evolution of intelligent creatures 
similar to ourselves, but devoid of logical rules. However, even the ante-
cedent is less problematic than one would have us think. Minimal practi-
cal rationality brings practical advantages, so the antecedent itself is not 
so wildly improbable as anti-naturalist critics (from Plantinga to Nagel) 
would have it. So, although the evolution of rational creatures is in itself 
“radically contingent” (extremely improbable), the fact that once rational 
creatures are on their way, minimally logical creatures are on their way is 
not radically contingent. We have no reason to doubt our own rational ca-
pacities and basic logical intuitions on the grounds of evolutionary theory. 
Evolutionary theory does not undermine itself. We now pass to the second 
tier, comprising internalist account.
The internalist justification
Human cognizers are able to reflect about their abilities and their re-
liability, to raise the issue of how reasonable it is to trust them. Take this 
level of reflection as the second level. Here, the reasons are accessible, or 
“internal” to the thinker herself. Such reason bestows an “internal” justifi-
cation, as opposed to the external one, bestowed by reliability. If a cogni-
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tive capacity is reliable (i.e. has external justification) and the cognizer has 
good reason available to herself to trust it (i.e. has internal justification) 
than the cognizer is justified in an absolute sense.
Interestingly, Russell’s texts on knowledge of logic go beyond the “false 
dichotomy” of foundationalism and coherentism (Sosa). He starts from the 
traditional foundationalist set, centered on the notion of acquaintance. Ac-
cording to it, cognizers are acquainted with logical form of complexes. This 
acquaintance has to be ascribed on theoretical grounds, and it explains the 
ability of cognizers to infer in accordance with the logical structure of proposi-
tions they understand. However, the set is not inimical to some coherentist el-
ements. In his “Regressive method” he is at great pains to stress that it is simple 
theorems that are known by acquaintance, whereas axioms are epistemically 
derived, and justified by their ability to entail self-evident theorems. 
One might take a slightly different route, and distinguish founda-
tionalist and coherentist elements according to the degree of reflection in-
volved: foundationalist ones are spontaneous, coherentist might find their 
place at the higher, more reflective level.
However, one important element has to be added, namely the explana-
tory one. What explains thinker’s entitlement in this area, e.g. her accept-
ance of 2+2 = 4 on the bases of 1+1+1+1 = 4? We need the explanation of 
having such beliefs, and of their reliability. First, we need it against mystery-
mongering. Second, against luck. But it is also a plausible way to specify the 
notion of coherence, namely in terms of explanatory coherence. Through 
this three grounds, explanation becomes a part of reflective justification. 
Note that some two-level theoreticians, e.g.Sosa, reject explanationism.4 
4 Here is Sosa’s version of Benacerraff ’s dilema:
E Sosa. 
a. Platonism is committed to the acausality of mind-independence of math-
ematical objects. 
b. Any causal explanation of our mathematical reliability is incompatible 
with the acausality of mathematical objects. 
c. Any non-causal explanation of our mathematical reliability is incompat-
ible with the mind-independence of mathematical objects. 
d. Therefore, There is no explanation of our mathematical reliability that is 
compatible with Platonism. (Sosa, “Reliability and the A priori” p. 370). 
In answer to it, he rejects explanationism.
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And this combination of coherence and foundations seems accept-
able.
Finally, a word about sources of apriority and aposteriority. At the 
level of externally oriented account we might encounter a possible empiri-
cal origin of some target concepts. How far this is relevant for justification 
is a question for further discussion. In considering the grounds of hyper-
safety one might appeal to independence
from particular features of the world as a source of apriority. But there 
is a consideration in the opposite direction. For instance, a causal explana-
tion might point to our innate categories derived from evolutionary trial-
and-error.
At the level of internalist considerations the main sources of apriority 
are the self-evident character of basic, quasi-foundational intuitions, and 
the narrow reflective equilibrium at the reflective level. However, there 
might be the opposite considerations of wide reflective equilibrium in-
cluding explanation. In this case both positive and negative support are 
holistic, i.e. partly empirical. And explanation is part of reflective justifica-
tion, but causal explanation is a posteriori, therefore, justification might 
be partly a posteriori. Here is the summary:
 DEMANDS SOURCES 
Of 
APRIORIY
SOURCES Of 
APOSTERIORIY
EXTERna- 
LiST
RELiaBi-
LiST
HYPER- 
SaFETY anD
aGEnT STaBiL-
iTY
of individual’s be-
liefs
 possible empirical 
origin of some rel-
evant concepts 
of trans- 
individual, e.g. 
evolutionary 
procedures
independ-
ence 
from particu-
lar features of 
the world
innate categories: 
evolutionary trial-
and-error derivation 
no reason for assum-
ing 
correctness
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inTERna-
LiST 
iMMEDiaTE 
CERTainTY 
self-evidence  
GEnERaL 
REFLECTiVE 
CoHEREnCE 
including 
EXPLanaTion 
oF HaVinG anD 
RELiaBiLiTY
narrow 
reflective 
equilibrium
wide reflective equi-
librium including 
explanation: 
a) explanation is part 
of reflective justifica-
tion
b) causal explanation 
is a posteriori
c) justification is 
partly a posteriori
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Lilia Gurova
NATIONAL PHILOSOPHIES Of SCIENCE?  
HOW SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION SCREENS 
Off GENUINE CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS
The main aim of this paper is to point to the evidence for the claim 
that some national/cultural explanations of how science works are based 
on fallacies in causal reasoning. It will be shown that taken seriously, the 
fallacious causal explanations may have far-reaching negative effects.
My interest in fallacious causal claims was provoked by the obser-
vation that unfortunate causal conjectures are not made only by laymen, 
they could be found even in masterpieces of 20th century philosophy of 
science. 
One could read, for example, the following in Pierre Duhem’s famous 
book The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (1906): “The English mind 
is clearly characterized by the ample use it imaginatively makes of con-
crete collections and by the meagre way in which it makes abstractions 
and generalizations. This peculiar type of mind produces a peculiar type of 
physical theory” [Duhem 1906: 86].
Duhem, obviously, has some recent followers. In his 2002 discussion 
paper, which is published on the web-site of the Centre for Philosophy of 
Natural and Social Sciences of London School of Economics, Rom Harré 
put ahead the conclusion that “…there are some influences from the na-
tional/cultural location of the researchers on the content and also on the 
methods of research” [Harré 2002]1. 
What kind of thinking leads to such causal claims that “peculiar type 
of mind produces a peculiar type of physical theory” (Duhem) and that 
“there are some influences from the national/cultural location of the re-
1 The italic mark in both citations is mine – L.G.
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searchers on the content and on the methods of research” (Harré)? How are 
these claims justified and are they justified at all? And is being unjustified 
the main defect of such claims?
In what follows I’ll try to elaborate on these questions.
Observationally indistinguishable causal relations
Let’s start with a simple example. Two bulbs are given to us. As shown 
on Fig.1 a) and b), either both of them are on, or both of them are dark.
   
        a)     b)
Fig. 1
We conclude (rightly) that the two bulbs are somehow connected and 
that anyone of the causal schemas shown on Fig.2 can produce the ob-
served behavior of the bulbs.
(2)
C
A B BA
C
(1)
Fig. 2
Can we decide whether (1) or (2) represent the real causal connection 
between the bulbs A and B, if we just observe their behavior? The right 
answer is: no, there is no way to do that because (1) and (2) are obser-
vationally indistinguishable. One may suggest then that (1) and (2) are 
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explanatory equivalent as far as they account for the same observations. 
They are not, and it is easy to demonstrate that. If both bulbs are on, and 
we unscrew the bulb A, in the case of (1) the bulb B will go off immedi-
ately, but if (2) is the case, B will stay on.
In other words, the only way to discriminate between (1) and (2) is 
to intervene, to make an experiment. Mere observation does not provide 
enough information to solve this problem. So, any suggestion to accept 
either (1) or (2) as an explanation of the observations a) and b) should be 
claimed unjustified, if it is based only on the given observational data.
In their real life people very often make such unjustified, and in this sense 
fallacious, causal explanations. They might be occasionally right, but in one 
half of the cases they go wrong. And sometimes staying attached to wrong 
causal explanations may have long-lasting negative effects. In what follows I 
am going to draw attention to one of these effects, which appears when the 
assumed unjustified causal explanation is a common cause explanation, i.e. 
an explanation assuming the existence of a hidden common cause, control-
ling the observed correlating events. It will be shown that once assumed, such 
a common cause screens off the relations between the observed events.
Reichenbach’s common cause principle
The effect of screening off was first revealed by Hans Reichenbach in 
his book The Direction of Time (1956). He pointed there to the fact that two 
events that have a hidden common cause appear dependent but are inde-
pendent conditional on their common cause. In this sense the common 
cause “screens off” the spurious relation between its two effects. Later on 
this claim has begun known as “Reichenbach’s common cause principle”. 
In Reichenbach’s example a real (but hidden) common cause screens 
off the spurious relation between its two effects, which one may assume 
(wrongly) causally connected because they appear dependent. But the 
screening off effect is also present in the reverse situation: when one as-
sumes wrongly the existence of a hidden common cause of two events, 
which appear dependent. In this case a non-existent common cause 
screens off the real connections between its alleged effects. The immediate 
result of this screening off is that those who have accepted the common 
cause explanation, stop looking anymore for any direct connections be-
tween the alleged common cause effects. 
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Let’s see how this happens when the suggested common causes are 
unobservable social, in particular national/cultural factors.
Duhem’s fallacious natural/cultural common cause  
explanation
Several important changes took place in the methodology of physics 
in the last quarter of 19th century: the beginning of use of models as a tool 
for bridging the gap between the abstract theoretical assumptions and the 
empirical data, which are supposed to support these assumptions was just 
one of them. 
As it often happened in science, not all of the physicists were happy 
with these changes, some of them openly resisted to the new methodologi-
cal inventions. Pierre Duhem was among those who did not admire the 
rise of what he called “the new English physics”. It is difficult to estimate 
whether his reluctance to accept the basics of the works of Maxwell and 
Thomson (Lord Kelvin) has led him to the claim that all these works are 
nothing but a product of the “ample but weak English mind”. Or on the 
contrary, his attachment to the common cause explanation that all that 
happens in contemporary British physics is simply a product of the ample 
English mind, has led him to the conclusion that it does not make sense 
to look for a deeper understanding of the introduced methodological in-
novations. It is clear however, that there is a strong connection between his 
blindness in regards to the values of the scientific standards enforced by 
the British physicists and his adherence to the national/cultural common 
cause explanation of these standards: his common cause explanation has 
completely screened off for him all proper scientific reasons that might 
be involved in the acceptance of these standards. A good illustration of 
this screening off effect is that when faces the fact that “the English man-
ner of dealing with physics has spread everywhere with extreme rapidity” 
[Duhem, 1906; 87], Duhem points to “the fashion” as the only possible 
explanance: “Among these reasons (for the spread of English manner of 
doing physics – LG) we must, in the first place, mention the taste for the 
exotic, the desire to imitate the foreign, the need to dress the mind as well 
as the body in the fashion of London.” [Duhem 1906: 91].
Duhem’s national/cultural account of what happened in physics in the 
late 19th century is, of course, unjustified. There is not any convincing evi-
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dence for the alleged difference between “the deep theoretical French mind” 
on the one hand and “the ample weak English mind” on the other. On the 
contrary, there are many counterexamples, which could not be simply put 
aside. (Duhem himself points to some famous exclusions of his national/cul-
tural categorization – “the deep theoretical mind of Newton” and “the ample 
and weak mind of Gassendi”). However, the main flaw of Duhem’s com-
mon cause natural/cultural explanation is not that it is unjustified. The main 
problem of Duhem’s national/cultural account is its explanatory weakness. I 
just pointed to its inability to provide for a plausible explanation of the rapid 
spread of British style of doing physics but this is just a follow-up. The main 
defect of the common cause national/cultural account is that it prevents those 
who take it seriously from seeing and understanding the proper scientific 
value of the new methodology (in particular, from seeing the methodologi-
cal merit of the idea to use mechanical models as mediators between abstract 
theories and raw empirical data). The national/cultural account thus leads 
to misunderstanding not only of this particular episode from the history of 
physics but of the driving forces of science in general as well. 
One of the blames which Duhem (wrongly) ascribes to the “ample 
English mind” is its alleged “hostility to metaphysical principles”. Such a 
hostility should be present if Duhem were right that “the ample English 
mind” is reluctant to any kind of abstract notions and/or principles. It is 
not: in fact, the late 19th century English physics is not less metaphysi-
cally grounded than the French or German physics of the same period, 
the difference is that it adheres to different metaphysics. That means that 
the social (national/cultural) categorization, which implies the mentioned 
blame is misleading in this respect, too.
* * *
Let me summarize the chief points made in this paper:
• The national/cultural explanations of scientific enterprise are usu-
ally common cause explanations.
• It has been shown that the common cause explanations which as-
sume a non-observable (hidden) common cause are typically un-
justified, if they have been drawn from mere observations. 
• However, the main defect of the national/cultural common cause 
explanations is not that they are unjustified; their main defect is the 
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explanatory weakness: insofar the common causes screen off the 
possible relations between their alleged effects, national/cultural 
explanations prevent seeing the variety of causal factors, which 
might be responsible for the dependencies among the observed 
phenomena. 
• In particular, Duhem’s national/cultural account of the late 19th 
century changes in the standards of doing physics has screened 
off the proper scientific reasons for these changes and thus has led 
to general misunderstanding of this particular episode of history 
of physics as well as of the proper scientific value of the main in-
ventions, which have appeared during that period: the algebraic 
and mechanical models, and their accompanying metaphysical as-
sumptions.
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Marina Bakalova
A DISJUNCTIVIST ANSWER  
TO THE PROBLEM Of SUBJECTIVE 
INDISTINGUISHABILITY 
Both in epistemology and in philosophy of perception a lot has been 
written about the common nature of the states in which one perceives 
something, and states where one only seem to do so, but which are in fact 
epistemically corrupted either by an evil demon, or by a mad scientist, or 
simply by hallucinations and illusions. On the basis of this reasoning some 
seriously pessimistic conclusions about the nature of perceptual knowl-
edge have been laid down, i.e. that perception like hallucinations and illu-
sions provides no access to the external world, and therefore that we gain 
very little by perceiving. In the recent decades, proponents of disjunctiv-
ism about perception have attempted to throw an optimistic light over the 
issue by arguing that there is much less in common between the veridical 
and the non-veridical states than previously thought. 
1. Traditional HCf Accounts of Perceptual Experience.
The traditional treatment of perceptual experience poses a common 
element to veridical perception and hallucination, which is constitutive of 
the experience as such. The main idea is that perception and hallucination 
belong to the same mental kind. McDowell calls the constitutive common 
element “highest common factor”1, and I will use the abbreviation “the 
HCF accounts” for the traditional accounts of perceptual experience. Ac-
cording to HCF accounts, perception is analyzable into two components: 
i) the common element (or HCF), constitutive of perceptual experi-
ence, and
1 McDowell 1996, p. 113
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ii) the satisfaction of some further condition: “the extra-bit that per-
ception has over and above the appearance”.2 This “extra-bit” in-
cludes the real presence of the object of perception, and its proper 
causal relation to the appearance of the object.
2. Disjunctivist account of perceptual experience.
Disjunctivism about perception is a single theory which denies the HCF 
accounts. Disjunctivists claim that veridical and non-veridical states are of 
fundamentally different mental kind, or that there is an excluding disjunc-
tion between them. The veridical state encompasses its external object; it has 
a factive and relational nature, which the non-veridical state does not have. 
Allan Millar nicely summarizes the view by outlining three main principles 
associated with it. The first principle claims a disjunction between veridical 
and non-veridical cases. Here is the formulation by Millar3: 
“(a) A case in which it appears to the subject (in some modality) just 
as if an F is there can be a case in which she has an essentially relational 
experience implicating an F or it can be a case in which this is not so.”
The second principle straightens the disjunction by stating that ve-
ridical case has an essentially relational nature, whereas the non-veridical 
one does not have such a nature:
“(b) Cases relating to (a) in which the subject is not having an es-
sentially relational experience implicating an F include cases in which 
the subject is hallucinating an F and cases in which the subject perceives 
something which, though it appears to be an F, is not.” 
Finally, relational experience omits the analysis of perception charac-
teristic to the HCF account, namely that to perceptive is to have a veridical 
appearance. In other words, disjunctivists reject the view that perception 
is a hallucinatory-like state, complemented by the presence of the object 
and the causal link between that object and the perceiver. Hence, the third 
principle of disjunctivism: 
2 Dancy 1995, p.421
3 Millar (forthcoming), p. 4
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“(c) The case in which the subject has an essentially relational experi-
ence does not admit of decomposition into (i) the having of a non-rela-
tional experience (what Snowdon calls an “inner experience”), and (ii) the 
satisfaction of further conditions.”
I would like to defend a moderate version of disjunctivism about per-
ceptual experience, although I could not fulfill this task within the present 
paper. Here, I am going to address one particular problem concerning my 
defense, the problem of subjective indistinguishability for disjunctivism.
Before focusing on the problem, let me explain why I do not like the 
HCF accounts and what I understand by “moderate disjunctivism”. First, it 
is mainly epistemological reasons that draw me against the HCF accounts 
of perception. By postulating a common nature of the veridical and the 
non-veridical states, those accounts isolate the perceiver from the external 
world. Thus, they secure only a very narrow basis for knowledge. In par-
ticular, HCF accounts deflate our putative knowledge to just knowledge 
about appearances, possibly pure fictions. Needless to say, such theories 
invite skepticism about the external world. 
By “moderate disjunctivism” I mean the view that rejects the letter 
of disjunctivism but preserves its spirit.4 In particular, I want to keep the 
disjunction between the good and the bad state, but at the same time to 
allow for a common element between them. There is no obvious obstacle 
to such a position, since one can argue that this common element is not 
essentially constitutive for the good case.
My moderate version of disjunctivism is based upon three main 
principles, which I will outline very briefly. The first principle is called 
the Primacy Thesis, and this is the claim that epistemically good situation 
is epistemologically primary (over the bad one). In particular, perceptual 
situation is epistemologically primary (over the mere being appeared to 
situation. The second principle is the Principle of Factivity. According to 
this principle, reasons and justification available in epistemically good 
situations are factive (to use Descartes’ example: the very fact that I am 
sitting by the fire). Hence, reasons and justification available in the per-
ceptual situation involves perceived states of affairs (“facts”) themselves. 
4 See Williamson 2002, p. 47
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And finally, the Principle of Reflective Inheriting is the principle that in the 
good case the reflective, second-order justification inherits the good fac-
tive qualities of the first-order knowledge. 5
3. The Problem of Subjective Indistinguishability  
for Disjunctivism
Finally, we arrive at the problem of this paper. A pressing objection 
against the disjunctivist theories of perception is that once abandoning the 
HCF, disjunctivists are left with no resources to explain why hallucination 
is subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perception. I want to argue 
here that the problem is not compelling. The disjunctivist can claim that 
there is a common element to both states sufficient to explain their indis-
tinguishability, but not constitutive of the perceptual state. 
What is this element? I bet on the phenomenological character of our 
experiential states. I will argue that both states are indistinguishable because 
they have the same phenomenological character, but that the character is not 
essential to the states. I have two reasons in support of my claim. First, char-
acter is usually not essential to the entity (e.g. if I change my character I will 
remain the same person). Second, cases of inverted qualia are possible. 
The second point requires further clarification. Under “qualia” I mean 
the components of the phenomenological character of experience, inter-
preted as introspectively accessible phenomenal features of our mental 
states. Qualia describe what it is like to be in a certain mental state, e.g. 
what it is like to see red. Now, what it is like to see red is probably a sub-
stantial property, but not very informative about red things. This statement 
is supported by the Inverted Qualia Thought Experiment. The experiment 
invites the possibility that there are people to whom red objects appear 
green since birth, but they have learned to call them “red”; yellow objects 
appear blue, but they have learned to call them “yellow”; and so on along 
the whole color spectrum.
The possibility of inverted qualia shows that states with the same de-
scription “it seems to me that I see red”, and more importantly with the 
same referent (which makes them both states of perceiving red) can have 
5 The principles are inspired by Duncan Pritchard’s paper in Pritchard (forth-
coming 2006)
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different phenomenological characters. So, once again: character is not 
constitutive of the veridical perceptual state.
Let me say some more words about my understanding of qualia. I 
would like to combine anti-representationalism about qualia with exter-
nalism about mental content.
Anti-representationalism about qualia is the view that qualia are 
qualities of experiences as opposed to qualities represented by experienc-
es.6 The view is motivated by the Inverted spectrum thought experiment7, 
which shows that qualia can vary without variation in the semantic con-
tent of our experience. On the other hand, externalism about mental con-
tent applied to qualia is the view that qualia do not determine the content 
of the mental states, at least the states of perceptual experience.8 Rather, 
our perceptual states have wide content, i.e. they are individuated by their 
relations to the environment. 
4. Objections to my proposal
One may object that qualia are too thin to explain why the good and 
the bad cases are subjectively indistinguishable. Indeed, qualia are only the 
non-intentional properties of experience, and being such they cannot ex-
plain why we seem to represent objects in our experiences. But in hallucina-
tion we seem to perceive objects, and this very fact begs for explanation. So, 
I need a story of why qualia are so salient that they by themselves can create 
an accomplished imitation of veridical experience (like in hallucinations).
I don’t have a clear answer to that objection, but I can offer a direction 
for reply. We can try to detach the informative (epistemic) elements of the 
state from the elements that contribute to the impact of the state, such as 
their aesthetic strikingness. Then, we could argue that only the core in-
formative elements are constitutive of the state. 
This answer is slippery, however, since it is undermined by a second 
and more cogent objection. I cannot say that the Invert’s state is a proper 
perceptual state only because it is informative enough. In other words, it is 
absurd to claim that the Invert perceives red properly, since what she sees 
6 Representationalism about qualia is supported by Siewert 1998. Motivation 
for anti-representationalism can be drawn from Block 1990 and Davidson 1986. 
7 Even more by the Inverted Earth thought experiment offered by Block 1990.
8 For classical defense of externalism about mental content see McGinn 1977.
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is actually green. I agree with that objection, and I think that just informa-
tion-conduciveness will not do the whole job. In order to classify as infor-
mation of a given faculty-type, i.e. perceptual information, it has to be ob-
tained by a standing faculty. Invert’s information about red is not obtained 
by her perceptual faculty, but in a roundabout way: through training in a 
particular linguistic community. However, I do not claim that the Invert 
perceives red properly, neither that she seems to perceive red properly. 
What I claim is that she can compensate the informational deficiency of 
her perceptual state in a non-perceptual way. This does not mean that the 
informative element is not constitutive of the perceptual state.
In conclusion, I believe that the disjunctivists can afford admitting a 
common element to veridical and non-veridical states without sacrificing 
their main standpoint, namely that what is constitutive of veridical per-
ception is its relational nature.
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Zoltan Wagner
fREE WILL, SELf-fORMING ACTIONS  
AND SCIENCE 
1.
Martin Luther’s famous sentence: “Here I stand, I can do no other” 
has been used in both sides of debate about free will and determinism. 
To mention only two significant theorists: Daniel C. Dennett and Rob-
ert Kane used him as a paradigmatic example to demonstrate their views. 
Dennett is confident in his belief that Luther’s example shows that free will 
is compatible with determinism for Luther’s act was free, responsible and 
rational. Robert Kane, as an incompatibilist libertarian thinks that Luther’s 
act can only be free if it was preceded by an indeterministic choice at some 
point that led to his unshakable decision. Whereas these two thinkers take 
Luther’s diction as both true and expressing his belief, Galen Strawson 
finds it less than obvious that we have to take it literally.1 In this paper I 
wish to look at Dennett’s and Kane’s opposing interpretations of Luther’s 
case. The latter one, Kane, relies on modern science; this is how science 
comes into picture. My conclusion will be that science does not make a 
crucial difference in our practices of judging people free and responsible. 
To do that we can rely on the phenomenology of the agents. 
Let us read first Dennett’s view:
“Here I stand,” Luther said. “I can do no other”. Luther claimed that 
he could do no other, that his conscience made it impossible for him to 
recant. He might, of course, have been wrong, or have been deliberately 
overstating the truth, but even if he was – perhaps especially if he was 
– his declaration is testimony to the fact that we simply do not exempt 
someone from blame or praise for an act because we think he could do 
1 Strawson, G (1986) Freedom and Belief. Oxford: Claredon Press, p. 139.
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no other. Whatever Luther was doing, he was not trying to duck respon-
sibility.”2 
Dennett refuses the shared assumption of several philosophers writ-
ing on free will. According to this, “A necessary condition for holding an 
agent responsible for an act is believing that the agent could have refrained 
from performing the act”.3 This widely held assumption lies behind the 
consequence argument and other arguments for the incompatibility of 
free will and determinism. Dennett thinks that we should forget about this 
assumption. Though perhaps Luther did not have free will in the libertar-
ian sense, his act was free and dictated by reason.
Kane disagrees with Dennett, and thinks that Luther’s example does 
not prove that his incompatibilistic libertarianism is false. He argues the 
following way:
An act like Luther’s can be ultimately responsible […] though deter-
mined by his will, because the will from which it issued was a will of his 
own making, and in that sense it was his “own” free will. […] Ultimately 
responsible acts, or acts done of one’s own free will, make up a wider class 
of actions than those self-forming actions (SFAs) which must be unde-
termined and such that the agent could have done otherwise. But if no 
actions were “self-forming” in this way, we would not be ultimately re-
sponsible for anything we did.”4 
It is crucial here that SFAs entail indeterminism, so in Kane’s view free 
will is only possible in an (at least parrtly) indeterministic world.
Now, let us look at the following two examples:
(1) We have two possible worlds, a deterministic one (Wd) and an 
indeterministic one (Wi). Martin Luther can be found in both of them. Let 
us call the one who lives in Wd Luther(d), and Luther(i) will be the name 
for the inhabitant of Wi. Now, suppose that both of them have exactly the 
same life histories. They have gone through exactly the same experiences 
2 Dennett, D. (1984) Elbow Room. Cambridge, Massachussets: The MIT 
Press, p. 133.
3 van Inwagen, P. (1984) ‘The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism’. 
In: Watson, Gary Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 46-58, p. 50.
4 Kane, R. (1996) The Significance of Free Will. New York, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 78.
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and they have made exactly the same acts. And most importantly, they 
are exactly the same in all phenomenological respects. Not only that we 
cannot tell them from each other by looking at their life stories but also 
there is no phenomenological difference between them. The only difference 
between them is that Luther(i) has made at least one kaneian SFA, whereas 
the other one has not. 
If we apply Kane’s theory on free will and responsibility to these two 
Luthers, we have to regard Luther(i) as a being who has free will and we 
have to judge him ultimately responsible for his “Here I stand, I can do no 
other”. But when we judge Luther(d), we have to say that he has no free 
will, and he is not responsible for his act in the sense relevant for moral re-
sponsibility. I believe that there is something wrong with this judgement. 
The reason for this is that the two Luthers are exactly the same from the 
phenomenological point of view. That is, both of them believe that they 
have gone through the same life history, that they both made enormous 
efforts to become what they are, that they both had the same intention, 
the same ideals and the same goals. Both of them experience themselves 
as executors of the same life project and as creators of the same life. But if 
Kane is right, Luther(d) is mistaken in his belief. In a sense he is right be-
cause Luther(i) could have become a different person who acts differently, 
whereas Luther(d) could not have. But given that they are the same in all 
observable respects, it seems to be unjust to claim that Luther(d) was only 
lucky. And what is more, Luther(i) is equally lucky. For it is mere luck that 
he is an inhabitant of an indeterministic world. And hence, it is mere luck 
that he made an SFA. 
Imagine a different example. (2) Jane and Joan live in the same world, 
are identical twins, and both of them are brilliant pianists. All music critics 
agree that they have exactly the same artistic credits, none can be said to 
be better than the other is. Now, suppose that Jane has made one kaneian 
SFA and Joan has not. Is it right to say to her: “after all, you have only been 
determined to all this, you are not a free agent and you are not ultimately 
responsible for your achievements”? What is wrong with this judgement 
is that both of them have practiced for ten hours per day for twenty years 
and both of them have made the same sacrifices to become pianists. Mean-
while they gone through the same experiences and they think that they 
have made the same choices and the same efforts. Hat is, they are simi-
365
lar from the phenomenological point of view. The point here is that given 
the phenomenological similarity, it is not just to judge Jane and Joan dif-
ferently. Of course, after getting to know the difference between them as 
regards SFAs, music critics will not cease to judge them differently from 
their point of view. They will not devalue Joan’s musical achievements and 
even though she had a completely deterministic life history, they will not 
regard her something like a mere machine. Why would this be different 
from an ethical point of view? Why would we say that she has no free will 
and that after all, she is not responsible for what she has become and what 
she has achieved? The difference between them is not like the difference 
between two rich people, one of whom has made his fortune by twenty 
years of work and the other of whom has won the lottery. Jane and Joan 
have made the same efforts, and are similar from the phenomenological 
point of view.
2.
In the second part of this paper I will focus on science, and how sci-
ence changes the interpretation of the two examples. Kane thinks that 
whether free agency works in the way he suggests is not a question to be 
answered by mere armchair speculation. Rather, it is an empirical prob-
lem that can be examined with the help of modern science. In Kane’s view 
the functioning of the human brain involves chaotic indeterminacies that 
make it possible for agents to do or to refrain from, doing something. 
There are quantum indeterminacies in the brain, and they are amplified to 
the level that is relevant in decision-making. 5 In the Luther example, Kane 
admitted that Luther’s dictum could have been true in a way that does not 
question his free will and his responsibility. That is, it is not a problem for 
libertarianism that Luther could not have acted otherwise, so long as his 
decision was based on motives that go back to an indeterministic SFA. If 
one reads a Luther biography, one like Erikson’s famous one6, one will see 
that Luther went through a serious identity crisis in his youth. Kane thinks 
that we can locate the indeterminacy somewhere here. The chaos of his 
5 For details of the theory see especially chapters 8 and 9 of his book cited 
above.
6 Erikson, E. (1958) Young Man Luther. New York, London: Norton.
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youthful crisis was an indeterministic one, in which Luther made SFAs, 
forming his character. In the resolution of his identity crisis he formed a 
character, and it was so firm that it made it impossible for him to do oth-
erwise when he broke with the Church. 
If the process of the formation of his character had been deterministic, 
he would not have been a free, responsible agent. At this point, science comes 
into picture. For it seems that if Kane’s scientific explanation of choice is right, 
Luther’s character formation could not have been deterministic. It seems to 
me, that Kane’s view implies that the phenomenology of agency which in-
cludes a feeling of inner uncertainty before the choice, and after the it has 
been made, a strong feeling of determination, is parallel with metaphysics 
(or rather, physics). That is, the inner feeling of indecision corresponds to a 
chaotic state that is actually indeterministic and the inner feeling of being de-
cided about what to do corresponds to determinism. Therefore, we are living 
in a world in which some of the events are determined, and some of them are 
undetermined. If this scientific picture is right, the phenomenology of free 
will cannot exist without indeterminism. Phenomenology of agency includes 
such concepts as choice. And this concept includes the inner feeling of uncer-
tainty together with the feeling that one can both do and refrain from, doing 
something, and if science is right, we can be sure that this feeling is due to an 
actually existing chaotic, indeterminisctic state in our brains. 
Now, let me go back to the two examples. If Kane is right, science 
could show that, since the phenomenology of agency corresponds to the 
indeterministic nature of reality, and since Luther(d) and Luther(i) are 
similar from a phenomenological point of view, the example cannot work. 
If Luther(d) really has the same phenomenology as Luther(i), he lives in a 
world that is not actually possible, or at least, in a world which is a strange, 
not normal, far-off possible world. If there is really a close connection be-
tween the phenomenology and indeterminism, then in all normal worlds, 
where there is conscious, intentional agency, choices are preceded by inde-
terminism and consequently Luther(d) is too strange a creature to count 
as a counterexample against Kaneian libertarianism. 
If we turn to the second example, we see something similar. If Kane’s 
scientific theory of agency is true, it is also true that all of us are such crea-
tures that make SFAs. Therefore it is not possible that while Jane has made 
at least one SFA, Joan has not.
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To sum up this point: if science could show that there is a close connec-
tion between the phenomenology of free agency and chaotic indeterminism, 
the two counterexamples would not work because they talk about something 
that is not possible. That is, the two worlds in the two examples (Wd in the first 
example and the world of the second example) are not really possible worlds. 
Such scientific theory could show that it could not be the case that two agents, 
having the same “superficial qualities” or being the same from the phenom-
enological point of view can be different as regards indeterminism. 
But if that is true, what effect does it have on our moral practices of 
holding people responsible? If our phenomenology is based on indeter-
minism and the existence of free will, we need not worry about the meta-
physical aspects of an act; we can simply rely on the phenomenology of the 
agent. But if it turned out that there could not be such a scientific theory 
that ties together indeterminism and the phenomenology of agency, our 
counterexamples start to work. In these examples I showed that given the 
phenomenological similarity, it is not just to judge Luther(d) and Luther(i) 
differently, and in the other example, that it is not just to judge Jane and 
Joan differently. So, in this case again, we can rely on the phenomenol-
ogy of the agent. That is, whether science proves that free agency is tied 
to indeterminism or not, in our practical judgements we can rely on the 
phenomenology of agency.7 Science cannot make a big difference for ethics 
of free will; rather, it can just show “how it works”. How come that we have 
such a phenomenology that we believe that we are free agents? And all this 
leads to the following compatibilist conclusion: it is correct to judge certain 
agents (similar to the ones in the examples) free on the basis of their phe-
nomenology even if determinism was true. But in case it is not, we would 
still rely on the same information in judging them free or not free.8 
7 Of course, it cannot be so simple since the phenomenology of the agent 
is accessible directly only for the agent. The point here is that when we have a 
piece of information of the phenomenology of the agent, it does not make any 
difference whether the phenomenological content was created by deterministic 
or indeterministic means.
8 It might be an important detail that we evaluate the lives of the agents dis-
cussed in this paper positively. Perhaps we would tend more to forgive someone 
whom we evaluate negatively if it turned out that he was determined but we 
should not devalue positive aspects of human life by saying they are determined 
and hence, they are not free. 
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Nina Atanasova
If SSK WERE A SCIENTIfIC METHODOLOGY
This essay deals with the scientific status of SSK in a twofold way. 
First, it will examine the SSK’s pretension to be a scientific study of sci-
ence. Next, it will be concerned with the confusion made by most of the 
science studies’ critics when taking SSK, along with other programmes 
that are even more radical, to be the contemporary philosophy of science. 
In addition, while the criticism, received by most of the science students 
from the scientists, taking part in the so-called science wars, is equitable, 
it is unfair regarding the contemporary philosophy of science, which is far 
from being a relativistic epistemology. Relativism being the main feature 
of the science studies is a solvable problem in philosophy.
The topic of this essay is inspired by Lilia Gurova’s presentation at 
the last session of the school1. In her paper, she defends the philosophy of 
science against the Sokal and Bricmont’s criticism by pointing out that it 
is unfair to blame the philosophers of science2 alone for the widespread 
misuse of their work. If we are to blame someone for the improper public 
image of science, these are both the philosophers of science and the sci-
entists3. 
The main thesis in what follows is that scientists blaming philoso-
phy of science are in fact fairly attacking other disciplines. Studies such as 
Latour’s and SSK students’ presuppose philosophy but are not a philoso-
phy themselves. 
It is worth taking exactly SSK under study because of their pro-scien-
tific attitude and even their science popularization ambition. The criticism 
they received from the scientific warriors in the science wars has to be 
1 Gurova, L. (2004). 
2 Which they do in their (1998, p. 52) and (2001, p. 29) for example.
3 Gurova, L. (2004, p. 53).
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carefully examined in order to SSK-ers be able to revise their programme 
and be useful science popularizers.
The Strong progamme
In his (Bloor, 1976) David Bloor states the new sociological pro-
gramme for studying science. It is a study, which strives to be a science of 
science. It is also an attempt to expand the implications of the classical so-
ciology of knowledge, which deals with cultural forms such as religion and 
aesthetics, to aeries like natural sciences, which are examined as cultural 
forms not much different from others.
In opposition to the old study of science, SSK deals with the genesis of 
scientific knowledge regardless of its truth-value. If the old programmes both 
philosophical and sociological allowed for the sociology of science to only 
deal with the wrong judgments (to be a sociology of error), made by the sci-
entists, the new way of studying scientific practice will not be concerned with 
the right or wrong status of a decision. Causes of both right and wrong beliefs 
will be examined and this will guarantee the morally neutral conclusion of 
the study. Thus, this new theory of science will be more as a science itself.
Its principles are:
1. It would be causal, that is, concerned with the conditions which 
bring about belief or states of knowledge. Naturally, there will be 
other types of causes apart from social ones which will cooperate 
in bringing about belief. 
2. It would be impartial with respect to truth and falsity, rationality or 
irrationality, success or failure. Both sides of this dichotomies will 
require explanation. 
3. It would be symmetrical in its style of explanation. The same types 
of causes would explain, say, true and false beliefs. 
It would be reflexive. In principle its patterns of explanation would 
have to be applicable to sociology itself. Like the requirement of symme-
try this is a response to the need to seek for general explanations. It is an 
obvious requirement of principle because otherwise sociology would be a 
standing refutation of its own theories.4 
4 Bloor, D. (1976; p.7).
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Bloor states the requirement for the causal explanation instead of the 
teleological and claims that it is a feature of sciences’ that helps establish-
ing the scientific status of SSK. However, it is a closely related to the em-
piricist methodology claim. Thus, SSK has to be a kind of an empirical 
study of science. Hence, it has to obey the rules stated by the empiricism, 
which they actually criticize following Feyerabnd and Kuhn. 
If this discipline were to take the model of science, that is the empiri-
cist methodology, in order just to call itself a science, it would be better to 
look for a better fitting to history of science model than the model pro-
posed by the empiricism. Such a model can be found in the methodologi-
cally realistic, though remaining empirically informed models of science. 
In this model, the seemingly arbitrary way of choosing a theory, which is 
obviously not driven by empirical considerations, is justified by at least 
methodological if not metaphysical claims to reality. 
Is SSK a Science?
If it is a science, than it is a false science. That is bacause it contradicts 
the empirical data, it studies. If it is the social reality, created by the sci-
entists, which is under study, than the scientists’ arguments for a theory-
choice will matter for the social study of science. SSK-ers in contrast, do 
not care for any philosophical argumentation used by scientists. All that 
matters for them is the sociologically detectable mechanisms driving the 
negotiation process. 
This is a clear case of a theory contradicting the empirical data it stud-
ies.Hence it has to be either given up, or at least revised. 
Is SSK a Methodology of Science?
One way of approaching this problem is when observing that it is 
mistakenly taken to be the only possible alternative to the old positivist 
philosophy of science, which was widely criticized and shone to be inade-
quate for explaining science. It is easy to observe that there are approaches 
such as the scientific realism that solve the problems put before the posi-
tivism without being relativistic.
Moreover if it were an empirically adequate study of science, than it 
would be justified to inductively state generalized claims about the causes, 
making scientists to maintain a theory. It is not, hence any general claim 
of its is not justified.
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If SSK is a science, which strives to fit the empiricist model of scientif-
ic theory, than it is a false science, because it is not empiricaltty adequate. 
The reality studied by SSK is the social reality where the scientists make 
their theory choices. Hence, the motives for preferring a given theory 
rather than another, proclaimed by the scientists themselves are the em-
pirical data, which should be studied by the SSK-ers. But these protocols 
contradict the SSK’ s conclusions for the scientists’ motivation. Therefore, 
SSK is falsified. 
If we are to be naïve falsificationists, then we should give up the SSK’s 
programme. But if we adopt a methodological falsificationism, then we 
should revise the programme and see whether it is worth reformulating 
some of its most unlikely claims.
Is it worth studying SSK at all?
As far as it has a science popularization programme5, which, if accom-
panied by a philosophical discussion of the cases studied, would give a good 
account of the scientific practice in respect to generating knowledge it is.
Finally, it is the time to state the conclusion: If SSK Were a Scientific 
Methodology, than the criticism exposed by the scientific warriors against 
the philosophy of science would be fair, because they often take the SSK, 
along with all the science studies, as the contemporary philosophy of sci-
ence. As far as SSK is not a philosophy of science, the criticism it received 
is not applicable to the philosophy of science.
The criticism SSK received could lead it to a revision of some of its 
most radical claims. If it restricts its cognitive pretensions to only external 
history of science, then it would be quite an acceptable programme. Actu-
ally there already are such attempts to make it acceptable to the scientists 
themselves. Peter Daers6 proposal for reading the science studies as merely 
epistemography leaving room for the classical epistemology of science is a 
step towards a sober solution of the too warlike mood of the science and 
anti-science warriors in the science wars.
5 See for example Public Understanding of Science, Vol. 1. Issue 1. 1992.
6 Dear, P. (2001)
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Jana Yaneva
LOGIC AND TOLERANCE
It is easy to preach tolerance from a position of weakness;
It is hard to abstain from using violence from a position of power.
The topic of Communication and Tolerance is one of the five topics in 
the Logic curriculum for secondary education in Bulgaria1. Until recently, 
this topic was not typically associated with logic. What do logic and toler-
ance have in common?
Logical culture is at the basis of European culture and civilization. 
The term European Rationalism has become a common name (just like 
American Pragmatism; or the Mystical East…).
In the broader sense of the word, logical culture is associated with 
effective argumentation. But before we can use logic as an instrument of 
argumentation, we need to have a sufficient array of logical knowledge 
and skills.
Tolerance is benevolent acceptance of individual, ethical, ethnic, reli-
gious, racial, political and other differences.
Logical knowledge and argumentation facilitate the dialogue between 
different cultural communities and help to unite them. Logical culture 
does not depend on any ethnic, religious, racial, political or other differ-
ences and exhibits natural tolerance toward them. But there are two as-
pects which need to be taken into consideration:
First, logical argumentation is only one of various possible kinds 
of argumentation. As any other kind of argumentation, its aim is to 
1 Programme No 5, 2000, of the Ministry of Education: “AzBuki” v. 
38, 2000. Logic and Tolerance is one of five topics, along with Rationality 
and Thought, Logic and Forms of Thinking, Questions and Answers, Truth 
and Argumentation. All these have to be fitted within 27 teaching hours or 
less (in reality).
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convince. But this is not always related to logic and rationality. Often 
rhetoric can be much more effective for this purpose. Suggestion is also 
a powerful means of argumentation. So are drugs. If a nation is suscep-
tible to belief (either religious or ideological), it would be inclined to 
be convinced through methods which are rather different from rational 
ones. There are various sources of knowledge and criteria for truthful-
ness, such as:
1. Practice (facts, usefulness);
2. Logic (rationality);
3. Belief (ideology, religion, suggestion);
4. Power (coercion, violence).
These same ones, under certain conditions, could be regarded as 
kinds of arguments: factual arguments; logical arguments; arguments of 
belief; arguments of power; and so on.
Logic (rationality) makes no claims to having a dominating influence 
over the process of knowledge and argumentation. But in this process it 
has the unique chance to build bridges and to unite people: logic, as a 
kind of disciplined thinking, exhibits no ethnic, religious, racial, political 
or other differences. And if efforts are made to develop logical culture (ac-
cording to European standards), this would undoubtedly limit the ideo-
logical and religious inclinations to knowledge and argumentation (which 
easily transform into “mentality”).
Among the many kinds of struggles in the world, we could outline 
two main kinds: the struggle for truthfulness and the struggle for power. 
In the first one, logic has some priority. But even in this area there are no 
high expectations from logic. The criteria for truthfulness are not exclu-
sively logical: factual criteria may be said to have priority (no matter how 
flexibly the facts are interpreted). On this plane, European Rationalism 
competes with American Pragmatism.
Second, logical argumentation has some specificity which determines 
its relation to tolerance:
a. Because of its very nature (order and disciplined thinking accord-
ing to some rules and regulations), logic cannot be tolerant toward chaotic 
thinking. Its tolerance has certain limitations.
In a logical aspect, tolerance means acceptance of different logical 
methods – their simultaneous application for argumentation and dia-
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logue. But the way to do this is through knowing them and being able to 
apply them2.
b. In a more general, humanitarian and educational aspect, the ex-
istence of logical culture (knowledge and disciplined thinking) could af-
fect positively the manifestation of tolerance to other kinds of differences: 
ethnic, religious, racial, political and so on. This tolerance, however, goes 
beyond the scope of logic. Logic cannot pronounce itself on tolerance in 
general, as the latter is rather an ethical or cultural category. Logic is not 
interested in the problems of tolerance toward organized crime, corrup-
tion, people trafficking, drug dealers and so on.
And even though logic has nothing to say about tolerance in such cas-
es, it takes little logic to understand that tolerance also has its limitations. 
It turns out that even though we need tolerance, we have much more need 
of “zero tolerance” to some things and phenomena around us. The term 
“zero tolerance” is often used as a mantra, a magical formula for things 
to get right. However, things don’t get right by talking about them only. 
And even if this “zero tolerance” is materialized, it will be nothing more 
than a step in a long list of measures: tolerance; zero tolerance; intolerance; 
passive and active intolerance; sanctions; a civil society; an ordered and 
civilized state…
Some aspects of life in our current society require more than zero 
tolerance. The other steps need to be taken as well:
1. Showing intolerance to some negative phenomena – passive and 
active intolerance3.
Passive intolerance toward the object of intolerance consists in “a re-
fusal to communicate, leaving the room, going away, relocation, etc. Ac-
tive intolerance is always directed toward the other, it is the striving of 
2 For example, the different logical methods for solving syllogisms 
have their advantages and disadvantages, and different people may have 
different preferences. But even if we use different methods, this doesn’t 
mean that we could obtain different (contradictory) answers to the same 
syllogism.
3 Tulchinskii, G. L.: Г. Л. Тульчинский, “Логика и ненасилие”. – In: 
Современная логика: Проблемы теории, истории и применения в на-
уке. St Petersburg, 2002, pp. 188 – 191.
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one power to domination over another power…”4. It could use force as a 
method of coercion. And then all logical arguments which could prevent 
the illegitimate use of violence are powerless.
2. It is necessary to go even further and to apply sanctions (regulated 
within a good and well functioning judicial system); 
3. There needs to be a civil society which would facilitate the develop-
ment and governance of the country. That would reduce the possibility for 
deviant governance (dictatorship or tyranny).
If no intolerance and sanctions against negative phenomena are ex-
hibited, the negative phenomena can easily be established as a style of liv-
ing (“mentality”).
Intolerance and sanctions could also be exhibited in some kind of 
grotesque fashion toward normal individuals and phenomena. An illus-
tration of that can be seen in One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest. However, 
there is no proof to date that the whole world is so confused.
If we don’t show the required intolerance and sanctions against the 
negative phenomena in our country, the better ordered and more civilized 
countries will do so. Obviously we shall have to tolerate it and live with it, 
even if it sometimes feels as humiliation, and even if we expect tolerance 
from them. We can only hope for them to exhibit “normal” criteria in ap-
plying just the necessary sanctions in just the right moments, rather than 
sanction us when they wish in some whimsical fashion.
Bulgaria is on the Balkan Peninsula and there may be a greater degree 
of Rationalism in it; but at the same time there is a considerable degree of 
Eastern disorderliness and Balkan unrest.
Is there a way for the constant Balkan unrest and Eastern disorderli-
ness to be curbed, so that they pose no threat to the cultural and civiliza-
tional values of Europe?
Will Europe manage to take control over those processes, or will it 
allow certain regions to become Balkanized and ideologized5 and to blow 
up its cultural and civilizational model, based on European rationalism 
with a human measure?
4 Ibid., p. 190.
5 A general term for processes referring to an overdose of religion, 
ideology, mentality of an ethnic community.
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In the European countries’ efforts to find a successful outcome to this 
problem, there can be found two simultaneous strategies:
1. Control (supervision) over the Governing structures of the coun-
tries exhibiting “Balkan mentality” in the process of their preparation for 
accession to the European Union, with the purpose of reducing disorder-
liness (a currency board, safeguard clauses, a number of limitations and 
requirements, reforms and harmonization with European standards and 
regulations, an energy-dependent economy, etc);
2. Cultural levelling in these regions:
2.1. In the form of tolerance toward different cultural, racial, and eth-
nic groups (multiculturalism);
2.2. Subsidies for education and educational programmes with view 
of common European cultural and civilizational values at the basis of glo-
bal European equilibrium.
Subsidies and Control, so that there are Reforms: these are still civi-
lized measures for influence, supervision and help in the development of 
countries like ours. Hopefully these civilized measures will be sufficient to 
make us part of the European standards.
In a more general humanitarian and educational aspect, the problem 
of “logic and tolerance” is in the context of the relation between European 
rationalism and multiculturalism. Logic is in a position to exert positive 
influence over the manifestations of tolerance to different (ethical, ethnic, 
racial or political) communities. In this sense, it facilitates their unifica-
tion.
As an application of the topic of “logic and tolerance” in a narrowly 
professional logical aspect we could see how logic treats different results 
in its own filed; how it decides which of its results are tolerable and which 
are not.
A private case of “logical tolerance” are the textbooks in logic for the 
secondary schools published between 2001 and 2002 in Bulgaria – a total 
of eight textbooks. In the different textbooks, the number of valid modes 
of the syllogism vary (there are either no modes given, or 24, or 15 in some 
of the textbooks). According to the different textbooks, one and the same 
syllogism will have different conclusions. How can one show tolerance to-
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ward such an “educational result”, since such tolerance has been shown to 
all these textbooks? How can a student’s competence be tested according 
to the “right – wrong” evaluation system, or even according to the existing 
grading system where 2 is “fail” and 6 is “excellent”?
The year 2005 was the year of education in Bulgaria. But the need to 
take care of education is not over with the end of the year. On the contrary, 
it has become clear that the reform in education is yet to come. A reform 
in the Logic curriculum is necessary too. But there will be no reform in 
Logic if we just rename and re-order the topics and include some fashion-
able ones such as “tolerance” in the textbook tables of contents, while at 
the same time reducing the number of teaching hours in Logic.
Reform requires subsidies and control, so that disorderliness and cha-
otic innovations in education are curbed. 
Tolerance is an important humanistic value, and even though it is 
only marginally related to Logic, logical knowledge and argumentation 
can contribute to the development of tolerance to differences.
However, tolerance has its limitations. Intolerance and sanctions are 
required in order to control certain negative social phenomena, as well 
as instances when the lack of professionalism leads to poor educational 
results.
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Miljenko Stanić
LOGIC, CREATIVITY AND NARRATIONS
We present here one software for teaching symbolic logic. We address 
the system of teaching to children 10 years old but also will be applicable 
in lectures on university to students who are not skilfully in mathematics.
Our main goal is improve student’s capability to make symbolic ex-
pression of reasonable utterance in natural language.
1. We focus our attentions up on a given configurations on chess-
board, and then we write down the sentences-formula.
The computer checks the well-formedness and the truth-value of for-
mula according the configurations found on table. (Formalizations world 
around us ) 
2. We start with several sentences-formulas and then the students 
have to construct the appropriate configurations on board. (Make model 
over formal languages)
The idea of teaching the symbolic logic with aid of computer came 
from software “Tarski’s world».
This software was published with the book of J.Barwise and 
J.Etchemendy: Language, Proof and Logic (1989)
Tarski’s world is the chessboard with geometrical figures.
Here, introduce a little different table-world, more collored, with 
some drawing figures which designed some tale or story which is possibly 
created in cooperations of students and teacher. 
Drawing 1. represent the original Tarski’s World and drawing 2. rep-
resent our modifications.
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Drawing 1.
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Drawing 2.
J.Barwise and J.Etchemendy, did not only give to us the good tools in 
teaching logic, but they opened new field of research in logic itself.
With them started new approaching to logic, the heterogeneous rea-
soning that meanings to apply pictures or diagrams into logical inferences.
I like to quote Sun-Joo Shin, today the most eminent scientist and the 
student of J.Barwise, from article 
Heterogeneous reasoning and its logic edited in The Bulletin of Sym-
bolic Logic vol.10 no.1 2004.
“Birth of heterogeneous logic. The innovations that….Tarski’s World 
…provided did not end in the teaching of logic. Barwise and Etchemendy 
drew a valuable lesson from the way these programs have been received 
by students and teachers, and opened a new area of research in logic. They 
gained important insight when they asked the following questions: Why 
are these programmes more effective than traditional teaching methods? 
Does it mainly have something to do the use of computer?”
In languague of classical logic they entered new rules as like as: Given, 
Apply, Observe, Assume, Subassume, Merge…etc for discraibing visual 
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inferences which we use in common life, by examples, when we read the 
map of unknown city. 
Now, turn back to ours pictures.
I like to show the properties which is possible to investigate from ta-
bleworld.
For instance, the student’s may try to find or to dicovere:
I. Universal laws.
It is evident by the picture that:
(1)  Property of predicate: «All items is on the red or the yellow 
square on table». 
In formal form: ∀X (red(X) ∨ yel(X))
(2)  Binary relation:«For each two items X and Y on table we can 
judge that X is to the left (right) of Y or X is a front (back) of Y»
In formal form: ∀X∀Y ( (X)left(Y) ∨(Y)left(X) ∨(X)front(Y) 
∨(X)back(Y) )
(3) Property of predicat: «Every one which has propetry to be wom-
en, man, 
animmals or plants is living beings.»
In formal form: ∀X(wom(X) ∨ man(X) ∨ ani(X) ∨ pla(X) ⇒
lib(X))
The sentance (1) is self-evident just from the picture ( or diagram) but 
other sentance need some more explainations. 
About the construction of relations left, right, front and back, we 
will easy to see that relations are relations of partial orders. However, that 
meaninig that we need some intrisic knowdlidge or have to discavered in-
ner propetry of relations.
The type (3) law is forced in the table-world from outside, from our 
private classifications.
Resumed with:
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II. Game and logic: performed by picture and tale story
One example for explaining the definition of a new relation.
We can suppouse that the chief of village (BAR) proclaimed the 
rules: 
(1) “Every men and women must be in same row or same column 
with at least one person of opposite sex”. 
(2) « Each vechicle must be at any time watched by his owner.»
How that orders is fulfilled in our world? Look on the chessboard.
The rule (1) is not fullfiled, even the chief not follow its owen procla-
mation.
The rule (2) is respected, if we assume that: the vehicle is watched by 
owner if not existed any items beetwen them.
formal achievement of the rules.
Rule1.
The rule brought to us new relations to be in the same row (or col-
umn). 
But our world recognize only binary relation: XleftY, XrightY, 
XbackY, Xback Y and ternary relation X between Y,Z.
Is it possible to interpret new relation with aid of old relations and 
predicates ?
Answer is afirmative: 
X is in the same row as Y: if X is left (right) of Y then is not that X 
is back or a front of Y.
Or more formally:
XleftY ∨ XrightY ⇒ ¬(XfrontY∨ XbackY).
In similar way the following is easly definied the X is in the same 
column as Y.
Rule 2.
We iterpreted this order in table-world like this:
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If on table is posted some vechicle then we must place some women 
or man but no items between them. Show the pictures.
TET is owner of AUT.
ANA is owner of ZAP.
Question: Does it is possible to send one women to perfom her job 
and reminde only one wumen to keep all two vehicles ?
This is question of minimal cardinality of the domain.
Answer: Yes, remouve the ANA and TET keep the watch over both 
vehicles. 
Let’s formalize the order. ∀X∃Y(vec(X) ⇒ ((wom(Y)∨man(Y)∧¬ 
∃Z(ZbetXY))) or this formula would be tansformed in prenex form like as: 
∀X∀Z ∃Y(vec(X) ⇒ ((wom(Y) ∨ man(Y)∧¬ (ZbetXY))).
Question: Is it possible to form the adjoins relations ? The adjoins re-
lation is binary relation which colected pairs of item posted in neighbour 
cells. See pairs (ANA,KRU),
(TRE,JUR), (JUR,JAB), (JUR,MAK)….ect. 
This relations is not possible represent by the basic relations.
The border problem. 
Look over the formulas:
∀X((X)left(BAR) ⇒red(X)) 
This formula is true becouse the atecedent is not satisfied. The indi-
vidua BAR is placed on utmost left column in world.
Question: Is it possible reconaizing the individua on border of world 
by basic relations?
If the answer is negativ then we open the problem to find the relations 
which be jointed to basic relations to give the positiv answer.
If the last formula be thru in all configurations with fixed position of 
BAR, then we be shure that the BAR is on the border. But then we open the 
door for stady the possibilia with table-world.
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Martin Tabakov
HOW A “PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC”  
IS POSSIBLE AND RELEVANT
In this paper I will discuss questions: Why, for what reasons the term 
“philosophical logic” appeared and become popular?; “How a “philo-
sophical logic” is possible and relevant.”; “What they call and what must 
be named a “philosophical logic””. I will analyze the common usage of 
term “philosophical logic”; common objection against usage of term 
“philosophical logic”; problems posed by use term “philosophical logic”. 
And finally i will explain my conception what must be a “philosophical 
logic”
1.for what reasons the term “philosophical logic” was approbated 
and become popular.
There are 2 main reasons – Scientific and Theoretical and social and 
practical.
1.1.Scientific and Theoretical reasons
The main question is “Are there a significant field of study for what 
there is no suitable TERM” It is followed by next main questions – where 
is this field of study named “philosophical logic” in the philosophical 
map, what are relations between “philosophical logic”, logic and phi-
losophy. Is “philosophical logic”(PhL) a logic?!
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There are two main possibilities
1.2. SOCIAL AND PRACTICAL, everyday life reasons. That for my 
opinion is the main reason for use the term “philosophical logic! (many of 
the causes are also of socially-psychological nature)
1.2.1. Reason of job Approving a such term is convenient and use-
fully for a large group of scientist, especially for their work and ca-
reer! – for instance:
– People with traditional, classical training without any knowledge 
in modern logic(those who do not know well enough current logical re-
search), but with anxiety for working and making career in the field of 
logic. - Philosopher with good knowledge in some other fields – ontol-
ogy, epistemology, philosophy of science, history of philosophy which for 
different reasons find job as logic lecturers. - Scientists with good skills in 
formal (mathematical) method, frequently with firmly mathematical ed-
ucation (having mostly a mathematical logical orientation) which for dif-
ferent reasons find job as logic lecturers in philosophical departments.
It is interesting to analyze the development of the term “philosophi-
cal logic”. In (1) Thomason notice “...the distinction between the two sub-
fields has been magnified by differences in the sorts of professional training 
that are available to logicians, and by the views of individuals on what 
is important for the field. The statement of policy presented in Volume 1, 
no. 1 of the Journal of Symbolic Logic (1936) lists bringing together the 
mathematicians and philosophers working in logic among the goals of the 
new journal. Probably at this time both the mathematicians and the phi-
losophers shared a sense that their subject was considered to be somewhat 
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marginal by their colleagues, and may have felt a primary loyalty to logic as 
a subject rather than to any academic discipline. Articles in the first volume 
of the JSL were divided about equally between professional mathematicians 
and philosophers, and the early volumes of the JSL do not show any strong 
differences between the two groups as to topic. This situation changed in the 
1960s. The 1969 volume of the JSL contained 39 articles by mathematicians, 
and only 9 by philosophers. By the early 1970s, many philosophers felt that 
philosophical papers on logic were unlikely to be accepted by the JSL, and 
that if they were accepted they were unlikely to be read by philosophers. At 
this point, the goals of the two groups had diverged considerably. Math-
ematicians were pursuing the development of an increasingly technical and 
complex body of methods and theorems. Many philosophers felt that this 
pursuit was increasingly irrelevant to the goal of illuminating philosophical 
issues. These divisions let to the founding of the Journal of Philosophical 
Logic in 1972.”
1.2.2. Publicity -“philosophical logic” sounds impressive and 
hardly provoke objection.
– It helps to earn money from. machinery of government, founda-
tion, deans, rectors and other university managers... – term “philosophi-
cal logic” is attractive for students – (instead of logic1, logic2...)
2.Objection.
The main objections against usage of the term “philosophical logic” 
are:Which problems belong to logic but not to “philosophical logic”, are 
papers of Aristotle’s, (Frege. Hilbert... Kripke) “philosophical logic”? Let 
we say that “philosophical logic” is (kind of) logic. But “Logic” is a part 
of philosophy(it study the Truth) so why we must Restrict logic through 
the more general concept philosophy (“philosophical logic” looks like 
“mathematical geometry, algebra”); By the way, if “philosophical logic” is 
philosophy but not logic it will conflict with 1.2.1. – all this people want 
to be logical lecturers!
“philosophical logic” in unnecessary – “LOGIC” is well enough in 
all cases.”. In my opinion it is reasonable. In basic usage of term “philo-
sophical logic” without any problems we can use “logic”! 
3. Let see Most common uses of “philosophical logic”
• philosophical logic” (PhL) is Traditional Logic
• “PhL” is that what “philosophical logicians” are doing – a vicious 
circle!
388
•	 “PhL” is Metaphysics
• “PhL” is philosophy of language
• “philosophical logics” are Nonclassical Logics (modal logic)
• “PhL” is general semantics for different logical systems
• “PhL” is the semantical foundations of logic
• “PhL” is metalogic
• “PhL” is philosophy of mathematics!
• “PhL” is philosophy of logic
• “PhL” is philosophical examination of systems of formal logic
•	 “PhL” as the philosophical elucidation of those notions that are 
indispensable for the proper characterization of rational thought 
and its contents.(2)
The list of sample topics in the first issue of the Journal of Philosophi-
cal Logic in 1972 included: “- 1. Contributions to branches of logical the-
ory directly related to philosophical concerns, such as inductive logic, 
modal logic, deontic logic, quantum logic, tense logic, free logic, logic of 
questions, logic of commands, logic of preference, logic of conditionals, 
many-valued logic, relevance logics; 2. Contributions to philosophical 
discussions that utilize the machinery of formal logic...;3. Discussions of 
philosophical issues relating to logic and the logical structure of language, 
.4. Philosophical work relating to the special sciences. But as Thomason 
in (1) mark “most of the articles over the subsequent 28 years of the JPL 
belong to the first of these four categories.”
Actually there are so many “philosophical logic’s” as “philosophi-
cal logicians”
Here the are some more, composed by me “definitions”. - “PhL” is 
the ontology of the logical forms and the objects of logic – their essence 
and nature. - An area where the logical concepts and problems are dis-
cussed and analyzed in a phenomenological, hermeneutical or hegelian 
style, rather than through the methods of analytical philosophy. Ore 
more general: philosophical studies in which are discussed questions and 
concepts of logic, but which do not comply with the established criteria 
for logical investigations. And in particular don’t use formal (mathemati-
cal) methods. But actually Aristotle use formal methods, so its work are 
not philosophical logic. The development of contemporary logic seems to 
me natural and consistent: the initial breakthrough has been performed 
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in the area where logic is used most extensively, most systematically and 
most coherently, in the use of its means of expression (in the most ex-
tensive, systematic and coherent way). Being aware of the efficiency and 
productivity of contemporary methods, contemporary logic continues to 
develop but this time it does it by going deeper and wider: mathematical 
methods allow explicating essential logical moments of the extra-math-
ematical logical ‘empirics’.
Besides in most contemporary studies in logic coexist both – the 
content-based reasoning and the formal (mathematical) methods! It is 
started with qualitative reasoning which justify the approach, then a logi-
cal system is define, it is analyzed through formal methods and finally the 
results are analyzed on an informal level. Are they “philosophical logic” 
ore are not?
So is there any sense to introduce a new term if the concept it sig-
nifies is from the outer so proliferate!!!
4. My conception what must be a “philosophical logic”
I accept the term “philosophical logic” when it is motivated by 
various social and practical goals – e.g. the increase in the number of 
lecture courses, or to impress sponsors, students or officials. But at a 
theoretical level the introduction of a special concept of “philosophi-
cal logic” is useless and it only leads to unnecessary augmentation of 
the essences (Ockam razor!)
But as long as the term “philosophical logic” is quite often used I 
shall expose my view on possible reasonable use.
–1. In narrow sense as logic “Philosophical logic” is logic and 
studding logical systems with connection to philosophy. So Logical 
systems serving as bases for a mathematical theory are not “philosophi-
cal logic” the same with Logical systems – (only!) mathematical models 
– and systems created without philosophical justification: they are inter-
esting at least because they allow analogies with other systems interest-
ing to philosophy. And also Applied logic – logical systems that do not 
claim to explicate logic in any general philosophical, epistemological or 
ontological sense, but aim only to express logical relations involved in a 
particular field of application far from philosophy.
But The creation of many-valued, modal, intuitionistic logic is re-
lated to philosophical postulations! Logical systems – attempts for the 
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explication of logical inference. (in philosophy) are “philosophical log-
ic”; Logical systems expressing epistemological aspects belong to “phil-
osophical logics”. Logical systems related to ontological aspects too. 
Especially Philosophical logic as logic investigate nonmathematical 
reasoning.
2.“Philosophical logic” is the “logic of philosophy” and to explore 
the rules of the logical inference, the modes of deduction from and in 
philosophy and epistemology.
In wide sense “Philosophical logic” is not a logic it is interdiscipli-
nary field between logic and other philosophical areas ontology, epis-
temology, philosophy of science, history of philosophy. For instance: 
Finding of tangent points and common studies with established philo-
sophical approaches, in which the word “logic” is used . The synthesis 
of the two types of rationality – the philosophical and the mathematical 
one- Analysis of the most important methodological logical results. The 
relationship between the results of Modern Logic and some basic philo-
sophical categories and conceptions.
– The development of Logic in the light of the popular conceptions – 
of Kuhn – about the scientific revolutions and Lacatos – about the princi-
ples of proliferation.; Are there revolutions and crisis in logic ... 
– Questions set to the philosophy by the development of modern 
logic, concerning the limits of the logical, the unity and the universality 
of logic, about the demarcation, etc. 
– Questions, which philosophy sets to or should set to logic:
Finding of tangent points and common studies with established phil-
osophical approaches, in which the word “logic” is used 
– Logic of the Non-classical science – Classical logic is related to state-
ments of classical science and it is not a priori evident that it can be extrap-
olated to the contemporary non-classical and post-non-classical science.
1. H.Thomason Logic and Artificial Intelligence Richmond Depart-
ment of Philosophy University of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI48109–2210 
USA
2. J. Lowe Philosophical Logic. From internet
391
Nikolay Obreshkov
ABOUT APPLIED CHARACTER  
Of THE GAME THEORY
1.Something about the fundamental concepts  
of the theory of games.
1.1. Game theory is the theory of mathematical models for decision-
making in conflict situations (e.g. in contests).
The implications of this very wide definition need detailed analysis.
The theory deals with models, i.e. not with actual optimal decisions 
but with idealized schemata of them. All the general statements that may 
be made about arbitrary models apply in game theory. These models are 
not just kind of model, but formal, symbolic, mathematical models. This 
means that all the game-theoretical statements must be sufficiently precise 
to lend themselves to complete formalization.
In particular, the very object of the game theory, the optimal deci-
sion-making under conflict must be formalized, and this in turn requires 
the formalization of the concepts of “decision-making”, “optimality” and 
of the “conflict” in question.
The formalizations for each of the three concepts are problems of en-
tirely different complexity.
1.2. Decision-making is understood in the simplest sense as the choice 
by the decision-maker of an arbitrary decision from within a set of possi-
ble decisions given in advance. Game theory is not necessarily concerned 
with the physical or social nature of the decision, the decision-maker`s 
reasons for or the means of selecting his decision, much less his manner of 
implementing it – these are partly matters for cybernetics (computer sci-
ence) and operation research. Nevertheless, in dealing with specific cases, 
game theory may also have to bear these aspects in mind. An elementary 
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but very instructive exposition of game theory contains in the book of 
M.D.Davis (1970).
1.3. The formalization of the idea of a conflict is appreciably more 
complex.
A conflict is a phenomenon in which we know who is involved and 
how; what are the possible outcomes; and how. This description can be 
enlarged upon.
First, we must list all the acting factors. These can be collective and 
possess some internal structure. Therefore they may be called acting coali-
tions. The total of all such coalitions constitutes a set, which we can des-
ignate Ca .
Secondly, all permissible decisions for each operational coalition 
must be indicated. Usually, in the theory of games no distinction is made 
between the decision and its implementation (a kind of identification fre-
quently used in mathematics). The actions, behaviors and decisions of 
each acting coalitions K can be designed Sk.
Thirdly, we have to indicate all the possible outcomes, which are ba-
sically the results of the choices of strategies by all the coalitions. These 
outcomes are called the situations. The set of all situations we designate S.
The coalitions having chosen and carried out their strategies (1.2. 
above), the outcome is assumed to be completely predetermined, i.e. the 
situation is univocal. This assumption is less restrictive then it might seem. 
Suppose the choice of strategy by the coalitions does not lead univocally 
to a particular physical outcome but leaves open the possibility of any of 
the outcomes of a subset of the set of all outcomes. The uncertainty here 
could be of tow kinds. 1) The outcome is random and the probabilities of 
its realizations depend on the strategies chosen by the acting coalitions. 
We can consider it as a single, complex outcome, i.e. a single situation; for 
example, the conflict is a chess mach in which the winner gets a lottery 
ticket as a prize. 2) The strategies chosen by the acting coalitions can have 
different outcomes to which no probabilities can be assigned. Here, at 
least one other factor not included in constructing the model is playing 
a role. Hence, the model does not describe the conflict adequately, and 
must be revised.
Fourthly, we must include all the parties interested in any way in par-
ticular outcomes of the conflict. Like the acting factors, they too may be 
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collective and structured and can be called interest coalitions. The set of 
all interest coalitions is Νi . 
In real conflicts, the operational and interest coalitions usually coin-
cide, but this is not a rigid rule. A football fan watching a match on TV has 
an interest in the outcome but cannot influence the result. On the other 
hand, the referee has no interest in the result, (or should have none…), but 
exercises considerable influence on the course of the match and its result.
Fifthly, we must indicate in what the interests of the interest coali-
tions consist. This is done by showing, for each comparable pair, which of 
the two is preferable. It is not essential, however, that any two situations 
for each interest coalition be comparable. Indeed, it may happen that a 
particular situation will be absolutely non-comparable (exactly as in ethics 
no comparison is allowable between the value of money and the value of 
human life). The fact that situation s for interest coalition K is preferable 
to situation t will be designated by s ›– k t .
Very often, the preferential relationship for interest coalitions is de-
scribed as follows. For each coalition of interests K for all situations S is 
defined a numeric function Hk and s ›– k t is accepted where Hk (s) › Hk 
(t). The function Hk is called the payoff function of the coalition.
It follows that any conflict may be formally described as a quintuple
‹ Na, {Sk}kєNa, S, Ni, {›– k }kєNi › (*)
In which the meaning of each letter is as explained above; the sub-
script near each of the braces indicates that the content of the braces is 
variable and depends on the index that accompanies it and that the index 
itself varies within the bounds of the set, as follows from the symbols ad-
jacent to the braces.
The formal model of the conflict, represented by the system (*), is 
called the game. Basically, the mathematical theory of games deals with 
the study of conflicts treated as a games, in the sense of this definition.
This definition of games may appear too complicated and abstract. 
However, it reproduces in a formal language all the features which are in-
evitably inherent in any conflict, without at the same time containing any 
of the indices proper only to special isolated classes of conflicts.
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1.4. The formalization of the concept of conflict led us to the game 
concept. The formalization of the notion of optimality, on the contrary, 
is not a preliminary step for working out game theory, but a fundamental 
problem of the theory itself. Moreover, it is in game theory that optimality, 
its nature and its variants, becomes a major scientific problem and, above 
all, a mathematical one.
2. Applications of Game Theory
2.1. When speak of applying the theory of games, a distinction must 
be made between: 1) the description, in game theory terms, of phenomena 
found nature or in society, and 2) real decisions arrived at by games theory 
methods in dealing with specific, practical questions.
The second are still sporadic and isolated. It is not proposed to go into 
detail, but simply to indicate the difficulties.
First, to store a practical problem by game theory methods, it is first 
necessary to formulate it with precision, i.e. give an exact description of 
the relevant game. All the players and their strategies must be determined, 
and the preferential relationships over the set of situation shown. This in 
turn requires accurate information about the phenomenon involved. If the 
preferential relations are determined by the payoff functions, the informa-
tion must be quantitative. But this implies exact measurements, and the 
methods for obtaining them have not yet been satisfactorily worked out. 
Secondly, the game theory solution does not always satisfy the executor 
who carries out the decision. For example, a mixed strategy recommendation 
raises the question of responsibility in the event of unfavorable consequences. 
Moreover, the multiplicity of the game`s solutions (already discussed) makes 
it impossible to obtain a specific recommendation on which to rely.
We therefore discuss only the possible rather than actual applications 
of game theory, in cases in which the phenomenon involved lends itself to 
description in game-theoretical language.
As its definition indicates, game theory is in principle usable in con-
flicts of any kind, and these can be found in nearly all disciplines. Accord-
ingly, many phenomena in nature and society lend themselves to treat-
ment in game theory terms.
2.2. Its originators saw game theory mainly as a mathematical tool 
to help in making optimal economic decisions. The title of the first basic 
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monograph by J. von Neumann and O.Morgenstern, “Theory of Games 
and Economic Behavior” (1944), is fairly explicit. In a competitive econo-
my, game theory could be used in studying competition for markets, ad-
vertising, price questions, stock market operations, and so on.
The theory has proved to have much broader possibilities. It can 
equally serve in the conditions of a 
2.3. War is of course the most obvious of all cases of conflict. Mili-
tary applications of game theory are dealt with in Drescher`s monograph 
(1961) “Games of Strategy. Theory and applications.” 
2.4. The low is another scene of evident conflicts – first who make 
up a society. But the making of the law is itself based on a conflict; for 
the legislator is at grips with the factors, not always very clear or specific 
but nevertheless very real, which give rise to crime or breaches of civil 
law. Legislation to anticipate mass developments that have juridical con-
sequences and accordingly may need to be incorporated in law also falls 
within the purview of game theory. Court trials are competitive, involving 
optimal behavior and norms of procedure. Verdicts are ordinarily made in 
conditions of uncertainty; and law-makers and courts alike can be consid-
ered as players making decisions.
2.5. Ethical and legal norms having much in common, applications of 
game theory to moral questions are very similar to those in jurisprudence. 
The fact that, in contrast to low, ethics is not codified only increases the 
uncertainty in the choice of optimal ethical behavior.
2.6. Sociology has a variety of openings for game theory – conflicts 
between groups and in concrete group between coalitions or individuals, 
global conflicts end so on. 
2.7. Application in biology are rather special. The animal and, even 
more, the vegetable kingdoms can hardly be said to take deliberate deci-
sions with a precise and in view, or to be conscious of interests that conflict 
or do not conflict. Nevertheless, the interpretations in game theory terms 
of such phenomena is both possible and useful. For example, the struggle 
for existence between two species can be treated as a two-person game in 
which the admissible forms of behavior of either species figure as their 
strategies and the number of individuals in each as their objective func-
tions. It is particularly worth while to treat questions of symbiosis and 
parasitism in game theory terms.
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Another natural subject for game theory treatment is the study of 
evolutionary processes, which may be considered as conflicts between the 
species complicated by random external conditions, with the line of evo-
lution of a species as its strategy and the principal evolutionary trends in 
species as their objective functions. Since optimal strategies are ordinary 
mixed, it is natural to assume that it is the mutations that represent the 
mixed strategies in this case. The description of these phenomena in terms 
of game theory may lead to new discoveries in heredity and in the shaping 
of the genetic inherence. 
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Christian Enchev
HISTORICAL AND SOCIO-CULTURAL 
PRESUPPOSITIONS Of THE INVESTIGATIONS 
ON INTENSIONAL LOGICS 
When the role of epistemic processes becomes thematized and in 
relation to them different formal structures are considered as admissible 
or not, it allows philosophers to ask how realizing something as known, 
wished, felt, imagined, etc. could be referred to a “mode of conviction” in 
order to be distinguished truthful and erroneous admissions (see Husserl 
1992: 114-115). Realizing something in this or that way is intentional; the 
logical aspect of the matter in hand falls back on grasping “cogitations” 
at the truth-functional level of logics and with regard to the attempts for 
adequate interpreting such contexts considered here as “intensional”. In-
tensional contexts are not univocally determinable with a view to the con-
ditions of their truthfulness because their structure could be explicated in 
many different ways. Intentionality expressed by those contexts is not a 
direct threat to logics – such one is rather their opacity and irreducibility 
to extensional contexts univocally determinable as truth-functional. 
When we apply approaches treating the language bearers as “ideal” the 
language seems like semantically reflecting world structures in their static, 
while the attitudinal dynamic of those bearers may relate to pragmatic. 
The impossibility to be considered in isolation some pure and utterance 
independent referential acts demands to be made the difference between 
the linguistic competence of a bearer and the utterance situation (context). 
Every real language bearer, however, possesses some specific information 
available in a particular situation. That information is different from the 
linguistic information in itself tied to the bearer’s linguistic competence. In 
that case, if we allow the too strong idealization of a linguistic competence 
related entirely with the character of the language itself, it will cost con-
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frontation between semantic and pragmatic such that the propositional 
attitudes may receive a “cold welcome” within the semantic field. Reduc-
ing the intensional contexts to extensional on these approaches come true 
at the cost of neglecting to the peculiarity of different language bearers 
bound by the content species of different ontological regions as well as to 
the dynamic of socio-cultural contexts influencing language structures. 
In his seminal work on modal logics “Meaning and Necessity” [1947] 
Rudolf Carnap admits that the problem of the logical analysis of sentences 
expressing propositional attitudes (Russell) or epistemic attitudes (Ducasse) 
“has been much discussed, but a satisfactory solution has not been found 
so far” (Carnap 1956: 62). In the introduction to his work “Intension and 
Decision” [1963] Richard Martin writes that “the study of intensions ... is in 
its infancy and although valuable progress has been made, no fully satisfac-
tory semantical theory of intensions seems yet to have been formulated” 
(Martin 1963: vii-viii). A similar ascertainment appears also in the leading 
article of Elena Smirnova and Pëtr Tavanez “Semantic in Logics” [1967] 
(for a reference note to that article see Smirnova 1982: 139): “a satisfactory 
sense theory is missing until now in logics” (Smirnova and Tavanez 1967: 
29). Considering those references we are not entirely unjustified in saying 
that the concept sense (Sinn) in its different modifications remains no less 
problematic in the logical investigations about the middle of the twentieth 
century than it has been for Frege on introducing the concept.
The treatment of the problem of sense in “On Sense and Reference” 
[1892] is as follows: it is not possible to reach to a fully “clarified” refer-
ence which could be expressed in the ability “to say immediately whether 
any given sense belongs to it”, but according to Frege “to such knowledge 
we never attain” (Frege 1952: 25). In a footnote referring to this citation1 
Frege clears up that opinions on the sense of a proper name could differ 
(the sense for Frege is objective not as a possession of all people in general 
but only as a “common possession of many people”), and only “so long as 
the reference remains the same, such variations of sense may be tolerated, 
although they are to be avoided in the theoretical structure of a demon-
strative science and ought not to occur in a perfect language”. (ibid.: 23). 
1 See the Kripke’s analysis on this note in “Naming and Necessity” (Kripke 
1972: 257-258).
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This imperative for a logical perfect language could be seen as a base of the 
strong program started at the end of the nineteenth century. The essential 
matter in our case is that the sense problem posed by Frege still remains in 
the contemporary investigations on intensional logics. 
Stephen Toulmin makes an analogy between the 30’s of the seventeenth 
century and the 30’s of the twentieth century about approving a unified pro-
gram of Reason within which occurs, according to the Hegel’s term, Aufhe-
bung. It is important to be specified that the ideals of formal accuracy refer-
ring to the natural philosophy of the seventeenth century are not recurred in 
the same way – we would be speaking of far more ultimate form of rational 
control. The rout of the Central Powers in the First World War, as Toul-
min draws attention to, posed a task to the European intellectual, situated in 
the period between the two World Wars, identical with that of Leibniz after 
1670: “to create a rational method for comparison of ideas from different 
nations and to form international institutions which could avert renovating 
the World War” (Toulmin 1994: 183). Obviously a rational method having 
such effectiveness had not been created: “renovating the World War” is not 
avoided. While consequently belonging to the Vienna Circle scientists and 
some of their adherents emigrated to America and became pillars of analytic 
philosophy, their colleagues from continental Europe did not have exclusive 
alternatives after the end of the Second World War: it seemed natural they 
together with Theodor Adorno to bring in question the moral value of the 
philosophy after Auschwitz. Richard Bernstein’s conviction is that namely 
here should be searched for the real reason for the opposition between, if 
it could be ironically said, the Anglo-American “serious” and “cleansed” of 
metaphysics philosophy and the “opaque” European philosophy.
At the beginning of the 50’s of the twentieth century first post-war 
international philosophical congresses have been conducted – Xth in Am-
sterdam [1948] and XIth in Brussels [1953] (see Sadovskii and Smirnov 
1980: 9). Giving a new meaning of the European continental philosophi-
cal conceptions, as a result of the emerged after the Second World War 
mistrust towards the value neutrality of pure science, provoked interest in 
phenomenological and existential (in general) attitudes for philosophiz-
ing. However, the adherents of positivism who left Europe during the 30’s 
and emigrated to the USA and Great Britain had the historical chance to 
get into conditions enabled them “to believe in productivity and construc-
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tiveness of their program for reorganization of all traditional philosophy – 
reducing it to a logical analysis of scientific language” (ibid.: 10). 
The opposition between extensionality and intensionality could be 
generalized as an opposition between the idea for absolute aquirableness 
of the world in a transparent way (in a “logically perfect language”) and 
the idea for rejecting the possibility of knowledge referring to all things 
in themselves. Parting of logics with some approved laws and principles 
gives me a reason to make a philosophical-methodological consideration 
of logics as a developing branch of knowledge in the context of transition 
from set-theoretical to constructive modeling of possible worlds taking as 
patterns, respectively, the metaphysical approaches of Leibniz and Kant.
In the dogmatic metaphysic of Leibniz we can see that “the concept of 
possible precedes the concept of existent” (Smirnov 1987: 225). As Georgi 
Donev says, in that metaphysic “thinking is reduced to analytic activity in 
the frame of absolute objectivity” and because of absent reflection “on the 
foundations determining existence of the object itself ” we could be speak-
ing of “transcendent object” alone which is “extensional a priori synthesis 
of all possible ontological models, on account of what does not exist “in-
tensional logical form of thinking which to describe the act of synthesis as 
independent of transcendent objectivity” (Donev 1996: 39).
The constructive approach borrows the Kantian idea about the possi-
ble as relativized towards the existent. In his work “On the One Possible Ba-
sis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God” Kant finds that the analytic 
decomposition of a concept stops on a limit beyond which is necessary, in 
order to preserve the concept’s meaning, to be specified its real basis. The 
last as well as it is embedded in the question “How something is given” to 
Kant means a basis of each analytic proposition, because according to him 
the logically possible connection between concepts could be thought only 
when the latter are considered through some material content (see Kant 
1998: 190). But the forms of possible knowledge, as well as the given is pre-
sented inside of them in some way, could be interpreted “constructivistic-
ly” (in general) as not fixed by the things in itself but by the subject and his 
cognitive activity (manner). In that way “when we mentally reconstruct 
the existent we obtain the idea for the possible”; “It is not that the existent 
is one possibility among all others but the possible appears rearranging of 
the existent” (Smirnov 1987: 225-226).
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Treating of propositions as sets of possible worlds in analyzing inten-
sional contexts shows the limits of set-theoretical approach. Philosophi-
cal-methodological consideration of a constructive approach in relation 
with the idea for structured propositions gives significantly more hopeful 
results in analyzing such contexts. One very important question in concre-
tization of the constructive approach refers to the role of the language bearer 
and to the relation between semantic and pragmatic. However, accordingly 
to that approach, as well as logics could not be considered independently 
of particular cognitive procedures, it is exposed to the danger of exchang-
ing the question about “the objective bases of knowledge which in a con-
ceptual form a priori give the conditions and possibilities for expanding of 
knowledge” with the question “in what stage the process of knowledge is 
anthropological, social, cultural or psychological” (Kanawrow 2003: 206). 
With a view to that it is not necessary “pursuing the last absolute basis” as 
it is in the set-theoretical approach of Leibniz, but raising a “logical-epis-
temological norm of clear and distinct knowledge” not only with respect 
to the content but also with respect to the form of knowledge (ibid.: 209). 
In this sense as an “articulation background” of analyzed texts should be 
searched a conceptualization “completely in the logical sense as a connec-
tion between palpabilities due to the truthfulness of their form” rather 
than building some “supreme faculty for human knowledge” grasped “in 
the psychological sense of subjectivized objectivity” and “presented in a 
consecution of acts” (Denkov 1994: 201).
It seems reasonable in accordance with what is said above to be 
searched such specification of the role of the language bearer which is un-
dividedly connected with semantic but not dependent on a preliminarily 
given ontology. Under the terms of adopted here logical-epistemological 
norm that specification should be viewed on a philosophical-conceptual 
stage of analysis so that to be grounded the possibility of clearly and dis-
tinctly defined intensional-logical form of thinking.
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Doroteya Angelova
IMPOSSIBLE WORLDS AS LOGICAL  
AND SEMANTIC CONSTRUCT  
AND THEIR ROLE IN EPISTEMOLOGY
Nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible.
Hume
The aim of this article is to show the necessity of such logical and 
semantic construct as this for impossible world. There are different con-
ceptions about this issue – some of them admit the importance of the 
impossible worlds, others – are skeptical about the productivity of their 
application. The opinions about the character of the impossible worlds 
are too much. We will try to present different views and will outline some 
methodological directions about their role in epistemology. We will dem-
onstrate that logical resources, including impossible worlds, are helpful 
for the epistemological work.
The mentioned construct is known in literature under the follow-
ing names: non-normal worlds, non-classical worlds, atypical worlds and 
impossible worlds.
In different conceptions the ways can’t be are refereed with the fol-
lowing constructs: 1) worlds (Restall, Zalta, Varzi, Priest); 2) situations 
(Barwise, Perry, Zalta, Restall); 3) state of affairs (Vander Laan, Mares); 
4) states (Barwise, Restall); 5) indices (Mares).
Usually under impossible worlds it is known some of these things: 
1) world, where some contradictory sentences of the form а and ~а hold 
(Restall, Mares, Zalta, Vander Laan, Varzi, Barwise, Mortensen). The rea-
son for calling such a world impossible is that such a pair of sentences can 
not be true in no classical interpretation. Therefore the epithet “impos-
sible world” is a generalization of the last. 2) world, where might be things 
that fail to hold, but that hold in every classical interpretation such as the 
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form а∨~а (Restall, Varzi); 3) world in which the set of truths are differ-
ent from those which somebody confess (Priest) [7: 481].
The nature of impossible world is some of the following: 1) ersatz 
constructions – just linguistic descriptions of the ways our world might 
not have been (Lewis); 2) elements of any set-theoretical model for which 
is stipulated to be under certain constraints (Mares, Restall, Priest, Varzi); 
3) abstract objects – which existence is inferred or abstracted in rational 
way (Zalta, Vander Laan, Barwise).
There are different positions about the usage of impossible worlds: 
1) to distinguish logically equivalent propositions (Vander Laan, Restall); 
2) in connection with the propositional content and in particular with 
intensional contexts (Restall, Mortensen,Vander Laan); 3) for counter-
factual statements with impossible antecedent (Mares, Zalta); 4) to inter-
pret systems of relevant and paraconsistent logic (Restall, Priest, Zalta); 
5) to analyse information (Barwise, Varzi, Restall, Mares); 6) the usage of 
impossible worlds is not needed (Lewis, Stalnaker).
We will try to present some of the most considerable cases, which 
use relevantly impossible worlds. That will permit us at the same time to 
express more explicit their particularities. A main direction in this pres-
entation will be to show a lot of examples mostly from the field of logic 
and epistemology in maintenance of our opinion that the impossible 
worlds have applications thoroughly in these disciplines.
• The impossible worlds in logic
As is well known, the following formulas are available according to 
the postulates of classical logic:
А∧~А├ В → The sun is shining and The sun is not shining conse-
quently I like to sing
в ├ А∨~А → 9 is even consequently I am sleeping or I am not sleeping
According to the first formula if there is a contradiction in a sys-
tem then can be trivially inferred each statement (true or false) from it. 
According to the second – when there is a logically true statement it can 
be inferred from any arbitrary (even false) statement of the system. It is 
typical of both formulas that they do not explicate any relation concern-
ing the content between the premises and the conclusion.
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To avoid such “paradoxes” of implication, the most successful mode in 
logic is the usage of paraconsistent (including relevant) notion of inference.
In general the systems of paraconsistent and relevant logic are look-
ing for counterexamples of the presented formulas. It is known that if we 
want to deny some formula for entailment, we need a “case” where the 
antecedent is true and the consequent is false. According to the above 
formulas – we need a “case” or a “world” in which А∧~А is true (namely, 
an inconsistent world) and А∨~А is false (namely, an incomplete world). 
In the first of these worlds the law of non-contradiction is not available 
while in the second – the law of excluded middle is invalid.
There are developed different semantics of impossible worlds to 
achieve these conditions. So the most essential usage of these worlds is to 
avoid the triviality of entailment.
Broadly speaking the inconsistent model is a model with gluts about 
truth-values and the incomplete one – is a model with gaps concerning 
truth-values. These are two opposite ways for generalization of the classi-
cal model where every atomic sentence is exactly determined – it is true 
or false [13, p.8].
• The impossibilities and logical semantics
Usually the semantics that contain impossible worlds introduce a 
certain relation between them C called a relation of compatibility. If we 
have хСу it means that nothing given by x is rejected by y. 
To admit inconsistencies the relation C has not be reflexive. Contra-
ry, if a certain world is self-compatible, i.e. there is хСх, then if it contains 
А and ~А the last ones can not be simultaneously true [9, p.9].
But in semantics with impossibilities, the states can be inconsist-
ent – in them A as well as ~A are true, i.e. х׀= А и х׀=~А. They can also 
be incomplete – where A as well as ~A are false. The latter is due to the 
presumption that the state x could be a state of some restricted part of the 
world so that it has nothing to say about A. 
1) If the states x and y are compatible, i.e. xCy and in x ~A is not true 
(х׀≠~А) then in y A is true (у׀=А).
2) When there is х׀=~А and у׀=А, i.e. in the state x ~A is true and in 
the state y A is true, then x and y are incompatible. 
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We will consider some examples which demonstrate the relation-
ships between some kind of worlds or states: 
a) The worlds x and y can be compatible even though some of them 
are incomplete, for instance x.
х = the world of Sherlock Holmes
у= the world of Watson
The world of Sherlock Holmes could not be in contradiction (i.e. 
could be compatible) with the world of Watson, although the world of 
Sherlock Holmes is incomplete with regard to Watson’s feeling about 
broccoli – maybe he likes broccoli, may be he does not – Holmes is not 
concerned [13,p.5].
b) There could be compatibility between the states x and y, i.e. xCy 
even though x is not compatible with itself. In such cases x is inconsist-
ent [9, p.9], i.e. х׀=~А∧А. Nevertheless, x may still be compatible with y, 
because y may support neither A nor ~A. So x does not contradict y, be-
cause y says nothing about A (y is incomplete in regard to A). Here is an 
example for states that are themselves inconsistent and in the same time 
are compatible with other states:
I may not contradict somebody although I contradict myself on some 
topic, because this person may not make any assertions about the topic in 
which I contradict myself [9, p.10].
According to us, the relation of compatibility may play a useful role 
about the relationships between theories and the statements that they 
support.
• The impossible worlds, databases and theories
Very often the impossible worlds are met in different databases. Ac-
cording to Restall, we ordinary have databases with information from dif-
ferent sources not all of which are completely reliable. As a result it may 
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contain inconsistencies. If the database is inconsistent, it is not a trivial 
collection of all the sentences that the language uses. In other words, if 
the database claims A and ~A, then it also claims А∧~А, but it does not 
follow that it claims every B which we want [9,p.17].
In other cases the data bank may be consistent, but incomplete – i.e. 
both A and ~A are false. So, nothing can be told for A and ~A. This is the 
case when, as Varzi shows, the models are not completely determined 
about the semantic value of some atomic sentences, i.e. when the bank 
does not contain all the information about the objects in its domain. The 
intuition is that we will get the same result no matter how will fill in the 
gaps, therefore the gaps do not matter [13,p.5].
The situation in scientific theories is similar. A scientific theory may 
be inconsistent for many reasons, i.e. directly or indirectly includes an 
inconsistency.
The most formal theories which are based on empirical or exper-
imental sciences are ordinary indirectly inconsistent. In this sense the 
theory admits the truth of some statement and its negation. Therefore the 
reasoning in such cases has to be paraconsistent in order to avoid the ne-
cessity to infer (to think) an arbitrary statement from any contradiction.
On the other hand a scientific theory may be incomplete in many ways, 
so for a contention A is possible A as well as its negation ~A to be false in 
the theory. Then the reasoning has to be incomplete in order to avoid the 
necessity to think about things which are out of the theory [2, p.3].
• The impossible worlds and the counterfactuals with inconsistent 
antecedents 
For the analyses of counterfactual statements with inconsistent an-
tecedent is used paraconsistent logic which is an extension of Lewis’s se-
mantic, including impossible worlds [3,p.516].
Let’s look at the next examples, given by Edwin Mares:
1. If Sally were to square the circle, we would be surprised. 
2. If sally were to square the circle, we would not be surprised.
The first of these counterfactual statements seems to us true whereas 
the second – false. 
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1’. А☐	→В ☐→ – a sign for counterfactual implication
2’. А	☐→~В А – an inconsistent antecedent
In order to think about such counterfactuals with metaphysically 
impossible antecedent and to deal systematically and non-trivially with 
them, we need means to distinguish these two kinds of statements. It can 
not happen without impossible worlds, because in the possible ones the 
contradiction is always false, which means that the consequent has no 
matter and two counterfactuals of this kind can not be distinguished. The 
usage of impossible worlds gives the possibility for pair counterpossibles 
to have different values. 
To acquit the first contention and if we accept the consequent to be 
true it is enough the antecedent to be false. This is acquitted, because it is 
absolutely natural to admit the contradictory antecedent as false. Howev-
er to deny the second contention, the antecedent have to be true and the 
consequent – false. It means that we need a world where the inconsistent 
antecedent is true, i.e. we need an impossible world. 
The impossible worlds are treated as presence of contradictory truths 
in order to do operations with such kind of counterfactuals. The idea is 
that in their practical activity people often consider what would be the 
case in various impossible situations.
• The impossible worlds and the problem of propositional con-
tent
The impossible worlds have a useful role about the propositional 
content. The latter is in close relation with the intensional context which 
content may be inconsistent. Here are also the inconsistent beliefs. 
We will show several examples about the meaning of impossible 
worlds in regard to the content of different propositions. 
a) I tie each of my shoes before the other. 
This proposition, as Barwise shows, is modeled by a set of possible 
worlds P. Since it is impossible to tie each of my shoes before the other, 
then the set P is an empty set of worlds [1,p.490]. 
That is also meant for the following examples:
409
b) 2+2=5 
с) Fermat’s Last Theorm is false
d) Socrates is taller than himself
е) the addition is noncommutative
Therefore different contentions expresses equivalent propositions be-
cause all of them pertain to the same set – the empty set. In this way they 
can not be distinguished. But then believing (or doubting, or claiming) 
one of these propositions should be the same as believing (or doubting, 
or claiming) the others, which is false [1, p.490]. There is an intensional 
difference between them.
However in the light of impossible worlds the claim of the impossi-
bility of P corresponds not to the claim that the set P is empty but rather 
to the claim that P contains only impossible worlds [1,p.491].
We will present two variants for dealing with the inconsistent beliefs 
in the view of impossible worlds. Here we will pay attention to other in-
consistencies. 
First, let’s see this example expressing agent’s beliefs:
А = Ivan Vazov Street is northwards-southwards. 
В = Pencho Slaveikov Street is westwards-eastwards.
С = Pencho Slaveikov Street is parallel to Ivan Vazov Street.
А∧В – is true;
А∧С – is true, because the agent is “quarantined” from the informa-
tion about the content of B;
В∧С – is true, because the agent is “quarantined” from the informa-
tion about the content of A;
А∧В∧С – is inconsistency;
According to the first variant, which is proposed by Lewis, the agent’s 
beliefs have to be considered as “chunked” into separate categories, quar-
antining inconsistencies [10,p.2]. The agent believes А∧С, В∧С, but not 
А∧В∧С. Namely, the set of beliefs is quarantined in consistent subsets 
that are considered separately. The methodological justification of such 
approach is that not all beliefs can be compared or conjoined with all 
other beliefs at all times [10,p.2-4]. According to us, it can be epistemo-
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logically explained with the circumstance that the pairs of beliefs hold in 
different moments and are inconsistent when are conjoined only in one 
moment or in one stage of the cognitive activity. 
The other variant, proposed by Restall, is to permit the overlap be-
tween these parts (in our case А∧В∧С) in order to be presented an in-
consistent theory using paraconsistent notion of inference [10,p.8]. Ac-
cording to him the situation is similar when we impose two maps, which 
inconsistently describe the landscape or connect two stories, which in-
consistently describe a situation [10,p.4].
We see that the impossible worlds are defined through the possible 
ones. Therefore in such models the possible worlds are, as Restall points, 
the basis and the impossible ones are `epiphenomenal’ [10,p.11]. The im-
possible worlds, which present how things can’t be, are combination of 
at least two worlds for which things can be. Since there are many ways 
things can’ be, so there are many different impossible worlds.
They have, as we saw, an important role when we want to distinguish 
the propositional content, giving the possibility to different inconsist-
ent beliefs (claims, doubts) to be included explicitly in different logical 
transformations. Otherwise, if are used only possible worlds, such kind 
of propositions will refer the empty set. They will be excluded from the 
logical transformations and of course, it will not be able to distinguish 
their propositional content. 
Except the discussed kind of impossibilities by imposing different 
worlds, there is other kind of impossibilities – by imposing different ob-
jects. In the second case the impossibility arises when are taken two differ-
ent objects which properties are inconsistent one another and with such 
objects is formed a new one [10,p.12]. Instances of such kind of objects 
are: circle square, square circle, being green and colorless and so on.
This kind of impossibilities can be justified epistemologically (ac-
cording to Barwise), if we are not concerned by the metaphysical possi-
bility, but by the epistemological one – if the agents have known about the 
circle and the square only how they can arise from the surface [1,p.499]. 
For example, in the following way:
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1)        2)        3)  
According to us, the only thing the agent knows in this case is that 
he/she may construct a square from (1) and that may construct a circle 
also from (1). Looking at the sketches (2) and (3) we see that it is really 
possible. So the only information which agent has about the circle and 
the square is that they can be constructed from two perpendicular lines 
as is showed on the sketch (1). She/he has no other knowledge about the 
properties of these figures. Because of that he/she supposes that it is pos-
sible to be constructed a figure having the properties of both the circle 
and the square (as they can be constructed from the same components), 
namely – a circle square. We constructed this example to show that a no-
tion for such kind of impossible objects can be formed from agents who 
are beginners in a certain sphere or who are deprived from considerable 
information. The semantics of impossible worlds give them the possibil-
ity to do operations with such kind of objects. 
The intensional contexts include also the perception. Illustrations 
about our ability to perceive impossibilities are the drawings of Escher. 
Epistemologically that, which we want to describe, is a cognitive 
phenomenon – how is it that it seems, when it seems inconsistent. It con-
cerns the presentation of the impossible data [4,p.532]. For the explana-
tion of such “phenomena” are used (Penrose, Mortensen) the theory of 
cohomology groups and the theory of heap.
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• Information and impossibilities
Now we will present the position of Barwise about the importance 
of the impossible worlds and their role in different inquiries. His position 
is a kind of pragmatic theory of possibilities. The latter he considers in 
regard to a system containing a certain information. On every stage of 
a given inquiry there are relevant issues. Every way for solving of these 
relevant issues is a state [1,p.494]. 
Those states of the system in the inquiry, which are excluded from 
(are incompatible with) the available information, are impossibilities. The 
states, which are not such excluded, are possibilities. So in regard to the 
available information certain states are possibilities and others, which are 
incompatible with the available information, are impossibilities. The state 
is unitary thing whereas the information comes in pieces. The Inverse 
Relation Principle is in use: when the available information is enlarged 
then there is a corresponding decrease of the possibilities and vice versa 
[1,p.492-495]. In other words, the elimination of possibilities leads to a 
strict increase in the information available at the next stage of investiga-
tion [1,p.488, 499].
The change in the relation between the available information and 
possibilities depends on the course of investigation and the context. Some 
states may be possible in any context and impossible in other one. The 
available information is affected: on one hand – by the viewpoint of the 
investigation; on other hand – by the context, which depends on the kind 
of possibility; on third hand – by the progress of investigation in regard 
to this viewpoint [1,p.493-498].
In other words it is necessary to have impossibilities in mind, be-
cause if we begin to believe for any reasons that our information is not re-
liable or is uncertain then it becomes invalid and that which has seemed 
impossible may begin to seem possible. 
As a conclusion of this article we think that impossible worlds are 
relevant construct for logic and epistemology. It permits us to do opera-
tions with logically undetermined concepts in contrast to the semantics 
of possible worlds where all things and properties are clearly determined. 
The impossible worlds are appropriate instrument when we have a lack 
of information on some issue. It gives a possibility to include the incon-
sistencies in our reasoning and work with them until we precise and treat 
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the available information and differentiate exactly our contentions. On 
the other hand they give us resources to exclude from our logical trans-
formations those contentions which are indifferent for our system. The 
presented construct releases us from the logical chaos of the classical in-
terpretations and allows us to realize non-trivial inferences.
The formalisms of classical possible worlds have no place for incon-
sistencies, because they are just systematization of possible, i.e. they con-
sider the total ways world could be. The semantics of impossible worlds 
include also partial ways, which describe limited parts of the world and 
model different phenomena sensitive to information [9, p.4]. And all of 
that have a place in the field of epistemology.
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Assen I. Dimitrov
ONTOLOGY Of COMMUNICATION
Abstract:
The paper deals with a simple model of communication, the 
problems it poses and the conclusions at which it arrives.
Keywords: communication, packages, signals, modalities, lan-
guage and reality
1. Packages
Let us imagine that we are in a foreign country, whose language is al-
most unfamiliar to us. It may be a beautiful and orderly country, and yet, 
as if an invisible wall separates us from its inhabitants and the objects that 
surround us. They, are as if wrapped up in an invisible envelope. We are in-
capable of reaching them in any way, and feel helpless (to ask) and awkward 
(to reply). We are incapable of searching and uninitiated to possess. – Both 
the people and the objects seem completely close and intelligible, the order 
and the abundance – impressing, but inaccessible. Instead of people and 
objects, we have to do with packages – tightly wrapped up and sealed.
We ourselves are tightly packed, besides not only abroad. – If we are 
in a locked room, we are packed in relation to our neighbours. We have no 
direct contact with them at all. Yet, we could signalise them about our ex-
istence. We could achieve this through signals, understandable for both. 
2. The packed iron atom
Not only the objects and the agents in the world of culture are packed. 
This completely refers to the building elements of the living cell, too. – It is 
by no means built up by the familiar from the inorganic chemistry atoms 
and molecules, but rather – from packages. 
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Let us consider a well-known chemical reaction, such as the oxidation 
of iron in the atmosphere. It could proceed like this:
4Fe + 3O2 → 2Fe2O3
This is a reaction between free chemical atoms and molecules, which 
directly react with each other.
The reaction between iron and oxygen in the environment of the liv-
ing cell proceeds in a completely different manner. – It is a matter of the 
equally well-examined oxidation of hemoglobin. Here the iron atom is 
tightly packed, besides in a double envelope. Its outer layer is a globular 
protein. Inside it is positioned the hem – an organic substance, known also 
as porphyrin. And only inside the hem, in a specifically adjusted nest, is 
the iron atom, itself.
Schematically, it looks like this:
It is seen how the iron atom is tightly packed in the Russian matry-
oshka type of structure of hemoglobin. It is no longer an ordinary chemi-
cal element, to which the atmospheric oxygen has a direct admission, but 
a package. A direct chemical reaction between the iron atom of the he-
moglobin and the atmospheric oxygen is impossible. Their interaction is 
mediated through a cellular signal path, which includes hormones, media-
tors and receptors.
3. Good alcohol
All biochemical processes in the live cell are reactions between pack-
ages, i.e. wrapped up chemical agents. These agents cannot bind up di-
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rectly, but only through chemical signals that are intercepted by specific 
receptors. No chemical agent can penetrate into the living cell, provided 
it is not intercepted by a – capable of recognizing it – receptor. Even water 
doesn’t penetrate through the cell membrane through osmosis, but is in-
terpreted by the cell as a chemical signal, which is again intercepted by a 
receptor, specific for this case. 
Biochemical reactions inside the cell are between packages, communi-
cating through chemical signals, intercepted by receptors.
This has led a team of British researchers to the idea of depriving alcohol 
of all its side effects as: hardened coordination of the motive, verbal and men-
tal activity, headache, etc., and leaving just the pleasant euphoria of drunken-
ness. They have succeeded in blocking the receptors intercepting the harmful 
and undesirable ingredients of alcohol and in leaving active only these that 
capture the desirable and harmless chemical signals, it conveys.
One could well drink unlimited quantities of sulphuric acid, if only the 
cell receptors for this aggressive chemical have been blocked in advance. 
This certainly might seem exaggerated, however it is a plausible explana-
tion of the nestinar dances on fire. It seems that somehow nestinars – here 
and elsewhere – succeed in blocking psychically their thermo-receptors, so 
that the glowing coals are incapable of causing them any skin injuries.
What is important is that the considered cases point at a simple
4. Ontological model of communication:
– What interacts during communication are wrapped up objects, 
packages 
– Packages can communicate only through signals 
Even this pretty simple model poses quite complex
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5. Problems of communication:
i) Who/what is inside the partner package?
Since the inhabitant of Package 1 has no direct access to that of Pack-
age 2, he can only rely on the self-description the latter provides through 
various signals. – A situation well familiar to the inhabitants of the cyber-
space.
ii) What is the ontological nature of the packages?
The inhabitants of the separate packages are dynamic agents, yet they 
never act immediately, as physical objects do. Through the signals they 
send out, they only demonstrate their real presence and aim at a rich ex-
pression of their qualitative potential. Packages, therefore, should be re-
garded as paradoxical, modal, ontological agents.
Let us compare the crossing trajectories of two billiard balls and the 
exquisite movements of dancing partners. Billiard balls are objects, which 
collide directly, governed by blind physical forces; while dance is a lan-
guage, through which partners communicate as modalities. Although 
they precisely express themselves in the dance language, these modalities 
are present solely in the meaning this language conveys.
iii) But then, is communication just a dialogue, a conversation be-
tween the partners, or is it a real interaction, after all?
It is definitely the second case. 
And indeed, at a certain moment packages can and have to be un-
wrapped. The whole meaning of the communication is precisely in 
specifying when and how it can take place.
We deposit a package of clothes to dry cleaning; we wrap it up addi-
tionally with a proper verbal message and monetary signs; after a certain 
time, we receive another package. In both cases, these are clothes, which 
are packed before the submission, and unpacked after the receipt. 
Packing and unwrapping, modality and reality, are not divided by a 
precipice; they are constantly converted into one another and it is precisely 
what endows our behaviour with meaning.
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The problem is that we could deposit into the above-mentioned firm 
a coat and receive trousers – in other words, errors are quite possible in 
a communication. Since errors are excluded for the physical interactions, 
the problem evidently is 
iv) What is the adequate language of communication?
The reply is simple, but its accomplishment – very hard. A meaning-
ful and productive communication starts with the spotting of universal 
processes and regularities. They could be the only basis for the producing 
of signals – precise and meaningful for the inhabitants of both packages. 
Indeed, in some cases, the objective may be just the opposite – communi-
cation may also be cheating. But even then, it again refers to the real and 
the universal1. 
v) What is the difference between signals and physical forces?
Physical forces cause effects, while signals induce meanings.
We cannot apply mechanical force upon an object, isolated from 
us through a thick wall. The signals we can send behind this wall are 
again physical processes, e.g. sound or electromagnetic waves. Signals 
however have unique peculiarities, which principally distinguish them 
from meaningless physical forces.
– Signals are physical forces, which can freely cross the envelope of the 
packages. 
The biochemical content of a delicious fruit, growing on a high tree 
is inaccessible for us, but it is generously signalled through the light waves 
it reflects. 
– Signals act upon their addressee in an inductive, rather than a causal 
manner.
1 The same refers to the assertion that language is conventional. It can grow 
to be such only on the basis of natural signals, immediately related with the behav-
iour of the packed objects. It is only above them that conventions could be built. 
We write out ‘There is no smoke without fire’ through symbols, conventional 
for each language, but each of them is a fruit of the thousands year old evolution 
of written signalisation. At the basis of the above string of signs, in its turn lays 
the universal for all communicating packages, chemistry of combustion.
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Their causal impact as direct physical forces is real, but negligible. 
They are however capable of inducing in the receiver the immediate pres-
ence of their sender (despite the lack of a direct encounter between them). 
– We instinctively bend ourselves at the sight of a frame of a swooping 
train or a gun, which the actor ‘by chance’ points at the spectator, rather 
than at the victim. “_ _ _ . . . _ _ _”, taken as a physical sound or light se-
quence has zero causal effect upon us, while its inductive effect as a signal 
of lethal danger, could be incomparably more suggestive.
Finally, how does reality look like through the ocular of communica-
tion?
6. Some implications of the model
i) Through communication, reality is inserted into semiotic (lan-
guage) settings;
ii) Thus reality turns into a proposition (sentence), rather than being 
a physical-chemical structure;
iii) Thus Wittgenstein’s thesis is turned upside down: it is not lan-
guage structure that mirrors the structure of reality; on the contrary – re-
ality turns into a linguistic construction;
iv) ‘States of affairs’ turn into statements; situations are stated, com-
municated, problematised and resolved; 
v) Reality, likewise the proposition, acquires meaning;
vi) Thus we arrive at a rational alternative of creationism; at the onto-
logical grounds of an intelligent evolution, which resulted in the origin of 
life, mind, human culture and civilization;
vii) At the intimate mechanism of the creative ontological act, through 
which modality turns into reality.
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Ivaylo Dimitrov
THE fALL Of TRANSCENDENTAL 
IMAGINOLOGIES AND THE RISE  
Of EPISTEMICULTURAL MEDIA THEORY
The odd-sounding title of this paper represents an attempt to imitate 
the neologisms and analyses of the sociologist Scott Lash in his remark-
able Critique of Information1. There is no irony in my appreciation of this 
book. As a fortunate holder of PhD in philosophy and MD in public rela-
tions I was impressed how fruitful could be the synthesis of inhomogene-
ous philosophical strands of thinking (mainly in the paradigm of so-called 
‘continental’ tradition) carried out into a general medium of leading inter-
pretational schemes of contemporary theories of media communication. 
I dare to mimic Lash’s analysis following his example to mark the 
structure giving opposition to Kant via partial modernization of the head-
ing of Critiques. However, my general purpose in this sketchy exercise is 
not related to some ‘reflexive’ defense of the need of Kantian critical ‘third’ 
way as a mediating alternative between the dogmatic and skeptical re-
search methods. In fact, Lash’s prime intention is to provide a reliable an-
swer to the crucial question: How is critical social science, critical theory 
or critique as such possible in the information society? 
My concern is focused on the fact that Critique of Information pos-
tulates2 as methodologically justifiable the approach according to which 
answering the question above takes as a presupposed the detailed and 
valid response to another question: How is the transcendental critique al-
1 Formally the heading mimics the title of Al & Laura Ries’s The Fall of Adver-
tising and the Rise of PR – philosophically not so valuable but an influential book 
in the realm of marketing communication practices. 
2 Lash, S., 2002, p. 97-98. (Bulgarian edition).
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ready impossible? Thus, becoming aware how influential Lash’s research 
is nowadays easily allows one to anticipate even harder times ahead for 
transcendental philosophy’s PR.
My exercise is formally an interpretation of Lash’s intuitions how his 
invention -- the cutting-edge construct ‘media theory’ -- should looks like. 
This would result to a mosaic-like representation bearing a resemblance to 
the last popular i-media form (the weblog), i.e. attractive title before/over 
concise abstract functioning as a motivation tool for taking the decision 
to follow the hyperlink to its bigger generic narrative. Therefore it is just 
conversely to Lash’s paper. In spite of the fact that Critique of Informa-
tion is discursively organized as a typical scientific study, it is semantically 
structured as a ‘mass immedia’-like product. It represents a spectacular 
collage of apparently inhomogeneous theoretical viewpoints and thus it 
functions as a media phenomenon, i.e. as a space-time operational and 
symbols producing machine. My intention is to sketch the possibility of 
a different type of media theory acting as a space-time transcending and 
schematically reproducing machine. 
Lash states that under the changing conditions into the global infor-
mation society the social and cultural theory apparently becomes more 
and more media-like and consequently it should be named ‘media theo-
ry’. This means that its scientific discourse should become colder, i.e. it has 
to be transformed from the novel-like narratives to icon/animation/ad-
vertising-like representations which are not light-emitting anymore but 
transparent to the light (pure information). Thus in my view, the media 
theory is actually becoming a pure medium of any possible ‘epistemicul-
tural’ communication by means of its functionality as a ‘cold media’ which 
presents without re-presenting, which ex-cites without citing, which mo-
tivates towards action without explaining. And that is why in the long run 
I am excited and motivated by answering the following question: Is it re-
ally so impossible to reconstruct and to defense a transcendental media 
theory?
“it’s too good to be a light”. This popular ad slogan could be am-
biguously used in an informal argumentation of my decision to choose 
the epistemological consideration of transcendental imagination as a key 
approach towards answering the question above. In my view some of the 
overall misunderstandings in interpretation of the term ‘transcendental’ 
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come from the failure of the transcendental epistemologies to reconstruct 
theoretically the crucial cognitive function of the imagination postulat-
ed by Kant’s critical philosophy. So, I chose the imagination because it is 
usually defined as an ‘obscure’ faculty even by philosophers awaiting the 
answers about its cognitive functions and free play from the developing 
cognitive science. Another reason comes from the fact that orthodox Kan-
tianism in all its varieties usually prefer to ignore this key conceptual con-
struct because of its impurity and vulnerability to accusations of psycholo-
gism and/or subjectivism. This explains the fact that the main researches 
on Kant’s theory of imagination are peripheral to post/neo Kantianism 
and most of them are strongly influenced by the interpretations of Fichte, 
Husserl and Heidegger which are truly original and thus distortional (‘too 
light’) to the undoubtedly obscure Kant’s position. Finally, my intuition is 
that the issue of imagination is the focal point of all puzzles and difficulties 
of the Kantianism’s ‘anti-realist variety’ and therefore it still deserves more 
intensive epistemological attention.
The Transcendental Appendix. Lash’s analysis definitely gravitates 
towards a well-known operations performed by the critical theories in 
respect to the concept ‘transcendental’ in order to emancipate the cri-
tique from its historical philosophical roots in the Kantian transcendental 
project. I do not mean the traditional suspicion of the analytical epistemol-
ogy concerning the term because of its superfluous metaphysical burden, 
a mistrust coming (according to Rorty’s view3) from the side of the logical 
positivism. Lash’s viewpoint on the transcendental is closer to the oppo-
site part of the so-called ‘neo-Kantian consensus’ – the ‘continental’ tra-
dition influenced by Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology where the 
Kantian view of transcendental undergo a considerable transformation by 
means of epistemic foundationalism’s interpretation. Thus Scott Lash has 
the philosophical legitimacy to speak about the impossibility of transcen-
dental reflection in the global information era involving specific space-
time definitions: the technological development reduces/compresses to 
annihilation the space and time of the constitutive transcendental level of 
reasoning, there is no other place (‘outside’) or there is not enough time 
anymore for such a reflection of the speculative observer – the spectator. 
3 Rorty, R., 1998, p. 181 (Bulgarian edition). 
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Hence, after the explosion of the Kantian’s dualisms the transcendental be-
comes useless to the critique which is already absorbed in the global flow 
of information and in this way becomes critique of information which 
should be ‘critique without transcendental’.
Slashing the Kantian’s knot. Scott Lash overcomes the Kant’s apo-
retical puzzles choosing Hegelian type of dialectical critique which can 
exist in the global information flow in the form of Harold Garfinkel’s radi-
cal empiricist phenomenology (not transcendental). This transition with-
in his analysis becomes feasible via opposition with the ‘transcendental 
ontologies’ of Husserl and Heidegger which shaped the thinking of the 
whole generation of post-modern ‘continental’ philosophy. Therefore Lash 
prefers the lighter way of empiricism. He does not return to the Kantian 
‘aporetical’ thinking, although he admits it is the original form of critique. 
Lash forgets the Husserl’s crucial operation over the Kantian meaning of 
transcendental as genuinely inseparable from his view of finiteness. But 
the attraction of transcendental phenomenology to the philosophers of 
post-structuralism comes precisely from Husserl’s postulation that the 
transcendental reduction is related to the ‘Wissenschau’ as a special state/
level of reflection which in fact rehabilitates the possibility of intellectual 
intuition as trans-scientific act of acquiring an apodictical knowledge.
At this point the adequacy of interpretation of Kant’s theory of im-
agination becomes crucial. It does not remain unnoticed within Critique 
of Information. However, the concept of imagination is mentioned as ‘the 
third concept’ produced in the process of Kant’s attempt to bridge the first 
two Critiques via the Third one, i.e. by the medium of the ‘force of judg-
ment’. Imagination is represented as an attempt to bridge the aporetical 
gap between intellectual reasoning and intuition coming from Kant’s pos-
tulate of absolute impossibility of intellectual intuition in reference to any 
cognitive finiteness. According to Lash Kant fails to provide the bridging 
function via the concept of imagination because this produces another 
aporetical pairs4. 
So, my task is to show that Kant’s concept of imagination is not apo-
retical. It is not a mere result or a derivative third concept from the ‘force 
of judgment’ because it does not pertain to thinking and therefore it is not 
an element of logic but rather it could be perceived as a pure content-giv-
4 Lash, S., 2002, p. 145. (Bulgarian edition).
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ing and limiting act in the realm of the transcendental logic. That is why 
the construct of imagination does not lead to another aporias because it 
is not an effect of the transcendental employment of Reason named tran-
scendental dialectics (‘logic of illusion’). For this reason, the productive  
reproductive dualism dominating the representations of the structure of 
cognitive faculty of imagination has to be clarified as imaginary aporetical 
and solvable within the media theory of transcendental imagination. 
Milestones of my present past way. In my view, Kant’s knotting of 
his own puzzle could be seen in his 1762 writing where he asserts that 
the knot of difference between rational and not rational animals could be 
resolved if a man is capable of insight to the ‘mysterious force’ (Geheime 
Kraft) which makes the judgments possible. Kant’s prolonged invention of 
‘Einbildungskraft’ is undoubtedly connected with his own anti-dogmatic 
insight inspired by Hume’s skepticism and dated around 17695. 
However, let me introduce some milestones of the way to my already 
defended dissertation which I believe form my anti-dogmatic sight to 
Kant’s insight:
Milestones of difference: Often we are ‘lost in translation’ because 
even the best interpreters were not aware of the fact that the critical Kant 
always did a strict difference and did not use synonymous. Key example 
is related to the crucial term synthesis and it consists of this differentia-
tion: Verknüpfung (nexus)  Verbindung (conjunctio)6. According to 
Kant’s reflections the first mode (nexus) is the authentic synthesis as the 
unity-giving form. In this way there could be identified the need of inter-
pretation of Kant’s threefold synthesis via the difference above, as well as 
through the forms of the “unity of the base” (Verbindung) schematized 
in the usage of the prepositions ‘in  durch  zu’7. This analysis could 
deliver better understanding of Kant’s late transition project which con-
cerns the possibility of transition from metaphysical nexus in the faculty 
of knowledge a priori to the nexus between the ‘Dasein’ of appearances in 
physical world8.
5 Carl, W., 1989, S.154-155.
6 Kant, I., 1956, S.216.
7 Mörchen, H., 1970, S.84
8 Förster, E., 2000, p. 1-23. Compare it with Kant’s reflections interpreted in 
Mörchen, H., 1970, S.24. See also: Kant, I., 1956, S.216.
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Milestones of confuse: In fact my research was inspired by the per-
plexing observation that Kant’s presupposition of ‘special form’ of imagi-
nation -- the transcendental one -- comes from the side of its reproductive 
synthesis. The second (medium) synthesis in the structure of the threefold 
one always upsets Kant’s scholarship9 no matter of the fact that the proper 
character of imagination as reproduction is in conformity with the com-
mon definition of this faculty. That is why I perceive the synthesis of repro-
duction as the inherent synthesis (nexus) of the imagination. 
Milestone of absence: It is an unnoticed fact that Kant speaks almost 
nowhere of ‘transcendental imagination’ (Transzendentale Einbildungsk-
raft). Talking about ‘transcendental faculty (Vermögen) of the imagina-
tion’ it is unambiguously related to its reproductive synthesis10. However, 
there is a remarkable exception. The term is mentioned once in Critique of 
Practical Reason in reference to the schematizing imagination as the me-
dium of transcendental philosophy’s task to point to the case under laws 
a priory. It could also be named ‘the banished second medium’ from the 
realm of the practical Reason.
Milestones of purpose: It is related to Kant’s necessary conjecture, 
i.e. the pure transcendental synthesis of the imagination under principles 
a priori which makes every experience (as empirical product of under-
standing) possible11. I relate this to another Kant’s conjecture represented 
as secret nexus between imagination and reason as the force of evolution 
in Conjectural Beginning of Human History (1786). Thus the heuristic 
regulative employment of reason can be adequately understood as medi-
ated by imagination and as preceding its own logical employment as well 
as the synthetic activity a priory of the understanding revealing itself in 
the intuition as the productive synthesis of imagination12. In this respect 
9 Most eloquent is Heidegger’s facing of an oxymoron in analysis of the medi-
um synthesis, as well as Riehl’s arbitrary removal of the prefix ‘re’ from the crucial 
text when Kant introduced the transcendental faculty of imagination. Heidegger, 
M., 1997, p. 157 (Bulgarian edition). See also: Kant, I., 1956, S.149a. 
10 Kant, I., 1956, S.149a.
11 Ebenda. S. 147a. 
12 Eckart Förster anticipates even more perplexities among the researchers 
concerning Kant’s theory in its Opus postumum according to which the pure rea-
son precedes the understanding with ‘the projection of its forms’ and not in its 
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I can envisage a fruitful interpretation based on Kant’s heuristic model of 
epigenesis13 applied to the system of pure reason where imagination  
reason nexus could be viewed as a transcendental act of virtual preforma-
tion of productive faculties which originally specifies and thus provides as 
given any form of finiteness. 
Epistemicultural construct. Why another neologism is needed? I 
am inclined to talk about ‘epistemicultural’ hyper-function of the imagi-
nation having in mind the EU concept “Knowledge-based society” and 
considering it as an appropriate object of a transcendental media theory. 
This hyper-function of imagination could be understood as functional in 
reference to the epistemic part and consequently as not pure as far as it is 
creative, productive, and theoretical under the guidance of understanding. 
But the pure transcendental imagination can be explained as genuinely 
dysfunctional (negative function), contra-productive and thus primarily 
as epigenetic and reproductive as far as it is in negative nexus with pure 
reason. Without having in mind the social and cultural implications of 
this issue even the most thorough exegesis of Kant’s Critiques looking for 
theoretical reconstruction of the cognitive function of imagination should 
be viewed as condemned to stay intangible and fruitless. And when we 
assume that any society could be interpreted as an epistemic society per-
ceived as given knowledge reproducing system or organism, there could 
be possible to replace the term ‘social’ with the term ‘epistemic’ as well 
as to consider any social theory as applied epistemology under the title 
‘media theory’. 
References:
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Vesselin Petrov
PROCESS PHILOSOPHY IN THE  
EUROPEAN CULTURAL TRADITION: 
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES
Process philosophy is a possible answer to the questions arising of 
the opposites of being against becoming and constancy against change 
which have been central for the metaphysics since the time of Ancient Gre-
ece. The present exposition will not have the task to explain the essence 
of process philosophy, nor will it discuss the variety of answers about its 
essence. As it is well known, contemporary process philosophy has as its 
founder or spiritual father Alfred Nort Whitehead with his philosophical 
works of the first half of 20th century. Through the combination of circum-
stances it has taken place in the USA after his going to work at Harvard 
University. That is why it is accepted usually that contemporary process 
philosophy has originated and developed first as a trend in the American 
philosophy in the face of Whitehead and his immediate pupils and follow-
ers. In the course of years the interest in process philosophy goes far bey-
ond the boundary of the American continent as a result of the originality 
of the approach, of its significance for the development of contemporary 
philosophy in general and of the actuality of problems to which this ap-
proach is directed even outside of the sphere of philosophy. Nowadays 
it is an affirmed trend in philosophical and in general in humanitarian 
thought in America, Europe, Asia and Australia. 
The subject of the present exposition is the discussion namely of the 
question when and how process philosophy has entered into the European 
cultural tradition. We could approach to this question in two ways: If it 
is considered in philosophical and historical perspective, it is clear that 
the roots of process philosophy are European because of both facts that 
a number of its predecessors in the history of philosophy as Heraclitus, 
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Leibniz, Hegel, etc. are Europeans, and also concretely because of the fact 
that the views of Whitehead himself has been moulded in the Great Brit-
ain in purely European cultural environment.1 In that sense we can say 
that process philosophy has never leaved the European continent. But we 
shall keep in the focus of our attention not this aspect of the question. 
The other aspect of the question – namely it will interested us in the 
present exposition – is, so to speak, the secondary coming back of process 
philosophy in Europe after its original moulding as a contemporary philo-
sophical trend by Whitehead and his immediate followers. The fact of the 
great development of process philosophy in Europe recently is noted by 
many researchers2 and cannot be questioned. 
I would like to begin the exposition with a story: a real occasion which 
has taken place just 50 years ago.3 In 1956, several years after the World 
War II, “Prof. John Smith of Yale University in USA has come in Europe 
and decided to pay a visit to the venerable Martin Heidegger. Their con-
versation lasted for three hours, during which time Heidegger expressed 
his passionate interest in turning toward a new, post-Hegelian pursuit of a 
philosophy of nature. Smith responded that in America A. N. Whitehead 
had already spawned such a movement. Heidegger was most pleasantly 
surprised and interested, and expressed a desire to read some of White-
head’s philosophy. It was, in fact, at Heidegger’s request that the tremen-
dous project of translating Process and Reality was begun at Suhrkamp 
Verlag (Frankfurt).” For a pity, the work of translation lasted longer and 
Heidegger died before the end of the work. But nevertheless it was carried 
to the end and the German translation has appeared in 1979.4 
Many other examples could also be pointed out of expressed interest 
1 As George Lucas, Jr. points out, Whitehead is “representing in fact a unique 
and functional blend of some of the main currents of English and American” 
tradition: Lucas, George R., Jr. The Rehabilitation of Whitehead. An Analytic and 
Historical Assessment of Process Philosophy. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 
1989, p. 148. 
2 For example, Lucas, George R., Jr. Op. cit., p. 6. 
3 This story is borrowed from the paper: Veken, Jan Van Der. Process Thought 
From a European Perspective. – in: Process Studies, 1990, Vol. 19, No 4, pp. 240-247. 
4 Whitehead, A. N. Prozeß und Realität. Suhrkamp Verlag. Frankfurt am 
Main, 1979. 
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of eminent European philosophers and thinkers to the philosophy of 
Whitehead. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin had read Whitehead’s Science and 
the Modern World while on an exploration in the Gobi desert and he had 
vowed to study in greater detail the ideas of Whitehead. Merleau-Ponty, 
toward the end of his life, read a French translation of The Function of Rea-
son and declared Whitehead to be one of the most original and creative 
philosophers he had ever read.5 
If we trace out and systematize chronologically the acts of influence of 
Whitehead’s works on eminent scientists and philosophers in Europe, we 
can outline provisionally three stages. In the first one we are speaking of 
an early influence of Whitehead during his lifetime on thinkers as Bergson 
(1859 – 1941), the chemist and philosopher of science Emile Meyerson 
(1859 – 1933), the philosopher and mathematician Louis Couturat (1868 
– 1914), the historian and philosopher Robin George Collingwood (1889 
– 1943), the philosophers Charlie Dunbar Broad (1887 – 1971), Philippe 
Devaux (1902 – 1979) and Enzo Paci (1911 – 1976), etc.6 
The second stage includes the next generation of European thinkers 
that had been influenced by Whiteheadian philosophy. Of course, the bor-
derline between the first and the second stages is only conventional. We 
should point out here the philosophers Dorothy Emmett (1904 – 2000) 
and Wolfe Mays (1912 – 2005), the scientist Ilya Prigogine (1917 – 2003), 
the philosophers Jules Vuillemin (1920 – 2001), Jean Ladriere (1921 – ), 
Gilles Deleuze (1925 – 1995), Volfhart Pannenberg (1928 – ), Reiner Wiehl 
(1929 – ), Jan Van Der Veken (1932-) and many others.7 
The third stage can be dated conventionally as beginning from the 
first half of the 1970-ties, when translations of Whitehead’s works began 
to appear into German, French and Dutch. For example, the first transla-
tion into Dutch appeared in 1974. During that time the interest in proc-
ess philosophy in Belgium is increased. The students there began to study 
process philosophy and several doctoral dissertations have been defended 
in this area. One problem then was still finding of enough materials and 
5 Veken, Jan Van Der. Op. cit. 
6 Weber, Michel. Introduction. Process Metaphysics in Context. – in: Weber, 
Michel (ed.). After Whitehead. Rescher on Process Metaphysics. Ontos Ferlag, Fran-
kfurt – Lancaster, 2004, p. 45. 
7 Ibid. 
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documents in Europe, devoted to process philosophy which are neces-
sary for an effective investigation. The investigator up to there had to 
travel to the USA, where there existed the Center for Process Thought at 
Claremont. So, it was decided to establish such center also in Europe. In 
1978, during the visit of one of the most eminent representatives of proc-
ess thought Charles Hartshorne in Leuven (Belgium), it was created the 
Louvain Center for Process Thought. Soon after that on the basis of this 
Center it was created the European Society for Process Thought. The task 
of the Center is to concentrate scholars from Europe with interest in proc-
ess thought, to invite specialists in that field from all over the world for 
seminars, discussions and research work. One focus of the investigations 
in this Center is the correspondence of process philosophy to the state of 
affairs in the contemporary European philosophical stage. 
We should mention also that the European Society for Process 
Thought already began to publish European Studies in Process Thought, 
whose first volume appeared in 2003, and the next two are in the press. 
This series is intended as a supplementation to the world-famous journal 
Process Studies, published in the USA. 
Quite recently, in October 2005 there was created a Whitehead 
Metaphysical Society in Poland by a group of Polish philosophers in-
terested in process philosophy. This society plans to organize conferences 
yearly and yet it began to publish its own journal “Studia Whiteheadiana”. 
There are analogous societies also in other European countries, for exam-
ple in France, Ireland, and the Netherlands. 
As to the Bulgaria, we are a small country with comparatively small 
amount of philosophers, amongst which the number of philosophers with 
interest in process philosophy is still smaller, so for the present, it would 
hardly be effective to create our own Whiteheadian society. But we have a 
Bulgarian Ontological Society which already has established contacts with 
the European Society for Process Thought. I hope that these contacts will 
strengthen and that they will lead to a more fruitful collaboration. 
International conferences devoted to specific problems of process 
philosophy, considered in European perspective, have begun to be organ-
ized in Europe during the third stage of the influence of Whiteheadian 
thought on European philosophy. The first conference has taken place 
in Leuven in 1978 and next conferences have been organized in Bonn 
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(1981), Bad Homburg (1983) and Switzerland (1987). Then followed the 
conferences “Whitehead and the Rythms of Education” in Lille (France) 
in 1994, and “The Future of Process Thought in Europe” in Kortrijk (Bel-
gium) in 1997; “The Interplay between Science, Philosophy and Religion: 
the European Heritage” in Leuven (1998) and “The Philosophical Signifi-
cance of Whitehead’s Concept of Creativity” in 1999. We should observe 
also that there are International Whitehead Conferences, held every two 
years. The last two were organized in China in 2002 and in Korea in 2004, 
but during the present 2006 year there will take place the 6th International 
Whitehead Conference in Europe, in Salzburg University in Austria from 
3-6 July. The discussions are envisaged to go parallel in more than 40 
sections on philosophy, religion, and science and humanities. These facts 
speak about the great importance which process philosophy has already 
become in Europe. 
After this short review of facts and events which are evidences for the 
firm settlement of contemporary process philosophy in the European cul-
tural space, it is relevant to say some words why process philosophy is in-
teresting and attractive for the European philosophical thought. In answer 
to the last question should be pointed out the theoretical dialog between 
the Whiteheadians and non-Whiteheadians in the area of philosophy, as 
well as fruitfulness of process philosophy for other fields of knowledge. It 
is not an accidental fact that outstanding scientists as Ilya Prigogine and 
Isabelle Stengers have been attracted by the approach of process philoso-
phy to such very important for the present day science problems as the 
way of the appearance of the order and of the novelty. David Bohm should 
be added to this number of scientists. Process approach is fruitful not only 
for physics, but also for biology, for the contemporary ecological and rela-
ted ethical problems, and for medicine.8 
Process philosophy is attractive not only for the philosophy of sci-
ence. It offers a definite approach also to the philosophy of culture, phi-
losophy of economics and philosophy of the political theory. Here should 
be mentioned such classical works of Whitehead as Adventures of Ideas 
8 See papers of the book: Griffin, David Ray (ed.). The Reenchantment of Sci-
ence: Postmodern Proposals. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1988. 
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and Modes of Thoughts, as well as publications of contemporary proces-
sualists.9 
Process philosophy gives support also to intercultural dialogue. Its 
nonsubstantialistic approach is particularly attractive to Buddhists, claim-
ing to be ancient predecessors of process philosophy. Such problems fre-
quently are themes of the regular East-West conferences. This subject-
matter is particularly interesting for the humanitarians from Europe. 
Last but not least, process approach is related to the great challenges 
of our time, such as our attitude to nature, the problems with the popula-
tion of people on the world, the calls for justice, and so on.10 It is clear that 
this approach does not offer ready decisions of the problems, but it offers a 
conceptuality which is probably most suitable for their solving. One of the 
dangers for the contemporary world consists in efforts to solve the prob-
lems in isolation. In this respect process approach is most adequate with 
its stress on the interconnectedness of the things in the world (including 
problems of the day). 
As to the philosophy in proper sense, contemporary process philoso-
phy is a constructive way of thought, opposing to the deconstructive trend 
both in Europe (in the face of Derrida, etc.) and in USA (in the face of 
Rorty, etc.). In philosophy of the second half of the 20th century they began 
to talk about constructive postmodernism, one of the fathers of which is 
Whitehead.11 Independently of the fact if we shall name them as construc-
tive postmodernists, the representatives of process philosophy try very 
successfully to restore the trust amongst philosophers to the possibility 
on principle for a new type of metaphysics, and with their activity in this 
respect they earn sympathy both on the other side of ocean and in Europe. 
9 Cobb, John B., Jr. Constructive Postmodernism. – http://www.religion-on-
line.org/showarticle.asp?title=2220 (June 2002). 
10 Very indicative in this respect is the paper by John Cobb, Jr. from January 
2006 dedicated to the current threats of USA to Iran for an air attack because of 
its nuclear programme: Cobb, John B., Jr. Whieteheadian Reflections on a Possible 
Nuclear Strike on Iran. – http://www.ctr4process.org/publications/Articles/nu-
clear_iran.htm (January 2006). 
11 Griffin, David Ray, Cobb, John B., Jr. (Eds.). Founders of Constructive Post-
modern Philosophy: Peirce, James, Bergson, Whitehead, and Hartshorne. Albany: 
State Univ. of New York Press, 1993. 
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This is valid not only for Whitehead and his immediate pupils, but also for 
the present day followers of process philosophy. 
On the other hand, the attractiveness of process philosophy to the Eu-
ropean philosophers is also due to the fact, that Whiteheadian philosophy 
can claim for a number of important anticipations of problems and themes, 
which have been laid down and developed subsequently in the works of 
such eminent philosophers as Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Richard Rorty, 
Saul Kripke, John Searle, Hilary Putnam, John Perry and others.12 
Generalizing the considered reasons for the interest to process phi-
losophy in Europe, we should outline, to use the words of George Lucas, 
Jr., that “students of the Western philosophical tradition can perceive a 
recent, intelligible, and highly plausible attempt to forge a unified and 
coherent perspective on the problems and concerns that they themselves 
(and the contemporary culture in which they participate) share and seek 
to understand”.13 
We can say definitely that at present time there already exists an af-
firmed school of representatives of process philosophy in Europe. There 
is a great amount of publications by European process philosophers in 
different areas of process philosophy, many of them are big books.14 They 
12 This aspect of Whiteheadian philosophy is considered in detail by George 
Lucas, Jr. in chapter 8 of his book: Lucas, George R., Jr. The Rehabilitation of 
Whitehead. An Analytic and Historical Assessment of Process Philosophy. Albany: 
State Univ. of New York Press, 1989, pp. 129-149. 
13 Lucas, George R., Jr. Op. cit., p. 11. 
14 Some of them are: Veken, J. Van Der (ed.), etc. World Views and the Prob-
lem of Synthesis. Springer, 1999; Veken, J. Van Der (ed.), etc. Framing a Vision of 
the World: Essays in Philosophy, Science and Religion. Leuven Univ. Press, 1999; Jo-
nas, Hans, etc. The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology. Northwes-
tern Univ. Press, reprint ed.,2001; Poli, Roberto. Alwis. Ontology for Knowledge En-
gineers. Ph.D. Thesis. Utrecht, 2001; Decock, Lieve. Trading Ontology for Ideology: 
The Interplay of Logic. Set Theory and Semantics in Quine’ Philosophy. Dordrecht, 
Kluwer, 2002; Debrock, Guy (ed.). Process Pragmatism: Essays on a Quiet Philo-
sophical Revolution. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2003; Seibt, Johanna. Toward Process 
Ontology: A Critical Study in Substance-Ontological Premises. Ph.D. Dissertation. 
Pittsburgh, 1990; Seibt, Johanna. General Process Theory: A Study in Ontological 
Revision. Habilitationsschriff. University of Konstanz, 2004; Seibt, Johanna (ed.). 
Crossdisciplinary Studies in Dynamic Categories. Springer, 2004; Riffert, Franz, 
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have already initiated many discussions in that direction. As an example 
we can point to the fact that when the American philosopher Ni  cholas Re-
scher created his own version of process philosophy, expressed in a series 
of his books15, it was organized immediately a discussion published as a 
large book on different themes and versions of process philosophy, cre-
ated by the initiative mainly of European process philosophers16 who work 
in Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Italy and other European 
coutries. 
In conclusion I would like to remember the observation of George 
Lucas, Jr. that parallel with the process of increasing of lively interest in Eu-
rope in process philosophy, there is also a process of “Continentalization” 
of philosophical (including process) thought in America through useful 
comparisons with the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and even 
with Hegel, Schelling and other European thinkers from the past.17 It is 
clear that these are processes connected with the increasing of mutual 
influence of the different cultural (including philosophical) traditions in 
contemporary world. We can rightly expect that this mutual influence of 
the different cultural traditions will give creative stimuli for new authentic 
philosophical investigations. 
Weber, Michel (eds.), Searching for New Contrasts. Whiteheadian Contributions 
to Contemporary Challenges in Psychology, Neurophysiology and the Philosophy of 
Mind, Vienna, Peter Lang, 2003; Dietz, Jan L. G. Enterprise Ontology: Theory and 
Methodology. Springer, 2006 and many others. 
15 Rescher, N. Process Metaphysics: an Introduction to Process Philosophy. Al-
bany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1996; Rescher, N. Process Philosophy. A Sur-
vey of Basic Issues. Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 2000; Rescher, N. Inqui-
ry Dynamics. New Brunswick. Transaction Publishers, 2000; Rescher, N. Nature 
and Understanding. The Metaphysics and Method of Science. Oxford, Oxford Univ. 
Press, 2001. 
16 Weber, Michel (ed.). After Whitehead. Rescher on Process Metaphysics. On-
tos Verlag, Frankfurt-Lancaster, 2004. 
17 Lucas, George R., Jr. Op. cit., p. 203. 
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Iva Georgieva
THE NOTION Of HUMAN AND  
ARTIfICIAL SELf – DEVOTION AND 
DEPENDENCE IN ONTOLOGICAL ASPECT
The idea of human and artificial intelligence clashes into various 
problems, concerning formation of a concrete self. While we are human, 
we easily give out our presence, attitude, character, intelligence to the outer 
world, by devoting to certain areas, cognitions or individuals. This giving 
of self awareness sometimes even includes forgetting or loosing our own 
self in order to be complete in the process of devoting to something ideal.
In other hand, we are trying to create an artificial substitute of a kind 
of our self, thus this self will not be free to forget completely, as it has not 
got a whole idea of its self as complete and free, but it depends on the crea-
tive mind and its programming, and there is a dependant factor in form-
ing of this kind of a self.
So, generally speaking, we allow ourselves to be lost, projected on 
something chosen else, but we still are not able to produce an entire free 
system that will choose to devote and depend on a creative principle, nev-
ertheless the main notion of A.I. is built on that dependence of a product 
to a supportive system.
In this meaning, if we are getting in more humanistic point of view, 
we depend on too much complicated beliefs and ideas, but we still create a 
machine and intelligence that is depending on ourselves. This means that 
preliminary given program, hardware, mind is already learnt to feel loos-
ing of a self, because of not creating by itself, only learning from distant 
sources.
Main perspective result will be in formation of a self that independ-
ently chooses its Self-ness, without forgetting the limits of human world as 
a whole. If we try to make artificial intelligence, we should not forget what 
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is important for our intelligence through the centuries and to give it free to 
be used and interpreted by a mind, secondary created by our own.
The miracle of producing new things and results can happen here, be-
cause we are researching area that has not been thought out before and has 
unique meaning of sense what is human, natural, supernatural and so on…
A strong ontological apparatus that helps distinguishing these prob-
lems can help merging dependence from devotion in human and artificial 
points of view by using ontological vocabulary as a whole library for such 
notions to clear out what we understand by self and the projecting it into 
the reality.
The idea of self is a constitution of stable principles that have indi-
vidualistic aspects and reach according to preliminary expected circum-
stances – area of being, thought out kind of reactions, specific for the self 
certain attitudes, beliefs, concepts and ideas.
The devotion of self-awareness is based on a whole or entire chosen 
giving on something desired and preliminary subjectivated. In other hand 
loosing one’s self in dependance can be particular giving on a habit or 
learned behaviour that creates boundaries. 
The first situation includes the essential of the human beings self no-
tion, the second can be found in the existence of humans, pets, or artificial 
minds and the types of self that they have.
The first stage of human self indicates characteristics of consciouss 
clear purpose of a free self. The investigation of the second condition re-
sults in specific unconsciouss fixed idea of a given self. These discrimina-
tive features propose the main differences between in a first sight not very 
common human and not-only-human conditions.
The mind-body problem in this case is on two levels – the devotion 
and the dependance only on mental or also on physical level. Ontological 
aparatus can give particular distinction between them.
In ontological point of view devotion has a moral and higher state of 
acceptace as a condition. The dependence in the very beginning is con-
nected with negative connotation. The two concepts are not exact omo-
nyms and that is why their connection here must be explained by present-
ing them in applied ontological view.
When we act in accordance to our human self we are deliberatly de-
voting our self to some ideas, goals, persons, acts. We are teaching devo-
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tion in religious point of view, in our family’s values and in our interper-
sonal relationships, also in medical conditions for example. 
We are using devotion very often in our child-parent interactions, 
strong-weak person, old-young people, pet-human connections etc. 
In strong artificial intelligence point of view devotion is very difficult 
to be learnt, because we as humans have difficulty to lose something from 
our inner freedom and to give it out deliberatively to something else. So to 
teach an artificial self to act not so economically envalued can be a strange 
task. 
In other hand we very easily depend on something – consciouss or 
not in our everyday life. The dependence on something from the matter 
around us is something without doubt – food, clothes, warmth, under-
standing, acceptance, power, love, health etc. We sometimes depend on 
more than needed substances and that is deliberately chosen or lost in the 
process of giving free will to our needs and desires. But that is the very hu-
man part in this equation. 
That is why in the field of A.I. that we can create something that de-
pends very strongly on us, but itself can not loose this dependance, because 
it is given in its preliminary in its nature. The very great fear of human in-
telligence is that it can create something independant that will eventually 
control our own self someday.
So, it is difficult not to predicate dependence on an artificial self, but 
not so easy to add some dependence features with negative connotations 
to it as well. I mean that teaching bad habits is the least expected result in 
creation of mechanical mind and the perfectness is the desired result in 
this endeavour with at least possible negative features.
That is why the understanding of human and artificial freedom and 
connection from and to some things is very important preliminary inves-
tigation in such attempts. Moreover, the understanding of them in our 
own nature can explain how to develop or avoid them in future creation 
workings.
The devotion is traditionally connected with belief. The dependence – 
with human disability to be independent and free from something. We, 
humans, are meant to be devoted on ideas and to be dependent on things. 
That sometimes clashes with the very idea for freedom in ourselves. That 
is a kind of an equilibrium of necessity vs. freedom.
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So, finally, this is a matter of values as in the headline of this confer-
ence. Devotions is a matter of love, while dependence can create hate to 
its object. Devotion to a cause, people, care; dependence on a substance, 
relationship, circumstances... There are many kinds. 
When we make most of the precious steps in our lives we devote – when 
we marry, even if we are not free sometimes – for example when we die. The 
same can be true about dependence – we could make a marriage like a cage 
for eachother; we could be struggling for life when death is near. We are 
concerned with in dealing with these two stages of the notion of the self.
How it is possible for example to teach an A.I. mind to be devoted to 
a fashionable style but not to be dependent on this like sometimes it hap-
pens with humans. Can we explain the fan-attitude to an artificial self and 
can we implement it (having in mind that for example the word for fanatic 
in Japanese ‘otaku’ literary means crazy, forgetting one’s own culture)?
If we have to generelize the notion in human and in artificial sphere – 
the devotion is based on one freely chosen intentional object of admirance, 
while dependence can create interaction between several factors that make 
a system difficult to be destroyed.
The connotation between devotion and dependence in human and 
artificial point of view can be very vague. These are fields of study directed 
to the most hidden parts of our inner self and the explanation of their act-
ing and impact is mostly individual question.
In creation of artificial self we should be able to distinguish our con-
sciouss and benevolent desires and needs and to include only the useful 
parts of this knowledge. The problems in our self ’s nature should be avoid-
ed in future created super-self.
While very broad theme of devotion and dependence here it is taken 
as a part of possible investigation in avoiding and perfection of the best 
possible artificial adequacy of our self.
We devote ourselves to life by all means and we depend on our life 
to be as we are. Nevertheless all the difficulties, we are learnt to deal with 
these two perspectives of our self and the notion of it can be very much 
altered when we alter them as well.
So, now we depend on computers and we are devoted to science, while 
we are gathered here to think about our selves and our future self in the 
best way. I hope this research only starts the investigation of this subject.
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Vladimir Stoychev
WHAT DOES SCIENCE COGNIZE OR 
PROLEGOMENA TO PHILISOPHY Of SCIENCE
To answer the question what does contemporary science cognize we 
have to ask in what consists its essence which would mean to search for 
what perception of being and truth determine this essence.
Obviously the contemporary science is neither the Greek epistheme 
nor the medieval doctrina or scientia and this suggests that the essence 
of contemporary science scarcely can be deduced from the cognition of 
ancient Greeks. At the same time the allegation that it differs from the pre-
modern science only in degree of progress would sound somehow unsub-
stantiated. Something is certain though: the essence of what we call today 
science is represented by the research work.1 Therefore we have to see in 
what the essence of the research work consists.
The essence of the research work is that knowledge constitutes itself 
in a given domain of the being as an actio (“undertaking”, “activity”, “ac-
tion”, “manner of acting”). This actio includes in itself not only a method 
(image of the action) but also something else as far as every actio primarily 
needs a revealed sphere for its display. That is, the founding step in the 
research work is exactly the revealing of such sphere. This founding step 
is realized as in some domain of the being, for example, the nature, is pro-
jected a definite comprehensive scheme of the natural phenomena. This 
project prescribes how knowledge as actio has to be bound to the revealed 
sphere and at the same time this mutual bind secures the stringency of the 
scientific research work.
On the one hand, science is a research work mainly by virtue of the 
project (the all-embracing scheme), and of its securitisation by the strin-
1 Heidegger, M (1954). Vorträge und Aufsätze. Pfullingen, 45-70.
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gency of the scientific actio. On the other hand, in exact sciences the re-
search work is carried out through the experiment but it is not science 
that turns into research work due to the experiment, but the experiment 
becomes possible only where knowledge of nature had already turned into 
research work.
As it was mentioned above, neither the Greek epistheme nor the me-
dieval doctrina are sciences in the contemporary sense of the word. Major 
reason for that is that they are neither “research” nor “experimental”. It is a 
fact that Aristotle created the notion of empeiria (experientia) – observa-
tion of things under varying conditions. But not only for him, whereas for 
all ancient and medieval observers, even though working with numbers 
and measures and utilizing in the process of observation different devices 
and instruments, experimentum is something other than the modern ex-
periment which came into existence with the hypostasis of a foundational 
law. The founding of such a law means an introduction of an overall pic-
ture of the “object sphere” which is a source of criteria and presupposes 
anticipating concept for the conditions of the experiment. The experiment 
is an image of action and is founded and guided by underlying ground law 
and has for its object to express the facts confirming or rejecting this law. 
The contemporary research experiment is not merely an observation but 
a specific method for confirmation of the law within the framework of the 
exact project of nature.
At the same time the contemporary science began to be valued as sci-
ence not only because of its modern characteristics – research work, meth-
od, stringency, premised project, foundational law, experiment – but also 
as a consequence of its transformation into institution. When the science 
turns into institution, the scientific research work acquires the character of 
production. On the other hand, the scientific production became possible 
only when the project of nature as an “object sphere” is finally applied to 
the “texture” of the being. Or, put in otherwise, the institutionalization of 
science ensures a leading role to the method regarding the being (nature 
or history) which this way is objectified in the research work.
The present text has for its object to show what does science cognize 
and thereby to rise the question of the logically-analytical, pragmatic, An-
glo-Saxon understanding of philosophy of science which, as a research 
program, and as an academic profile legitimates itself rather as “philoso-
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phy of natural sciences” (Naturphilosophie). In order to have full reason 
to call itself “philosophy of science”, before to be engaged with logic and 
methodology of scientific knowledge, with analysis of scientific theories, 
with epistemic standards in science or with the problems of demarcation 
and confirmation of scientific knowledge2, it has to put itself the question 
of essence of the modern science. That would mean to ask what type of 
perception of the being, and what very understanding of truth have trans-
lated contemporary science into research work.
Many people believe that contemporary science is a product of the 
spirit of the Enlightenment which expresses itself in man’s liberating him-
self from the medieval dogmas and thus becoming free. Partially true as it 
is, this understanding is inexact since what is most important in this case 
is that a change has occurred in the essence of man who had turned into 
a subject.
How in fact we come to this exclusiveness, to this absoluteness of the 
subject as lying at roots of everything? This becomes possible due to the 
pretension of man to possess fundamentum absolutum inconcussum ver-
itatis (the absolute foundation of the immovable truth). This pretension is 
a result of the emancipation of the man when he liberates himself from the 
obligations to the truth of Christian Revelation and turns his steps towards 
a self-laying legislation. At the same time the liberation from the truth of 
2 “Philosophy of science, the branch of philosophy that is centered on 
a critical examination of the sciences: their methods and their results. One 
branch of the philosophy of science, methodology, is closely related to the 
theory of knowledge. It explores the methods by which science arrives at 
its posited truths concerning the world and critically explores alleged ra-
tionales for these methods. Issues concerning the sense in which theories 
are accepted in science, the nature of the confirmation relation between 
evidence and hypothesis, the degree to which scientific claims can be fal-
sified by observational data, and the like are the concern of methodol-
ogy […] Typical problems are the nature of scientific laws, the cognitive 
content of scientific theories referring to unobservables, and the structure 
of scientific explanations. Finally, philosophy of science explores specific 
foundational questions arising out of the specific results of the sciences.” 
– in: Audi, Robert (gen. ed.) (1999). The Cambridge Dictionary of Philoso-
phy. Cambridge University Press, 700.
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the Revelation (certifying and securing the Salvation of the Spirit), that is, 
the liberation from the reliability of the Salvation given in the Revelation, 
translates itself into liberation for such reliability in which the man himself 
secures the truth as something known to his own knowledge. Thus the 
man who liberates himself transforms himself into guarant for the reli-
ability of the knowable. This happens when he, on his own, and all by 
himself decides what does it mean for him the knowable, what knowledge 
and certification of the known is, that is, what reliability is. The pathos of 
Descartes is that he puts metaphysical foundation under the liberation of 
the man for a liberty understood as a self-certifying self-determination. 
This metaphysical foundation has to be reliable not only by itself but as 
far as it is unapproachable to external criteria, through which the essence 
of the demanding freedom confirms itself as a self-reliability. However, 
what certifies itself nolens volens secures at the same time the reliability of 
that being (the subject) for which such knowledge is reliable, and through 
which everything reliable certifies itself. Fundamentum, the foundation of 
this freedom, the underlying, the “subject”, is that reliable which satisfies 
the upper requirements. And this is ego cogito ergo sum. That is, the relia-
ble is a thesis telling that simultaneously (as togetherness) and at the same 
time (synchronically) with its thinking man by himself in incontestable 
manner is a givenness for himself. In fact the thinking is a re-presentation 
establishing the relation to the represented. That is, the idea (the “proto-
type”, the “archetype”, the “original”, the thesis cogito ergo sum) is perceptio 
(“collection”, “comprehension”, “understanding”).
In this context the representation is grasped as to put something in 
front of us and to certify the re-presented as such a thing. Such certify-
ing can only be an account in view of the fact that only a calculation of 
the represented can guarantee its permanent and incontestable certitude. 
The representation is already not revealing of the things for us but their 
comprehension and their understanding – we already can not speak about 
the power of the present but about the domination of its interpretation. 
The representation is a self-founding invasion in the sphere of the secured 
data in which, however, the subject has to confirm itself. The being is not 
already present at its sojourn but is determined by the objectifying work 
of the representation. The representation is an apodictic determination of 
the object. Also, it reduces everything to oneness of the objectiveness. It is 
“gathering”, “closeness”, “co-motion”, that is, co-agitatio.
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Every relation to whatever it may be – will, opinion, sensation – from 
the very beginning is a representation, a co(a)gitation which is translated 
as “thinking”. The subject, the foundational reliability is every time one 
re-secured self-representation of the representing man together with the 
represented. The foundational reliability, the subject, is every time an apo-
dictic equality of the representing and the represented: me cogitare = me 
esse. Due to the foundational reliability man is assured that his reliability 
and his truth determine themselves and this no longer guarantees that he 
is. Exactly because man is necessarily co-represented together with the 
foundational reliability (the subject, the “me cogitare = me esse”) – what 
transforms itself into protagonist of the self-liberation from the truth of 
the Christian Revelation – he, on his own, can and has to be an exclusive 
being, that is, a “subject”.
As a subject man is coagitatio, gathering of everything around his ego. 
Man constitutes himself as legislator of all measures which make possi-
ble the supervenient calculations and measurements, as something that 
has the right to consider itself as reliable, that is, as true, consequently as 
existing. In coagitatio the representation gathers all objects in the totality 
of the representedness. The ego of this cogitare acquires its essence in the 
certifying itself reduction of all representable in one, in con-scientia, in 
“consciousness”. The consciousness is a co-representedness of the “object 
sphere” and the representing man in the field of force of the secured by 
them representation. All present acquires from the consciousness mean-
ing and appearance of its presence. That is, the present has its secondary 
birth in the representation. 
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Wolfgang Hofkirchner
THE CHALLENGE Of COMPLEXITY.  
SOCIAL AND HUMAN SCIENCES  
IN THE INfORMATION AGE
On the one hand not only the most industrialised countries, but also 
less developed countries, are subject to transformation processes in the 
sphere of the technological organisation of society, due to the develop-
ment and diffusion of modern information and communication tech-
nologies, which are supported and furthered by national and regional 
policies which set up a tremendous number of technology-advancement 
programmes. These policies are still confined to a view that looks upon 
technology as an independent factor of societal development.
On the other hand there has been growing awareness that technologi-
cal determinism is too myopic, since the belief in technological progress, 
which per se entails social progress, has diminished. Development in tech-
nology is not accompanied by an equally rapid growth of scientific insight, 
let alone foresight, as to the impacts of technology on levels of society, 
other than that of technological organisation. Attempts to observe and un-
derstand the basic nature of this change are still second place.
With the words of Manuel Castells, famous writer of the trilogy of 
the information age: “The dream of the Enlightenment, that reason and 
science would solve the problems of humankind, is within reach. Yet there 
is an extraordinary gap between our technological overdevelopment and 
our social underdevelopment” (1998, 359-360). 
This gap is due to the fact that a scientific understanding of the de-
velopment of society in the information age has not had time to develop. 
There is not yet a “science of the information society” which is a science 
for, about and by means of the information society. Sociology of technol-
ogy which deals with the impact of information and communication tech-
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nologies on society and with the task of shaping them through design as 
well as all social and human sciences need to undergo a paradigm shift 
that makes them part of science of the information society.
1
The information age is a time of bifurcation – the Great Bifurcation 
(Hofkirchner/Maier-Rabler 2004): either humanity manages the break-
through to a new organisation of world society or it faces the breakdown 
of civilisation. 
Edgar Morin has stressed that the conditio sine qua non for success 
is a reform in thinking: “The Planetary Era demands that we situate eve-
rything in the planetary context. Knowledge of the world as world has 
become an intellectual as well as a vital necessity. It is the universal prob-
lem of every citizen: how to gain access to global information, and how to 
acquire the possibility of linking together and organizing it. To do so, and 
thereby recognize, acknowledge, and know the problems of the world, we 
need a reform in thinking“ (1999a, 124). 
The basic obstacle to accomplishing that paradigm shift throughout 
sciences and everyday thinking is “blind intelligence”. “Incapable of seeing 
the planetary context in all its complexity,“ says Edgar Morin, “blind in-
telligence fosters unconsciousness and irresponsibility. It has become the 
bearer of death” (1999a, 128).
Blind intelligence comes today in three different ways of thinking 
which can be seen as ways of considering the relationship of identity and 
difference (cf. Hofkirchner 2004). Regarding identity and difference while 
approaching complexity, the question arises as to how the simple does re-
late to the complex, that is, how less complex problems or objects or phe-
nomena do relate to more complex ones.
Given the less complex and the more complex, there is, in terms of 
ideal types, one way that eliminates identity by establishing the difference 
for the sake of each manifestation of complexity in its own right; it aban-
dons all relationships between all of them by treating them as disjunctive; 
it dissociates one from the other, it dichotomises and yields dualism (or 
pluralism) in the sense of diversity without unity. The often bemoaned 
cleft between the so-called two cultures of hard science and soft science 
(humanities) is the most striking example for this way of thinking. In fact, 
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this is a description of the state of the scientific adventure as a multiplic-
ity of monodisciplinary approaches that are alien and deaf towards each 
other. “Intelligence that is fragmented, compartmentalized, mechanistic, 
disjunctive, and reductionistic breaks the complexity of the world into dis-
joint pieces, splits up problems, separates that which is linked together, and 
renders unidimensional the multidimensional”, as Edgar Morin points out 
(1999a, 128). It fails to put the abstract in the context again from which it 
has been abstracted, it fails to relink it to the bigger picture. 
Dissociation in that sense is the first fallacy of blind intelligence. 
There are two other ways of thinking that are opposed to dissociation and 
pretend to accomplish unification. So unity is their aim – but as they lose 
sight of diversity they are just another variety of fallacies. 
The first of these two ways of thinking establishes identity by eliminat-
ing the difference for the benefit of the less complex side of the difference 
and at the cost of the more complex side; it reduces “higher complexity” to 
“lower complexity”; this is known as reductionism. Reductionism is still 
the main stream of natural science. In an attempt to preclude nonmaterial-
istic assumptions it fails to do justice to the emergent properties of higher 
complexity. 
The counterpart of the reductionistic fallacy is what might be called 
projectionism. It establishes identity by eliminating the difference for the 
benefit of the more complex side of the difference and at the cost of the 
less complex side; it takes the “higher” level of complexity as its point of 
departure and extrapolates or projects from there to the “lower” level of 
complexity. It overestimates the role of the whole and belittles the role of 
the parts. 
Both fallacies yield unity without diversity. What is needed, howev-
er, is “unitas multiplex” as Edgar Morin calls it (1999b, 25), understand-
ing unity-in-diversity and diversity-in-unity, unity-through-diversity. “It 
means understanding disjunctive, reductive thought by exercising thought 
that distinguishes and connects. It does not mean giving up knowledge of 
the parts for knowledge of the whole, or giving up analysis for synthesis, 
it means conjugating them. This is the challenge of complexity which in-
eluctably confronts us as our planetary era advances and evolves” (1999b, 
19). This is a way of thinking that establishes identity as well as differ-
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ence favouring neither of the manifestations of complexity; it establishes 
identity in line with the difference; it integrates both sides of the differ-
ence (yielding unity) and it differentiates identity (yielding diversity); it is 
a way of thinking that is based upon integration and differentiation; it is 
opposed to both dissociation and unification and yields unity and diver-
sity in one. It integrates “lower” and “higher complexity” by establishing 
a relationship between them that, in particular, might be characterised 
by the following criteria: firstly, both sides of the relation are opposed to 
each other; secondly, they depend on each other; thirdly, they are asym-
metrical. When all these criteria are met the relationship is usually called 
“dialectic”. This way of thinking opposes dualism as well as reductionism 
and projectonism. 
The unity-through-diversity principle is itself a kind of dialectical 
sublation of dissociation and unification, of dualism and reductionism 
and projectionism. A dialectical sublation eliminates the dominant role of 
the preceding quality rather than the quality itself. This quality is kept, that 
is, continued, but it is continued under the dominance of a new quality 
and is therefore – as Hegel put it – lifted onto a next level. All of that holds 
for the unity-through-diversity thinking with regard to the fallacious ways 
of thinking. Dualism, reductionism as well as projectionism are not totally 
negated but taken cum grano salis. Each of them has an aspect of overexag-
geration that has to be abolished but, by the same token, it has an aspect 
that is right once the onesidedness is removed. Doing justice to these as-
pects is carried out through the novel integrative view – hence unity is 
established among the diverse confligating views. Duality, reduction, or 
projection are justified within certain boundaries and when taking into 
account the legitimate claims of each other.
2
The perspective of these different ways of thinking can be applied to 
social and human sciences. Their central theme is known today as the du-
alism of agency and structure (see Reckwitz 1997). How are they related 
to each other?
One possible answer to that question is to grant autonomous exist-
ence to phenomena of individuals and society respectively. Here individu-
als are cut free from societies and vice versa. It is dualism, en vogue in 
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postmodern thinking. Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social systems, e.g., is 
dualistic since his social systems (subsystems of society) are made up of 
communications only while the psychic systems (individuals) belong to 
the environment of the social ones.
Another solution is individualism. Theories belonging to that kind 
of conceptualisation methodologically, ontologically and ethically give 
priority to individual action and related phenomena and postulate that 
societal facts and related phenomena are to be logically derived from the 
individual ones, are in a modular way built up by the latter ones and do 
not inhere values different from values on the individual level. The way of 
thinking underlying individualism is reductionism and makes it positiv-
istic. Societal phenomena are reduced to phenomena on the individual 
level. Knowledge of individual phenomena is necessitated by and suffices 
for getting knowledge of phenomena on the society level, the second re-
sults from the first. The most well-known example for individualism is 
rational-choice theory in economics. The whole paradigm often is labeled 
action theory or subject theory. Agent-based modeling methods may suit 
this approach.
Contrary to individualism, the opposite might be called “societalism”. 
By this the tradition is meant that goes back to Emile Durkheim who in-
sisted on the autonomous existence of social facts. Recent representatives 
of this variety are functionalist and structuralist theories. Starting point is 
dealing with social facts or social functions or social structures which is 
deemed necessary and sufficient to describe, explain or predict what is go-
ing on on the individual level. Instead of being reductionist, this way of 
thinking extrapolates or projects phenomena which are found on a higher 
level onto a lower level where these phenomena cannot be found. Insofar as 
it stresses some whole to be examined in order to understand phenomena, 
it is interpretivism. Several systemic approaches belong to that category.
As Mario Bunge puts it (2003, 75): “Individualism sees the trees but 
misses the forest, whereas holism sees the forest but overlooks the trees. 
Only the systemic approach facilitates our noticing both the trees (and 
their components) and the forest (and its larger environment.)”
That is, there is a dialectical solution too. Thus, individuals and so-
ciety are interdependent (none of them can be understood without the 
other), they oppose each other (none of them is fully understandable by 
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understanding the other), and they build a hierarchy (society plays the 
dominant role). They form parts and a whole which is a dialectical rela-
tionship. Dialectics is said to apply whenever two correlates build a mutu-
ally dependent relationship between themselves as opposites in an asym-
metrical way. 
The dialectical relationship between agency and structure being a 
process whose products freeze into structure, which in turn influences 
further processes of action as it enables them and constrains them at the 
same time, can easily be retheorised in terms of a feed-forward and feed-
back loop between society as a (supra-)system, and individuals or systems 
of individuals as elements or (sub-)systems: a loop that does not medi-
ate strictly deterministic causations, but allows for the emergence of new 
qualities instead (see Hofkirchner 1998).
Evolutionary systems theory – a term coined by Ervin Laszlo (1987), 
Vilmos Csanyi (1989) and Susantha Goonatilake (1991) – as a theory 
about evolving systems and as a theory that is the result of the merger 
of systems theory and evolutionary theory which nowadays not only ap-
plies to biotic and human or social systems but also to physical systems, 
that is, to the cosmos itself (Layzer 1990, Smolin 1995), is the most recent 
elaboration of General System Theory of which Ludwig von Bertalanffy is 
known as one founder (Hofkirchner 2005). It revolves around the notion 
of self-organisation. It provides a transdisciplinary framework for consil-
ience throughout science thereby positioning social science within the or-
chestra of disciplines.
It distinguishes between different levels of self-organisation, i.e. self-
organisation has aspects that are common to all types of systems as well 
as aspects that are particular to each concrete type of system. In each self-
organizing system there is this relationship between elements and system. 
In a social system, as distinct from a living system or a physical system that 
is prehuman, self-organisation refers to the so-called re-creation (Jantsch 
1992) of such a system. Re-creation means that social systems do not only 
have the capacity to modify themselves (as physical self-organizing systems 
do) and to maintain themselves (as living self-organizing systems do), but 
they also have the capacity to re-invent themselves, to shape themselves, 
to produce a specific character by which the individuals that are parts of 
a social system can strive to realize themselves in a more or less self-de-
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termined way. That is to say, systems at the evolutionary stage of human 
society are just another – but new – way of metabolism nonhuman living 
systems carry out (just as systems at the evolutionary stage of living beings 
are another way of making use of energy that nonliving material systems 
do). It is the specifics of that way sociality is about. But it would narrow the 
possibilities of understanding to neglect the roots of sociality.
The core of evolutionary systems theory is a stage model. It is a phase 
model and a layer model in one. The stage model of evolutionary systems 
is based upon the principle of emergentism and the principle of asymm-
etrism. Emergence takes place in transitions in which by the interaction of 
proto-elements systems are produced. Asymmetry describes the suprasys-
tem hierarchies in which subsystems are encapsulated.
The shift from one phase to a subsequent phase is tantamount to a 
shift onto a new layer. The new system includes this additional layer. It 
encapsulates what previously were autonomous systems as subsystems 
and shapes them to reflect the dominance relation. However, the newly 
formed system will always depend on the functioning of its subsystems. 
When they cease to support the system, it will break down. 
In that way, evolutionary systems theory resembles dialectical think-
ing as to “sublation” (“Aufhebung”) in Hegel’s sense. The first connotation 
of sublation which is to break, to cancel, to nullify, that is, to discontinue, 
is reflected in the stage model by the point that marks the end of a certain 
stage of evolution. The second connotation which is to keep, to save, to 
preserve, to store, that is, to continue, comes to the fore when the scheme 
concedes that each new layer is built upon a preceding one and that the 
new stage comprises not only the new layer but parts of the old one. The 
third connotation which is to raise, to lift, that is, to leap in quality, is de-
picted by the notion of the higher level that exerts downward causation 
onto the lower ones. 
3
Evolutionary systems theory, thus based upon dialectical philoso-
phy, sketches the framework of social self-organisation in a critical theo-
ry of social systems which might serve as the core of the required science 
of the information society. Given that contemporary society undergoes a 
critical phase of evolution – marked by global challenges – which might 
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end up in devolution, this phase can be conceived of in terms of com-
plexity: there is a bifurcation between a breakthrough towards a stable 
path of societal development that is based upon a novel principle of or-
ganisation of society, on the one hand, and a breakdown of the system at 
all, on the other. Furthermore, since information, in terms of complexity 
as well, is defined as that which is functional for the orderliness of the 
system in question, ICTs in contemporary society gain a new meaning: 
it is not the acceleration of cognitive, communicative and co-operative 
processes in society by ICTs  per se but their inherent potential to facili-
tate the generation of innovative information that might enable society 
to trigger its re-organisation onto the sustainable path provided by the 
Great Bifurcation.
Being critical can be ascribed to this theoretical framework in that 
it is normative and doing justice to the factual at the same time. For it 
includes not only an account of the potential that is given with the ac-
tual but also an evaluation of the potential which sorts out the desired. 
Thus this theory embraces an ascendence from the potential given now 
to the actual to be established in the future as well as an ascendence from 
the less good now to the better then which altogether yields the Not-
Yet in critical theorist Ernst Bloch’s sense. These processes aimed at the 
Not-Yet are at the core of the dynamic of social self-organisation. That 
systems theory inheres values does not come as a surprise when looking 
back to the forerunner of evolutionary systems thinking, the General 
System Theory of Ludwig von Bertalanffy who took a normative stance 
 – system theory, in his opinion, had to be based upon humanism (see 
Hofkirchner 2005).
It is only this last way of thinking that can cope with complexity. 
It is only this last way of thinking that provides the basis for success-
ful changing the world. It is only this last way of thinking that contests 
the fallacies of blind intelligence and fosters responsibility for the fate of 
humanity. With the words of Edgar Morin: “We need a kind of think-
ing that relinks that which is disjointed and compartmentalized, that 
respects diversity as it recognizes unity, and that tries to discern interde-
pendencies” (1999a, 130). 
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